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This thesis examines metaphysics in order to re-present Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being and deconstruct the notion of mental illness.  A holistic 
understanding of Being is crucial to Māori and indigenous worldviews and takes 
priority as a focus for this thesis. Holistic notions of Being allow indigenous peoples 
to reimagine potentiality in general and the possibility of a renewed experience of 
being-in-the-world more specifically. Through an exploration of Māori and 
indigenous (complex) holism, I seek to re-turn to the influence of things in the world 
that exist outside of the self-contained individual - that is, beyond the cognitive 
rational agent.  Doing so shifts the concept of well-being to reside not simply within 
the person (or the individual’s reactions), but within the entire world in which we 
live.   
 
It is posited that a dominant Western metaphysics poses a fundamental risk to Māori 
and indigenous expressions of Being.  This deeper layer of influence – the 
metaphysics of presence - is examined to expose its structure – one that insists that 
things in the world will be represented as fully discernible objects.  The implications 
that a dominant Western metaphysics has for the notion of mental illness are 
explored within the context of the metaphysics of presence that sets up things in the 
world as Beings whose essential meaning is identified only through qualities that 
can be seen, measured, described and defined.  Within this view of the world, the 
notion of mental illness is solidified, reflected in a focus on the most discernible 
aspects of Being – the observable and physical parts of a person that can be 
examined through science.  To counter this, the more mysterious and unthinkable 
aspects of Being reflected in Māori and indigenous metaphysics are highlighted as 
a way of re-turning to holism, to the extent that they resist the expectation that things 
in the world will be reduced to fit the dominant (metaphysical) framework.   
 
I engage the relational holistic research approach of whaiwhakaaro (a non-method 
implicating the more-than-human entities that push thinking and characterised by a 
free-flowing style of reflection), to draw out the possibilities that exist for re-
presenting Māori and indigenous metaphysics and the notion of mental illness.  
Eleven interviews were conducted with participants from varying professional and 
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community-based backgrounds.  While the participants represent different views 
on metaphysics and mental illness, each has a passion for exploring the philosophies 
that shape the experience of being-in-the-world and how we understand ourselves 
in relation to all other things.  Their responses provide important signals for how 
human nature, more-than-human nature, and (mental) well-being are re-
conceptualised.   
 
The main ideas that emerged through the interviews and the process of reflecting 
on participant responses (whaiwhakaaro) provoked thinking about the possibilities 
of holism in reconsidering the notion of mental illness.  Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being were used to re-turn to ideas of well-being as a collective 
experience. I posit that, if there is illness, then it resides in the world rather than 
being centred solely on the individual who experiences the world.  If there is a way 
to talk about illness and well-being, then it need not be restricted to assigned 
concepts or pre-determined categories that explain behaviour.  Through a re-turn to 
complex holism – to Māori and indigenous metaphysical premises – I suggest we 
can engage with people’s experiences on different terms.  These are the terms that 
carry excessive meaning, that allow for mystery – to break from conventions and 
categories. These terms support a different view of individualism where the person 
is free to express their experience of thorough interconnection – of whakapapa.  In 
its broadest sense, the re-turn to holism is an understanding of the self as part of a 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Metaphysics, Being, and the notion of mental illness  
This thesis seeks to explore how Māori and indigenous understandings of Being 
can be re-presented in order to deconstruct the notion of mental illness, exposing its 
role as a ‘disciple’ of a dominant metaphysics.  The term ‘re-present’, constructed 
here to give the prefix ‘re’ its own space and emphasis, carries the intention of 
signalling a re-turn to something. The original meaning of the term ‘represent’ in 
fact signals an act of repetition, to re-turn again and again.  It is within this context 
that I aim to re-present Māori and indigenous worldviews as a re-turn to a non-
dominant metaphysical ground.  From this, the metaphysical premises that support 
both dominant Western and Māori and indigenous worldviews will be explored to 
expose the premises that support the notion of mental illness.    
 
Engaging in re-presentation, repetition and re-turn is done in two ways: firstly, there 
is a significant repetition of focus on what I posit is a fundamental issue impacting 
on Māori and indigenous Being or metaphysics.  This fundamental issue, discussed 
at length later in this chapter, is referred to throughout the thesis as a ‘dominant 
Western metaphysics’ or ‘the metaphysics of presence’.  My writing reiterates what 
I argue is an insidious influence that has significantly re-structured Māori and 
indigenous understandings. My position here is that the problem needs repeating 
throughout the thesis to steadily unwind the normality that has wrapped itself 
around the issue by countless repetitions over time.  This influence is something 
that sits beneath the immediate surface of our expressions, demanding that what is 
presented adheres to a certain structure of representation.  The structure that I am 
referring to has been characterised by its insistence on clear representation, of solid 
descriptions that provide a particular type of certainty that ‘brings things into the 
light’.  I assert that these solid representations expect the essential nature of a thing 
to be made visible, to be explainable, and to be things that we can ‘think’ or things 
that have been made intelligible. It is this expectation that, I argue, impacts on 
Māori and indigenous expressions and the intangible aspects of Being.  Secondly, 
the act of re-turn is reflected in an attempt to present Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics (or understandings of Being), in ways that allow for and acknowledge 
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the unknowable and intangible but that also acknowledges the constant presence of 
things in the world as whanaunga.    
 
If I were to use a more conventional linguistic structure to discuss the re-
presentation of Māori and indigenous metaphysics (if I were, that is, to use the term 
‘represent’), I would be signalling something altogether different.  The term 
representation signals a claim to speak on behalf of something - to hold a certain 
position in the naming of things.  To represent through naming is to denote a full, 
singular nature of any one thing in the world, giving an account of its limits, its 
essential nature and shape, its qualities and boundaries.  Naming as representation 
carries an authority: a strong and overpowering presence that observes the world, 
going about the business of discovery and identification.  Each thing that is named 
is subjected to a separation or a definition that casts a hard line of division between 
this thing and that. In this context, representation is an act of assumed agency and 
of silencing other voices.  It is, as I will argue, a type of ‘ordering on behalf of 
things’: a concept that Māori and indigenous peoples know well.  The act of 
‘speaking on behalf of’ is one that is recognised by Māori and indigenous peoples 
in the stories that are told about Māori and indigenous realities. It is also an act of 
authority that has formed a significant part of the experience of those that have been 
labelled as experiencing ‘mental illness’.  
 
 Mika and Stewart (2016) describe this sense of authority in reference to Foucault’s 
‘Gaze’: an authoritative systemic surveillance of the subject that seeks to normalise 
and bring order.  Bringing the idea of the Gaze into a Māori philosophical 
framework, Mika and Stewart explain how the system of normalisation, ordering 
and surveillance, characterised by its powerful imposition of order and naming, 
takes on, from a Māori perspective, an entitized quality. This observant entity 
imposes a metaphysical expectation that the Māori and indigenous self will be 
presented in line with what has been deemed “normal for native or Māori 
tendencies” (p. 302).  Further, these normal traits must be available as visible or 
‘thinkable’ qualities that can be observed and conceptualised in order to assign, 
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describe, limit and shape identities, constructing things in the world as objects that 
can be ‘known’.  
 
The question of what is correct, or ‘what is the essential nature of a thing’ is one 
that is central to the idea of the Gaze as a mechanism for ordering.   The ordered 
representation that is imposed by the Gaze, with its insistence on the identification 
of essential traits that are used to construct an understanding of what is normal for 
a group, requires that things are represented as certain things.  It is also the 
expectation that these representations will follow an order of pre-determined 
notions: of actions, thoughts, beliefs, values and cultural expressions.  However, 
the re-presentation that I aim to convey in this thesis departs from these principles 
of expectation, aligning instead with what Deloria and Wildcat (2001) call, “an 
active reconstruction of indigenous metaphysical systems” (p. 10), that I interpret 
as having a sense of the world as a far more complex entity.   
 
A re-presentation of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being is captured in 
the term ‘(k)new knowledge’ that Ahenakew, de Oliveira Andreotti, Cooper and 
Hireme (2014) use to invoke a view of knowledge as a creative, holistic experience 
that is something other than the individual subject’s rational and intellectual uptake 
and discovery of things in the world.1  (K)new knowledge is regarded as a 
thoroughly holistic relational positioning that opposes the view of the self and the 
world as separate Beings in which the concept of relationship is represented as the 
human subject observing the world as a detached object of study.  As Ahenakew et 
al., state, “knowing itself literally comes from the ground, above, and beyond, from 
the wisdoms of continuous metaphysical engagements and familiarity with “all our 
relations” (p.222).  They reflect on this view of knowledge as a type of re-
positioning of the indigenous self - shifting our view of Being to reside within the 
world rather than as a rational subject that surveys a world as a separate entity.  
Further, this re-positioning of Being is described as a type of (alternate) 
 
1 The term (k)new knowledge will be repeated throughout the thesis to capture this sense of reaching 
into holistic creative spaces where Being within the world accounts for how we know.  It also reflects 
the temporal collapse that characterises Maori and indigenous understandings of time where all our 
relations - past, present and future - are a continuous influential presence in our lived experience.   
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metaphysical inheritance or “what our ancestors have known and tried to pass 
down, but we are yet to fully appreciate (as)…(k)new knowledge.” (p. 222).   
 
Re-presenting Māori and indigenous understandings of Being is an act of re-turn 
that acknowledges both autonomy and relationship.  This might seem like a 
paradox, but it is, within Māori and indigenous relational Being, also a comfortable 
complexity that reflects an understanding of the world as a thoroughly 
interconnected whole and as an entity that retains something of itself, denying the 
‘business of discovery’ a full and essential view.  Within Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics, things in the world are more than objects to be discovered or contained 
within tidy and efficient conceptual frames.  In this thesis, things in the world are 
discussed as entities that stand on their own accord, presenting themselves in their 
own way (sometimes for our regard and sometimes not).  It is, in this sense, the 
recognition of what Mika (2017a) calls ‘worlding’: an understanding of Being that 
is thoroughly holistic, suggesting that any one thing is constituted by all other things 
in the world.   
 
A ‘worlded’ view of Being invites a consideration of how this holistic constitution 
of the self implicates the influence of things in the world that ‘dance in our 
thoughts’, going beyond simple considerations of human agency and self-contained 
rational thinking.  But it is also a consideration of how things resist full 
representation, retaining (as entities with agency), a mystery of Being – the 
unthinkable aspect of a thoroughly complex world, discussed in this thesis as an 
‘excess of meaning’.2  It is a far more complex view that implicates all things in a 
more than human spiritual ecology (McIntosh, 2008) or what might be referred to 




      2 The ‘excess of meaning’ is discussed in chapter six in reference to Jacques Derrida’s (1978) essay 
Cogito and the History of Madness in which Derrida asserts that madness itself is the excess of 
meaning that cannot fit within the structure of order.  Excessive meaning (or mystery), is what 
Derrida believes is the disorder that dominant Western philosophy seeks to suppress through a 
metaphysics that proposes a rational uptake of the world in which things can be known by their 
(assigned) measurable, quantifiable and discernible qualities.  Derrida would also refer to this 
metaphysics as logocentrism. 
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Holistic Being, holistic health 
While Māori and indigenous metaphysics might appeal to a holism constituted by 
an irreducible interconnection between all things in the world, there are other 
existing representations of holism that appear to follow more conventional 
(metaphysical) understandings.   These representations of holism are important to 
considering the idea that the notion of mental illness, and the dominant 
conceptualisation of mental illness, are constructed by a particular metaphysics.  
The form of metaphysics I am referring to has been described by Mika (2015a) as 
“a ground of ontological assumption that underpins all thinking and conceptions in 
the West and that prefers the presence of an object …[that]…would be thought of 
as this or that, in advance” (p. 4).  Further, this preference for presence equates to 
the pre-determination of a thing through the setting of concepts that would then 
represent a things essential nature.   
 
An example of pre-determination can be found in health policy where holism is 
often framed in terms of tangible phenomena, represented in a ‘whole person’ 
approach that includes a consideration of what has been referred to as the 
‘determinants of health’ encompassing the various aspects of a person’s life (such 
as mental health and addiction needs, physical health, housing, employment, and 
social supports).  In addition, a holistic approach has been described as the co-
ordination of services across sectors (including, for example, health, education, and 
justice sectors), aligning services with the diverse needs of the person (e.g., 
Ministry of Health, 2002).  Holism has also been discussed as the tangible and 
evident aspects of health and well-being within the field of Precision Driven Health: 
an approach that aims to identify and predict how the different aspects of a person’s 
life might interact to cause illness.  Vogt, Hofmann and Getz (2016) call this the 
‘new holism’, describing it as “holistic medicalization” (p. 314), in which a person’s 
whole life process is defined and translated into biomedical risks and 
technoscientific solutions aimed at disease prevention and ensuring optimal health 
and well-being.  The result is an all-encompassing quantification of the individual’s 
life process that is, “directed at all levels of functioning, from the molecular to the 
social, continual throughout life and aimed at managing the whole continuum from 
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cure of disease to optimization of health” or “the medicalization of health and life 
itself’” (p. 314).    
 
The idea of determining health and well-being in terms of precision is highly 
problematic when considered from the viewpoint of Māori and indigenous holism. 
This is not because the variables being measured are completely insignificant but 
rather that these variables, when positioned as the central indicators of well-being, 
are provided with a privileged (type of) validity that overshadows other possible 
ways of understanding well-being.  For Māori and indigenous peoples, this has 
implications for other possible experiences of holism that are constituted by the 
(collapsed) co-existence of both tangible and intangible things.  
 
Conceptualising holism as an all-encompassing quantification of the individual also 
implicates the idea of the ‘Gaze’ discussed earlier in relation to Mika and Stewart’s 
(2016) description of a surveillant expectation that things will appear in an ordered 
manner.  This ordering of things happens to such an extent that even holism 
becomes a list of visible and measurable variables: the visible aspects of a person’s 
physical and social existence.  In terms of the notion of mental illness, the Gaze has 
been described as a mechanism for ordering individual experience to support the 
development of objective explanations of behaviour.  Foucault’s (1989) term 
‘medical Gaze’, for example, explains how the notion of mental illness could be 
explained as something constructed upon a ground of thinking that favours the solid 
presence of things that can be seen and interpreted as explainable, fixed and ordered 
objects within clinical categories.  As Foucault (1988) explains, the “body was 
regarded as the visible and solid presence of [the patient’s] disease” (p.159), a 
physical, tangible site of illness that can be examined and medically separated from 
the entirety of the person’s identity and Being.    
 
These examples of how holism is framed within health institutions provide some 
insight into the issue that I aim to address in this research.  Talking about holism as 
a tangible phenomenon is, I suggest, a symptom of what was earlier referred to as 
a ‘metaphysical inheritance’.  This inheritance, while not immediately referenced 
within health systems as a ground of thought that contributes to constructions of 
solid representations of holism, continues to exert a pervasive influence.  This 
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influence is one that I posit takes the form of an expectation reflected in the 
development of quantifiable, highly present frames in which to represent things.  I 
propose that dominant Western metaphysics (the metaphysics of presence), has 
continued to influence how things in the world are constructed as objects that are 
known by their discernible qualities.   
 
In relation to the notion of mental illness, the expectation of solid representation – 
the construction of people’s experiences and Being as measurable qualities and 
properties of disease or wellness – has been criticised for its tendency to reduce 
complex lived realities into (for example) medical classifications (e.g., Gordon, 
1998).  Critiques of reductionism (and essentialism) in relation to the notion of 
mental illness are discussed at length in chapter six.  Here, however, I simply aim 
to introduce the general problem of the construction of human experience and 
behaviour as objective pre-determined variables whose meaning is contained (and 
constrained) within conceptual frames that can include only what is intelligible, 
measurable and present in terms of what is (rationally) conceivable.   
 
Framing culture 
Already in this chapter I have alluded to the nature of Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics and the understanding of Being as a complex holism that is constituted 
by an irreducible interconnection between all things in the world.  Within this 
metaphysics, things in the world would resist full containment within conceptual 
frames, retaining a certain mystery that is reflected in an excessive ‘overplus’ (Otto, 
1958), of meaning.  The notion of mental illness, and its representation as objective, 
discernible and quantifiable behavioural variables, would appear to sit at odds with 
a more complex metaphysics in which meaning is excessive – unable to be reduced 
to fit within a limited structure.  Despite this, it has been noted that Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics, when included within the disciplined fields of practice that 
deal with what is labelled as mental illness, are often restricted by the expectation 
that Māori and indigenous worldviews will be presented as fixed concepts with 





Taitimu (2007), in discussing the various types of modern Western psychiatry that 
attempt to engage with indigenous worldviews, points out that many cross-cultural 
disciplines within psychiatry work to identify how indigenous perspectives can be 
understood in generalised clinical terms.  For example, early attempts to extend the 
epistemic and cultural bases of clinical perspectives are captured in terms such as 
‘culture bound syndrome’ which has been used in cross-cultural psychiatry since 
the 1950s (e.g., Yap, 1965).  The term ‘culture bound syndrome’ was officially 
included in the DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
Fourth Edition, American Psychiatric Association, 1994), along with other more 
general considerations of the interplay of culture and diagnosis.  Mezzich, Lewis- 
Fernandez and Ruiperez (2008) outline the 3 main types of cultural considerations 
incorporated into the DSM-IV including:  
 
(a) in the clinical presentation of disorders, a discussion of cultural variants of each 
disorder, called symptoms dependent on culture and gender;  
 
(b) guidelines for a “cultural formulation” of the clinical presentation to help 
clinicians perform a culturally sensitive diagnosis; and  
 
(c) a description of “culture-bound” syndromes, including the name of the disorder, 
the cultures in which it has been diagnosed, and a brief description of the 
psychopathology associated with each clinical presentation. (p. 648). 
 
Cultural variants of disorder, cultural formulations of clinical presentations to aid 
the clinician in their work, and translating cultural meaning into psychopathology 
are all examples of what Yen and Wilbraham (2003) describe as a professional 
discourse that turns indigenous knowledges in mental health into accounts of illness 
and madness that can be policed by the medical gaze in its search for similarities.   
Psychiatric discourse is also recognised by Levett, Kottler, Burman, and Parker 
(1997) as a product of power relations that produce and/or position people and ideas 
as types of subjects who are affected through specific epistemes and ways of talking 
about the world. Within the context of cultural competency, Carey (2015) explains 
that considerations of culture have often resulted in essentialised identities and ideas 
that are strictly catalogued and distinguished from (and measured by), a superior 
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prior category.  Further, Carey contends that fixed, essentialised conceptualisations 
of culture are necessary to the idea of cultural competency in order for cultures to 
makes sense.  Within this context, the tidy packaging of Māori and indigenous 
worldviews into essentialised ideas is, therefore, what would make Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being intelligible to the medical profession.   
 
Ethics and cultural suppression 
The tendency to define Māori and indigenous worldviews and understandings of 
Being as versions of dominant Western concepts that manifest in the representation 
of culture as visible qualities and concepts constitutes what I suggest is a type of 
spiritual or cultural suppression. The suppression of Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics (as the suppression of holistic spiritual or cultural worldviews), has 
been described by Walters (2012) as “a disruption in our ability to fulfil our original 
instructions” (p. 7).  Original instructions have been discussed as “ethical systems 
that govern relations with the human and the more-than-human world” (Wall 
Kimmerer, 2018, p. 31), guided by wisdom that was given within what Goldtooth 
(2017) refers to as ‘the time of Creation’ (p.462). Similarly, Mikaere (2012) 
discusses tikanga Māori in this context in reference to whakapapa that she describes 
as “the core of the philosophical framework underpinning tikanga” (p.25), which 
brings forward a reciprocal obligation between all things.   
 
The ethical reciprocity reflected in discussions of original instructions (elaborated 
on in chapter four), provides a view of holistic Being that foregrounds ethics as a 
recognition of  “the eternal convergence of the world within any one thing, and (the) 
ethical outcome…that the individual person should implicate a sense of mystery 
within any one object” (Mika, 2017, p. 1).  This view of ethics relates to a point 
made by Justice (2017) who explains that knowledge can be understood as a partial 
understanding of things in the world rather than seeing knowledge as having the 
ability to represent things through (the idea of) complete and full conceptualisation.  
However, the expression of holism, as a thorough co-constructive interrelationship, 
carries an intangibility that, within the disciplined fields of practice that deal with 
what is labelled as mental illness, is difficult to retain. In line with this, Ahenakew 
et al. (2014) point out that Māori and indigenous understandings of Being are 
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impacted on by dominant Western thinking which reduces “possibilities of 
articulation” (p.217).  These reduced possibilities have the effect of forcing the 
Māori and indigenous experience of original instructions into conceptual 
frameworks that represent Māori and indigenous ontologies as formal instructions 
when taken up within institutions (including for example the institution that is 
Mental Health and Addictions).   
 
The way that culture has been represented in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) is one example of how meaning is constrained within 
disciplines and institutions seeking (paradoxically) to develop approaches within 
mental health that support diverse cultural worldviews.  However, the extent to 
which institutional cultural frameworks suppress the deeper metaphysical fluidity 
of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being remains as a barrier to achieving 
respectful and ethical partnerships within these institutions.  Ethics, as it relates to 
the notion of mental illness (and the experiences of those who have carried the label 
of mental illness), has of course been discussed in the context of reductive 
psychiatric classifications that emphasise symptoms in order to diagnose 
‘disorders’, discarding the person’s lived social, historical and cultural context 
(Carr and Taggart, 2017).  However, ethics as it relates to Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being highlights the expectation that Māori and indigenous 
expressions will be reduced to fit the boundaries of conceptual classification in 
order to be taken up as ‘knowable’ phenomena.  Ethics as a cultural metaphysical 
concern within mental health (and in relation to the notion of mental illness), 
therefore highlights the imposition of meaning that orders and disciplines 
complexity, representing the experience of being-in-the-world in more rigid terms, 
achieving a type of conceptual efficiency that forces us to “pass over whole realms” 
of meaning (Heidegger, 1967, p.8).3  
 
The tendency to reduce Māori and indigenous metaphysics to fit frameworks of 
conceptual simplicity enables dominant Western disciplines and institutions to 
make sense of Māori and indigenous complexities.  However, it is also this 
 
    3 Heidegger’s statement, of ‘passing over realms of meaning’, is discussed at length in chapter five 
in relation to metaphysics and the notion of things that are made absent because of the conceptual 
frames that will only deal with things that can fit within certain forms of representation.   
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reductionist tendency that threatens the ethical relational nature of Being reflected 
in the complexities of Māori and indigenous metaphysics where all things in the 
world have agency.  It is important to consider, for example, how cultural 
representations within institutions work to suppress the ability for the indigenous 
self to engage with the world while retaining a sense of mystery that is part of 
respectful relational Being.  Within this context, I would ask what relational and 
metaphysical ground sits beneath Māori and indigenous expressions of spiritual and 
complex holism when these are taken up within dominant institutions.  If the 
frameworks for presenting diversity and difference are ones that rely on highly 
evident descriptions equating to types of static, unchanging definitions, then what 
happens to Maori and indigenous expressions when they are deposited within these 
frameworks? 
 
Metaphysical disharmony in the mental health sector 
Māori and indigenous responses within mental health have made a valuable 
contribution in terms of developing perspectives that highlight systemic 
contributors to negative health trends.  Māori and indigenous knowledges have also 
positively influenced models of care within health systems, enhancing service 
provision and shifting ideas about how to work with tāngata whaiora (mental health 
service users) (e.g., Taitimu, 2007; Boulton, 2005).  However, despite making 
major gains in influencing mental health policy and practice, concerns remain about 
the degree to which Māori and indigenous worldviews affect change within the 
mental health sector (e.g., Lawson-Te Aho, 2013; Yen and Wilbraham, 2003).   
 
Durie (2018) notes that important changes have taken place in the health system 
including gains that have been made in mental health policies and practice in 
Aotearoa since the mid-1980s.  The underlying philosophy of mental health 
approaches was shifting at this time, marked by the beginnings of the 
deinstitutionalisation movement and the growing recognition of the need to ensure 
Māori participation (as part of a wider Treaty of Waitangi response), within societal 
institutions including the health and social sectors.  Part of the concern driving 
changes also included recognising that Māori experiences in health care services 
were less than positive and services were often incongruent with Māori cultural 
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beliefs and values.  In addition, according to Durie, Māori hospital admission rates 
had increased, exceeding non-Māori admissions rates from 1976. While it is noted 
that the reasons for the increase are complex (including for example changes in help 
seeking behaviour, changes in ethnicity data recording, and urbanisation’s impact 
on the ability to access support from extended family), concern about the change in 
admission rates was sufficient to motivate Māori communities to seek opportunities 
for enhancing Māori participation and influence in the health sector.  In terms of 
mental health, Māori aspirations were complemented in the early 80s by a 
recommendation to the Minister of Health that Psychiatric treatment broaden to 
provide for Māori “cultural values and spiritual beliefs” (The Committee of Inquiry 
into Procedures at Oakley Hospital and Related Matters, 1983. p.116).   
 
Following on from the developments that emerged in the 1980s, Māori approaches 
within health have grown to include Māori service provision in both government 
organisations and in community based (Non-Government Organisation) services.   
Amohia Boulton’s (2005) doctoral research highlighted the growth of Māori mental 
health providers as part of the response to recognising Māori needs within the health 
sector.  As Boulton outlines, the move to increase the number of Māori mental 
health providers saw the growth of Kaupapa Māori based services that offered 
tāngata whaiora holistic, culturally relevant modes of treatment and support.  
Despite this, Boulton noted that Māori providers’ experience of participation as 
partners with Government organisations has been marred by unequal power 
relationships that compel providers to ‘play a part’ within a dominant system that 
would favour highly structured practices developed within frameworks of 
efficiency.  These frameworks restricted the potential for providers to implement 
and practice desired cultural approaches to supporting tāngata whaiora and raised 
concerns about Government service specifications that placed significantly more 
importance on clinical aspects of care.  Further, this favouring of clinical 
approaches came at the expense of cultural considerations that participants in 
Boulton’s research identified as including intangible, spiritual aspects of Being 
reflecting a holistic view of a person and their whānau.  
 
More recently, criticisms of the government-led review of Mental Health and 
Addictions services (Government Inquiry into Mental Health Addiction - Oranga 
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Tāngata, Oranga Whānau), have surfaced following the release of an official report 
designed to inform on concerns voiced by Māori during the review process.  Allen 
(2019) reports that Dr Lyn Russell, a researcher working as part of the inquiry, 
stated that Māori submissions were sanitised, resulting in “missing voices” (para. 
6), and the deletion of crucial insights that could support (systemic and cultural) 
change for Māori and the mental health sector.  Māori who responded during the 
review process note that there appears to be a number of points that have been 
deleted from an original report that has now been modified and officially released 
as the final record of what Māori respondents said.  One deletion in particular 
appears to reflect the issue of cultural suppression raised earlier.  As Allen reports, 
 
An anecdote about the Panel being presented with 
pounamu remained, but the gifter's accompanying quote 
was deleted, which included: "These gifts are here to 
remind you that it's not just the face value of something  
- we want the panel to be mindful of the deeper meaning 
of what people have said”. Instead, a separate quote was 
added, which read: “Thank you for the privilege of 
speaking, sharing and making a stand for change” (para. 
21).   
 
The issue of sanitising Māori responses and silencing voices is poignantly reflected 
in the changing of the words that were offered by the person described as gifting 
pounamu but who is, I suggest, also gifting a deeper sentiment about looking 
beneath the surface of what is able to be articulated through verbal and written 
responses.  For example, Māori submissions also included a strong call for an 
increase in funding to grow Kaupapa Māori mental health services which could be 
framed as a fiscal request, but (I believe) could also be interpreted as a concern 
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related to the development of cultural space in which Māori worldviews can be 
privileged.4 
 
Clearly, there are tensions that continue to exist that have persisted beyond the early 
recognition of the need for culturally congruent health services for Māori.  Marsden 
(2003), in reflecting on the extent to which dominant society has changed as a result 
of Māori efforts to bring issues such as institutional racism and reform to light, 
comments that an awareness of unequal status has merely resulted in a “shift in 
philosophical posture towards the tangata whenua” (p.99), preventing any real and 
fundamental change from taking place.  In terms of Boulton’s (2005) research and 
the desire to have (systemic) support for Māori providers to use approaches that 
include a focus on intangible, holistic views of health, I would suggest that a slight 
shift in philosophical posture will do little to support fundamental changes that 
enable spiritual and holistic approaches to flourish.   
 
In a report completed by Milne (2005), Māori who advocated for a more 
independent stance, opposing the integration of Māori knowledges into mainstream 
services, expressed concern that there is a deep and fundamental dissimilarity 
between Māori and Pākehā ‘thinking’.  In fact, one of the key themes that emerged 
from the report was entitled, “Māori think differently from Pākehā” (p. 12).  Among 
those that expressed concerns about this fundamental difference was a kaumatua 
who described his own experience in seeking help from a mainstream service.  The 
kaumatua wondered how, without the right understanding of his state of unwellness 
and its relationship to fundamental parts of his Being (including a mauri that was 
“jarred and shaken”), a mainstream service would know what to do.  In his own 
words, he wondered how this mainstream approach would, “help to reinstate my 
mana and my mauri” (p.13).   
 
The report also included responses that signalled there is a willingness to integrate 
Māori knowledge into mainstream systems to form complementary epistemic bases 
for the treatment of what is broadly labelled as a mental disorder.  However, 
considering how a person’s mana and mauri can be reinstated sets forth an inquiry 
 
       4 See earlier discussion of the privileging of clinical approaches in the development of mental health 
service specifications (Boulton, 2005). 
15 
 
that is prior to questions about how to approach and realise an integrative 
partnership inclusive of bicultural epistemes.  It raises the issue of whether there is 
a fundamental difference between Māori and Pākehā thinking that must be explored 
before we step further into integrating Māori knowledge within non-Māori 
institutions and if so, what the nature of that difference is?   
 
The desire to integrate and to work within a bicultural practice framework implies 
at least some common ground, both epistemological and ontological, on which 
Māori and mainstream understandings of Being can stand to share cultural versions 
of mental illness.  But how would mana and mauri (for example), be understood 
within a Western ontological and epistemological frame and what types of 
epistemologies and ontologies are required to even begin to contemplate a person’s 
mana and mauri? The question foregrounds yet another inquiry that is prior to 
considerations of epistemology and ontology and in this context, also constitutes 
and constructs the epistemic and ontological.  Within this thesis, this most 
fundamental inquiry relates to metaphysics, described by Deloria (2001) as, “the 
set of first principles we must possess in order to make sense of the world in which 
we live” (p.2).    
 
Ahenakew et al. (2014) describe the ‘first set of principles’ as the relationship 
between Being and knowing and in terms of Western metaphysics, (the set of first 
principles that makes sense of the world from a Western perspective), these 
principles represent a hidden system that structures what can and cannot be said or 
what is real and unreal.   They propose that Western metaphysical principles assume 
a relationship between Being and knowing that is grounded in cognitive processes 
of rational thinking, Cartesian subjectivities or “Being defined solely as thinking” 
(p.217).    In terms of indigenous inclusions into institutions such as mental health, 
defining Being as thinking has significant implications for which knowledges are 
considered legitimate and also for how knowledge production is understood.   
 
One of the implications of defining the constitution of knowledge production (and 
therefore what counts as legitimate knowledge), in terms of Cartesian subjectivities 
relates to the possibilities of articulation that were discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the limits of which, I argue, are set by a specific metaphysics.  In order to understand 
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how a dominant Western metaphysics might influence Māori and indigenous 
expressions and understandings of Being, it is important to understand the nature 
of metaphysics as a foundational philosophy that shapes worldviews.  The ‘first set 
of principles’ that I am concerned with in this research, and one that I contend 
heavily influences, restricts and suppresses Māori and indigenous metaphysics, is 
what will be discussed in the following section as an ‘essentialist’ metaphysics or 
what was referred to earlier as ‘the metaphysics of presence’.   
 
Metaphysics - The first set of principles  
The concept of metaphysics is not easily defined and there is no obvious consensus 
about its exact meaning within philosophy.  Ancient and medieval philosophers 
may have spoken of metaphysics in ways that are similar to Deloria’s (2001) 
description of the ‘first principles’ that help us make sense of the world: “the first 
causes of things” or “things that do not change” that relate to Being (Van Inwagen, 
and Sullivan, 2018, para.1) and the nature of reality (e.g., Fine, 1994).  Tahko 
(2013), referring to Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics, describes it as “the first 
philosophy” (p.49), highlighting its inherent relationship with the notion of the 
fundamental.  As Tahko explains, 
 
The first philosophy is an account of what is, or what it 
means to be, fundamental. Things that are the most 
fundamental are not grounded in anything more 
fundamental, they are ontologically independent. This 
does not necessarily mean that first philosophy attempts 
to list the most fundamental things, although this could 
be a part of the discipline. Rather, the study of 
fundamentality focuses on giving an account of what it 
is for something to be fundamental. So, first philosophy 
studies a certain type of being – the fundamental type, 
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and it may also involve an account of which (kinds of) 
things are, or could be, fundamental (p.49). 
 
Cook (2013) summarises some of the major contentious issues that have motivated 
vigorous debate among Western philosophers who have sought to position their 
metaphysics as the correct “accurate and coherent account of reality as it is, and as 
we experience it” (p. 9).   These issues include familiar subjects of debate such as 
the mind/body dualism, fixed versus fluid views of reality, and the nature of space 
and time.  However (perhaps at the fundamental base of these issues), Cook asserts 
that essentialism is the doctrine within metaphysics that impacts most profoundly 
on theories of reality.  Using the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as a compass for 
dominant Western philosophy and an essentialist metaphysics, Cook explains that, 
while there are necessary differences between Platonic and Aristotelian 
philosophies, common to both is the idea that a thing’s nature is determined by its 
essence.   Essence – the essential nature of things – is the primary substance and 
intelligible identity of things in the world such that they are able to be marked by 
definition (Perl, 2014).  Essentialism and essence bring forward a view of the world 
where things have intrinsic properties (Austin, 2017) or “fixed, universal, 
immutable sameness” (Cook, 2013 p.13).   
 
Richard Rorty (1979) contends that essentialist metaphysics is inseparable from 
epistemology; the search for knowledge – where and how knowledge might be 
found.  Rorty attributes epistemology’s place in essentialism to the positivist 
tradition and the belief that man’s essence is in fact to discover essences, 
 
The notion that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in 
our own Glassy Essence, the universe around us is the 
complement of the notion, common to Democritus and 
Descartes, that the universe is made up of very simple, 
clearly and distinctly knowable things, knowledge of 
whose essences provides the master-vocabulary which 




Arola (2007) also relates the idea of having knowledge of the essence of things to 
the creation of concepts.  Arola (2007) describes concepts as a central element in 
making the world into an intelligible entity: bringing things under concepts as 
sense-making universals that represent a things essential nature.  Conceptualising 
the world as an intelligible entity highlights the relationship between metaphysics 
and epistemology that Rorty (1979) describes: the question of where and how 
knowledge can be found.  The assertion that things in the world are knowable is 
based, therefore, on a set of fundamental premises or a ground of thought that posits 
the world as being an entity that is separate from the self and ‘present’ for study and 
identification.   
 
Another way of describing the idea of essence is found in the term logocentrism, 
which was first introduced by philosopher Ludwig Klages and later taken up by 
Jacques Derrida (Backman, 2012).  Klages (2017) provides a definition of the 
Greek term logos as “an ordered rational method of thought that explains the nature 
or origin of a phenomenon…the concept of rational thought, as opposed to desire, 
which is irrational…the idea of the word as representative of the mind's rational 
processes” (p. 245). 
 
Similarly, Derrida’s (1998) early critique of logocentrism emerges through a 
critique of the privileging of speech over writing that Derrida attributed to the Early 
Greeks and Classical philosophy.  For Derrida, in the metaphysical tradition since 
Aristotle, speech has been positioned as comprising of primary signifiers; the 
spoken word signifying an object’s meaning.  Writing, on the other hand, is simply 
a representation of primary signifiers, removed from the origin of meaning 
presented through speech.  Derrida’s (1998) concern and dissatisfaction with the 
privileging of speech over writing is such that he uses the term “repression” (p.28), 
to illustrate the impact of this hierarchical dualism.  The act of repression for 
Derrida is intimately linked to the idea of logocentrism and its association with 
logos as something that explains the nature of a phenomenon.  The presence of 
speech, intimately connected to the internal workings of the mind, ensures that 
logos (meaning, reason) is readily at hand in the presence of the speaker.  Writing, 
open to unchecked interpretation, on the other hand, threatens that assurance 
(Lüdemann, 2014).  For Derrida, it is the idea of logos, represented through the 
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primacy of voice and speech, that is the offending character; it promotes a belief in 
an unchanging central meaning of a thing that flows from the internal voice to 
speech as the symbol of mental experience (Reynolds, n.d.).   
 
Derrida’s (1998) opposition to the primary position of the spoken word is an 
opposition to the idea that writing fails to signify the unchanging central meaning 
of a thing - not because writing is equal to speech in achieving this natural 
attachment to an object’s essence, but because the idea of essence (essentialism) is 
highly problematic.  The definitive presence of meaning, in Derrida’s critique, is an 
illusion of classical philosophy and one that stems from a metaphysical legacy that 
we continue to encounter in our style of representation.  According to Derrida, we 
are forced to slip into the form and logic of signifiers.  In a broader and more basic 
sense Derrida (1978) urges us to consider that words signify things, that there is a 
connection between our sense of things and the signifiers we assign to them but it 
is a connection that, through an inherited metaphysical expectation, produces 
calcified meaning and privileged signifiers that limit and deny the unlimited play 
of signification.  Derrida’s reference to an unlimited play of signification is a 
reference to an active and complex world with equally complex meaning that cannot 
be constrained by the terms and words (or signifiers) that are believed to be accurate 
representations of a thing’s essential nature.  There is, according to Derrida, always 
something more at play than what can be said about a thing.   
 
Extending the critique of the centrality of certain linguistic representations, 
Broekman (2016) asks, “what does it mean in general when the ‘Word’ [as signifier] 
is at the absolute center of each linguistic articulation?” (p.14).  Focussing on 
logocentrism and a “cosmic silence” (p. 14) that denies a voice to the other, 
Broekman describes a metaphysics that bans that which is contradictory - that 
which denies constancy and articulates something other than the order of coherent 
visible meaning.  As Broekman explains, 
 
a word-directed approach creates a veiled silence in all 
articulation processes but one: that of the word, which 
inhibits a deeper insight into meaning. One should not 
forget that this cosmology of the separate, this 
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dominance of partitioning is typical for Occidental 
metaphysics, as already Plato unveiled. That cosmology 
is based on the principle of identity and of 
noncontradiction— both principles are foundational for 
Western philosophy. As a result, philosophy demanding 
presence, constancy and coherence becomes a power of 
silence, because any contradiction, disorder or 
marginality is banned, and wholeness is not necessarily 
the result of such a ban (p.14-15). 
 
Essentialism, in both the Derridean sense of signifiers, and in Broekman’s (2016) 
explanation, positions the ‘word’, the signifier of things, as that which confuses 
having the experience of a thing with the act of pure speech, “the thought of a thing 
as what it is” (Derrida, 1978, p. 8).  The implications of this understanding of 
essentialism (and logocentrism) relate to what has already been mentioned in terms 
of the inherited metaphysics that Derrida believes creates a form of representation 
of the world – one we are forced to slip into.  This inheritance is what Derrida (and 
philosophers such as Heidegger) called ‘the metaphysics of presence’: the idea that 
presence in traditional philosophy is the fundamental principle of being that can be 
found in all its expressions.  In Derrida’s (1978) own words it is, 
 
the determination of Being [de l’être] as presence 
[présence] in all senses [les sens] of this word. It could 
be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the center have always designated an 
invariable [l’invariant] presence–eidos, archē, telos, 
energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) 
alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, 
and so forth (pp. 279-80). 
 
The metaphysics of presence is explored further in chapter five; however, here it is 
important to introduce the idea of presence as an expectation – a metaphysical 
interpretation of the world.  According to Derrida (1982), Being as presence is an 
enduring Being of what is, an unchanging constant that equates to essence.  Being 
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in this sense is also the existence of a reality that is present to mind and the adequate 
representation of reality from within human knowledge. 
 
Deconstructing the notion of mental illness requires a critical investigation of the 
philosophies and theories that have supported the development of this notion.  It 
requires that the notion of mental illness be explored in the context of early 
philosophies that are firmly embedded in both colonial histories and geographies.  
And it also requires that we look at how early philosophies influence how we talk 
about phenomena (including behaviour and emotions) as positive, identifiable and 
knowable things. This journey into the beginnings of the metaphysics of presence 
and its relationship to the notion of mental illness is one component of this thesis. 
 
Mental illness, the metaphysics of presence and essentialism 
Challenges to the idea of mental illness and related professional concepts such as 
diagnosis are well represented in critical analyses that question the legitimacy of 
the notion of mental illness including within the context of structuralism (Foucault, 
1988), biological essentialism (Szasz, 1961), and historical philosophical sexism 
(e.g., Cook, 2013).  Much that has been written about mental illness as a 
problematic notion has focussed on how the idea of mental illness has emerged as 
a constructed concept embedded in cultural and historical perspectives (e.g., 
Walker, 2006; McCann, 2016).   
 
While there are many authors who support a constructionist view of the notion of 
mental illness, others have expressed concern about these critiques and the view 
that mental illness (as a concept) has no legitimate validity.  For example, Shorter 
(1997) characterises critiques of the notion of mental illness as a “new orthodoxy” 
(p. ix), that betray the fundamental truth that mental illness is, in fact, real.   For 
Shorter, what makes mental illness ‘real’ is the “biological brain events” (p. 59), 
that govern behaviour and form the basis of mental disease.   This biological model 
of mental illness (explored later in chapter six), has invited its own specific 
critiques; however, here I highlight the theoretical (and philosophical) bases of 
Shorter’s belief that mental illness is a ‘real’ phenomenon.  This belief in the factual 
basis of (the notion of) mental illness illustrates a common theme that is often 
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deconstructed within critical literature.  The idea is that there are ahistorical, 
universal explanations of human behaviour that, rather than representing culturally 
constructed beliefs about human nature, explain natural kinds of behaviour or 
natural behavioural categories.   
 
The concept of natural categories and universal explanations of behaviour can be 
linked to the early philosophies, which so far have been identified and discussed as 
(generally) essentialist.  Again, these early teachings exist within a wider 
philosophical (metaphysical) tradition (Carr, 2014) that is characterised by a desire 
to know and understand the ultimate and essential nature of the world and existence.  
To the ancient Greeks, this desire to know the world would require a certain type 
of metaphysics that would allow for accurate knowledge of what is real and in such 
a way that there could be lasting knowledge of those ‘real’ things.  This lasting 
knowledge would be predicated on a view of the world as having an essential 
unchanging and discoverable nature (Cook, 2013).   
 
We might recognise this metaphysics today in terms that signal a particular 
approach to interacting with and understanding the world that include, for example, 
‘predication’, ‘extrapolation’, and ‘measurement’.  Indeed, as Shields (2012) 
observes, ancient metaphysics mirrors a “deep impulse” that seems to drive 
scientific inquiry, centring on the idea that there is some “basic and irreducible 
stuff” (p.3), forming the basis of universal and ultimate explanations.   
 
While Shields is referring to physical sciences (the kinds that look at things like 
atoms and molecules), he also makes the point that the search for universal and 
ultimate explanations is a metaphysical inheritance that is demonstrated in our 
responses to the expectation of “scientific systematicity” (p.4).  Further, Shields 
contends that this systematic approach demands a step away from what we sense 
and feel in order to discover and present “projectible explanations” (p.4), that can 
be taken as general truths.  Holbraad and Pedersen (2017) observe how this 
approach to inquiring about the world is based on a “no- nonsense pragmatism [that] 
bleeds into more elaborate theoretical models, in terms of universal human traits or 
other underlying mechanisms that may explain cross-cultural variations” (p.2). 
These explanations of underlying mechanisms may include, for example, socio-
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political functions, symbolic structures, and cognitive processing of social 
information.  
 
The implications that an essentialist and universalist view of the world has for the 
notion of mental illness concern both the constructionist view of mental illness (that 
mental illness is simply a created concept), and the view that mental illness is a 
factual, real, ahistorical ‘object’.  In terms of constructionism, those that are critical 
of the notion of mental illness (positing that mental illness is a constructed, 
historical and cultural concept), oppose the idea that there are universal human traits 
that explain behaviour.  For those subscribing to the view that mental illness is real, 
the concern centres on identifying the essential, universal qualities of human 
behaviour, which include, for example, the universal applicability of psychiatric 
disorders across cultural groups (Canino and Algeria, 2008).   However, I argue, 
despite the tensions that exist between each of these two broad and opposing views, 
there is something more insidious lurking beneath the debates that often escapes 
full critique, particularly when the notion of (spiritual) holism or holistic being is 
considered.  This more insidious influence is described by Mcintosh (2012) as 
“iceberg-like structures of…epistemology which are largely invisible until struck.” 
(p.59), or what has so far been discussed as the expectation that things will be 
represented as objects with conceptual clarity; making things present to the rational 
self who can take things up as thinkable phenomena.  I argue that Māori and 
indigenous explanations of Being have not been immune to this expectation, 
perhaps signalling that there is a deeper form of cultural suppression at play than 
what can be addressed through offering Māori and indigenous versions of mental 
illness as a way of resisting the essentialised concepts that have been applied to the 
idea of human behaviour. 
 
The expectation of clear (conceptual) representation is what, I argue, makes 
madness out of Māori and indigenous expressions when more mysterious 
(unthinkable) presentations of Being are expressed.  For example, Cermolacce, 
Sass, and Parnas (2010) explain that the DSM has previously included a discussion 
of the concept of ‘bizarreness’ or Bizarre Delusions (BD) including notions about 
peoples’ beliefs being, “patently absurd (with) … no possible basis in fact” (DSM-
III), and “clearly implausible and not understandable and not derived from ordinary 
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life experiences” (DSM-IV).  While the concept of bizarreness has since been 
excluded from the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
Fifth Edition, American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the features of bizarreness, 
embedded in a clinical frame of understanding the way that people represent the 
world, remain as a standard of assessing and of sense making.  As Llewellyn and 
Van Heugten-van der Kloet (2018) explain,  
 
since (the) multiple features and expressions, such as 
incongruities, contradictions, and paradoxes occurring 
in natural and human domains prevent subjects to 
engage in credible representations and appropriate 
actions, the concept of mental bizarreness still 
constitutes a relevant empirical and theoretical 
challenge (p.76).  
 
The more inexplicable qualities of Māori and indigenous metaphysical grounding 
may therefore continue to be impacted on by an expectation of ordered Being in 
which paradoxes, contradictions, multiple features and expressions are cast as 
deficits and are filtered out.  The dissatisfaction with a complex metaphysics might 
also perpetuate the expectation that Māori and indigenous expressions succumb to 
the order of clear conceptual representation or become alternative expressions that 
harbour (divergent) essentialisms. 
 
Kaupapa Māori and indigenous approaches within mental health 
Kaupapa Māori Psychology 
Within Aotearoa, Kaupapa Māori psychology has developed from a dissatisfaction 
with mainstream research and behavioural theories that were seen as disruptive to 
Māori worldviews (Bishop, 1999).  In a 2002 keynote address, Mason Durie asked 
the important question, “is there a distinctive Māori Psychology?” (p.19).  In line 
with wider challenges to assumptions about the universal applicability of 
mainstream psychology, Durie explored the question of whether Māori people have 
“ways of thinking, feeling and behaving that derive from customary Māori 
worldviews.” (p. 19).  Using “marae encounters” (p.19), as a point of focus, Durie 
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discusses interactions and activities on the marae as “domains, (and) broad 
conceptual zones within which distinctive psychological and behavioural” (p.19) 
actions take place.   While much of what is described addresses the practical 
implications of these encounters, the metaphysical nature of the domains that are 
discussed (including space, time, the circular nature of relational being, and 
synchronicity), locates people within a broader context of existence that challenges 
the individualised focus of mainstream Western psychology (Tamatea, 2008).  
  
An important theme emerging from Durie’s analysis is the use of metaphorical 
language to convey a philosophy that presents transformational meaning and “shifts 
the focus onto another plane” (p. 21), not governed by the laws of exactness that 
connect what is meant only to what is said. Durie states that “Metaphor allows 
comparisons to be made, a wider context to be established and allusions to be 
suggested avoiding a micro-focus and positioning the subject within a broader 
perspective” (p. 21).  Durie also discusses metaphor in relation to the domain of 
interconnectedness that shifts attention to spiritual planes.  Rather than presenting 
a romanticised notion of spirituality, Durie’s description positions all things in 
relation to one another: in that locus, the spiritual symbolises the interconnectedness 
of Being from a Māori perspective.   
 
The implications that this understanding has for Māori psychology lies in valuing 
the connectedness of phenomena as opposed to focusing on individual phenomena 
as a primary mode of seeing the world.  Durie (2002) concludes by considering the 
potential for a distinctive Māori psychology to effectively respond to Māori ways 
of Being (and thinking) by basing assessments in worldviews that are not structured 
by patterns of thinking and behaviour relied on by mainstream Western psychology.    
However, as Tamatea (2008) observes, localized worldviews that include ancestral 
knowledge (that Tamatea conceptualises as pre-industrial or non-scientific), while 
able to disrupt dominant Western paradigms, may be undermined by inevitable 
interactions that stem from the development of indigenous Māori psychologies.  
This sentiment is echoed by Cruikshank (2012) who warns that one of the 
consequences of placing indigenous knowledge into non-indigenous spaces is that 
it becomes like, “fragments without reference to the contexts and relationships from 
which these [indigenous] practices emerged” (p. 247).  This may lead to situations 
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where, even if accepted, Māori knowledge may be misunderstood, or worse, 
misunderstood and then spread in a corrupted form that only exacerbates 
misunderstandings. 
 
A recent publication by a group of Māori psychologists within Aotearoa presented 
an implicit challenge to the idea that Māori and indigenous practitioners must work 
solely within Western (clinical) conceptual frameworks.   Levy and Waitoki (2016) 
conceptualise indigenous psychology practice as, “a place of opportunity where we 
privilege our meta-knowledge about the seen and unseen, of knowing and not 
knowing and being comfortable with how we interpret and makes sense of Māori 
realities and experiences” (p.18).  This description of indigenous psychology, and 
in particular the contrast and inclusion of both the seen and unseen, of knowing and 
not knowing, aligns with the research question that guides this thesis. The unseen 
and the unknowable present possibilities that negate the epistemic structure seeking 
to codify indigenous knowledges into classifications, universal explanations of the 
intangible, and cultural variations of the norms associated with clinical knowledge.   
These possibilities are reflected in Swinton’s (2001) discussion of the intangible, as 
an “experience that (moves) beyond that which is available at a mundane level” 
(p.20).   
 
Rather than remarking on common or familiar explanations of things, Swinton 
(2001), when referring to things that are beyond that which is available at the 
mundane level, is pointing to things that are unthinkable - things that are not present 
to the mind.  This unthinkable experience supports the ideas of meta-knowledge 
that Levy and Waitoki (2016) describe.   Privileging indigenous meta-knowledge 
creates a space for indigenous knowledges to move beyond the epistemic corner 
afforded to indigenous worldviews in institutions such as mental health.  As Durie 
(2009) states,  
 
Both indigenous knowledge and science are shaped by 
particular worldviews and each is bounded by a set of 
conventions that confer credibility and consistency as 
well as limitations.  Importantly, the tools of one should 
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not be used to analyse and understand the foundations 
of the other (p.242). 
 
The gains made within the mental health sector in developing policies that carve 
out a space for Māori worldviews within services have enabled Māori to make 
inroads into developing and providing Māori centred and Kaupapa Māori models 
of care.  Nationally, the intangible aspects of health are recognised as a cornerstone 
of a Māori approach to health and well-being.  He Korowai Oranga, Māori Health 
Strategy Aotearoa (Ministry of Health, 2002), includes the objective of recognising 
and valuing Māori models of health and traditional healing that include spiritual, 
unobservable aspects of health.   Mika (2017a) explains that tangible aspects of 
health (e.g., access to appropriate food resources, clean environments), must be 
considered alongside non-tangible aspects that include our ability to,  
 
resonate properly with one’s place, perceive other 
things in the world as if they are all connected and 
living, acknowledge and name the self as one animate 
entity among many others with essentially no separation 
from them, and label a concept along holistic lines 
(p.45).  
   
Holism, when taken as an understanding of Being within which all things are 
indivisible is, therefore, an important ontological premise that can guide our 
consideration of how the intangible aspects of health and well-being are reflected 
in health care systems. 
 
Global partnerships in indigenous psychologies 
The wider context of health and well-being reflected in holistic indigenous views is 
also being developed internationally through global partnerships of knowledge 
sharing between indigenous practitioners and communities.  These partnerships 
have led to the development of research that is intended to influence how the mental 
health sector conceptualises mental dis-ease and subsequent models of care that 
result from translating research into practice.  One of the key areas of work focuses 
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on historical trauma theory, a framework for intergenerational trauma first 
introduced into Aotearoa by Native American scholars including Eduardo Duran, 
Karina Walters, and Bonnie Duran (Pihama, Reynolds, Smith, Reid, Smith, and Te 
Nana, 2014).   
 
While dominant Western views on trauma tend to focus on individual experiences, 
indigenous models are turning the focus towards trauma resulting from historical 
(and current) events that have continued to impact across generations.  The DSM 5 
provides a clear example of an individualised trauma focus, describing trauma as 
“exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 271).  In contrast, indigenous 
perspectives consider more complex forms of trauma including collective trauma 
resulting from colonial practices. 
 
Two major Māori led research projects completed in Aotearoa provide examples of 
local indigenous research that has developed from intergenerational trauma work 
being undertaken in indigenous communities in America and Canada.  These 
projects aim to develop Māori Trauma Informed Care approaches and trauma 
healing strategies based on Māori and indigenous worldviews.  Within these 
projects, trauma is conceptualised as a collective (as opposed to individual) 
experience and is also linked to intangible aspects of health and well-being5.  A 
significant goal of the global intergenerational research programme is to move 
beyond a focus on individual, surface level manifestations of trauma (Beltran and 
Begun, 2014) to address what Duran (2006) describes as soul wounding caused by 
historical events that have impacted on not only visible physical and psychological 
aspects of well-being but also on spiritual well-being.  
 
Global indigenous research and indigenous psychologies have provided valuable 
frameworks for understanding concepts associated with mental health and well-
being from diverse perspectives.  According to Duran (2006), there is a strong post-
colonial philosophy that drives the development of indigenous frameworks 
 
       5 Maori and Indigenous models of trauma are also discussed in chapter six and are offered as one of 
the examples of approaches in mental health that aim to disrupt the limited (clinical) frame that the 
notion of mental illness is ‘fixed’ within. 
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acknowledging the legitimacy of indigenous knowledges.  As Duran explains, "A 
postcolonial paradigm would accept knowledge from differing cosmologies as valid 
in their own right, without their having to adhere to a separate cultural body for 
legitimacy" (p.6).   However, the degree to which indigenous and Māori 
psychologies represent a post-colonial paradigm continues to be questioned.  As 
discussed earlier, some indigenous scholars are cautious about the potential 
consequences that may come from interactions between indigenous and non-
indigenous knowledges and the inevitable exchanges that occur. 
 
Conclusion 
The relationship between the notion of mental illness, associated treatment settings 
and Māori and indigenous understandings of Being is complex.  In a service 
development context, Māori and indigenous peoples are both contributing to 
knowledge that is integrated into mainstream mental health systems and continuing 
to seek ways to grow and implement approaches that are largely independent of the 
mainstream.  It is important to point out that the disciplines within the mental health 
system have not rejected (wholesale) calls for frameworks that represent the 
identities and subjectivities of marginalised, non-dominant groups. However, in the 
development of more culturally responsive treatment settings, the ‘integration’ of 
Māori and indigenous knowledges may reflect what was referred to earlier as a 
“shift in philosophical posture” (Marsden, 2003, p. 99), as opposed to a 
fundamental shift in understanding how notions of Being construct systems of care.  
This is particularly concerning for things that sit outside the conceptual space 
afforded through the notion of (cultural) frameworks – the things that cannot be 
captured by the frame.   
 
The way in which holistic Being is translated into health systems represents a type 
of “cognitive familiarity” (Gordon, 2008, p.37), with spiritual holism.  However, 
simply having familiarity with Māori and indigenous spiritual holism does little to 
ensure that the fundamental basis of a health system is congruent with (and 
therefore supportive of), Māori and indigenous re-presentations of holistic Being.  
Going beyond cognitive familiarity with indigenous worldviews requires a deeper 
consideration of how things that cannot fit within the limits of available concepts 
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can be engaged with.  There is, within this context, a deeper holism that exists 
outside of any conceptual description that we might apply in, for example, health 
policy.  This is particularly significant where it has been noted that Māori and 
indigenous concerns are framed in ways that are described as a type of reductionism 
or as a softening of Māori and indigenous expressions (Russell, 2019).  As Green 
(2018) notes, discussions about the intangible aspects of Māori and indigenous 
knowledge tends not to venture past a certain point, often ending at the mention of 
the intangible and seldom venturing into more murky territory -  into the realm of 
things that in Māori metaphysics would render holism as a complex (and, from a 
dominant Western perspective, unintelligible) interconnection.   
 
As I will argue, Māori and indigenous responses within mental health continue to 
sit at a crossroads where clinical frameworks are evolving to increase a focus on 
physicalist explanations of behaviour.  As clinical frameworks evolve to solidify a 
position based on the preference for highly evident representations of human 
(centred) behaviour, new challenges may be emerging.  These challenges raise 
questions about the ability for Māori and indigenous understandings to be (easily) 
integrated into the systems of knowledge that underpin mental health and the notion 
of mental illness. From the translation of Māori terms into clinical language, to the 
development of cultural frameworks that deliver cultural constructs as readily and 
easily decipherable concepts, Māori and indigenous complexities are constantly 
open to a type of (metaphysical) reductionism.  Having an understanding of the 
philosophical and metaphysical ground that the tendency for reductionism emerges 
from provides a pathway to meeting the challenge of essentialised, limited 
representation and to engage a re-presentation of Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being.  
 
Thesis structure  
Before providing a detailed overview of each of the chapters in this thesis, I want 
to first provide some direction to the reader about how the thesis is structured and 
about how I have approached the task of deconstructing the notion of mental illness 
and re-presenting Māori and indigenous understandings of Being.  There are some 
points of departure from a conventional presentation of a thesis, intended as a way 
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of highlighting issues related to the indigenous researchers place in the research.  In 
line with this, chapter two (outlined below), introduces some ideas about the 
researcher’s location, conceptualised as a description of how an indigenous 
researcher is positioned within the world.  Chapter three follows on from this 
consideration of location and position, launching from ideas introduced in chapter 
two to address the question of method, thereby suspending a direct discussion of 
metaphysics until chapter four.   
 
The approach of suspending a direct discussion of the notion of mental illness 
continues through chapters four and five.  Rather than attempting to immediately 
get at the problem of how mental illness is constructed, I have first sought to lay a 
ground of thinking.  This groundwork enables a critical analysis of how mental 
illness (as a concept), has been set up by a dominant metaphysics and (most 
importantly) how it may be re-presented through a Māori and indigenous lens.  For 
this reason, chapters four and five focus on both Māori and indigenous metaphysics 
(chapter four) and a dominant Western metaphysics: the metaphysics of presence 
(chapter five).  These two opposing metaphysics are then brought together in 
chapter six to focus on the task of deconstructing the notion of mental illness, 
clearing ground for a reimagining of possibilities: a (k)new presentation of 
experience that might contribute to how Māori and indigenous approaches are taken 
up within mental health.   
 
Content of chapters 
In chapter two, metaphysics is explored in relation to the onto-epistemic location 
of the researcher.  The idea of the relational experience of research is highlighted 
to expose those things that call on the indigenous researcher, implicating the more-
than-human aspects of research and how other things in the world help shape the 
researcher’s work. Whaiwhakaaro (presented as a holistic understanding of 
‘thinking’ from a Māori perspective), is introduced in this chapter as a way of 
considering what might replace a view of research as a human contained and 
centred activity.  The overall aim within this chapter is to disrupt the 
conceptualisation of research as an individual and primarily cognitively driven 
endeavour.  Through a focus on whakapapa as the researcher’s experience of 
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multiple connections and influences, the research process is understood as a 
spiritually collaborative exercise: a collab of creation with the more-than-human. 
 
Chapter three continues a focus on the influence of the more-than-human in 
research by bringing the ideas discussed in chapter two into a consideration of 
method.  Here, the idea of engaging with things in the world through whaiwhakaaro 
is discussed in more detail.  Method is related to the dominant Western metaphysics 
that prefers a structural approach and an ordered representation of things in the 
world: a process of extracting the essential qualities of a phenomena.  In questioning 
the place of method within a thesis that is focussed on the things that exist outside 
of the structure of representation (regardless of whether a method of analysis 
highlights their existence), I seek to disrupt the notion that a thing’s meaning can 
be captured by the application of method.  I also seek to further disrupt the idea that 
an individual researcher, engaging in cognitive human centred activities, is alone in 
the process of thinking and of finding meaning within research.  Whaiwhakaaro 
(discussed as a holistic research experience), expands the idea of participation to 
reflect the co-constructive nature of Being and how this is expressed through the 
researcher’s experience. 
 
Chapter four begins the exploration of metaphysics: of the premises and principles 
that shape Māori and indigenous understandings of Being.  In this chapter, I lay the 
ground of thinking that will further support a view of Being as holistic and 
interconnected.  This necessary grounding in Māori and indigenous metaphysics 
provides a basis for the emergence of (k)new ideas that re-shape and dislodge the 
dominant onto-epistemic framework.  The indigenous self is presented as part of a 
cosmological whole: as fully immersed within the world, requiring that a particular 
approach to healing within mental health is considered.  The premises of Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics are presented as a foundation on which we might 
understand the notion of healing as a (spiritually) holistic exercise. 
 
In chapter five, I describe the metaphysical opposite of Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being – the metaphysics of presence.  This oppositional 
worldview has already been characterised in the introduction chapter as a dominant 
and expectant influence that encases non-dominant onto-epistemes.  In order to 
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understand what threatens Māori and indigenous expressions (and opportunities for 
re-presentation), I aim, in chapter six, to expose the underlying predicates of a 
dominant Western metaphysics.  Through this, I seek to show how this pervasive 
structure apprehends all things in the world, interning them to its own language of 
objectification – the representation of things in terms of their present qualities.  
Exposing the dominant structure supports an understanding of how the idea of 
presence interrupts the holistic indigenous self, shutting down the excessive 
meaning that stems from a complete interconnection with the spiritual, mysterious 
world.  It also supports an understanding of how the meaning of people’s 
experiences have been reduced to fit the frame of mental illness.   
 
Chapter six brings together both Māori and indigenous and dominant Western 
metaphysics in examining the notion of mental illness.  The genesis of mental 
illness as a broad theory that explains an individual’s behaviour and experience is 
analysed within an historical philosophical context.  The notion of mental illness is 
examined as a disciple of the metaphysics of presence: specifically, as the idea that 
a person’s well-being is dependent upon the type of order that eliminates irrational 
excesses.  Through exploring the dominant West’s focus on creating order (of 
discarding things that do not fit the rational frame), the idea of creating Māori and 
indigenous versions of mental illness and mental health concepts is problematised.  
The issue of exposing and addressing the deeper structure of a dominant 
metaphysics is raised here.  Highlighting this more fundamental metaphysical 
ground aims to expose how the notion of the mind, the philosophy of presence, and 
the idea of rational balance potentially restricts Māori and indigenous expressions 
of Being and cosmologies.  
 
Chapters seven and eight present the findings of the research6, drawing from the 
participant responses to reflect on how Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being (and the notion of mental illness) can be re-presented.  These chapters are 
 
    6 It is important to note that I have problematised the term ‘findings’ in the prologue to chapters 
seven and eight.  As I explain, the conventional view of a findings chapter is closely related to the 
idea of method and a belief that method allows the researcher to find types of truths about 
phenomena – to identify their essential qualities.  In line with my intended departure from using (a 
conventional) method, I also move away from presenting findings as a representation of essential 
things – of central truths about Maori and indigenous understandings of Being or the notion of 
mental illness.   
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where the experience of whaiwhakaaro comes into play, demonstrating what might 
be seen as an unconventional approach that detracts from the process of using 
normal research methods of data analysis.   Rather than searching for themes, 
whaiwhakaaro allows for a free-flowing engagement that highlights how different 
terms, sentences and ideas provoke thinking.  The provocation of thinking is 
conceptualised as thoughts that arrive from the relational influence of the 
participants, from me as the researcher, and from the more-than-human participants 
that place things in view: things that show up on their own accord. In keeping with 
the structure of this thesis, where I initially deal with first principles and then with 
the human manifestation of those, I present the idea of a complete indivisibility in 
chapter seven and then the lived experience of the more-than-human relationship, 
emerging through the notion of mental health, in chapter eight. 
 
Those two chapters (seven and eight), together with the rest of the thesis, establish 
the potential of creative speculation, and I conclude the thesis in chapter nine, re-
iterating the idea of a free-flowing approach to research by resisting the convention 
of providing a prescriptive discussion of the research findings.  In this chapter, 
building on the main thoughts that emerged through whaiwhakaaro in chapters 
seven and eight, I imagine the possibilities for re-presenting Māori and indigenous 
understanding of Being and the notion of mental illness.  There are no firm 
strategies presented in this chapter – no fully determined approaches to implement.  
Instead, I present a (k)new ground of thinking within which divergent articulations 
and multiple approaches to healing might unfold. The concluding chapter is 
therefore non-foundational. I conclude in chapter nine by reiterating (but also 
adding to), the main principles that I suggest can support a re-turn to Māori and 




CHAPTER TWO: LOCATING THE RESEARCHER 
This chapter presents a narrative that provides an understanding of how the research 
developed.  The description that is offered in this section provides an explanation 
of how I, as an indigenous researcher, became drawn to this piece of work.  It is a 
way of orientating the reader to the kaupapa of the research, and to my relationship 
with this kaupapa.  Any statement I, as a researcher, make about the world, is 
paradoxically constructed by the world. Here, perhaps, is the first overt gesture 
towards the aforementioned mystery of things in the world as they inform my 
research. This chapter points to an understanding that there is a particular Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics at work in those acts that are conventionally 
understood as being banal.   
 
My experience of being Māori is one of treading softly into our interactions with 
each other, locating ourselves as a first step in a process of connection.  Lavallee 
(2009) states that locating ourselves as researchers is often viewed as an exercise in 
declaring bias within a post-positivist epistemological framework, recognising the 
influence of constructivism and interpretation.  As Lavallee states, “Indigenous 
research is not objective, nor does it see itself as unbiased” (p. 23). Issues of bias 
and constructivism are important in this research; however, I also value Lavallee’s 
assertion that, for indigenous researchers, locating ourselves is more significantly 
about “who we are, where we are from (and) who our ancestors are” (p. 26).    
 
The knowledge creation process 
In discussing the value of presenting a narrative that describes the complex 
relationships that converge when engaging in research, I made a comment to my 
supervisors that exploring my approach to research in this way would be like a mihi 
to all that has been involved in the research, including the reader.  One of my 
supervisors, reflecting on how this could be conceptualised, talked about 
acknowledging both the tangible and intangible aspects of the research as creative 
participants in the research process.  This fits with a description of research offered 
by Absolon and Willett (2005) who state that indigenous research fosters “a 
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knowledge creation process that takes into account the underlying and often hidden 
factors of the researcher and producer of knowledge” (p.106).   
 
As part of this experience of knowledge creation, I bring the reader's attention to 
some surprising encounters that I have had during this research.  These encounters 
(described in chapters four and nine),7 demonstrate what I experienced as hidden 
factors that I believe influence the research process.  They are examples of what in 
a Māori worldview may be called tohu or what could be described as things in the 
world showing themselves for our regard.  The encounters (described later in the 
thesis), are related to the researcher’s relational journey - how ideas show up 
through our connections with things that are both seen and unseen.  This view of 
the world’s influence on our thinking is discussed throughout this thesis; however, 
the examples in chapter four and nine help to answer a question that I have 
constantly reflected on during the research process - wondering how a more 
spiritual understanding of Being shows up in academic work.  This chapter begins 
the task of taking seriously the view that academic work (as with all things in the 
world), is more than a rational self-contained activity.  
 
This section aims to locate the researcher and the research within Māori and 
indigenous worlds conceptualised as both physical and philosophical place. Place, 
as an understanding of where something or someone is connected, is an important 
aspect of indigenous research (and indigeneity as a whole).   It orientates and locates 
both the research as a complex web of concepts and the researcher in relation to 
those concepts.  Deloria (2001), when discussing principles of Indian forms of 
knowledge, describes place as “the relationship of things to each other” (p.23).  
Deloria also discusses the principle of power or life-force as it engages with place 




7 See the description of Indranil Chakravarty’s PhD journey in chapter four for an explanation of the 
world’s influence as seen through the lens of Sanskrit spirituality.  In chapter nine, see the 
description of a comment made by Dr Naomi Simmonds and how this pushed me to reflect on 
Papatūānuku as spiritual nourishment within the context of mental health. 
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the substantive embodiment, the unique realization, of 
all the relations and power we embody. Because each of 
us is someplace and, but for a few exceptions, never in 
exactly the same place as anybody else, our 
personalities are unique. Our phenomenal existence 
entails a spatial dimension and variations in power 
relations with other persons in the world. Therefore, 
personality as Deloria uses the term is a metaphysical 
concept, fundamentally different from the popular 
science view that what and who we are can be reduced 
to genetics or biochemical mechanisms (p.145). 
 
What Deloria describes is a living world that we have a personal relationship with, 
and a way of engaging with the world in a personal manner.  What we offer in our 
writing is a personal expression of our relationship with and within the world.   
 
My relationship to the research is explored through the idea of subjective co-
creation.   This idea acknowledges the deeper connections that are at play in the 
development of the thesis and the subjective approach that characterises my 
engagement with those things that are involved in these deeper connections.  The 
articulation of these connections explains my position as a researcher, including 
where I am located physically, spiritually, and conceptually.  From an indigenous 
perspective, subjectivity is an important concept related to understanding how ideas 
are represented.  As Absolon and Willett (2005) state, 
 
You might say that any part of my experience accounts 
for my opinion and that is the whole point—that who I 
am mitigates what I say. I might make any number of 
seemingly radical statements and the reason I might say 
any one of those things is based in part on my personal 
experience. We locate because what you remember 
about what anyone says depends in large part on who is 




Subjective representations are common within indigenous research (e.g., Pihama, 
2001; Kainamu, 2013); however, when indigenous notions of location are also 
considered, these subjectivities are constructed in ways that extend beyond simply 
presenting individual accounts of an experience.  Location, symbolic of our 
connections, includes both the physical connections that we have (such as our 
connections with people and land), and our connections to those things that are not 
immediately visible or easily definable.  
 
Location can also be conceptualised as an epistemological standpoint.  Daniel 
Heath Justice (2016) discusses Western epistemological standpoints as equating the 
concept of knowledge with mastery.  As Justice explains, knowledge, 
conceptualised in this way, is akin to domination over things, characterised by a 
violent possession that grounds the concept of understanding in acts of “stripping 
bare the mysteries of human experience…an extractive exercise of epistemic 
privilege, with violence at its center” (p.23).  As Hunt (2014) explains, however, 
there is another standpoint that presents a different relationship with the world that 
retains mystery and the unknowable: 
 
One starting place might be accepting the partiality of 
knowledge. Its relational, alive, emergent nature means 
that as we come to know something, as we attempt to 
fix its meaning, we are always at risk of just missing 
something. If we accept the alive and ongoing nature of 
colonial relations, and the lived aspects of Indigeneity 
as critical to indigenous ontologies, any attempts to fix 
indigenous knowledge can only be partial (p. 31). 
 
The idea of knowledge that is partial opens up the potential of the self in relationship 
with other things in the world that may influence our work.  It is also an important 
consideration in understanding how mystery relates to Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics, and moreover how it disrupts the idea that Māori and indigenous 
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knowledges can be represented in ways that mirror a dominant Western epistemic 
structure of representation.  
 
Whakapapa and co-creation in research  
Cherryl Smith (2000) explains how Māori cosmologies transform what we 
encounter as written work into a more profound and personal expression of 
relationship with things in the world reflecting a dynamic process of co-creation.  
Referencing her own act of writing, Smith explains: 
 
According to Māori belief all things have a mauri or life 
aspect, a piece of writing or a speech therefore has its 
own mauri. As a writer of a paper I am engaged in the 
act of creation which stems from the way that I see 
creation occurring.  Just as the carvers who carve the 
houses by `hanga whare’ (building houses) so too as 
Māori academics we build thoughts/feelings (hanga 
whakaaro) and build discourses (hanga kōrero). I am 
not alone in this work, all my ancestors, past, present 
and future also have to bear with me (p.43).   
 
Smith (2000) relates the co-creative process to whakapapa that she describes as the 
participation of ancestors in the work. Elsewhere in her paper, Smith describes the 
expansive nature of relationships that the term whakapapa relates to pointing to the 
endless connections that are at play when referring to ancestors or relations and 
their involvement in work that is created, including research.  My writing in this 
section is intended as an explanation of a deeper connection to the research that is 
reflected in thinking about understandings of place as relationship and 
understandings of power as life force or mauri.   My discussion of these things 
includes focussing on how power and place can be an expression of conversations 
with the world that leads us to understand our work in ways that differ from 




In relation to the ideas that are explored within this thesis, the acts of creation that 
mirror what Smith (2000) describes do not rely on evidence or the gathering of data 
to measure something in the world, but locates the research within my own 
experience that, I contend, cannot produce objective measurements.  The research 
is completely bound with a whakapapa that is my own in a genealogical sense but 
also expands to include things that genealogy as a notion does not constitute.  This 
understanding of whakapapa is also described by Smith (2000) who states that, 
 
Whakapapa, which is usually translated as genealogy or 
descent, lays out Māori views of existence by showing 
the connections between states of existence, the human 
and natural world. It provides an explanation for 
existence and also articulates the human role within that 
existence. Within whakapapa there are origins and 
explanations for trees, birds, parts of the human body, 
words and speaking, the cosmos, the gods, karakia, the 
moon, the wind and stones. All life is connected and 
interrelated. Appropriate behaviour is also indicated to 
all aspects of life within whakapapa (p.45). 
 
Whakapapa, as a state of Being, describes my understanding of how this research 
has developed and continues to unfold.  The co-creative process for me undoubtedly 
includes the involvement of my tūpuna.  But in line with a deeper and more complex 
understanding of whakapapa, I understand that co-creation also includes the 
influence of other things in the world.  My tūpuna may show up in what I recognise 
as thinking or through the sudden rise of an idea.  Other things in the world may 
also come forward to play upon the field of conscious thinking.  It is also possible 
that things may choose to show up as a physical feeling that gives a sense of 
something that cannot be defined, only making sense when someone makes a 
remark in passing, or an image that catches my eye when I turn in response to a 
noise that has invited me to look in a certain direction.  These experiences make 
sense to me in a way that is hard to express in academic writing that demands I 
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explain what is happening and that I engage with the belief that I can name it and 
give it a quality and quantity.  
 
The showing of the world in this way is perhaps reflected in the following quote 
from Royal (2008): [m]ā te Ao te tangata e tohu e oho ai tōna ngākau, tōna wairua 
e mārama ai ia ki ētahi mea” (p. 37).  Royal’s quote has been translated by Mika 
(2013) as “the world represents itself to humanity, awakens humanity’s heart and 
spirit, and brings it to understand something” (p.76).  Discussing the rise of ideas 
as the intentional act of an external hidden Being disrupts the conventional view of 
thinking as an individual’s single act of intuition. Mika (2017a) describes the 
agency of ideas as “living material entities” (p. 3), that reveal and conceal 
themselves at will.  Further, what seems like the disappearance of the idea is simply 
its movement into concealment while remaining in hidden spaces that our senses 
(such as hearing and seeing), do not easily enter into.   As Mika explains, 
 
In indigenous thought... the idea is a material entity that 
is constituted by all other things in the world; it is as 
equal to the situation as my own neurological decision 
to think is. So, it should come as no surprise – to me 
while writing, or to anyone else – that an idea should 
decide of its own accord to seemingly drift away and 
allow another to take its place. Whether the former idea 
has indeed moved on or has just decided to slip into the 
background of the current idea can only be speculated 
on. And this ability to speculate is itself the convergence 
of both the human and non-human worlds, the latter 
including the world of the idea. That we can think at all, 
shows that the external world makes us up, or forms us. 
Like all other things, the idea may have moved on, or it 
may have simply withdrawn on its own account for a 
time but remain there in a hidden sense, whilst still 




My relationship to those things, conceptualised here as ideas, is expressed in this 
research as my understanding of creation occurring, though it is not an 
understanding that is arrived at through autonomous subjectivity.  Rather than 
conceptualising the process of thinking and writing as an individual’s intellectual 
activity, co-creation is an ethical stance that recognises the agency of all things.  
Co-creation recognises things in the world, not as objects of our individual or 
collective observations (and subsequent descriptions or critiques), but as subjects 
that engage in incessant movements that show up in our experience as ideas or 
emotive responses.  The researcher, in this process, is not the central creative figure.  
Instead the researcher is immersed in what Arola (2007) describes as the “ecstatic 
character of identity in Indigenous engagements with the world” (p. 2).  This 
understanding of co-creation is one of the main themes in the research and includes 
a focus on metaphysics and Being where things in the world, rather than being 
represented as partial components to be discovered and explained, are 
acknowledged as co-creators with agency.  How this co-creation manifests as a non-
rational and non-intellectual experience is also important to the research process 
and to what the research is attempting to communicate.   
 
It is difficult to argue for this view of knowledge creation in an academic setting 
because of the emphasis that is placed on an individual's ability to think and develop 
insight into a subject.  Within this thesis, the conceptualisation of thinking as an 
individual cognitive exercise is traced back to classical philosophy and a 
metaphysics that sets up the world as consisting of objects that may be known 
through an individual’s internal meditations, “to treat everything as though it were 
an object-in-general—as though it meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for 
our own use” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 159).  The impact of classical philosophy 
on indigenous metaphysics is discussed at length later in the thesis.  However, it is 
important here to introduce dominant Western metaphysics as a problematic 
perspective on knowledge and the disconnected observation of things in the world 
as objects with a universal essence that can be discovered and represented.  From 
an indigenous perspective, the world is an ecstatic matrix of intentional entities and 
while we can present our experience of these entities, we cannot (ethically) claim 




Throughout the thesis, the concept of ground or grounding is referenced as a way 
of describing where different philosophies have emerged from by attempting to 
locate their origins.  The concept of ground can also be related to how we carry who 
we are, where we are from and who our ancestors are, into other conceptual 
locations.  During this research, I was gifted with the anthology, Critical Indigenous 
Studies: engagements in first world locations, (Moreton-Robinson, 2016).  The sub-
title of this book, ‘engagements in first world locations’, is intended as a way of 
illustrating the political and cultural positioning of critical indigenous scholarship 
within a global community dominated by first world nations.   The concept of ‘first 
world locations’ creates an imaginary that illustrates the complex work that 
indigenous researchers must undertake within locations that are invested in non-
indigenous epistemes.   
 
The concept of grounding can be discussed as a way of understanding where 
‘things’ emerge from, including people but also extending to thoughts and ideas.  
The first world locations that are talked about in the Critical Indigenous Studies 
anthology are conceptualised as a form of ground from which understandings of the 
world emerge.  Moreton–Robinson (2016) states that there is a separation between 
indigenous and non-indigenous analytics that is warranted because “Indigenous 
knowledges, modes of inquiry we employ, methods we develop, and ethical and 
cultural protocols that inform our academic practice are not the same as those of 
non-indigenous scholars” (p. 4).  Indigenous methodologies create new places 
within these first world locations and as Moreton-Robinson states, “We are all 
constituted by kin and territory as owners or visitors.  We are always in an 
indigenous place wherever we find our institutional location” (p.10).  For the 
indigenous researcher, the challenge lies in presenting an experience of the world 
that avoids positively describing things as ‘this’ or ‘that’ or, as Arola (2007) 
explains in referring to Heidegger’s critique of classical philosophy, making the 
world into an intelligible phenomenon.   
 
Despite the fundamental differences that mark indigenous and dominant Western 
metaphysics, the academic expectation that what is written about will fit under a 
taxonomy of concepts remains as a concern (Hokowhitu, 2016).   As an indigenous 
researcher, I must continue to be mindful of the pull towards positivist 
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representations of things even as I aim to avoid this.  As Robertson (2017) explains, 
indigenous knowledge needs to involve more than, “rational deliberation on 
culturally mediated meanings” (p.181).  For me, the experience of being located 
within the world includes having an understanding that there are non-rational 
experiences which, rather than being hard to explain, do not necessarily require 
understanding that equates to Western reason.  As Marsden (2003) states, the reality 
we experience subjectively is incapable of rational synthesis.  These non-rational 
experiences are other ways of knowing the world without engaging a primarily 
cognitive calculation of what is being experienced.  
 
The metaphysical understanding of Being that a co-creative whakapapa experience 
brings forward is a way of understanding knowledge (and indeed the concept of 
knowledge) that differs from the metaphysical foundations of ‘Cartesian 
subjectivity’ that largely defines Being as thinking (Ahenakew et al., 2014).  The 
connected communication that the co-creative process involves also helps to 
illustrate the metaphysics of disconnection where, “The subject is simply the “I”, 
“soul”, or the “thinking substance” which is what it is even without the body and 
the world” (Cucen, n.d., para 4).  In contrast, connected, co-creative, embodied 
knowledge shifts the orientation of the self as a thinking substance external to the 
world, to understanding the self as a body that is a localised site of a wider 
ecosystem of existence.   
 
Whaiwhakaaro and its entities 
Within this research, engaging with the wider ecosystem in this way is called 
‘whaiwhakaaro’.  The term whaiwhakaaro (discussed at length in chapter three), 
was shared by Moana Jackson (2015) (quoting his grandfather) who translated it as 
“to follow the thought” (p. 60).  The term was shared as a way of reflecting on Linda 
Smith’s insights into Kaupapa Māori Research: that it is, “more than a paradigm 
and less than a paradigm, more than a methodology and less than a methodology” 
(Jackson, 2015, p.60).  Jackson is reflecting on Māori research and Māori 
knowledge being ‘something more and something less’ to capture a sense of fluidity 
characterised as an enabler of exploration and discovery.  The fluidity of Māori 
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research and knowledge, explained in this way, is more than a product of cognitive 
thinking and other than a person’s self-contained internal meditations.   
 
Reflecting on how to engage with a kaupapa that is concerned with the presentation 
of things in non-fixed terms, I wonder how I would avoid fixing things as soon as I 
refer to them using the concepts and terms that are available to me.  Each term that 
I use either has a fixed meaning, or a dominant meaning, or a range of meanings 
that can be applied.  It is hard to escape this. I am not seeking to construct a new 
archetype but to disrupt the notion of archetypes, insofar as that is possible.   
 
My understanding of the research process as co-creation and whakapapa is 
important not simply because it challenges what is often criticised as a dominant 
Western insistence on representing the world through the lens of rational thinking 
but (most importantly in my view), because the research seeks to discuss the 
unintelligible and indeterminable ways of knowing from my own experience which 
can be conceptualised as an expression of whakapapa.  This expression is not simply 
recalling memories of experiences I have had that can be described as solid, positive 
representations of events that have taken place.   Just as Jackson (2015) reflects on 
the nature of Māori research and Māori knowledge as ‘something more and 
something less’, I too understand that each idea presented in this thesis is an 
approximation of a much more profound meaning.  Conceptualising the 
presentation of ideas as approximations of things is a part of the ethical stance that 
recognises the agency of all things.   
 
The metaphysics that this experience and expression of whakapapa brings forward 
provides a basis for re-presenting Being from Māori and indigenous perspectives, 
but the presentation of ideas must be understood as a description of my relationship, 
including my non-verbal conversations with those seen and unseen things that help 
shape my understanding.  As Absolon and Willett (2005) explain, “In our 
experience as Indigenous peoples, the process of telling a story is as much the point 
as the story itself.” (2005, p. 98).  In this way, re-presenting my work as a researcher 
as something that comes from relationship, and that produces a type of ‘partial’ 
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rather than definitive knowledge of things, is as significant as the information that 
is produced through the research. 
 
Knowledge as embodiment 
While there is valuable research that describes our being-in-the-world as being 
influenced by physical, social, cultural and historical factors, this thesis explores 
Being as embodiment.  A focus on Being as embodiment gestures to an 
understanding of a metaphysics that recalls the influence of things that are not 
visible or readily identifiable in documented physical, social, cultural and historical 
landscapes.  Embodied knowledge is not a concept that is original to indigenous 
research.  However, the way that some non-indigenous explanations of embodied 
knowledge conceptualise our relationships with the world maintains a reliance on 
measurable, visible phenomena. For example, Ott (2017), describes embodied 
cognition as a process of thinking, 
 
to a large extent with the help of the things in our 
environment. The body itself has an extension and 
duration, and it can extend to other things, e.g. for a 
blind person, the stick becomes a sensing organ; when 
we drive a car, our perceived bodily dimensions extend 
to the car (so we can feel where we can pass and where 
not), etc. A very special way of extending embodied 
knowledge is to adopt another person’s viewpoint. 
Other persons are very important “tools” for extending 
and correcting our knowledge and behaviour (p.68). 
 
The embodied knowledge that is discussed in this thesis differs in that it describes 
an embodiment that exists in more than our spatial, psychological, or even 
conscious awareness of the world.  Further, embodied knowledge relates to other 
bodies such that the objects in Ott’s example may also be seen as a body rather than 
an extension of our own. Another way of understanding this view of embodiment 
is through a consideration the term ‘worldedness’ that Mika (2017a) uses to refer 
to the holistic understanding “that any one thing is constituted by all others…the 
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fullness of the world within one thing.” (p. 3).   In this context, the extension that 
Ott associates with embodiment exists without obvious acts of extension because it 
already is, even if it is not made obvious.  In this sense, the concept of embodied 
knowledge from a holistic indigenous perspective involves a relationship with the 
world - not simply embedded in the body through experience but existing through 
a common embeddedness shared by all things in the world.   As Ingold (2000) 
explains when reflecting on the relationship between the world and Being:  
 
it suddenly dawned on me that the organism and the 
person could be one and the same. Instead of trying to 
reconstruct the complete human being from two 
separate but complementary components, respectively 
biophysical and sociocultural, held together with a film 
of psychological cement, it struck me that we should be 
trying to find a way of talking about human life that 
eliminates the need to slice it up into these different 
layers (p.3).    
 
What is helpful in the examples that Ott (2017) uses is that some aspect of the 
extensions that he describes can remain indescribable or unknowable.   If the 
example of a blind person experiencing a stick as a sensory organ is viewed in a 
holistic sense in line with the concept of worldedness then the fullness of that 
experience cannot be fully known.  As Mika (2017a) explains, 
 
one thing is never alone, and all things actively 
construct and comprise it. As one thing presents itself to 
me, others within it may appear and hide, but even if I 
cannot perceive them (which I cannot) we can be 
assured that they are there. An object that I perceive is 
therefore fundamentally unknowable; I can speculate on 
it and give it a name, but all I can be certain of is that it 




The idea that things present themselves to us in a complex communication that does 
not rely on our ability to perceive or explain things might be described as intuition 
thinking (Ingold, 2000; D. Smith, 2018) or knowledge that is unintelligible 
(Hokowhitu, 2016).  Ingold’s (2000) reflections on connected Being, in particular 
his insight that “the organism and the person could be one and the same” (p. 3), to 
some degree articulates the understanding of intangible things in the world that I 
am engaging with in this thesis.  In coming to a new conceptualisation of being-in-
the-world that no longer attempts to merely bridge biophysical and social 
understandings of human nature, Ingold’s new orientation brings forward a holistic 
appreciation of Being that is helpful in reflecting on intuitive as opposed to 
cognitively derived communication.  It makes the entire world at once a part of 





CHAPTER THREE: WHAIWHAKAARO - A 
DIFFICULT DEPARTURE FROM METHOD 
Given that the focus of this thesis foregrounds those things in the world that are not 
fully tangible, I have had to consider other ways of engaging with utterance.  This 
is particularly important in terms of how I understand my approach to engaging 
with the interviews conducted as part of this research.   It is not enough to simply 
write about an intangible holism without bringing this worldview into the research 
process.  In this chapter, I consider how this intangible holism can guide the 
research and, in particular, how it can guide the development of (and departure 
from) what would, in conventional research, be called method. 
 
In chapter two of this thesis, the term whaiwhakaaro was discussed in relation to 
the act of engaging with the wider ecosystem of Being (both physical and non-
physical), reflected in Moana Jackson’s (2015) translation of this term which, as I 
noted earlier, was given by Jackson’s grandfather and means “to follow the thought’ 
(p. 60). In this chapter, I expand on the philosophical settings introduced in chapter 
two that foreground whaiwhakaaro.  The movement and fluidity that accompanies 
whaiwhakaaro, for Jackson, suggest that the concepts commonly associated with 
research and academic analysis are unable to contain the rich meaning that the term 
and its concept reflect.   
 
Whaiwhakaaro, as it applies to this research, concerns the active event of co-
creation, or an expression of conversations with the world and the influence of those 
things that both manifest in conscious thought and influence the self in embodied, 
unthinkable ways.  Whaiwhakaaro relates to the agency of things in the world that 
make this research (and all other things) something other than an individual’s 
academic effort.   This sense of the world’s agency will be explored at length later 
in this chapter; however, here I re-cover the general ground of thought that has led 
to my concern with an aspect of research that I describe as a fundamental dissonance 
between the idea (and application) of method and a holistic understanding of 
engagement.  This dissonance underlies what I have experienced as a dissatisfaction 
with the notion of method, which is often, at least in orthodox qualitative research, 
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conceptualised as an internal cognitive analysis (or interpretation) of external 
material or data.   
 
In this chapter, I explore some of the main issues related to my engagement with 
the concept of method and the problem that method has presented for me throughout 
this research.  From the outset, I want to make a declaration about my discomfort 
with the concept of method.  I begin by discussing this discomfort in order to 
highlight the aspects of method that have led to what I view as a fundamental 
discord between the idea of the methodical and ordered treatment of information as 
data on the one hand, and a more holistic research experience on the other.  I do this 
for two reasons: firstly, I aim to clear conceptual ground to make way for discussing 
this more holistic experience of research without the constraint of having to fit in 
with existing methods and approaches.  This is not to say that existing methods are 
ignored; rather, it signals that these methods provide ideas that help articulate a 
view on method (and non-method) as opposed to providing frameworks to align to.  
Secondly, it allows me to disrupt the concept of method when discussing 
whaiwhakaaro as a term that relates to how I have experienced the research process.   
 
Departure from method 
I set out, in this chapter, to defend my intended departure from conventional 
research through an attempt to disrupt the concept of method.  This intended 
departure is meant as a radical move to push beyond the limits of method as an 
expectation of how the research will be conducted.  I use the term radical here 
because it signals my intention to (attempt to) demonstrate what Mikaere (2015) 
refers to as a radical altering and re-ordering.  This move demands what she 
describes as a rigorous examination of Māori research to avoid sliding “unwittingly 
towards the point where we are in fact conducting [research] in largely the same 
way as Pākehā researchers do, while hiding behind the Kaupapa Māori label” 
(p.78).  Mikaere also challenges Māori researchers to pull away from colonised 
ways of thinking to instead traverse the path that is laid with Māori wisdom and 
theories of reality.  It is within this call for a departure from colonial thought that I 
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address the concept of method and the dissatisfaction that has led to my attempt to 
change my path and escape its expectations. 
 
In this chapter I argue that method expects a certain conformity that does not sit 
well with the holistic research experience I am attempting to articulate.  It seems to 
be common, for example, within conventional research that data collection and 
analysis are leaned on heavily to justify what it is to research.  While criticisms of 
rigidity in research methods are commonly applied to quantitative research that is 
seen as a reductive approach equating meaning with statistical representation (e.g., 
Verschuren, 2001), qualitative research methods are also of concern here because 
of the emphasis placed on certain components of research conceptualised as 
essential tools that ensure validity and reliability.   
 
Chamberlain (2000) makes this point when discussing qualitative research and what 
she refers to as ‘methodolatry’, described as a combination of method and idolatry 
in which the mechanics of method preoccupy the concerns of researchers at the 
expense of the story that is being told.  Chamberlain identifies specific aspects of 
method that are ‘idolised’ in the privileging of method over meaning including, “a 
focus on description at the expense of interpretation [and]… a concern with issues 
of validity and generalizability” (p. 285).  Chamberlain also identifies measurement 
as a core tenet of qualitative research supporting a view of validity as the degree to 
which a researcher’s methods can be said to produce a valid measurement of an 
aspect of reality. However, as I will argue in this chapter, the conceptualisation of 
reality as measurement restricts our view of validity in research so that we perceive 
validity to reside (exclusively) in method’s epistemic territory.   It also highlights 
the problematic clash of metaphysics within method demonstrated in Mika’s (2012) 
description of existence, “calcified” (p.1089), through the pre-eminence of 
“utterable data” (p. 1089), that affords the status of ‘realness’ only to what is made 
(methodically) visible.  Here we see a link between one key theme of this thesis – 
the metaphysics of presence – and the expectation that we will encounter things in 
the world as individual objects, utterances and thoughts for grouping. 
 
Where interviews are conducted in research, as they have been in this thesis, it 
would appear that there is an expectation that a conventional analysis of interviews 
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will follow where the interviews are treated as ‘data’.  The data driven analytic style 
for me, as I have just identified, is tied to a strict expectation that responses from 
participants will be ordered and grouped into themes that identify the (apparent) 
significant points related to an area of inquiry.   The ordering and grouping of 
themes and the relationship that this ordering has to presenting highly evident 
meaning is tied to the idea of objectivity and legitimating research through 
providing interpretations of data that are generalisable, landing on some type of 
universal meaning.   As I will go on to explain, my process of interpreting the 
interviews detracts from conventional approaches that codify talk into patterns of 
repetition equating what is real with what is prominent.   While the prominence of 
an idea or aspect of a participant’s response may still be presented through my own 
interpretation, the significance of participants’ responses will not depend (wholly) 
on their membership within a particular category of responses.  It is entirely possible 
(and valid) that one word, sentence or thought shared by a participant will provoke 
thinking and in such a way that reporting about my response to that provocation 
will carry significant meaning for myself as the researcher and others who may read 
what is presented.   
 
In attempting to articulate a holistic research experience I move across different 
theoretical (and non-theoretical) landscapes in what I experience as a complex web 
of contradictory thoughts about method, non-method, interviews as data, things that 
do not fit easily with the concept of data, and the process of analysis.  I engage with 
contrasting ideas proposed by others who also express dissatisfaction with the 
current use and structure of method but whose critiques appear to be limited (and 
captured) by the parameters of method and the legitimated tools that are made 
available to make sense of the information gathered through research.  These 
expressions of dissatisfaction, while not a perfect mirror of my own dissatisfaction, 
provide helpful points that approximate my own concerns.   
 
Appealing to the critiques provided by other researchers has been helpful as I 
attempt to disrupt the term method and its function in order to conceive of holism 
as an approach to research and what might be conceptualised as a type of culturally 
informed analytic experience.  As an indigenous researcher, I believe that disrupting 
the concept of method is a move that builds on the wider context of indigenous 
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discontent with dominant Western research methods and methodologies. I see in 
indigenous critiques of dominant research approaches the seeds of my own 
discontent - the acts of naming and claiming that characterise research and, in 
particular, research that has focussed on indigenous realities.  
  
The discontent expressed in this chapter is reflected in the concerns of Smith, 
Maxwell, Puke and Temara (2016) who describe a “gnawing sense of mayhem at 
play” (p.131), when considering how indigenous knowledges are consolidating 
within the academy.  This sense of mayhem is mirrored in a scepticism about 
academic research expectations - a wariness tied to the academy’s tendency to over-
determine Māori and indigenous knowledges and attempts to ensure a structured 
alignment with institutional research regimes.  As part of these regimes, they point 
out that method and methodologies provoke complex questions about research – is 
it friend or foe?  Does research empower and expand Māori and indigenous worlds 
or are methodologies “simply new technologies of cultural assimilation”? (p. 133).  
Indeed, as Gordon (2011) observes, 
 
That modes of producing knowledge can be enlisted in 
the service of colonization is evident. Frantz Fanon, for 
instance, reflected…that methods have a way of 
devouring themselves. In doing so, he brought into 
focus the problem of evaluating method itself, of 
assessing methodology. If the epistemic conditions of 
social life are colonized, would not that infection reach 
also the grammatical level as well? Put differently, 
couldn’t there also be colonization at the 
methodological level? If so, then, any presumed 
method, especially from a subject living within a 
colonized framework, could generate continued 
colonization. To evaluate method, the best “method” is 
the suspension of method. This paradox leads to a 
demand for radical anti-colonial critique. But for such a 
reflection to be radical, it must also make even logic 




Within this scepticism, questions about the kind of Māori and indigenous 
knowledges that are being produced and constructed through research also arise, 
including research that claims to use methods from within indigenous knowledge 
frameworks.  My own “gnawing sense of mayhem” is at play in this context as I 
question my use of method and what this means in claiming to produce Māori 
research and Māori knowledge.  
 
Māori and indigenous critiques of method and methodologies 
Indigenous scholars have engaged in long-standing challenges to dominant research 
paradigms both within academia’s epistemic system and within the broader context 
of colonisation.  It is widely understood that European colonizers applied standards 
of what is ‘right’ to the study of Indigenous communities, resulting in stories of 
backwards civilizations and imaginaries of the Indigenous Savage (Denzin, 
Lincoln, and Smith, 2008).   Historically, research has positioned indigenous 
peoples as the object of research rather than “initiator, manager or co-investigator” 
(Rigney, 2006, p. 32).  Tied into the history of researching indigenous ways of life, 
the positivist research paradigm is recognised as a central feature of dominant 
research methods and methodology in which the distant expert engages in a 
detached, value-free study of phenomena (Fong, Braun, & Tsark, 2003).   
 
Positivistic research constructs are also criticised for the partial cultural worldviews 
that they reflect (i.e. that of Euro-American society), and their role in perpetuating 
these worldviews through determining the validity of research practices (Wilson, 
2008).  Discussing the positivist approach through the example of qualitative 
scientific research, Denzin, Lincoln and Smith (2008) describe how research in this 
context becomes a metaphor for coloniality and the lens through which scientific 
investigation sees the world: 
 
Sadly, qualitative research in many, if not all, of its 
forms (observation, participation, interviewing, and 
ethnography) serves as a metaphor for colonial 
knowledge. The metaphor works this way: Research, 
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quantitative and qualitative, is scientific.  Research 
provides the foundation for reports about and 
representations of the other.  In a colonial context, 
research becomes an objective way of representing the 
dark skinned other to the White world.  Colonising 
nations relied on human disciplines, especially 
sociology and anthropology, as well as other field note-
taking journaling observers, to produce knowledge 
about strange and foreign worlds.  This close 
involvement with the colonial project contributed, in 
significant ways, to qualitative research’s long and 
anguished history (p.4). 
 
The process of making “representations of the other” that is described here is a 
central concern for indigenous researchers and communities. Jahnke and Taipa 
(1999) describe traditional Western research methods and methodologies as a 
process whereby knowledge was taken, manipulated to fit a Eurocentric framework, 
and represented back to the rest of the world in a form that is unrecognisable to the 
original custodians. Indigenous responses to positivist colonial research have 
worked to resist (and re-tell) the stories created as descriptions of indigenous 
communities, resisting reports about ‘the other’ that emerge from the scientific 
gaze.  This resistance has led to a strong commitment from indigenous peoples to 
ensure the stories that are told through research stem from indigenous accounts of 
lived realities and are connected to the communities that are involved, not only as 
participants, but also as investigators.  Further, indigenous communities have made 
strong contributions to work that seeks to disrupt the central authoritative position 
of dominant Western epistemologies and methods of knowledge production as a 
means of decolonising approaches to research (Lavalee, 2009; Smith, 2009).   
 
The term ‘decolonisation’ has been used in critical discussions on research practices 
referring to the potential to change research approaches to expel colonial, scientific, 
and positivist explanations of indigenous realities.  Linda Smith’s (1999) 
publication, Decolonising Methodologies is a prime example of the complex and 
intricate critiques that have emerged from within indigenous research communities. 
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In writing about the decolonisation of research, Smith describes indigenous peoples 
desire to “write our own stories, write our own versions, in our own ways, for our 
own purposes” (p. 29).   
 
The imperative of engaging in decolonising research methods and methodology lies 
not only in re-telling stories from indigenous perspectives but also in understanding 
the methodical construction of stories and how the process or method of 
constructing stories through research has displaced indigenous epistemologies and 
ways of knowing (Good-year-Ka’opua, 2013).  As Bishop (1996) explains, in 
relation to Māori worldviews, Western research’s misrepresentation of Māori 
knowledges has had lasting impacts, creating myths out of, “misconstrued Māori 
cultural practices and meanings” (p.14), that are taken up as facts about the Māori 
world.   He gives the example of research that measures Māori knowledge and 
worldviews against frameworks designed to legitimate colonial values, setting in 
place a false standard of what counts as real and what is considered positive (and 
progressive) in the context of human endeavours.  This type of measurement is one 
that Bishop recognises as an embedded structure of methods that are a fundamental 
step in the process of positioning Māori knowledges as culturally inferior.   
 
Smith (1999) explains that many critiques of research focus on empiricism as a 
theory of knowledge which gave way to the scientific paradigm of positivism.  
Braun, Browne, Ka’opua, Kim and Mokuau (2014) describe a core criticism of 
positivist knowledge and research as the tendency to position the researcher as 
expert, producing definitive knowledge or being cast as “distant, and value free” 
(p.118).  While much indigenous scholarship within institutions of knowledge 
production has worked to oppose the positivist scientific paradigm, there is 
continued dissatisfaction with the philosophies that guide dominant Western 
knowledge systems (Rigney, 2001).  Whether or not positivism has given way 
continues to be a matter of conjecture. 
 
Kincheloe and Tobin (2009), in an article titled The much-exaggerated death of 
positivism, argue that while there are many claims that positivism has been 
discredited, knowledge production continues to follow core tenets of positivism 
through empirical research that frames the application of scientific methods as 
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pathways to obtain social truths.  Kincheloe and Tobin describe the methods of 
historical positivism as observation, experimentation and predication that,  
 
would lead to an understanding of social life in terms of 
causal, invariable, and universal laws and interrelations 
among them [and] positivism involved posing salient 
research questions, identifying important variables, 
obtaining measures for participants on all variables, and 
analysing data to produce causal relationships between 
variables. Empiricism was positivism’s backbone as it 
evolved and thrived (p.515).   
 
Using the term “crypo-positivism” (p.514), Kincheloe and Tobin (2009) propose 
that there are six epistemological and ontological (onto-epistemic) assumptions that 
characterise the “contemporary manifestations of the culture of positivism” (p. 
518).  These include: formalisation (a fundamental research methodology that 
resists circumstances and new ideas; usually taught in a step by step process), 
intractability (the ontological assumption that the world is inert, static and fixed, 
allowing for conceptual representation), decontextualization (phenomenon are 
removed from the contexts that they are intimately tied to and that give meaning 
e.g. IQ tests, psychological testing), universalism  (a step by step process leads to 
the production of knowledge that is applicable to all domains), reductionism 
(reducing complex wholes to simple parts and assuming no information is lost), and 
uni-dimensional representation (representing the one true reality that can be 
identified and described through using the right research methods).   Many of these 
assumptions are familiar to indigenous scholars who have worked to articulate 
culturally specific epistemologies that reflect local realities, defying the 
universalist, reductionist essentialism inherent in positivist research and 
representations of the world.  However, Kincheloe and Tobin warn that positivism 
haunts our methods of inquiry (including the notion of methods itself), in such a 
way that the complexities of what are thought of as knowledge, and processes of 
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producing knowledge as validated epistemologies, remain (to differing degrees) 
unexamined in learning institutions.   
 
This haunting legacy of positivism does not indicate that there is a lack of care from 
researchers (and this point is particularly relevant for those researchers that are 
intimately linked to indigenous communities).  What it does indicate, however, is 
that there are ongoing complex challenges faced by indigenous researchers in 
attempting to articulate cultural knowledges from within dominant Western 
research paradigms.  As Braun (2014) explains, researchers do not,  
 
deliberately set out to cause harm through their 
research. However, most indigenous and non-
indigenous researchers have been trained in the 
positivist research paradigm, which is heavily 
influenced by the research methods of the natural 
sciences dating back to the turn of the 20th century. 
Thus, we likely embrace it until challenged otherwise. 
At the same time, data are needed upon which to base 
social policy and service delivery, and researchers are 
applying quantitative and qualitative methods to obtain 
these data (p. 119).   
 
Indigenous researchers tend to understand the importance of developing approaches 
to research that are consistent with indigenous philosophies, accounting for 
complex methodological and ethical issues (Smith, 1999).  Yet vigilance is needed 
where dominant research approaches demand a distanced observation of objects 
(including people), thereby ensuring the measurement of a social world existing 
independently of messy, untrustworthy things, such as intuitive understandings of 
life that elude measure and experiences that do not form tidy patterns (Macguire, 
1987).   
 
While my own research includes activities that could be conceptualised as methods 
(including interviewing and reviewing literature), I am taking an approach that 
purposely resists rigid structure. I also aim to resist using a methodical style of 
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analysis that allows for measurement or produces findings to describe the central 
nature of a phenomenon.  In this sense, while the terms I have at hand to describe 
the research are commonly associated with an empirical structured approach, the 
research is just as equally free flowing and ‘messy’, following the intuitive 
understandings of life and eluding measure and definitive representation. In 
considering whaiwhakaaro as a holistic research experience, I have tried to imagine 
how my approach to research is different from orthodox empirical research 
methods.  I am also aware that I am traversing difficult terrain in opposing an 
empiricism that has (so far) supported many indigenous research efforts and, in this 
context, I have much to explain about the exact nature of my dissatisfaction with 
method and what I propose to do instead.  I am, after all, telling a story in this 
research (as all research tells stories), so how do I avoid also producing “reports 
about and representations of the other”? (Denzin et al, 2008, p.5).  
 
“What method have you adopted for your research?”   
The question, “what method have you adopted for your research” is taken from 
Luce Irigaray’s (1985) reflections on research and her experience as a student who 
was challenged about her resistance to using more formal methods while 
completing her doctoral thesis (see Irigaray, 1985, p. 150).  Avery Gordon (2008) 
borrows from Irigaray’s experience in being asked this question, using it to 
highlight how she herself has experienced the challenge of resisting the rigidity of 
method and her attempts to defend what the academy views as unusual research 
territory.  It is a common question – a familiar anticipation within an academy that 
expects research to fit the shapes left by research that has come before.  The 
question “what method have you adopted for your research?” is loaded with the 
anticipation of reference - that the method selected already has a name, that the 
name will already have a theoretical position and place, and that the place will 
already contain familiar structures.   
 
Gordon’s (2008) concern with method as a problematic construct is embedded in 
her own research question: she describes this murky exploration as a type of 
sociological haunting.  She is compelled to look at the hidden spaces of meaning 
that are left by what is not said or written about: to acknowledge that same gnawing 
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sense of mayhem Smith et al. (2016) describe when imagining the workings of 
Māori and indigenous knowledges within the institutions that produce knowledge.  
 
Gordon’s (2008) research is, by disciplinary definition, located within sociology, 
but her research question cannot as easily find purchase within the disciplinary 
frame.  She is concerned with what she calls, “the tracks of our fieldwork” (p. 36): 
that method hides these tracks, emboldens assumptions about real stories being told, 
and the assumptions about ethnography being “the capacity to say “This is so” 
(p.20).  In attempting to explain her research, and a feeling of urgency in addressing 
sociology’s role in the making of scientific stories, Gordon inevitably faces 
questions about method.  In boldly asserting that social science research is in the 
habit of producing what she calls “real fictions” (p.38), Gordon explains that the 
latter stem from a culture of knowledge production characterised by, 
 
Bloodless categories, narrow notions of the visible and 
the empirical, professional standards of indifference, 
institutional rules of distance and control, barely 
speakable fears of losing the footing that enables us to 
speak authoritatively and with greater value than 
anyone else who might (p.21).    
 
Tied into these bloodless indifferent categories are the “strategically repressed 
marks of the so-called private” (Spivak, 1987, p.15).  These are, in essence, the 
marks of  imagined objectivities that claim, through normal social science method, 
to dispose of mayhem, unruliness, the researcher’s personal markings and the trace 
of what Gordon refers to as “paths disavowed, left behind, covered over and [that] 
remain unseen” (p.41).  
 
Gordon’s (2008) concern for ‘real fictions’ is a concern for the ‘real’ as something 
produced:  a concern that might seem familiar to indigenous researchers who have 
dealt with real fictions for generations in stories that are told about indigenous 
realities and observed cultural curiosities.  Gordon’s resistance to method (as an 
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insistence that we look to the traces created by the stories that are not told) provokes 
strong responses from the academy that poses,  
 
a question demanding to know the implications of 
understanding the ethnography within an epistemology 
of truth as partial, as an artifact of the complex social 
rituals, bound historically to modernity and its uncertain 
aftermath, that produce an understanding, a truth, the 
real (p. 38).   
 
My own concern about real fictions and about claims to find truth through methods 
that ensure the identification of the real is also a concern about the traces of things 
left behind by the expectation of true representations.  These are the things that 
remain unseen or what Gordon eloquently describes as “the factual’s always 
encroaching other” (p.40).  We are told in different ways that method will offer 
some assuredness and what we produce will have validity: our research, rigorous 
and methodical, will tell types of truths and, in line with academic expectations, 
will help determine a certainty about the thing being analysed.  I reflect on this 
when thinking of what I have so far resisted calling a method, the act (or perhaps 
relational process) of whaiwhakaaro that is characterised by its haziness (Mika and 
Southey, 2016).  This haziness is not a statement about ‘hazy thinking’ that can be 
misconstrued as a laziness of incomplete thought.  As a whole, it is perhaps less 
about the type of thinking that is taking place and more, from a metaphysical 
perspective, about the input of the ‘other’ into the thinking; it engages the holistic 
experience as a relationship with things in the world that can affect thinking.    
 
I reflect on these things not just as a way of witnessing the personal markings that 
I leave in developing research (the otherwise ‘strategically repressed marks’ that 
are left when engaging in the analysis of data), but also as an acknowledgement of 
those things that haunt.  These are the “paths disavowed, left behind, covered over 
and (that) remain unseen” (Gordon, 2008, p. 41), which, from a Māori perspective, 
might be understood as the co-creators of our work that presents (as described in 
chapter two of this thesis), ‘the profound and personal expression of relationship 
with things in the world’.  I am, of course, acutely aware of the expectations of 
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objectivity that are suspicious of a metaphysics locating the researcher within all 
that is part of the research, preferring an approach that is based on detachment.  I 
understand the risks that are taken through attempting to not only disavow method 
but to assert (in necessary contrast therefore), a non-method, and to articulate how 
I have researched within this non-method, drawing on a thoughtful relational Being 
and the co-creative movement of whaiwhakaaro.  
 
I cannot easily escape the potential consequences of attempting to disrupt the 
ground of methodical research simply through borrowing from existing techniques 
that have some purchase in academic research (though I might find the idea of some 
existing methods like, for example, Grounded Theory, useful and complementary). 
Even if we resort to a process of emerging meaning (such as with Grounded 
Theory), as opposed to utilising pre-set theories or ideas, the expectation of active 
and organised searching still holds sway. The researcher is the central agent of 
construction, denying methods that might allow for the kind of fluidity that I aim to 
demonstrate. For example, Morse (1994) critiques Grounded Theory research for 
utilising the idea of things emerging through analysis, rather than being 
predetermined, by arguing that, 
 
Doing qualitative research is not a passive endeavor. 
Despite current perceptions and student’s prayers, 
theory does not magically emerge from data. Nor is it 
true that, if only one is patient enough, insight 
wondrously enlightens the researcher. Rather, data 
analysis is a process that requires astute questioning, a 
relentless search for answers, active observation, and 
accurate recall. It is a process of piecing together data, 
of making the invisible obvious, of recognizing the 
significant from the insignificant, of linking seemingly 
unrelated facts logically, of fitting categories one with 
another, and of attributing consequences to antecedents. 
It is a process of conjecture and verification, of 
correction and modification, of suggestion and defence. 
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It is a creative process of organizing data so that the 
analytic scheme will appear obvious (p.25).  
 
Reading this description, I can discern the image of a researcher who, through 
proper process and method, has discovered things external to the self.  These things 
exist ‘out there’ waiting to be found, no longer invisible and, after proper method 
has been applied, clearly marked by their significance (as if this was a real quality 
to be discovered above other insignificant qualities).  These obedient data, waiting 
to be homed in their proper place, are the passive objects in qualitative research that 
is not a passive endeavour.  Within this view of research, and the researcher’s 
central role, the researcher is permitted an agency that things (as objects of 
research), are completely denied.  However, I wonder about this accusation of 
passivity - what is passive about the profound and personal expression of 
relationship with things in the world?  In acknowledging the holistic experience as 
a relationship with things in the world that can affect thinking, is there not an active 
communication occurring? It is with this question in mind that I go further into 
exploring the term whaiwhakaaro and its implications for the notion of relationship 
and holism in research.   
 
Whaiwhakaaro 
The term whaiwhakaaro will be explored here to assist in providing an explanation 
of the holistic research experience and the act of thinking as responsive and 
reflexive reaction.   Whaiwhakaaro, in the context of how research is conducted, 
brings forward complex questions about the process of knowledge production and 
the acceptability of certain methods to produce what is deemed to be valid 
knowledge. This includes raising questions that interrogate perspectives that 
privilege knowledge stemming from seemingly rigorous approaches to 
investigating and/or measuring phenomena.   
 
My own approach to research could easily be challenged within an academic 
framework that is shaped by notions of validity and rigorous measurement.  
Whaiwhakaaro is not a structured methodical process.   It has so far been described 
(broadly) within this thesis as ‘thinking’, or ‘thought’, though not in the sense of 
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thought that can be defined within a cognitive context.  As mentioned, it is a type 
of thinking that is characterised by its sense of conceptual haziness, resisting a full 
representation of any one thing.  Whaiwhakaaro speaks to the researcher’s 
vulnerability and openness to the influence of other things in the world (Mika and 
Southey, 2016).  This vulnerability and influence can be understood in the context 
of Gordon’s (2008) concern with the traces of things that linger outside of the limits 
of meaning we create in our descriptions, suspending our arrival at conceptual 
places of certainty.   
 
As an ethical stance, whaiwhakaaro, and the researcher’s vulnerability as a partial 
contributor, signal that there is more at play than an individual’s detached value-
free analysis.  As I discussed in the introduction of this thesis in relation to Mika’s 
(2017a) reflections on the interrelationship of things in the world, our drive to (over) 
determine sits at odds with the mystery that Māori and indigenous metaphysics 
conveys. This metaphysics has been described as the collapse of all things (of the 
world), into any one object.  Within this collapse, the agency of things in the world, 
including ideas that form the self and the forming of thought through relationship 
with ‘all that is’, illustrates a powerful influence that shows up in thinking yet also 
impacts on the researcher in ways that are not obvious or fully discernible. The 
embodied knowledge that I described earlier in chapter two is implicated here. It 
provides an understanding that embodied knowledge relates to other bodies and that 
these bodies, while part of our experience, are not qualities that can always be 
discovered or known.  As Mika explains, 
 
It does strike me as a curious possibility with 
indigenous philosophy that, as soon as the ultimate, true 
ground of thought has been identified, it appears to 
swim out of view, to be replaced by an apparently 
similar idea of a ground. Another creature altogether 
may have moored itself (p.1). 
 
Some might seek comfort in understanding whaiwhakaaro as a type of 
hermeneutics, which involves a methodology of interpretation dealing with 
meaningful human actions, particularly when interpreting written text 
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(Mantzavinos, 2016).  Indeed, much work has been done by indigenous scholars to 
ensure that descriptions and interpretations of the world are more than simply 
stories told from a singular dominant worldview. However, whaiwhakaaro, while 
inclusive of a type of interpretation, is both a natural aspect of being-in-the-world 
and an active stance taken by an indigenous researcher.  This stance is one that 
seeks to re-claim a relationship with Being that otherwise would be moved into the 
shadows of thinking, conceptualised merely as a mental activity and one that 
manages only to explore things that are visible to the thinker.  The invisible, the 
absent, and the agency of other things in the world are wholly important in 
considering whaiwhakaaro as a personal relationship that re-imagines thinking as 
relational Being.   
 
Here, I will explore whaiwhakaaro within a broader consideration of what 
traditional knowledge frameworks indicate about the nature of knowledge and the 
act of ‘thinking’ from Māori and indigenous perspectives.  The term whakaaro is 
helpful as a starting point in this exploration because it provides an understanding 
of thinking outside of a dominant Western conceptualisation of thought as a rational 
process. Takirirangi Smith (2000), in breaking the term down to whaka aro, offers 
the translation, “to cast attention to” (p. 58), which, as I will go on to argue, carries 
a more appropriate meaning from within a Māori worldview.  For example, my 
initial response to this translation is to imagine being called to attention by other 
things in the world that signal their presence with intention and that would, 
simultaneously, cast their own attention to things.  
 
As T. Smith (2000) explains, the common translation of whakaaro merely as 
(cognitive) ‘thought’ is part of a wider process of marginalisation in which Māori 
discourses are submerged into dominant frameworks.  The effects of this 
submergence, rather than representing a mere linguistic dissonance, are said to be 
deeply felt by the indigenous subject.  Mika (2014) explains that the translation of 
Māori terms disrupts meaning and what traditionally would signal the connection 
of the self to things in the world.   In translating whakaaro as the casting of attention 
towards a thing (beyond mere thought) we begin to see the sense of connection that 
thinking involves from a Māori perspective.   This sense of connection implicates 
a holistic thinking that expands ideas of thought, moving past the (conceptual and 
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material) containment of thought as a mental process but also moving beyond the 
conceptualisation of thought as a self-contained activity.   
 
The concept of embodied thought is highlighted here as one pathway to begin 
understanding thought as a more expansive notion.  T. Smith (2000) describes 
embodied thought as the engaging of emotions, feeling and instinct, associated not 
with the mind or brain but instead, as evidenced in pre-colonial language, with other 
parts of the body and to things external to the body.  T. Smith (2015) discusses 
knowledge in relation to the human body, describing the body as having a structure 
with components that are “influenced by particular atua and poutiriao” (p.259).   
Discussing contemplative and reflective thought, T. Smith (2015) describes how 
language indicates that ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ occurs within the ngākau.   
Referring to descriptions of thought associated with the ngākau, he points to, ‘te 
whakaaro o te ngākau’ and ‘te hinengaro o te ngākau’, explaining that,  
 
Early language references do not say that this activity 
occurs in the brain (roro), which suggests that responses 
centred within the brain were perceived as fleeting and 
impulsive.  Therefore, most evidence indicates that 
rational thought was centred within the ngākau and was 
a holistic process (p.261). 
 
Similarly, Marsden (2003) points to the heart as the place where knowledge is 
integrated as wisdom.  Knowledge, Marsden explains, is “a thing of the head” or 
“an accumulation of facts” (p.59) that constitutes a grouping of unorganised ideas.  
Wisdom on the other hand is an inner awareness gained through the thought 
processes of the heart.   
 
L. Smith (1999) also discusses the body’s role in thinking, contrasting an embodied 
view of knowledge with that of dominant Western philosophy.  Smith’s concern is 
with the creation of cultural constructs that favour a view of the world marked by 
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separation, including the separation of sense and reason and the idea of separating 
mind and body exemplified by Cartesian Dualism.  As she explains,  
 
Whilst the workings of the mind may be associated in 
Western thinking primarily with the human brain, the 
mind itself is a concept or an idea.  In Māori 
worldviews, for example, the closest equivalent to the 
idea of a ‘mind’ or intellect is associated with the 
entrails and other parts of the body.  The head was 
considered tapu for other reasons (p.50).   
 
Further from this, notions of rational thought that, in a dominant Western 
worldview, may be associated with cognitive abilities such as memory, are 
explained as an interconnected network.  As T. Smith (2000) explains, this network 
involves ‘Te Wananga a Rangi’ (knowledge from above) and intuitive, instinctive 
knowledge; this includes knowing and learning associated with the ira tangata 
(earthly component of that which forms the basis of action), Papatūānuku 
(referenced earlier in Marsden’s translation as ‘rock foundation beyond expanse, 
the infinite) and “the ngākau, the stomach and the central region of the body” (p. 
58), rather than resulting from the act of detached internalised thinking.    
 
This interconnected phenomenon extends to what is apparently the most integral 
aspect of an entity.  In the case of the human Being, the ira tangata aspect is 
commonly translated as ‘gene’, indicating a preference to equate ira with a highly 
visible (and, by using certain methods, measurable) phenomenon.  From a Māori 
perspective, however, the connection between ira and the concept of knowledge 
(and thinking)8 cannot be reduced to a biological function.  Ira tangata has 
elsewhere been described as the human essence which comprises physical, spiritual 
and emotional needs (Walker, 2016), and humankind (Tamati, 2007).   However, 
far from denoting a detached human condition, ira tangata, in the context of the 
interconnected process of knowledge generation, is intimately linked to ira atua 
 
    8 I have separated thinking and knowledge here to emphasise that I am not making any claims to 
knowledge as an outcome of the research; instead I am seeing where thinking takes me in relation 
to the research question. 
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(translated by Tamati, 2007, as supernatural life).  Knowledge associated with the 
ira tangata aspect of Being has also been described in an embodied sense that does 
not restrict thinking to the conceptual mind or physical brain.  This view of 
knowledge augurs a very different view to that of the West.  As one participant in 
a study by Cram, Pihama, and Phillip-Barbara (2000) explained, “In terms of 
knowledge, it is very different from the occidental way of seeing knowledge, 
feeding knowledge into the head. We see that knowledge is already there and 
through learning it was brought to consciousness” (p. 65). 
 
Whaiwhakaaro, translated as “to follow the thought” (Jackson, 2015, p. 60), implies 
a sense of movement towards a thing as well as providing a sense that a thought has 
presented itself with agency.  I say this because it would appear that, in order to 
follow a thought, it must be something that is at once connected to the self (as we 
might understand a thought to be within our consciousness), and also something 
that has its own autonomous stance, presenting itself in order to be regarded.  
Marsden (2003) describes this co-existing autonomy and connection in relation to 
students of wananga who are approaching graduation, describing their task of 
learning “to commune with the spirit of their tutelary deity and (to) return with some 
original knowledge.” (p. 58).  Kovach (2009) similarly describes rituals (such as 
fasting and other ceremonial practices) that lead to “inward knowledge” (p. 50), 
gained through spiritual connection.   
 
In discussing Marsden’s own experience of communion as a student within 
wananga, Royal (2017) describes the expectation that the student would return with 
new knowledge, conceptualising it as “new knowledge arriving”, imbuing a sense 
of movement that, again, indicates the things showing of the self (in Marsden’s 
account, a spirit or deity) in order to be regarded.  Again, this sense of movement 
and arrival connects back to the translation of whaiwhakaaro as “to follow the 
thought” (Jackson, 2015, p. 60), as a type of fluidity, implicating an animated 
entitized movement that we can engage with or follow.  Similarly, Murphy (2011), 
discussing knowledge held by women, articulates the sense of an experience of 
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knowledge arriving through the use of the term ‘immaculate’.9  Immaculate 
knowledge might be understood as something gained, not through rational focus or 
study, but rather through a process of receiving that is not fully explainable.  
Further, the communion that Marsden describes may indicate a potential source of 
knowledge but does not denote a fully describable, discernible (or intellectual) 
process.  
 
This simultaneous engagement in the showing of the self (the autonomous aspect 
of things in the world), and communion or connected communication (the act of 
regarding as an internalisation of the external arrival of knowledge), can be related 
to the idea of co-creation introduced earlier in the thesis.   The co-creation of 
thought and knowledge encapsulates the idea that what is produced in writing (and 
other forms of presentation) culminates from a communal process of knowledge 
production intrinsically formed from whakapapa.  Rather than conceptualising 
knowledge as a human endeavour that reflects the “rhetoric of modernity and 
coloniality” (Ahenakew et al., 2014, p. 221), whakapapa as a conceptual frame for 
understanding knowledge production, disrupts the idea of knowledge as definitive 
understanding or as an endpoint of individual intellectualism.   
 
Roberts and Wills (1998) describe how whakapapa frames knowledge as metaphor 
“with language [which] creates a ‘whakapapa of the mind,’ revealing and 
concealing the many layers of meaning of mātauranga and of wananga” (p. 62).  
This complex process of revealing and concealing allows for a legitimate 
uncertainty that (from a Māori worldview) is rich with meaning.  This simultaneous 
revelation and concealment of meaning helps to illustrate how we might consider 
thinking as whaiwhakaaro that, from a metaphysical perspective, sits askew to other 
ways of relating to the world including relating through certainty and through the 
discovery of universal essence.  As De Castro (1998) explains, understanding 
knowledge as certainty sits “at right angles” (p. 469), to other possibilities of 
 
    9 In reading Murphy’s description of women’s knowledge as immaculate, I did not get the impression 
that Murphy is connecting women’s knowledge with a Christian view of the ‘immaculate’.  Rather, 
I read this as a clever use of the term that raises the possibility of knowledge being a type of influence 
on the person which aligns with T. Smith’s (2013) description of being “influenced by particular 
atua and poutiriao” (p.259).    
70 
 
knowing that represent what Hokowhitu (2016) describes as the “radical component 
of Indigenous studies” (p.84), including the unintelligible.   
 
Within te ao Māori, metaphorical expressions of knowledge have also been related 
to pūrākau, which Lee (2015) describes as, “a traditional form of Māori narrative, 
[that] contains philosophical thought, epistemological constructs, cultural codes, 
and worldviews that are fundamental to our identity as Māori” (p. 96).  As Lee 
explains, in research, pūrākau has provided the means to rethink “conventional 
research methods and academic styles of documentation and re-turn to our own 
narratives, to experiment with literary techniques to research, and disseminate 
knowledge in ways that are culturally relevant and accessible” (p.99). While 
whaiwhakaaro as a (non) method may not necessarily inform the development of 
pūrākau, the freedom to express in ways that the academy might deem 
unconventional is a point of difference that is shared with pūrākau within a research 
context.   
 
Roberts (2013) describes pūrākau (as narratives), as guides for understanding a 
landscape or habitat including those cosmological aspects such as (collapsed) space 
and time.  Roberts highlights the complexity of pūrākau, while also referring to their 
purpose in terms of human faculties, calling them “mental mind maps” (p. 97), of 
ecosystems.  Roberts refers to these mental mind maps as a “cosmoscape” (p. 97), 
where the intangible is acknowledged, existing in unison with visible phenomena 
that are understood using cognitive capacities where person-centred understandings 
of the world are aided by narratives of relatives - Beings and ancestors.  Further, 
Randal, Geekie, Lambrecht, and Taitimu (2008) describe these metaphorical 
presentations as an “alternative narrative” (p. 340) on states of Being.   
 
Whaiwhakaaro, qualitative research and method 
Discussing knowledge and research as a holistic experience that implicates both 
physical and spiritual elements of Being illustrates a metaphysical consideration of 
whaiwhakaaro as the act of thinking.  Whaiwhakaaro provides a cultural frame to 
describe how I intend to engage with the material that comes from interviews 
conducted as part of the research and with other things in the world (such as ideas 
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that come, incidental informal kōrero, and involvement in specific wananga that 
appear to provide synergistic answers to things I have been questioning).  I argue 
that my engagement with these things cannot be reduced to an account of how I 
have analysed data as might be the case in most conventional qualitative research.  
I do not, for example, describe a method of analysis that details how I have coded 
interview transcripts.  Part of my experience of dealing with the concept of method 
has been navigating the difference between method as a technical activity and as a 
philosophical idea.  In a technical sense, I understand there is an expectation that as 
an academic researcher I will provide an explanation of how I have gathered 
information and how I have engaged with this information to produce findings and 
ideas related to these findings.   
 
In research, method is used to describe the systemic process of investigation.  The 
method section of a research report provides information that determines the 
validity of the research, including enough specific detail to enable others to replicate 
the research and for the audience to determine whether the findings and conclusion 
of the research hold true (that is, have validity) (Kallet, 2004).  I understand that, in 
a traditional academic sense, there is much at stake in the selection, planning and 
application of a method.  The validity of what I report in this research is at stake 
and is tied, in a very structured way, to how I have produced ‘knowledge’.  Am I 
heading into an “improper defence of an institutional territory” (Gordon, 2008, 
p.39), or an improper defence of method?  
 
I wonder about my own fate in the context of Luce Irigaray’s (1985) experience of 
defending, not an institutional territory, but its apparent opposite in engaging in an 
honest attempt to leave behind a rigid idea of method as an (expected) structured 
approach to ‘analysing data’.  This is also a position on method that is full of messy 
contradiction.  My own aversion to the notion of method and denial of this notion 
in areas of writing within this thesis co-exists with descriptions of activities like 
interviews, interview schedules and the review of literature.  I wonder, as I defend 
my position on method, whether I have escaped the rigid use of method and if I 
have not, how do I describe this complex experience?  Within this complex 
72 
 
experience there is a haunting sense of persistent metaphysics that upholds method 
– a monolithic philosophy that captures and shapes my approach to investigation.   
 
In a philosophical sense, my relationship with method is a difficult one because of 
the nature of the research I am undertaking that, while inclusive of the appearances 
of a standard technical approach (i.e., semi structured interview schedule, 
interviews as ‘data collection’), aims to challenge strict notions of a structured 
method.  The research also challenges notions of truth and ideas about what is real 
or what we are able to find through research and other means about the reality of 
the world.  From an indigenous perspective, and in terms of research methodology 
and its relationship to considerations of theory, the philosophy of the research forms 
a broad framework of political, social and cultural complexities and specificities 
that shape the research from its conceptual beginnings (the shaping of the idea), to 
its technical applications (the ‘what methods should I use’ decisions) (Smith, 1999).   
 
In conducting research that is wary of method’s relationship to objectivity and the 
implications of such claims to support notions of ‘truth’, ‘validity’, and ‘reality’ 
(including subjective reality), I am responsible (in the sense that Derrida used the 
term)10 to ideas of divergence.  These divergent ideas are not simply those that 
emerge in response to imposed meanings that have been visited upon Māori and 
indigenous identities as forms of resistance; they are also the divergence that is 
reflected in those things that cannot be made fully visible and exist with strong 
identity regardless of human activity.  In this sense, and with an expansive, complex 
sense of whakapapa pulling at my thinking, I aim to ensure I follow through by 
engaging with the notion of method in ways that do not simply re-create the 
expectation of structure that I posit as problematic in the first place.  In other words, 
I cannot critique notions of knowledge production as methodical structured 
pathways to representing objective (or subjective) understandings of things we can 
be sure of and then proceed unreflectively to present my analysis of interviews (or 
other material) in the same way.  
 
 
       10 See Derrida (1991), Letter to a Japanese Friend. 
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Whaiwhakaaro and qualitative research – considering a potential 
(mis) fit between whaiwhakaaro and method  
I recognise that this thesis has been developed within a methodological frame that 
is generally labelled as qualitative.  In some ways, I am comfortable with this when 
considering qualitative research in a broad sense.  There is common ground between 
Māori and indigenous descriptions of knowledge production and ways that 
qualitative research is described.  For example, qualitative research is seen as a 
methodology that,  
 
celebrates richness, depth, nuance, context, 
multidimensionality and complexity rather than being 
inconvenienced by them.   Instead of editing these 
elements out in search of the general picture or the 
average, qualitative research factors them directly into 
its analyses and explanations. This means that it has an 
unrivalled capacity to constitute compelling arguments 
about how things work in particular contexts (Mason, 
2002, p.1).   
 
The words that Mason uses here to describe qualitative research are compelling.  
References to “richness, depth, nuance, context, multidimensionality and 
complexity” appear to open possibilities for equally rich, complex and 
multidimensional engagements with things in the world that are not necessarily 
invested in arriving at conceptual points of certainty.  However, in this quote, 
Mason also provides a steer towards the researcher’s role in determining ‘how 
things work’ albeit within the context of difference and the particular.  In this thesis, 
I seek a more reflexive description of qualitative research to make sense of 
whaiwhakaaro as something that might replace the idea of a conventional main 
method within this research.  In seeking this, there is something that edges me 
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towards an escape from the existing content of the qualitative framework to engage 
with what might be conceptualised as the outer limits of research.   
 
The researcher’s presence and role in the research is a significant consideration in 
Māori and indigenous methodologies.  Holliday (2007) addresses issues of voice 
within qualitative research, describing the researchers “voice and person” as a 
“major ingredient” of the written study (p.122).  However, Fine (2002) warns that, 
despite multiple references to the issue of researcher voice, there is a persistent 
naivety within qualitative research that assumes that our methods and 
methodologies, based on principles of giving voice, escape from acts of silencing.  
As Fine explains,  
 
even a ‘giving voice’ approach ‘involves carving out 
unacknowledged pieces of narrative evidence that we 
select, edit, and deploy to border our arguments.  
Assumptions about giving voice and opening up 
analytics to account for diverse realities should not be 
naïve about the role of the researcher in shaping the 
stories that are told, particularly when using methods 
like thematic analysis that rely heavily on researcher 
interpretations and descriptions of the voices that are 
being heard.  The claim of giving voice is problematic 
in this sense because it creates a belief (or claim) in 
which the stories of others, and the reporting of those 
stories, is framed by an altruistic expression of 
expressive empowerment while the way in which the 
stories are reported retains the imprint of the 
researcher’s interpretation without necessarily 
dissolving the assumption of voice giving (p. 218). 
 
This concern, related to the co-existing principle of giving voice and the strong 
influence of the researchers (often over-powering) hermeneutic voice, was a key 
part of early discussions that took place when considering my doctoral research, the 
‘method’ of whaiwhakaaro, and wider issues related to the apparent principles of 
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qualitative research.  In the quote above, Fine is concerned with claims of giving 
voice; however, in a broader sense, qualitative research, in the context of 
whaiwhakaaro, provides grounds for a Māori feeling of scepticism towards the 
ability of dominant research methods (both qualitative and quantitative), to allow 
for a Māori metaphysics of mystery.  This appeal to mystery marks the inclusion of 
those other voices (described above as being part of a whakapapa of influence), that 
show up in intuition, attention to ideas, and (for example), highly personal 
responses to words and text. These non-human voices are, in orthodox research, at 
the mercy of the researcher’s interpretation as much as the responses of human 
participants.   
 
Whaiwhakaaro, as the presence of other voices (though not necessarily in the literal 
sense of being heard), allows for the influence of things other than the researcher’s 
interpretive voice.  In an ethical sense, whaiwhakaaro foregrounds, through an 
open, aware and voluntary vulnerability, the limitation of the researcher’s voice.   
Moreover, it signals that personality shows up in how the researcher responds to 
interviews, not simply as a coded analysis, but as whakapapa or co-creative 
expression: the world’s urging to “look here” and “experience that”.  Within this 
urging, the limitation of the researcher’s voice, the tools with which the researcher 
can express the profound experience of intuition and co-creation as acts of regarding 
what shows up and “springs to mind”, are again highlighted.  This limitation might 
be expressed in the term ‘unsayable’ or as a sense of wonder expressed as a 
reflexive hybrid of thought and feeling that defies intelligible explanation.     
 
What is produced in this research therefore is not a story of certainty but is perhaps 
a type of qualitative writing as storytelling.  Richardson and St Pierre (2005) 
describe qualitative writing as, 
 
an unfolding story in which the writer gradually makes 
sense, not only of her data, but of the total experience 
of which it is an artefact. This is an interactive process 
in which she tries to untangle and make reflexive sense 
of her own presence and role in the research. The 
written study thus becomes a complex train of thought 
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within which her voice and her image of others are 
interwoven. Therefore, ‘unlike quantitative work that 
can carry its meaning in its tables and summaries, 
qualitative work carries its meaning in its entire text… 
its meaning is in the reading (pp. 959-960). 
 
In this quote, Richardson and St Pierre offer a description of research that is helpful 
to my own reflections on the research process as a holistic experience.  I am 
particularly drawn to the description of research that includes a “reflexive sense” of 
presence and the “complex train of thought” in which the researcher’s voice, and 
indeed the voice of others, are interwoven.  It is unclear whether Richardson and St 
Pierre have intended to describe qualitative research as something that cannot 
pinpoint precise meaning or find the essential nature of a thing.  However, their 
description creates the image of a researcher’s relationship with things in the world 
that is dynamic and fluid, accompanied by an honest acknowledgement that 
research is often, instead of objectively orientated, a story that emerges from the 
interweaving of the researcher with those other things in the world that influence 
thought, writing, and research. 
 
Whaiwhakaaro would present my own reflexive thinking with the things that 
provoke, grab attention, and subjectively, emotively emerge in an unapologetic 
flight from (claims of) objectivity.  Whaiwhakaaro, as a sole approach to engaging 
with the conversations that emerge during interviews, treats the participants’ 
responses as something other than data to be coded or decoded.  Rather, responding 
to words, expressions, and ideas takes on reflexive engagement as reactions to 
world and stories or as a reflex in thinking.  This reflex might be provoked by what 
is heard and present (in one sense) but also acknowledges that there is much that is 
not heard or present to mind.  These are the things that are at once absent and 
present, the “always encroaching other” (Gordon, 2008, p. 40), that might not be 
immediately highlighted in writing but whose existence should not be denied 
through a focus on only what can made apparent.  This view signifies that there is 
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much more at play than what we are able to present within the limits of the 
conceptual tools that we have at hand.   
 
Interview schedules and thematic analysis 
Whaiwhakaaro, as a way of responding to interviews within a holistic research 
experience, is an attempt to engage in what Smith et al. (2016) call, “the ethical and 
culturally appropriate gathering and interpretation of data, discourse, ideas, 
experiences, perceptions, attitudes, memories and stories” (p. 143).  Initially, a 
traditional form of method (thematic analysis), was going to be used to present the 
interviews.  It was thought that this could simply be used as a structure in which to 
house the information that came through the conversations.  Whaiwhakaaro as 
thinking would be presented elsewhere in the thesis, in separate chapters that would 
include a type of discussion conceptualised as a creative speculation.  Thematic 
analysis would seem to provide some advantages.  The interview responses could 
be synthesised: the complex stories that are told through interviews could be formed 
into packages of patterns - the repetition of ideas and expressions that might 
represent codes of meaning that emerge from interviews.  Detouring from 
whaiwhakaaro to present interviews as thematic information would be a practical 
technical manoeuvre that would allow for the reporting of interview content.    
 
While I will go on to explain how I eventually departed from the strict use of 
thematic analysis, it is important to acknowledge that research often includes an 
inherent structure that begins the thematic process early on, particularly when 
interviews are guided by set questions that reflect pre-determined ideas.  The use of 
an interview schedule in research that is concerned with fluidity of meaning is 
difficult to reconcile from within a holistic Māori ethical framework.  The 
researcher’s voice and interpretation are already taking charge in the shaping of the 
questions. The ethical issues that arise when considering holistic research and the 
representation of other voices is based on a Māori metaphysical worldview that is 
aware of not only visible phenomena but also the complexities of Being: that things 
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(and their meanings) emerge and conceal at will, reflecting their simultaneous 
interconnection and autonomy.    
 
It must be acknowledged that interview questions provide a structure and security 
and are often used as a way of organising information, including interview 
responses (Vaughn and Turner, 2016).  Interview schedules are often directly linked 
to thematic analysis, providing a type of pre-set scaffold from which to structure 
and code responses.  Thematic analysis is described as a method that uses strategic 
analytical tools to provide a complex account of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  It 
is a method that identifies common threads within data along with apparent patterns 
that can be presented in an organised structure.  The SAGE Encyclopedia of 
Qualitative Research Methods (2008) defines thematic analysis as, “a data 
reduction and analysis strategy by which qualitative data are segmented, 
categorized, summarized, and reconstructed in a way that captures the important 
concepts within the data set” (para. 1). Thematic analysis is also defined as, “a 
systematic approach to the analysis of qualitative data that involves identifying 
themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, usually textual, 
according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking 
commonalties” (The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, 2010, 
para 1).   
 
The organised representation of information as data through coding and 
classification is related to an objective approach to analysis.  However, there is 
contention related to how thematic analysis is conceptualised either as a visible 
method that provides instructive guidance, or as a more organic practice where 
interpretations come from relationships.  The latter is sometimes described as 
thematic analysis that requires skills learned, not from a 'recipe' for how to conduct 
the method, but from a relationship built through complex engagement with those 
involved in the research or the ones who are sharing their stories (Potter, 1997).  My 
intended approach is located within the more complex view of engagement and 
relationship, not solely based on an appeal to give voice to those who are 
participating in the interviews, but also because of the intention to take seriously 
the way in which other influences are at play.  Again, whaiwhakaaro, and the 
79 
 
translation of whakaaro as the casting of attention, are highlighted as a holistic 
experience that is shared by all things involved in the research. 
 
The use of an interview schedule in this research means that a type of thematic 
structure already exists, forming patterns of inquiry and shaping the flow of 
responses from those participating in the interviews.  While some of the interviews 
developed into comfortable, informal, free-flowing conversations in which none of 
the formal written questions were used, others were more structured, relying on the 
interview schedule to encourage the continued flow of conversation.  For this 
reason, claiming to have disposed of method completely would be naïve, regardless 
of the desire to become immersed in a holistic research experience with Māori 
metaphysics as the guiding principle.  However, it would also be naïve from a 
qualitative research perspective to assume that the use of an interview schedule 
automatically leads to the treatment of interview responses as data.   
 
Within this research, whaiwhakaaro is at once within the bounds of research activity 
and beyond its borders, engaged through the researcher’s efforts to focus on and 
‘cast attention to’ an idea, while also taking seriously that things in the world cast 
their own attention and influence.  The holistic research experience also allows the 
researcher to be liberated by the nature of ‘play’ in the world and those things that 
are more than (and cannot be fully grasped by), the researcher’s interpretations and 
expressions.   
 
In trying to make sense of whaiwhakaaro from within a research frame, it has been 
useful to reflect on existing approaches to research and interpretation as a way of 
‘pushing off from’ those methods and their character to reflect on whaiwhakaaro 
and its difference.  One of the benefits of using this approach to understand 
whaiwhakaaro, as it is situated in (not as) a research activity, is the ability to reflect 
on analytic approaches.  These approaches contain elements that both carry some 
likeness to whaiwhakaaro, as well as stark differences.  They push and provoke 
thinking about how whaiwhakaaro participates in the research as opposed to 
arriving at a definition of method.  These approaches allow me to explain the 
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experience of whaiwhakaaro and set the scene for understanding how I aim to 
engage with and present what is commonly referred to as research findings.   
 
While I have not used thematic analysis to make sense of the interviews, some of 
the terms and ideas that have been applied to the experience of thematic analysis 
are useful in considering its likeness and contrast with whaiwhakaaro.  One of the 
terms associated with thematic analysis that has resonated is ‘emergence’ or the 
idea that things emerge from the data (Vaughn and Turner, 2016).   The idea of 
emergence and revealing is interesting in the context of whaiwhakaaro because it 
implies a sense of agency that does not belong solely to the researcher who is 
reading the text or hearing the words spoken by participants.  Others argue that 
these are dangerous ideas - that thematic analysis must be understood as a product 
of the researcher’s cognitive activity.  As Ely, Vinz, Downing, and Anzul, (1997) 
state, ideas about themes emerging,  
 
can be misinterpreted to mean that themes ‘reside’ in 
the data, and if we just look hard enough, they will 
‘emerge’ like Venus on the half shell. If themes ‘reside’ 
anywhere, they reside in our heads from our thinking 
about our data and creating links as we understand them 
(pp. 205-206).  
 
Similarly, Taylor and Ussher (2001) warn that,  
 
An account of themes ‘emerging’ or being ‘discovered’ 
is a passive account of the process of analysis, and it 
denies the active role the researcher always plays in 
identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of 
interest, and reporting them to the readers (p.4). 
 
These accounts of a (preferred) agency (one that belongs to the researcher as the 
constructor of meaning), both support earlier critiques of qualitative research that 
are put forward in this chapter and illustrate the divide between conventional 
thematic analysis and whaiwhakaaro.  Some might advocate for a purposeful 
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interpretive privilege that is afforded solely to the researcher while others describe 
at least an attempt to see ‘data’ as an active influencer.  However, if both 
descriptions of thematic analysis aim to achieve the representation of things through 
discoverable patterns of meaning, then both are bound to a metaphysics of visible, 
thinkable phenomena that become highly visible through repetition that is equated 
with significance.    
 
Ho, Chiang and Leung (2017) advocate a different approach to interpretation that 
hinges on the researcher’s awareness about the role of the self in constructing pre-
determined meaning that is (within conventional beliefs about methods value), 
commonly conceptualised as the objective reporting of results.  Referring to 
Heidegger, they state that awareness (and, in particular, self-awareness of 
projecting pre-determination), enables us to engage with what he called ‘ontological 
possibilities’ as other ways of interpreting the world.  Awareness in this sense is 
explained as the act of understanding the interpretive limitations that exist because 
of the automatic projections that researchers make when engaging with ‘data’ 
(including data that is developed from interviews).  The ontological possibilities are 
the alternative interpretations that are potential meanings sitting outside a 
researcher’s automatic view and, in a metaphysical sense, are the multiple 
existences that make possible multiple interpretations whether we attend to those 
things in our writing or not.   
 
One example of this view of analysis and interpretation has been discussed in 
relation to theological study or the analysis of biblical texts as Exegetical analysis, 
or exegesis, in which meaning and mystery were understood to co-exist in biblical 
writing.  Thomas Aquinas refers to Gregory Nyssa’s description of biblical study 
that yields complex paradoxical insights in which "in one and the same sentence, 
while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery" (Summa Theologica 1q.1a.10). 
Further, Leithart (2009) describes the personal and spontaneous energy of exegesis, 
stressing that many who study biblical text have based their interpretation on the 
exegetical interpretation of other scholars.   
 
This type of relational analysis recognises the significance of the intimate analytic 
relationship that shows through in people’s work and how analytic intimacy makes 
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meaning that, through an ongoing series of personal engagements, can be made 
anew with each subsequent reading.  The meaning and mystery that marks exegesis 
as a spontaneous potentiality of thought, along with the sense of presence and 
absence, echoes the metaphysical nature of whaiwhakaaro that is at once a showing 
and concealing of meaning, of enduring mystery, or the “overplus” (Otto, 1958, 
p.5) of meaning that exists beyond perception and the intelligible or thinkable.  It 
also privileges an understanding of ‘meaning making’ that is not restricted by the 
rules of finding universal meaning as we might see in conventional research.  This 
more expansive view of interpretation has implications for how the researcher’s 
role is conceptualised and particularly as it relates to ideas of self-originating 
thought as a way of understanding how meaning is created through the interview 
process. 
 
While the interview schedule might signal that the researcher has already taken 
charge in shaping the direction of research, the holistic research experience from 
within a Māori metaphysics also poses a challenge to the idea that the researcher is 
alone in their construction of any part of the research. The researcher’s awareness 
of interconnectedness and its role in the co-creation of research, I would argue, has 
a material effect on what is constructed, reported, written and expressed such that 
an individual’s interpretive efforts are diminished in favour of what Ho, Chiang and 
Leung call the crucial act of “‘dwelling’ (as neither subject nor object) in the 
language of participants.” (p. 1758), including non-human participants as co-
creative influencers.  I also wonder at the existence of this influence and experience 
in conventional research within the context of criticisms about the researcher’s 
voice as a dominant steer in the narratives that are produced.  Are we always 
expressing our connections with things in the world despite being shaped to 
understand these expressions as objective findings or, in the case of more subjective 
approaches to research, as highly personal yet still intellectual and ordered reports?  
Does the conventional qualitative research experience veil an expression of 
personality (as interconnectedness) that always sits within our work but one that is 





Participants, kōrero and whaiwhakaaro 
Often in research, there is an expectation that the researcher will describe, in detail, 
the process of recruiting participants that in turn is often linked to an existing 
method of recruitment that helps others makes sense of ideas of selection, inclusion 
(and exclusion) and representation.  Within this thesis, the selection of participants 
has followed what might be described as a more organic process.  In part, I can say 
that I have felt drawn to the participants because of the work that they have 
undertaken in different fields, but I also feel that my attention has been turned 
towards them through more than simply being aware of things that they have written 
or through having knowledge of their scholarship.  For example, some of the 
participants are people who are seen as experts in Māori spirituality.  They have 
seemed to be perfect as ‘expert’ informants in this research.  But they are also 
people who have been pushed into my path by life, through different work that I 
have undertaken, or through other social ties.  They are, however, not people I knew 
before I started to seriously consider this research.  It’s as if they have shown up 
almost in response to the kaupapa. Of course, this is not something that can be 
proven.  But it is something that has entered my thoughts as I have reflected on this 
research. 
 
In line with what was earlier described as things arriving or ‘showing up’, each of 
the participants has ‘shown up’ in some way that might be explained within a certain 
metaphysical worldview, as something more in line with terms such as 
synchronicity or synergy.  It could be said that there is a lack of rigour in seeing 
participant selection as the ‘showing up’ of a person (or an idea that synergistically 
aligns with a participants writing or public speaking event and signals a push to 
invite the person to engage in an interview).  However, when viewed within the 
context of holistic Being as a research experience and whaiwhakaaro as an 
expression of the Being, there is a rigour and faithfulness at play, including an 
understanding that a thought will be followed by a possibility – a question will be 
answered by a person (participant) entering the scene.   
 
In total, 11 participants were interviewed for this research.  Each of the participants 
is recognised as having made significant contributions to different fields of study 
84 
 
and disciplines that both relate directly to mental health and to ideas that hold much 
potential in influencing how the mental health system and the notion of mental 
illness are understood.  Some have worked in the mental health system for many 
years and have contributed to growing Māori knowledges within this system as 
practitioners, educators and researchers.  Others have grown knowledge in a 
philosophical sense, deconstructing and re-presenting ideas, language and 
conceptualisations of Being.  Again, I wonder about the participants entering the 
scene and the possibility that, rather than being selected solely through my own 
‘thinking’ about who might provide meaningful and useful responses, they have 
been put in my path (so to speak).  This aspect of ‘participant selection’, seen 
through this more expansive metaphysical lens, represents a re-turn to considering 
relationships with not only people (how we connect to other human subjects), but 
with other things in the world that may always be influencing our connections.  And 
it is this influence, creating connections in this research, that is, I suggest, also at 
play in the way that the participant’s words push my thinking as a researcher: this 
impetus is one aspect of the active influence that is whaiwhakaaro. 
 
Concluding thoughts: Reaction to another’s utterance 
The nature of whaiwhakaaro as thinking that is reflexive, responsive and emergent, 
brings forward a consideration of the researcher’s reaction to things that are said, 
particularly in the context of interviews.  Within this thesis, kōrero is conceptualised 
as provocative utterance that sets up other ontological possibilities as alternatives 
to simply treating interview responses as data.  As discussed earlier, in the 
conventional analysis of interviews there is an expectation that responses from 
participants will be ordered and grouped into themes that identify the apparent 
significant points of meaning related to an area of enquiry.   Within this view, 
objective meaning, found through a thorough methodical analysis of interview 
responses (data), will present a type of truth that exists in the world even if the 
researcher has an intimate relationship to the research area.   However, these truths, 
and the assumptions that are made about how research finds truths within data, have 
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been criticised for resting on a naivety about voice and the beliefs that researchers 
hold about giving voice to others.    
 
Whaiwhakaaro, as an approach to responding to interviews, does not claim 
objectivity or deny the role of the researcher’s voice in telling the story that emerges 
from the research.  It also sits comfortably in uncertainty without giving way to the 
development of themes and patterns as a presentation of knowledge or the ability 
to determine qualities about a phenomenon.  Subjectivity is embraced, not simply 
in the form of owning the influence of the researcher’s voice, or as a Māori 
subjectivity where research focuses on Māori aspirations and needs (e.g. Te 
Awekotuku, 1991), but as a re-presentation of the researcher as the influenced 
subject whose thoughts are etched by and with an active and entitized world at play.   
At the heart of whaiwhakaaro is the acknowledgement and expression of relational 
Being and a metaphysics that places the researcher within the ground of thought.  
This relational understanding of the researcher has significant implications for how 
one attributes knowledge to things including attributing thinking (and the 
subsequent writing of ideas) to one’s own independent analysis and reflections on 
data gathered in qualitative research.   
 
In Mika and Southey’s (2016) article that explored the idea of relational Being and 
thinking as method, participant kōrero was described as an “influence” or 
“provocateur for one’s own creative speculation” (p. 3), as opposed to presenting 
the researcher with information that can be mined through analysis.   Through this, 
the notion of voice is explicitly owned by the researcher who fully acknowledges 
their role in and with the world, offering their reactive thinking as a story that stems 
from the influence of the interviews (including words and phrases that push 
thinking) rather than offering a determination.  That is not to say that ideas related 
to the area of research or interest will not emerge.  As already mentioned, the nature 
of holistic Being as a research experience and whaiwhakaaro as an expression of 
the Being achieve a type of rigour that relates to thoughts arriving in response to 
faithful inquiry.  This is the idea that thoughts will arise and be followed by a 
possibility and questions can, in a sense, be answered.  The answers, however, are 
not ones that provide definitive description but rather thinking may be pushed in 
any direction through any number of influences.  In the context of interviews, this 
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influence might be a word or an incidental sentence that is spoken at the same time 
as a thought comes to the researcher.  This is the haziness mentioned earlier in 
relation to whaiwhakaaro and its apparent character.  It is difficult to pin down and 
by its very nature (including the metaphysical understanding described by Mika, 
2017, that things, of their own accord, will appear and swim out of view), defies 
conclusive description.   
 
The idea of what comes from whaiwhakaaro, at this stage in attempting to describe 
it as influence, should be emerging.  It relates to a highly personal response to 
interviews and to other things that ‘show up’ - both as the impetus to ‘wonder’ about 
particular phenomena and to receive ideas in response to wonder.  When expressed 
in research and writing, these responses are the researcher’s personality, not in the 
sense of an individual’s character but as ‘power and place’, discussed in the preface 
as Deloria’s (2001) idea of personality: a metaphysical concept that encompasses 
our relationships with all persons (both human and non-human), in the world as 
substantive embodiment and unique realization.  It is not simply that I have been 
pushed by an utterance to think in a certain direction or wonder at a term that is 
used but it is also that the participant, when understood from within a Māori 
metaphysics, has been pushed to make utterances. Their words are an expression of 
relational Being, of co-creation, of embodiment, unique realization and personality.    
 
Responding to interviews in ways that detract from using the story or lesson that is 
apparent in a participant’s visible or discernible message raises questions about 
ethics and again foregrounds concerns about whose voice is being heard in the 
writing up of what, in conventional research, are conceptualised as findings.  Ethics, 
in the context of whaiwhakaaro and interconnected thinking is, however, a complex 
issue that cannot be expected to follow dominant considerations of ethical 
researcher behaviour as might be prescribed within the academy’s stance on what 
is ‘right’ or normal in research practice.  As discussed earlier, indigenous 
researchers’ awareness of ethical complexities is tempered with the need to remain 
vigilant about dominant research approaches that frame the central research 
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relationship as one where the researcher engages in a detached (or only seemingly 
connected) process of discovery.   
 
The culturally appropriate gathering and interpretation of data does not necessarily 
rest solely within a consideration of what stories are told but also concerns how 
these stories are told which, in this thesis, resists ideas of data, discovery and 
certainty in favour of partial subjectivities.  These partial subjectivities 
acknowledge that there are always other stories at play that Gordon (2008) refers to 
as things that ‘haunt’ (p. 5), or Derrida (1978, 1998) would call the ‘trace’ or ‘play’; 
these are the real spectres that sit behind what is verbalised and able to be written.   
The outcome that will emerge through the writing, I suspect, will be a story that 
provokes others to think in their own holistic, relational subjective capacities.  I also 
have a growing feeling that the story is already coalescing (and at the same time 
fully coalesced), forming from things encountered today, encountered before and 
yet to arrive (though always already here).   
 
The story feels like it rests within an ‘in between’ – both pending and already 
written.   This is not meant as simply a more poetic description of a conventional 
research process in which the researcher is gathering their thoughts and is moving 
closer to reaching the goal of finding the essential components of a phenomenon 
that can then be described.  It is, much more, an expression of a feeling that there is 
a holistic response to the questions I have been influenced to pose and that this 
holistic response, rather than being self-contained, arrives through what was 
described in chapter two as the world’s self-disclosure and giving of the self.  There 
is, in this sense, no certainty in the story that I feel will be told through this research 
but there is, instead, a sense of relationship and response - a worlded Being reflected 
in an experience of holistic research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MĀORI AND INDIGENOUS 
NOTIONS OF BEING 
We cannot go further into this thesis without considering Māori and indigenous 
notions of Being.  The idea of being-in-the-world, as a relational, holistic 
experience marked by an interconnection between all things, has been discussed in 
previous chapters as a personal experience of engagement giving way to a holistic 
research journey.  While the previous chapters that have discussed a holistic 
experience of research have explored the nature of whaiwhakaaro as collective 
interconnection (as opposed to the translation of whaiwhakaaro and whakaaro as 
individual ‘thinking’), it is the metaphysical basis of whaiwhakaaro for  expressions 
of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being that I will consider in this chapter. 
It is important to explore Māori and indigenous metaphysical premises as these will 
support the overall aim of re-presenting Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being.  Importantly, these premises also mark points of departure from a dominant 
Western metaphysics, supporting an exploration of how different metaphysical 
traditions consider and construct the self and world.  These initial considerations 
will later be utilised to deconstruct the notion of mental illness that, I posit, is a 
product of a dominant Western metaphysical view of Being.   
 
In this chapter I will explore this foundational metaphysics through a discussion of 
cultural concepts and, in doing so, speculate on the metaphysical narrative that 
Māori and indigenous cultural concepts present.  The chapter builds on what I have 
already discussed and sets the scene for what in later chapters will be a more direct 
consideration of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being, aiming to disrupt 
conventional views of people’s experiences within mental health and in the context 
of the notion of mental illness.    
 
Exploring Māori and indigenous understandings of Being relates to a question that 
was raised in the introduction of the thesis concerning what Deloria (2001) refers 
to as a most fundamental inquiry or “the set of first principles we must possess in 
order to make sense of the world in which we live” (p.2).   These principles, when 
taken as an expression of indigenous metaphysics, are an important foundational 
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guide in considering how Being is conceptualised and, within this thesis, how that 
conceptualisation effects our understanding of the notion of mental illness.  
 
As I will discuss at length in chapter six, many have argued that the notion of mental 
illness, in its diagnostic application, names behaviours and experiences as 
measurable, observable, individualised behavioural categories and through this 
application, frames the clinical and social response to those behaviours and 
experiences as the treatment of observable symptoms. In contrast, I suggest, Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics raises questions about the way that behaviours and 
experiences are framed and how this framing sets up clinical and social responses 
to a person who is labelled as experiencing mental illness.  
 
Indeed, Māori and indigenous metaphysics, when considered as part of what guides 
a deconstructionist analysis of mental illness, brings into question the very basis of 
the term mental illness and the idea that a person’s behaviour and experience is 
centred somewhere in their mental faculties.   This application of Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics as a deconstructive ‘other’ that interrupts the framing of 
behaviour and experience also pushes us to raise questions about how we respond 
(clinically and socially), to people’s experiences and behaviours. There is, within 
this context, a type of ‘re-framing’ that occurs, urging us to shift our understanding 
based on a view of Being that foregrounds a relational interconnected self whose 
Being cannot be restricted by an overwhelming focus on individual, internalised 
‘mental’ existence.  
 
I illustrated this view of the relational affected self earlier in the thesis by citing a 
question raised by a kaumatua who, when reflecting on the ability for mainstream 
Mental Health services to respond effectively to Māori tāngata whaiora, asked how 
a mainstream service would respond to his mauri being “jarred and shaken” and 
how the Western approach would “help to reinstate my mana and mauri” (Milne 
2005, p. 13).  The question posed by the kaumatua has important implications when 
considering the lived experience of holism that emerges from within a Māori and 
indigenous metaphysical standpoint.  For example, the idea of worldedness (Mika, 
2017), discussed in the introduction of the thesis, describes the co-existing influence 
of things on the self with the self’s (necessary therefore) influence on things in the 
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world (Mika, 2015), implicating a more than human agency that is at play in the 
world.  These ideas will be explored further later in this chapter; however, at this 
early stage, we can consider the general concept of the shared or co-existing 
influence of all things in the world to reflect on how a mental health service 
responds to the need to consider the mauri of the person and the state of a person’s 
mauri (as described by the kaumatua).  
 
Inevitably, important questions arise about how a mental health service understands 
mauri (and other Māori terms) from within either a Māori (and indigenous) or 
dominant Western metaphysical viewpoint.   The relational view of lived realities 
that are expressed through Māori terms such as whakapapa and 
whakawhanaungatanga (discussed earlier as both a lived expression of relational 
Being and as the experience of knowing the world that is characterised by 
embodiment), denotes a holistic rather than purely intellectual connection with the 
world. The jarred and shaken mauri in this sense, and in the wider sense of a Māori 
and indigenous worldview, immediately implicates the influence of other things, 
external to the self.  This co-existing influence interrupts the conventional 
(metaphysical) view that conceptualises the self (and perhaps all things in the 
world), as an individual. It also interrupts the view of Being that is reliant on the 
conceptualisation of behaviours and experiences as highly evident, thereby 
discarding the sense of mystery (the unseen influences), that exists in considering 
how a person’s mauri can be influenced.   
 
It is in this context that I question the fundamental metaphysical foundations of 
dominant Western conceptualisations of non-relational Being and seek to highlight 
how dominant Western metaphysics might suppress Māori and indigenous views 
of holistic Being.  After all, there is a certain type of holism, emerging from Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics, that may be necessary to effectively consider how to 
support tāngata whaiora Māori whose expressions signal things (in this example - 
mauri) that extend beyond the limits of conventional concepts in mental health. 
 
While the nature of dominant Western metaphysics and the idea of having a 
primarily intellectual connection with the world will be discussed at length in the 
next chapter, it is important to begin here by noting, for the purpose of marking an 
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initial contrast, some key characteristics of a non-holistic metaphysics and how this 
metaphysics impacts on how the self is viewed as either separate from or connected 
to the world.  Gillett (2009) offers a helpful description of the features of the 
philosophical framework that supports a dominant Western metaphysical 
conception of Being, favouring the separation of the self from things in the world.  
Gillett also offers insight into how this conception of Being relates to subsequent 
conceptions of knowledge or an ‘onto-epistemic’ view on the nature of being-in-
the-world.  As Gillett explains, Being, from a dominant Western perspective, is 
centred in the human mind that is distinct from the external world which allows for 
a state of separation.  This state of separation then allows for a state of objectivity, 
enabling a view of the world that aligns with measurable, universal laws of 
discovery.  Describing this separation in terms of the Cartesian position, Gillett 
explains that,  
 
The underlying philosophical framework for 
metaphysics (and truth) according to the modernist 
worldview is Descartes’ Res extensa – the world as 
sharply distinct from the human mind and therefore 
objective. This objective world is viewed as a set of 
interwoven mechanical processes impersonally 
specifiable and obeying universal mathematical laws. 
For that reason, it is quite other than the res cogitans in 
which the human mind has its Being, something apart 
from the world as it is and from which the subject 
achieves ‘an objective view’ of what goes on there so as 
to discern the regularities and devise laws describing its 
operations. The laws are constrained in such a way that 
they must be articulated in terms of the favoured 
‘objective’ descriptions of states of affair that preserve 
the separation of mind or spirit and material objects 
(p.5).  
 
Within this view, there is an assumption that the world as an entity can be seen as 
inert and static, available and ready for conceptual representation (Kincheloe and 
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Tobin, 2009). What is important to note from this view is not just how we 
conceptually construct the world as an inert and static entity (and the contrasting 
possibilities of re-presenting the world as alive and sentient) but also how this view 
must metaphysically structure the self (Calderon, 2008), as a separate self-
contained Being unaffected by the world in which we live.  In line with Gillett’s 
(2009) explanation of this dominant Western metaphysical structuring, we might 
conclude that the modernist underlying philosophical framework for metaphysics 
that Gillett describes, constructs and assembles the world and the self as entities 
that must follow certain rules of constraint.  
 
Heidegger (1977) would also appeal to the notion of constraint (of the self and 
world), when raising the problem of enframing in which things in the world are 
subjected to a type of ordering.  For Heidegger, there is a metaphysical structuring 
of things in the world that stands in for and replaces the complex nature of Being, 
rendering existence in reductive terms of material impersonal matter and 
instrumentality.  Kisiel (2014) interprets Heidegger’s enframing as a type of 
“synthetic compositioning” (p. 138), that creates artificial notions of being aligned 
to reductive conceptualisations, discarding excess meanings of existence and 
looking only to catalogue Being based on constructed identities that are 
characterised by their function.   
 
In Heidegger’s (1977) view, a thing, taken only as its function, is subject to being 
ordered as an item that is available for manipulation and control, “The forest is there 
for us as lumber, the river is there for us as electric power” (Bailey, 2014, para, 20).  
But it is also subject to a limitation of meaning (and Being) where a thing’s 
functional relation replaces its “vitally lived relations” (Kisiel, 2014, p. 145), 
obscuring a thing’s complex nature within the whole that is the entire living world.  
Both Heidegger’s analysis of metaphysical structuring and Kisiel’s interpretation 
of Heidegger’s concern point to a deeper conditioning of self and world in which 
things are subject to an act of separation: the separating out of things in the world 
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through their conceptual representation, displacing them and casting each thing out 
from each other – from the whole.  
 
The self, as a subscriber to a metaphysics that posits that the world is sharply distinct 
and separated (conceptualised within the Cartesian position as the human self or in 
Gillett’s, 2009, description, the self as the human mind), can no longer be with the 
world (Mika and Tiakiwai, 2016), as might be reflected in an indigenous 
worldview.  A type of relational restraint occurs where even the idea of holism can 
be affected, transforming the understanding of a holistic relational existence to one 
where individuals are merely connected to other individual things (Mika, 2016).   
 
Mika (2017a) observes, when describing indigenous metaphysics, that the holistic 
presentation of a thing leaves room for the existence of the complex nature of any 
one thing in the world, preserving its personality as a “silent representative of all 
other things” (p. 25), as it retains points of mystery and resists, through its nature, 
full insight and the possibility of being revealed in its entirety.  Within this view, 
no bright line can be drawn around this or any ‘thing’ that demarcates it from the 
rest of existence so even the term or concept of a thing takes on an altogether 
different meaning than what is represented from within a dominant Western 
viewpoint.  As Mika explains, a metaphysics that insists on the representation of 
things in the world as objects of certainty must discount the play of other entities so 
that clarity can be achieved.  Māori and indigenous metaphysics, therefore, would 
posit that holism (taken as meaning more than simply an interconnection between 
individual phenomena or the self’s relationship with things that are out there in the 
world), is the thorough collapse of all things reflected in the term ‘worldedness’ 
that denotes a thorough holism.   
 
Holism, as the idea that all things are connected, when understood within Mika’s 
(2017) explanation of interconnection, is the view that a thing is constituted by all 
other things in the world (p. 34). This view, from within an indigenous metaphysics, 
brings an extreme understanding of relationship and holism into play such that no 
thing in the world can stand apart.  This understanding of the world also makes 
certainty a highly problematic standpoint for the indigenous self as the world resists 
that more simple representation, asserting instead a complex interplay of entities 
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and a claim on the self as one entity among many (Mika, 2015), or, from within a 
Māori worldview, as whanaunga.   
 
The complexity that is at play here can perhaps be understood as a full collapse of 
certainty in favour of a more dynamic worldview.  This sense of collapse disrupts 
certainties and comfortable assuredness, exposing the synthetic nature of certainty 
as a constructed concept that is always haunted by what was earlier described as the 
“factual’s always encroaching other” (Gordon, 2008, p. 40).   Māori and indigenous 
Being, presented here through a consideration of Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics, invites an exploration of complex philosophies and narratives about 
the nature of reality.  Further, the importance of metaphysics as a guide for 
understanding the self has implications for the self’s well-being.  Indeed, as 
Marsden (1988) explains, the implications of metaphysics are far reaching, 
influencing our lives in terms of our ethics and the foundations of our beliefs:   
 
Metaphysics deals with the nature of reality, and is the 
sum total of one’s beliefs, basic convictions, and 
assumptions through which we direct our lives. The 
very nature of this being and existence is connected to 
these concepts. Descending from these broader 
principles are the ethical systems defining the nature of 
right and wrong, and also the epistemology of the theory 
of knowledge and the grounds of valid belief. In the 
Māori world these branches of philosophy are 
illustrated in the traditional creation stories and the 
general principles of tikanga Māori (Māori custom) (p. 
13).   
 
While Māori and indigenous metaphysics and its implications for how we 
understand the notion of mental illness will be discussed at length in chapter six, in 
this chapter, an exploration of Māori and indigenous metaphysics lays down a 
foundation for understanding Being, and the re-presentation of Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being as a profoundly relational experience.  As I 
develop these ideas within this chapter, however, I remain cognisant of the question 
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raised earlier about how mental health services would regard (and respond to) a 
person’s experience that is expressed as a metaphysically holistic condition (i.e. the 
jarred and shaken mauri).   
 
Whakapapa and ‘Radical Ecology’ 
It is not incidental that many indigenous writers have described Māori and 
indigenous philosophy and principles of Being within the disciplinary subject of 
ecology (e.g. Henare, 2001; Williams, 2012).  Indigenous ecological knowledge has 
been discussed as “cultural landscapes [that] are produced by and reflect the long-
term interactions between humans and nature” (Jiao, Li, Liang, Takeuchi, Okuro, 
Zhang, and Sun, 2012, p. 247).  Berkes (1993), similarly speaks of ‘Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge’, defining it as "a cumulative body of knowledge, practice 
and belief evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by 
cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) 
with one another and with their environment" (p.3).  
  
Often, these definitions of indigenous and traditional ecological knowledges share 
some similarities with how ecology is characterised in a wider disciplinary context 
and the study of environments.  Loening (2012), for example, suggests that ecology, 
and particularly what he calls ‘human ecology’, is driven by an urgent inquiry that 
questions every aspect of how and where we live. For Loening, this most urgent 
inquiry must also include the question of “why we do things the way we do?” (p. 
36).  Though not necessarily intended as such by Loening, I interpret his query as a 
metaphysical question, much the same as Deloria (2001) had dealt with first 
principles or what he describes as, “the world, and all its possible experiences, 
[constituting] a social reality, a fabric of life in which everything had the possibility 
of intimate knowing relationships because, ultimately, everything was related” 
(p.2). 
 
The human ecology that Loening (2012) describes emerged as a sub thread of 
ecological studies and generally refers to, “the study of the dynamic 
interrelationships between human populations and the physical, biotic, cultural and 
social characteristics of their environment and the biosphere” (Lawrence, 2003, 
97 
 
p.31).  In addition, Conventional Human Ecology (as a study of relationships) has 
focussed on the relationship between ‘man’ and the environment (Quinn, 1940).  It 
has also been defined as a subject that,  
 
explores not only the influence of humans on their 
environment but also the influence of the environment 
on human behaviour, and their adaptive strategies as 
they come to understand those influences better. For us, 
Human Ecology is a methodology as much as an area of 
research. It is a way of thinking about the world, and a 
context in which we define our questions and ways to 
answer those questions (Environmental Change 
Institute, Oxford University, cited in Loening, 2012, 
p.35).   
 
More recently, theorists have argued for the development of human ecology to 
move towards a radical shift to include non-material understandings of existence 
that Mcintosh (2012) describes as metaphysical or spiritual.  As McIntosh explains, 
this view of (radical) human ecology is part of a ‘premodern’ approach that, 
 
poses an ancient but fundamental challenge to the very 
structure of knowledge... (requiring)… clarity about 
what our premises or starting points in seeking 
knowledge are. Specifically, it presses us to address the 
question of whether the basis or our values are derived 
from a purely physical or materialistic grounding, or 
whether there is also an underpinning to our being 
human that might be called metaphysical or “spiritual” 
(p. 51). 
 
The premises of radical human ecology discussed by McIntosh are helpful in that 
these ideas push the boundaries of the ecological discipline to include the ‘spiritual’ 
and non-material.  Building on this, I suggest the premises or starting points of 
Māori and indigenous philosophy that form the basis of this chapter can offer 
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insight into what might be seen as more radical views (or what Nelson, 2008, calls 
the “eco-spiritual”, p. 10), concerning not only the relationship between humans 
and the environment in which we live, but the relationship between all things.   
 
Others might argue that any claims about Māori and indigenous philosophy’s 
radical departure from conventional ecological studies are simply a reflection of 
measuring non-dominant views against a normative standard.  However, as Mikaere 
(2015) states, “there is nothing normal about Western theoretical frameworks 
assuming centrality in the space that is Aotearoa” (p.78). Whichever view is taken, 
critiques of conventional approaches to ecology and human ecology illustrate that 
the philosophical premises of Māori and indigenous understandings of relationship 
with the world, and relational ways of Being, go beyond the limits of disciplinary 
and metaphysical convention. As Williams (2012) explains when referencing 
conventional ecological perspectives, 
 
These ways of thinking about Human Ecology remain 
implicitly bound up in the dualism of man and “other,” 
in this case the environment, rather than seeing people 
as a deeply interconnected and an integral part of 
biodiversity. Likewise, popular discourses on human 
agency - as the ability to exercise various forms of 
power in shaping our everyday realities - have also 
traditionally been rooted in modernist 
conceptualizations of reality. These conceptualize the 
“individual” as the unified, rational, sovereign, actor 
who shapes an environment as if he were separate from 
it (p.115). 
 
The premises of Māori and indigenous metaphysics present a departure from what 
Williams describes here as the realm of the rational, sovereign actors or those with 
human agency, which constructs a divided dualistic view of Being.  As a 
foundational premise of Māori understandings of Being, the idea that the world is 
holistic has found expression in many discourses that seek to describe how, as 
tangata whenua, we are interconnected with the natural environment, resisting the 
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modernist conceptualisations of reality that Williams describes above.  The premise 
of holism is one example of a well-known (metaphysical) cultural concept that has 
found some purchase in, for example, public sector policies, but when we talk of 
holism, what do we really mean?   
 
The premise of cultural holism has been conceptually incorporated into policy and 
practice within the New Zealand health system.  For example, within mental health, 
holism is typically integrated into policy as a steer towards ensuring that whānau 
are involved in treatment and care planning (e.g., see chapter eight of He Ara 
Oranga: Report of the Government Inquiry into Mental Health and Addiction, 
2018), or that a person’s needs are considered across a number of social indices 
(such as cultural and socio-economic circumstances).11  However, writers like 
Lawson -Te Aho (2013) and Green (2018) have criticised this approach for being 
too superficial.   
 
What then lies beneath what have been criticised as superficial representations of 
holism?   Schor (1989) points out that in efforts to be inclusive, institutions will 
engage in a behaviour she refers to as ‘saming’ in which the ‘other’ (and in the 
context of this thesis, the other’s metaphysical premises), are subject to inclusive 
practices that result in the “universal applicability of categories” (Blaser, 2014, p. 
52).  In an effort to break from these practices of saming and universality, Mikaere 
(2015) calls for the “radical altering of our perceptions and…priorities” (p. 78), 
through a re-centring of mātauranga Māori.  
 
In terms of health policy, and, in particular, mental health policy and practice, what 
does it mean to apply the concept of holism (from a mātauranga Māori perspective) 
and how might the cultural value of holistic well-being be presented from within a 
Māori and indigenous metaphysical frame? While these questions will be directly 
addressed in chapter six, here I aim to lay the foundation for that discussion by 
 
    11This view of holism within health policy was discussed in the introduction, namely, the 
representation of health and well-being as measurable variables (e.g., Precision Driven Health, Vogt, 
Hofmann and Getz, 2016). 
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exploring the concept of holism by highlighting Māori and indigenous worldviews 
from within their metaphysical grounding.     
 
Metaphysics and holistic Being  
As an attempt to engage in a radical departure from more superficial representations 
of holism, I turn to ideas that reflect the spiritual and metaphysical underpinnings 
of our being human that McIntosh (2012) refers to as a deeper inquiry into our 
existential reality.  As an initial step into this inquiry, and borrowing again from 
McIntosh’s directive, I explore the premise of the spiritual as a foundational 
element of the world and what this may mean from within Māori and indigenous 
worldviews.   
 
Historically, indigenous views on spirituality have been seen through a colonial lens 
that has framed indigenous spiritual values (as a fundamental principle of Being in 
and with the world), as primitive expressions of anthropomorphism (the projection 
of human qualities onto non-human forms), or animism (viewing things in the world 
as ‘objects’ that are inhabited by spirits) (Williams, 2012).  More modern Western 
representations of indigenous spirituality are discussed by Smith (1999) who points 
out that indigenous spirituality has become a profitable commodity among New 
Age groups who have their own interpretations of indigenous spiritual beliefs.  
Curiously, some of these beliefs, including from individuals who claim to be 
“inhabited by indigenous spirit guides” (p.105), mirror the colonial interpretation 
of indigenous spiritual values and the projection of a separate spiritual energy into 
objects and non-human forms.  
  
The tendency to view spirit or the idea of spirituality as a separate entity that is then 
projected into things (as demonstrated by some non-indigenous interpretations) has 
been described by Khisty (2006) as a perception of separate spiritual systems.  
Further, Khisty contends that this conceptualisation of a separated spirituality exists 
only in the minds of human beings.  In contrast, and in reference to North American 
peoples, Khisty explains that indigenous views of spirit equate to seeing spiritual 
systems and natural systems as the same beings.   Māori and indigenous 
understandings of spirit present what might be called an inclusive (rather than 
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separate) view of the life world where spirit is an indivisible organising element 
(e.g. Marsden, 2003; Pere, 1982; Deloria, 2006).  For example, in Lakota teachings, 
spirit has been referred to as a binding element and is presented as a key premise 
and organising principle that Walker (1976) refers to as the creator or 
Dakuskanskan, which may be translated as “that which moves all things that move” 
(p.24).  Similarly, Metzner (1997) refers to this sense of generative spirit as “a 
unitive field or fabric of energy and consciousness” (p. 4). 
 
From within a Māori worldview, the term mauri also imbues a sense of indivisible 
animation.  Marsden (2003) uses the terms life principle and essence when 
discussing mauri, explaining that, 
 
Immanent within all creation is mauri – the life-force 
which generates, regenerates and upholds creation. It is 
the bonding element that knits all the diverse elements 
within the Universal ‘Procession’ giving creation its 
unity in diversity.  It is the bonding element that holds 
the fabric of the universe together (p.44).   
 
Jahnke (2006), in reflecting on the work of Elsdon Best, remarks that there is “a 
productive interaction between materiality and spirituality” (p. 73), indicating an 
active relationship between form and spirit.  Jahnke also refers to mauri as ‘life 
principle’ (p.73), stating that it is not something that can be grasped by the senses 
but that some believe it can be felt.  Mika (2007), however, suggests that there are 
possible sensorial encounters with mauri that may include touch, smell and sight 
along with tohu (signs) and matakite (second sight).  Mika also moderates his view 
by hinting at the mysterious nature of mauri, commenting that any attempts at 
holding mauri in constant perception are futile, implicating its dynamic nature, 
reflecting Marsden’s (2003) description of the “energy within creation” (p.49).   
 
Barlow (1991) states that “Mauri is a special power possessed by Io which makes 
it possible for everything to move and live” (p.83).  Like Barlow, Mika (2007) notes 
the place of mauri in creation, stating that, “whenever the various names of Io were 
mentioned, the context in which they were placed likewise possessed mauri” 
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(p.184).  The contexts that Mika refers to are illustrated by Marsden (2003) in his 
depiction of ‘The Genealogy of the Cosmos’ (p.180) (see figure 1).  Here, mauri is 
depicted as the “breath of the spirit and of life” (p. 95), but, if we are guided by 
Mika’s description of mauri within the process of creation, we might read 
Marsden’s cosmological genealogy in a holistic rather than linear sense.  Mauri, 
therefore, would be manifest in the genealogy with Io, noted by Marsden as being 
the “first cause” (p.95).   
 
Marsden (2003) also states that, “This essence (mauri) I am convinced, was 
originally regarded as elemental energy derived from the realm of Te Korekore, out 
of which the stuff of the universe was created” (p.6).  Te Korekore also guides us 
to an understanding of the world as a dynamic space of movement.  It is, according 
to Marsden, a realm of potentiality that, rather than fully denoting a space of 
emptiness and nothingness, imbues a sense of “latent being” (p. 20), symbolising 
the fullness of the notion of ‘becoming’ or what Marsden describes as, 
 
the realm between non-being and being: that is, the 
realm of potential being.  This is the realm of primal, 
elemental energy…It is here that the seed-stuff of the 
universe and all created things gestate.  It is the womb 
from which all things proceed (p.20). 
 
In terms of holistic Being, Māori and indigenous understandings of creative 
spiritual expression have implications for how we understand the concept of holism. 
As Quince (2007) explains, “Because the Māori of te ao kōhatu believed that the 
ultimate source of all being is spiritual, the idea of kinship can, and ultimately does, 
extend to all things” (p.3).  Further, Fixico (2013) states that indigenous spirituality 
and holism involves all Beings, including all of human and non-human life (i.e., 
human, animal and plant life), along with things that do not take physical form such 
as “the metaphysical world of visions and dreams” (p.2).   In this sense, when the 
relational nature of the world is highlighted in Māori philosophy, it extends beyond 
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the often-mundane translations of Māori terms that are used to provide a steer 
towards understanding the concept of holism from a Māori cultural viewpoint.   
 
One of these terms, whakapapa, has been discussed in chapter two in order to 
present a view on Māori metaphysics and the act of co-creation (C, Smith, 2000) in 
writing and other endeavours where a Māori researcher is drawing on more than 
their own self-contained efforts to express ideas.   This is the view that what is 
presented in writing (and in all other creative acts), is an expression of whakapapa 
and the constructive influence of things outside of the individual (who is the 
apparent agent of creation).  
 
Whakapapa, when thought of outside of a limited definition linked to the idea of 
genealogy, can be considered as a holistic, constructive experience of Being.    
Henare (2001) describes this as a Māori “cosmic religious worldview” (p.198), that 
encompasses an understanding of creation as a process of constant emerging and 
unfolding.  As Henare explains, “In traditional belief creation is described as a 
dynamic movement, which is expressed in Māori as “i te kore, ki te pō, ki te ao 
mārama,” and rendered as “out of the nothingness, into the night, into the world of 
light.” (p.198). This sense of dynamic movement and creation is also reflected in 
Salmond’s (1997) description of the connected, creative and co-constructive nature 
of Being as a type of generative relationship.  Whakapapa as a generative 
relationship may therefore be understood as an expression of Being that is 
intimately connected to Māori cosmology and what Marsden (2003) describes as a 
“process of continuous creation and recreation” through a ‘three-world’ view “of 
potential being symbolised by Te Korekore, the world of becoming portrayed by 
Te Pō, and the world of being, Te Ao Mārama” (p.20).   
 
Marsden also describes a sacred whakapapa that is the symbolic presentation of 




- Io, the Creator and First Cause, begat:  
- Te Korekore, Te Kōwhao, Te Pō (Void Abyss, Nights), the Realm of 
Potential Being, which begat: 
- The seeking, pursuit, burgeoning, increase, elemental energy; i.e. the 
realm of energy and process, which begat: 
- Latent memory, deep mind, emerging consciousness, sound – the 
Realm of Mind, which begat: 
- Word and wisdom.  Into that total milieu was infused:  
- The Breath of the Spirit and of life – the realm of Mauri. 
- Then was begotten light/shape/form; begetting in turn:  
- Time and Space. Into this framework of Space/Time continuum was 
born: 
- Rangi and Papa – Sky Father and Earth Mother – the world of sense      
perception.  (p. 89).  
Figure 1:Māori Marsden’s (2003) “World of Symbol”, the Genealogy of the Cosmos  
 
This sacred whakapapa also reflects the view of what lies beyond what some might 
understand (if framing the idea of creation using Christian ideologies, for example), 
as a one-time event of creation (i.e., science might refer to this as the Big Bang). As 
Manuka (2001) states, “At the heart of this view of the creation process is an 
understanding that humanity and all things of the natural world are always 
emerging, always unfolding” (p.198). Sacred whakapapa would, therefore, imbue 
a sense of ongoing creation or the perpetual state of becoming.   
 
Whakapapa as a state of relational Being may also be understood in the context of 
Royal’s (2004) description of “a feature of the human condition to exist in 
relationship with the environments in which we dwell” and that our “environments 
‘speak into’ human cultural manifestation in conscious and unconscious ways” 
(p.1).  In offering a description of the human relationship with environments, Royal 
departs from what might be seen as more conventional views that, as mentioned 
earlier, premise the self’s relationship with the world as one where the self 
maintains an autonomous individuality but is connected to things external to the 
self (Mika, 2016).  Royal uses the term “correspondence” (p.4), to describe a sense 
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of active engagement between the self and the world that, when viewed from within 
a Māori metaphysics, presents an indivisible whakapapa of Being such that self and 
the world experience an inseparability (Raerino, 1999). According to Royal, this 
relationship manifests itself in Māori expressions of identity.   
 
Williams (2012) also recognises the sense of the inseparable in the recitation of 
whakapapa, describing whakapapa as connections to land, sea, the sky and “the 
outer universe” (p.125).  The significance of place, therefore, rather than simply 
representing a particular geographical location, is a spiritual significance in which 
the world “exerts conscious and unconscious influences” (Royal, 2004, p. 1).  While 
possibly not intended as such, Royal’s description of conscious and unconscious 
influence raises the idea of the world as a dynamic space of movement and one that 
is inhabited by things that emerge and conceal at will (Mika, 2017).   
 
In drawing on this understanding of influence, Mika (2016) states that, “any one 
entity is immediately and actively constituted by all things” (p.167).  For example, 
this influence has been described in the context of well-being and identity. As an 
indigenous First Nations Elder who, when talking about his own journey of healing 
in terms of his place in (and with) the world, notes, 
 
You know I find my identity within the fire, within the 
sacred fires, the rock, the water, the air.  I find my 
identity within the sun, the earth, the moon and the stars, 
all the plant beings and all the animal beings, and all the 
human beings.  Because these are the elements that give 
me my identity because they are a part of me, and I am 
a part of them.  And this is the way (Waldram, 2012, p. 
113).  
 
I turn again here to the term worldedness that was earlier discussed in relation to 
the notion of embodied, holistic and non-rational forms of thought that extend 
beyond conceptualisations of individual intellectual engagement.  Worldedness, 
defined by Mika (2017a) as “the fullness of the world within any one thing” (p. 4), 
presents the underlying holism of Māori and indigenous concepts of Being.  
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Understanding things in the world as having a synchronistic existence extends our 
perception beyond a worldview where Being is largely understood within a human 
to human context.  This worlded existence makes way for not only a relational 
worldview but also the necessity of understanding the co-constructive element of 
relationship (as described by the First Nations Elder who speaks of his identity as 
co-constitutive).  
 
If we were to express this idea of worlded construction in scientific terms, we might 
use the concept of a fractal (Mandlebrot, 1983); a geometric shape with self-
similarity in that the parts are in some way related to the whole or are a “never 
ending pattern that repeats itself at different scales” (Dekker, 2018, para).  From a 
Māori perspective, Manuka (2001) alludes to this same sense of generative holism 
when discussing traditional Māori art that presents the “unfolding of the cosmos” 
(p.198), utilising images such as unfolding fern fronds (e.g., see figure 2) that also 
possess the self-similarity that the term fractal signifies.  In a similar fashion, Pei 
Te Hurinui Jones (1959) links Māori carving that depicts a double spiral and 






















Figure 3: Pascal's triangle modulo 3 (Source: Monnerot-Dumaine, 2006) 
 
What this signals is that, “the fullness of the world within any one thing” that Mika 
(2017, p. 4) refers to, is something that appears to be hinted at in what we can 
observe in nature and in (for example), computer generated fractals (see figure 3), 
that aim to mirror what natural fractals demonstrate by using the methods of 
mathematics and geometry.  However, while fractals are visible in nature when 
examples of self-similarity are presented through images of a fern, or in computer 
generated fractals (such as that shown in figure 3), it is the principle of self-
similarity, taken as a symbol of a complex process of holistic connected Being, or 
Mika’s reference to a complete constructive interconnection, that is of interest in 
the context of the metaphysical premises of Māori and indigenous understandings 
of Being.   
 
Deloria (2006) suggests that there has been a radical shift in spiritual values that 
has led to a reliance on visible phenomena, trusting only what we can see (and feel).  
The principle of holistic self-similarity, however, when viewed through a Māori 
and indigenous philosophical lens, need not be restricted to visible examples but is 
perhaps a demonstration of the co-existing, co-constructive fabric of life that gives 
clues about the nature of our metaphysical reality.  We may not be able to prove 
that the world in all its visible and non-visible forms follows a principle of relational 
holism - a dynamic ‘holding together of things’ or the world’s, “thoroughgoing 
collapse with the self” (Mika, 2017a, p. 34).  However, as I will go on to discuss 
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later in this chapter, the notion of proof denies other Māori and indigenous spiritual 
principles that are integral to the idea of a relational co-constructed self.  This 
includes the principle of mystery reflected in the world’s agency in revealing and 
concealing its different layers of existence and Being.   
 
Reciprocity  
Another term that connects to the idea of holistic Being and that has been taken up 
in popular representations of Māori and indigenous philosophy is reciprocity (e.g., 
Henry and Pene, 2001).  Common representations of the term relate to 
whanaungatanga and the obligations of care that are inherent in whānau 
relationships (Ritchie, 2003).  Kruger (2010) also sees reciprocity as a kinship 
philosophy that carries cultural obligations of care directly connected to 
relationships based on genealogical ties. It is possible, however, to engage with this 
term from a different viewpoint that implicates the spiritual holism discussed so far 
in this chapter.  I turn to the idea of ‘attunement’ to illustrate a deeper perspective 
on reciprocity in an attempt to take account of a spiritual foundation in 
understanding the principle of generosity and acts of giving.   
 
Attunement has been discussed by Williams (2012) in the context of the self’s 
connection in and with the world, as a type of empathetic resonance that can be 
likened to a shamanic experience in which the principle of generosity was enacted 
as part of living in the world.  While this view of Being from a dominant Western 
perspective has been associated with traditional (or perhaps primitive) practices, 
Williams states that, 
 
This is not about going back. Rather, it represents the 
perceptual wisdom we must carry into the future. It was 
in the ancient communities of our ancestors that the 
shaman mediated between the human and non-human 
community, ensuring there was an appropriate flow of 
nourishment not just from the landscape to the human 
inhabitants, but from the human community back to the 
local earth (p. 117).   
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Williams description of attunement could be interpreted from the perspective of a 
metaphysics that relies on visible phenomenon, such as the physical landscape or 
usable resources that form a large part of a human focussed ecological study of 
human–environment relationships.  But if we are to take seriously the spiritual 
foundation or essence that Māori and indigenous philosophers teach is the 
animating substance of the world, then the reciprocal engagement that Williams 
illustrates in the quote above becomes more than the exchange of things for 
nourishment in a physical sense.  Cruden (1995) captures this sense of the ‘more 
than physical’ when recalling the teachings of Shaman Lewis Sawaquat, referring 
to an “attunement to the essence of what lies beneath forms” (p.6).  When viewed 
as an expression of whakapapa - translated as more than human genealogy - 
reciprocity as attunement to what lies beneath visible phenomena or forms points 
to a relational experience that aligns with the “co-existence of the self and thing” 
(Mika, 2015b, p. 93), that is enacted in such a way that both the self and the world 
yield a simultaneous influence over the other.  This view indicates a holistic 
attunement that also highlights the world as an active essence: the potent spiritual 
fabric of the world in which we live or what, from an ecological perspective, might 
be referred to as the environment (Cruden, 1995). 
 
For Māori, attunement shows up in the more than physical expression and 
experience of relationship with cultural sites of significance (Kilgour, et al., 2014).  
For example, when speaking of wairua, (described by Valentine, 2009, as a 
fundamental attribute that enables Māori to engage with their reality or an ‘intuitive 
consciousness’), Hiroa (1958) indicates that it is strongly associated with the 
connections that Māori have to whenua.  A sense of constructive co-existence 
between people and the land is also found in Barlow’s (1991) description of wairua 
where he remarks that people were “fashioned from the earth” (p.152).  Marsden 
(2003) highlights the reciprocal nature of relationship with whenua, noting that it is 
also a term used for ‘afterbirth’ or placenta.  Marsden goes on to explain that this 
translation reminds us that “we are born of the womb of the primeval mother” or 
Papatūānuku, who shares, through this sense of attunement, “a web of support 
systems” (p.45).  In line with this, Quince (2006) describes Papatūānuku as “the 
primordial parent and nurturer of life.” (p. 5).    Again, while descriptions of 
indigenous peoples’ relationship with whenua (translated as ‘land’) might raise 
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ideas about connections with solid visible phenomena, in terms of attunement, we 
need not restrict our view to this.  The descriptions of whenua and of Papatūānuku 
that are offered by Marsden and Quince, along with Cruden’s (1995) appeal to an 
essence that lies beneath forms, present something other than the physical, which is 
highlighted in Marsden’s (2003) observation that the earth, or Papa-tua-nuku, is the 
“rock foundation beyond expanse, the infinite” (p. 22).    
 
Language may also be regarded as an element of reciprocal attunement, particularly 
when conventional views on language are resisted, allowing us to look beyond the 
idea of language as words that represent human centred meaning. Abrams (1996) 
captures this sense of language and attunement through highlighting the world’s 
perceptive state that, rather than representing the world as a static object to be 
studied and re-presented through human language and description, presents all 
things in the world as “sensorially resonant…expressive bodies” (p.80).   Abrams 
describes what might be thought of as an ‘ecology of language’ that escapes the 
limitations of a view that insists on a structure of linguistic rules (Williams, 2012), 
that is restricted to human expression. Cajete (2005) describes language in terms of 
a spiritual orientation to and with the world or a “sacred expression of breath (that) 
incorporates this orientation in all its foundations” (p. 70).  Similarly, when 
discussing Polynesian languages, Manuka (2001) describes this spiritual foundation 
as words and phrases that are “vitalistic (and) expressive of life forces, metaphysics, 
and cosmic energy” (p.199).  
 
Similar to Cruden’s (1995) steer towards a focus on what lies beneath forms, Mika 
(2015b) points to the spiritual movement of the world in terms of language, 
describing the connection between language and “the realm that ultimately stands 
behind utterance” (p. 98).  Similarly, Williams (2012) discusses language as that 
which sits beneath the abstract; language includes the sensorial gestures towards 
things in the world that are reciprocated by all things as part of an “empathic 
resonance” (p. 117) 
 
The spiritual foundation of reciprocity as attunement, demonstrated through 
language as vitalistic resonance and the connections that people have to whenua 
(both in the sense of being physically present at sites of significance and spiritual 
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in the sense of intangible connection), extends our view of reality to remain 
cognisant of the spiritual.  Within this view, the idea of reciprocity is extended to 
bring through the intangible foundation that is expressed through what we observe 
in human centred reciprocity but that, in line with Māori and indigenous spiritual 
holism, is more than visible acts of generosity.  It is, within the context of 
attunement, a far more complex expression that is demonstrated in all gestures: the 
empathic vitality of being-in-the-world. 
 
The onto-epistemic nature of Being  
The premises of Māori and indigenous metaphysics that have been discussed in this 
chapter have laid the ground for considering another component of relational Being 
that will be explored here in the context of what was noted earlier in McIntosh’s 
(2012) call for a recognition of “an ancient but fundamental challenge to the very 
structure of knowledge” (p.51).  In this call to challenge, McIntosh urges us to look 
closely at the premises that underlie the notion of seeking knowledge, and to be 
wary of the conceptualisations of knowledge that follow from these notions.  As 
discussed earlier, the premises that underlie a dominant Western metaphysical and 
philosophical framework posit that the world (as object) is a phenomenon that is 
separate from the (conceptualisation of the) human mind, and humanity as a whole.  
This separation allows for the study of the world as object and the observance of 
certain universal laws that in turn perpetuates the metaphysical structuring of the 
world and self as distinct subject (human) and object (the observable material 
world) (Gillett, 2009).   
 
Here I use the term onto-epistemology or the onto-epistemic to refer to the 
ontological claims that are made when an epistemological structure and stance is 
advocated.  The distinct separation that underlies the dominant Western orientation 
to the world, as a platform for objectivity, is one example of an epistemic stance 
that must carry with it an ontological claim, structuring and implicating the self in 
particular ways in order for objectivity to exist. In contrast to this view of a 
separated self and world, Māori and indigenous metaphysics present what has been 
discussed in this chapter as a self and world that experience a relational 
indivisibility.  By the very nature of the term onto-epistemic, this contrasting 
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metaphysical view, steeped in premises of holism, must posit something other than 
objectivity and its necessary condition of separation as a foundation for 
epistemology or what some might refer to as knowledge.   
 
The premises of Māori and indigenous knowledge seeking cannot be separated from 
the cosmological accounts that have been discussed in this chapter in exploring 
Māori and indigenous worldviews and the metaphysical premise of a holistic 
existence.  Immediately we see a divide between Māori and indigenous holism and 
Gillett’s description of a dominant Western structuring of the self as a separated 
objective human observer that is set against the world in order to discover reliable 
universal and natural laws or what might be conceptualised as certainty. For 
example, the spiritual foundation of Māori and indigenous creation narratives that 
present the premises of Māori and indigenous metaphysics also present a challenge 
to the idea that things in the world are assembled as measurable discoverable 
phenomena.  As Marsden (2003) explains, “Spiritual values are always beyond the 
grasp of mortal man.  They are ultimate and absolute in nature and yet always 
beckoning man onwards” (p.39).  There are two lessons that might be taken from 
Marsden’s description of the spiritual.  Firstly, the world’s fundamental spiritual 
nature denies full access and knowledge.  Secondly, this denial of full access is a 
part of the nature of Being in the world that, when understood from the perspective 
of (sacred) whakapapa, is based on a constant movement of emergence and 
becoming that is then experienced as a state of Being and endless learning.   
 
Nepia (2012), who completed a creative practice doctoral research project that 
focussed on Te Kore, describes the process of creation in a similar frame.  As he 
explains,  
 
Te Kore may articulate experience and feelings of 
absence, void, nothingness, loss and annihilation, and 
also notions of potentiality, a source or origin. The 
creative process for me often seemed a similarly 
conflicted state of emotional and physical awareness in 
which I found myself deliberating upon strategies to 
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introduce uncertainty, chance, and risk as positive 
features enhancing potential for discovery (p.28).   
 
In Nepia’s description of the search for spaces of uncertainty that enhance 
discovery, there appears to be a type of inverse process in the production of 
knowledge that (I interpret) as a different type of knowledge or perhaps a departure 
from knowledge as certainty in order to experience knowledge as creativity.   
 
The divide between Māori and indigenous and dominant Western views on 
knowledge, and their claims on the self and the self’s experience of relationship, 
are also demonstrated in an example provided by Anne Salmond (1985) who 
recounts a debate between tribal elders over which canoe first brought the kūmara 
to Aotearoa.  In debating this issue, one of the elders challenges the genealogy 
provided by an elder of another tribe, “asserting a principle of absolute truth against 
which all accounts can be judged” (p. 251).  This challenge is swiftly rebuked by 
the following speakers, one of whom implicates European ideas of validation as 
having impacted on the elder’s perception of tribal histories.  As one elder, Tamati 
Tautuhi of Mata-ahu explains,  
 
Now young fellow, the old men of this area tell these 
stories as well.  The elders of the ancient past saw 
certain things, and they told them to others and so on 
right down to this generation…. Those accounts are still 
being told today and they can be laid clearly before you 
whenever you like.  It is not right (tika) to say that Major 
Ropata conjured up this information (mohiotanga) by 
himself, for he didn’t invent it – the old men taught him 
this knowledge (mātauranga) and it was not a myth 
(tito) made up in the porch of his own house (cited in 
Salmond, 1985, p 252). 
 
Salmond explains that, while each elder may present a different account of the 
arrival of kūmara, Māori thinking was able to accommodate variance, 
demonstrating an open epistemological worldview and (in the example provided 
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above), a valuing of relational knowledge sharing as opposed to ideas of absolute 
exclusive truth and verification.  Salmond extends this critique of the dominant 
Western framing of knowledge by differentiating the term mātauranga, commonly 
translated as Māori knowledge (Mika, 2012), from what she calls the “parochial” 
(p. 240), pre-conception of European evaluation: 
 
A particular form of maatauranga is waananga, 
ancestral knowledge which enabled its possessor to 
communicate directly with the ancestor gods and to 
activate their power.  All of these forms of knowledge 
were stored in the belly (puku) where the various organs 
of thought and emotion were located; the hinengaro or 
spleen where thought, memory and emotions were 
originated; the ngaakau or entrails where thought and 
feeling were given expression; and the manawa or 
bowels, where thought and feeling associated with the 
life force or manawa ora.  Thought (mahara, 
whakaaro) and desires (hiahia, manako) received their 
original impulse in the hinengaro, and welled up in the 
ngaakau or mind-heart to be expressed in words or 
actions: while the mind-heart received information 
about the phenomenal world through the senses: ‘ka kite 
te kanohi, ka rongo te taringa, maatau ana ki te 
ngaakau’ (the eyes see, the ear hears, the mind-heart 
understands).  The head had nothing to do with 
cognition in this account (p. 240 – 241). 
 
Mātauranga, rather than being conceptualised as knowledge that is an intellectual 
arrival at a conclusive point, comes through ‘impulse’ and the complex embodied 
unfolding of thought.  Through placing mātauranga within a wider, embodied 
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process, Salmond resists the singularity and finality that the translation of 
mātauranga as knowledge implies.   
 
In discussing the appropriation of the term mātauranga by the intellectual 
traditional, Mika (2012) explains the implications of the more mundane and 
singular representation of what carries, within a Māori metaphysics, a more 
complex and multifaceted character.  As Mika explains, “the effects of the term 
(mātauranga) on Māori spiritual relationships with the world have not yet been 
sufficiently theorised, especially when it is rendered as ‘knowledge’” (p.1081).  For 
Mika, these effects are the fixing of things in the world (that again rests on the 
separation of the human observer in order to attain an objective view), that denies 
the movement and agency of the world and its status as Being or its ‘impulse’.  In 
departing from the view of mātauranga as a complex phenomenon, there is a danger 
that mātauranga is instead conflated with the term knowledge.  This act of 
conflation puts in place a problematic restriction, denying the self a contemplative 
stance towards things in the world: a stance that privileges relationship rather than 
(the projection of) intellectual comprehension or ‘apprehension’.  Mātauranga, 
when the term is equated with knowledge, instead renders the world as object - one 
that, rather than being embodied by the self, stands distanced and apart.  
 
It is appropriate here to revisit the term whakapapa to consider its influence in the 
context of the onto-epistemic.  Whakapapa, so far discussed in terms of a co-
existing creativity (C. Smith, 2000) and the sacred connections inherent in the 
cosmological genealogy (Marsden, 2003), provides a further metaphorical 
representation of knowledge that signifies not only what can be sensed, seen, or 
consciously thought but also what cannot be immediately perceived.  Mika (2015b) 
refers to this co-existence of the seen and unseen as the worlds, “fixed strata, their 
interstices, and the potential for thinking both of the layers themselves and the dark, 
mysterious spaces between them.” (p.104).  Roberts and Williams (1998) similarly 
point to whakapapa as a thought process that is experienced (though not necessarily 
in a conscious perceptive sense) as meaning that exists in layers, shifting to reveal 
and conceal, as opposed to elucidating points of certainty.  This sense of complexity 
and layered meaning is captured by Puhakka (cited in Esbjorn-Hargens and 
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Zimmerman, 2009) who, when talking about the complex (and therefore uncertain) 
nature of the world, states that, 
 
We live in systems within systems, contexts within 
contexts indefinitely, and the systems are constantly 
sliding and the contexts shifting. The vision of an open 
universe unfolding and enfolded upwards and 
downwards without end effectively removes all bases 
for certainty and completeness (p. 75). 
 
This sense of the world’s uncertainty can be viewed alongside the ideas explored in 
the method chapter in relation to whakaaro and whaiwhakaaro that implicate the 
agency of things in the world and an interconnected process of knowledge 
generation.  The notion of embodied knowledge within a Māori worldview 
implicates the influence of things on the self through the self’s embeddedness in 
whakapapa.  It also implicates the ira tangata aspect of Being intimately linked to 
ira atua, acknowledging the world’s spiritual impetus and its active presentation 
that calls for our attention. The idea that things in the world have an influence on 
the self (and from within an eco-spiritual worldview, things that are sentient) 
suggests that the world is animate with agency or as Mika (2017a) states, the world 
moves and arranges itself.   Further, Mehl-Madrona and Mainguy (2012) share a 
similar sense of the world’s agency when they state that, “The spirits of the natural 
elements had their own order” (p. 237).  
 
Mika (2016) describes the world and its entities as, “fundamentally unknowable 
and…nevertheless influential and constructive” (p. 171).  In terms of the impact on 
the self, this view of the world sets us up with the understanding that what we think, 
or ideas that come to mind, are constructed from the influence of other things and 
are not simply constructions of our mind developed through intellectual 
contemplation.  This experience of being holistically connected to a thing, 
characterised by the human being’s inability to know the thing in its entirety, is 
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what Mika (2017b) refers to as ‘mystery’ or, put simply “a limit on what we know 
about an object, related to its ability to withhold part of itself from our view” (p.5).   
 
For example, during the course of this PhD research I attended a conference 
presentation in which a researcher described the process of discovery that they 
experienced as part of shaping their research question.  The researcher,  Indranil 
Chakravarty (2017), described his work as an attempt to “write a screenplay on a 
man in 19th century India who is said to have killed a tiger with his bare hands at 
14, became a globe-trotting circus performer, a surgeon and a triumphant Captain 
of the Brazilian Army.” He remarked that the man in question was, “Erased from 
public memory” and that as a researcher, Chakravarty feels that he has been forced 
to navigate the problem of having sparse evidence of the man’s life.  This man’s 
story had for some time stayed concealed under a veil of obscurity, hardly touched 
by the interests of historians, but, as Chakravarty discovers after commencing his 
research, almost in synchronicity, other researchers have begun to search through 
the man’s history.  He wonders what called him to form his relationship with the 
man’s story – what has drawn him to form what he describes as ‘obsession’.  He 
also wonders what has called others to take on this search, and how it could be that 
their search has emerged at the same time as his own has begun.   
 
In reflecting on what has driven this surge of interest in a historical figure that was 
previously out of the scope of popular attention, Chakravarty (2017) turns to what 
he calls, “an attitude of openness implicit in Sanskrit text” noting that “we can only 
understand ourselves in our relationship with others”.  While Chakravarty did not 
speak directly (or more broadly) about the exact implications of Sanskrit teachings 
in the context of a seemingly spontaneous revival of a historical story that has arisen 
in the work of researchers (who have no visible connections) across the world, his 
subsequent reference to relationship hints at the nature of the openness that 
Chakravarty links to Sanskrit text. Chakravarty’s meditation on why the idea for 
the research has arisen for him, in the context of relationship, may be less of a 
question of why he has reached a self-originating decision to focus on a particular 
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research question and more about how relationship explains the movement of an 
idea towards a person.   
 
The conceptualisation of ideas or things arriving in our thoughts was discussed in 
the method chapter in relation to the experiences of Māori Marsden who, as a 
student within wananga, was immersed in the process of communication with 
deities (Royal, 2017).  This process, described as knowledge that arrives, and the 
sense of movement that it implies of a thing showing itself, can be related to 
Chakravarty’s (2017) question of how to explain the re-emergence of an obscure 
historical figure.  It also provides a pathway to imagine how this re-emergence has 
manifest (in the same space of time), in the work and interests of researchers 
worldwide who have largely shared no previous connection.    
 
While this example demonstrates the potential influence of another on the 
researcher (perhaps even the influence of the memory of another person on the 
researcher, if we take seriously that memories are entities that influence), it can just 
as easily be applied to any other thing in the world influencing a person and 
participating in a type of formation of that person as thinker, actor, and Being. This 
may demonstrate that what we conceptualise as ideas (or even feelings) that are 
internally constructed can in fact be understood, from a different metaphysical 
viewpoint, as things that visit.  
 
From within a Māori worldview we might reflect on the term tohu to understand 
how things in the world show themselves, laying claim to our attention.  When 
discussing Māori relational modes of knowledge, Salmond (1985) remarks that 
there were “interpretations of tohu (signs, omens) in sickness, battle, and other 
meetings between people and ancestor gods, which could be reinterpreted if other 
information emerged; and it gave resonance (of reference to landscape, carvings, 
gods, and people)” (p.250).  Salmond’s description implies a sense of the world’s 
disclosure and self-emergence.  It could perhaps be described as the things that 
come into view, not through an individual’s distanced observance of a landscape or 
other solid phenomenon, but through the movement of the world that is again 
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reflected in the generative relation that Salmond highlights in describing the co-
constructive nature of Being or Manuka’s (2001) reference to an ‘unfolding’.   
 
Williams (2012), reflecting on acts of influence, describes the experience as one 
where things lay claim to us.  To illustrate this experience, Williams turns to the 
idea of dreams as a type of knowledge but one that is characterised by the ability to 
be within a psychic space, sharing in communication with the world in which all 
involved, “are viewed as constituting and re-constituting each other” (p. 120).  
Williams recalls a particular dream that holds significance in the context of a shared 
constitutive assembly of self and world: 
 
I’m in the kitchen of my house in Auckland, Aotearoa 
New Zealand. I’m at the bench, looking out the window, 
when suddenly to my shock there is a cobra rising in the 
air in front of me. I’m really frightened. I don’t want 
this intruder in my house. I try to kill it. As soon as I cut 
off its head it immediately becomes two cobra. Now I 
am desperately lunging in for the kill at two of them; 
just as I reach them, they transform themselves into fish. 
Reflexively, I reach into the water for the fish, but just 
as I grab them, they slip from my grasp, transforming 
themselves into fireflies.  
 
The instant I clutch at the air to catch the fireflies, they 
become deer, and we are standing on Prairie land, 
somewhere on the North American continent. “Kill 
them! Kill them!” the voice in my head insists. I’m 
filled with fear at the irrepressible life force that inhabits 
these animals that just keeps transmuting into one 
physical form after another. The instant I lunge towards 
the deer, they become a buffalo— a huge, powerful 
buffalo. The buffalo glowers at me, its energy filling the 
space. “I’M HERE! AND YOU’LL NEVER KILL 
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ME!’ it thunders at me. I wake, in terror, knowing that 
this irrepressible energy is far bigger than me (p. 130). 
 
Williams interprets this dream as a deeply transformative message, describing the 
impact of the vision as, “being called awake” (p.130).  This interpretation 
immediately raises the idea of an active communication that comes not from an 
isolated individual thinker but another entity, external and yet connected to the self 
– that which moves to call the self.  In line with this, Williams further notes when 
reflecting on the dream that, “It (the dream) came “out of the blue” so to speak, as 
if from the deepest recesses of my psyche. I instinctively recognized that this dream 
was a “take note” kind of dream, one that had come from a place of spirit or 
mystery.”  (p.122).   The description of the dream may also be interpreted as a 
symbol of mystery or reaching for something only to have it slip from our grasp 
and change form - never fully knowable and resisting apprehension or certainty.   
 
What replaces certainty? 
The question of “what replaces certainty” is one that I was asked during my PhD 
confirmation and one that I have reflected on throughout the writing of this thesis.  
It seems that the notion of certainty is one that has infiltrated the onto-epistemic 
experience, and in the context of doctoral research, shows up as an academic 
expectation.  The expectation, as I interpret it in the context of academic work, is 
the anticipation of objective representation that dulls complex understanding, 
demanding that things in the world will be put forward (by the detached human 
observer) in neat packages of essential meaning.  As discussed earlier, this type of 
(non) relational objective representation must discount the play of other entities so 
that clarity can be achieved.  Further, the expectation of objective representation 
makes it difficult to argue for an alternative view of knowledge creation in an 
academic setting because of the emphasis that is placed on an individual ‘ability’ to 
think and develop insight into a subject.  However, I will attempt to speculate on 
something that may counter certainty as a way of illustrating what Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics offers in terms of re-contextualising the notion of 
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knowledge, and also where it may lead us in our conclusions about what is learned 
through its application.   
 
When viewing the notion of knowledge as (a positive) uncertainty through a Māori 
and indigenous metaphysical lens, it is possible to pick up on the sense of a 
complex, contextualised, moving knowledge as opposed to a fixed sense of 
knowledge that dominant Western epistemology upholds.   In reflecting on this 
sense of movement and the uncertain terrain that it presents, I am drawn to 
indigenous notions of time as a way of understanding the world’s self-disclosure 
(in its mysterious, never fully knowable nature), and what the world’s giving of the 
self provides that is other than certain knowledge of a thing.  Indigenous notions of 
time offer important insight when reflecting on the gift of uncertainty that makes 
way for something other than an arrival at a conclusion or the apprehension of 
things in fixed place and focus.   
 
Roberts (2013) hints at the nature of time from a Māori worldview when she refers 
to the cosmological aspect of time as, “collapsed space-time framework” (p.107).  
The term ‘collapsed’ is important here because it links back to the idea of 
worldedness that was discussed earlier in the thesis that illustrates the nature of 
Being as a thorough enmeshing of things such that no one thing is independently 
constituted.  Rather, worldedness highlights the notion of ‘collapse’ as being a 
thorough co-constitution of all things in the world.  It is within this context that 
Māori and indigenous notions of time can be understood, not as a linear progression 
of past time from one point to another separate and distanced future, but as a circular 
movement (Marsden, 2003) in which “The present loops back to re-join the reality 
of past… rather than… marching steadily into an unknown future” (White, 1996, 
p.3).  It is in this sense of circular collapse that time shifts as a metaphysical 
interpretation of experience and as a notion. 
 
Rifkin (2017) offers an indigenous view of time with this same sense of collapse 
explaining that, 
 
there is no singular unfolding of time, but, instead, 
varied temporal formations that have their own rhythms 
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- patterns of consistency and transformation that emerge 
immanently out of the multifaceted and shifting sets of 
relationships that constitute formations and out of the 
interactions among those formations (p.33). 
 
Through Rifkin’s description, time, rather than representing a singular (universal) 
now in which the past is a tattered relic, calcified in its no longer relevant state of 
has been, takes on a new temporalism that can be translated as relationship.  The 
relationship between the past and the present ‘lives’ in a dynamic and constant 
dance of remembrance and re-turn but one that signals the immediate and constant 
presence of each.  Within this relationship, all things in the world are at play, 
forming an indigenous temporal sovereignty, conceptualised as ‘orientation’.   
Rifkin explains this temporal orientation as something that foregrounds the 
experience of Being as our (embodied) interpretations of experience, sensations, 
and the networks we are immersed in as part of a process of becoming as opposed 
to being fixed in time.  We are immersed in the world at play, shaped by experience 
as multiple directions of feeling, thought and Being.  
  
Within this conceptualisation of time, repetition and direction interrupt the notion 
of linear progression, bringing instead the imaginary of multiple points of departure 
and pathways of becoming that Rifkin (2017) refers to as a collective “unfolding” 
(p. 16).  In exploring the idea of orientation, Rifkin turns to the works of Sara 
Ahmed (2006) who, in her book, Queer Phenomenology, asks, “What does it mean 
to be oriented? How do we begin to know or to feel where we are, or even where 
we are going, by lining ourselves up with the features of the grounds we inhabit, 
the sky that surrounds us, or the imaginary lines that cut through maps?” (p. xvii). 
Ahmed also interprets time as “shaping” (xiii), describing time in ways that mirrors 
the ‘collapse’ of time and space referred to by Roberts (2013).   As Ahmed states, 
“Depending on which way one turns, different worlds might even come into view. 
If such turns are repeated over time, then bodies acquire the very shape of such 
direction” (p. xxvi).   
 
It is this notion of time as orientation (as complex relational movement) that I 
speculate provides a potential escape from the concept of certainty.  Orientation, as 
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the movement of bodies through non-linear time and unrestricted notions of space, 
invites us to understand ourselves (and all things in the world), not through 
intellectual deliberation that provides certainty, but as a ‘cosmo-scape’ of complex 
and shifting relationships.   
 
Rather than observing the world through a distant objective lens that leads to a (dis) 
orientation, manifesting as the representation of things as static phenomena with 
knowable objective qualities, indigenous orientation immerses us within the world 
- within time as space.  The cosmoscape that we are immersed within allows us to 
interact with things as relations and to find types of meaning, but the basis of our 
understanding would be necessarily measured, tempered by the experience of 
shifting  people and landscapes: the shaping and re-shaping of the self and world as 
we take new directions.  Deloria (2001) uses the term “discern” (p.3), to capture a 
different sense of knowledge that is reflected in how our relationships influence our 
Being.  It is, according to Deloria, a different type of knowledge that is akin to 
wisdom: something felt in the body as it relates to other bodies.  Deloria (2003) also 
uses the term ‘revelation’ (p. 67) in an attempt to capture what comes from the lived 
experience of relational orientation, explaining that, 
 
The places where revelations were experienced were 
remembered and set aside as locations where, through 
rituals and ceremonials, the people could once again 
communicate with the spirits. Thousands of years of 
occupancy on their lands taught tribal peoples the 
sacred landscapes for which they were responsible and 
gradually the structure of ceremonial reality became 
clear. It was not what people believed to be true that was 
important but what they experienced as true. Hence 
revelation was seen as a continuous process of 
adjustment to the natural surrounding and not as a 





In Deloria’s description of relational Being as a process of shaping understanding, 
the experience of what is ‘true’ sits in sharp contrast to the view of knowledge as 
the discovery of ‘truths’ that are fixed in time and place.  Instead, place becomes 
the site of “epistemo-ontological cultural orientations” (Calderon, 2008, p.111), 
born from the experience of being-in-the-world, immersed within the ground of 
Being rather than standing (with authority) upon it.   
 
Concluding thoughts: Revisiting mauri  
Having explored Māori and indigenous metaphysics and the possibilities for re- 
orientation that foreground the necessity of relational Being to re-presenting Māori 
and indigenous onto-epistemes, I now want to revisit the question that was 
considered at the beginning of this chapter.  The question concerning the “jarred 
and shaken” mauri (Milne, 2005, p. 13), as an expression of a person’s experience 
was considered within the context of how a mental health service would approach 
the task of responding to a person’s need for culturally congruent healing.   
 
Mauri, as a basis for considering what is observed as a person’s emotions and 
behaviour, carries profound spiritual meaning requiring that the premises of support 
and healing are based in an equally profound and spiritual worldview.  Mauri is not 
something that is divisible or easily apprehended by the clinical concepts that might 
be used to translate the experience a person is intending to articulate.  The 
complexity reflected in mauri is something the permeates all things, whether they 
be physical ‘objects’ or ideas and thoughts (e.g., C. Smith, 2000).  This 
understanding of mauri within a mental health context would require a shift in 
thinking from what Gillett (2009) describes as the dominant Western tendency to 
separate out all things in the world (to objectify things as separate knowable things), 
to seeing things as part of a complex, holistic and mysterious lived experiences.   
 
The implications that this shift in thinking might have for the re-presentation of the 
notion of mental illness is discussed at length in chapter six.  However, I conclude 
here by emphasising the metaphysical premises that are reflected in the principles 
of Being discussed in this chapter and how these premises highlight the need to re-
consider a person’s experience of illness or dis-ease.  If the self and world are 
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holistically caught up in a complex co-constructive dance, then the frameworks 
employed to understand this experience of holism must be able to deal with the 
complexity that is at play.  Indeed, the very idea of using frameworks (the tidy 
conceptual framing of experience), comes into question and is problematised.  The 
framework of framing, disrupted by Māori and indigenous holism, must be 
addressed in order to clear ground for a re-presentation of Being and the potential 
for healing that Māori and indigenous metaphysics might offer.  In order to clear 
this ground, to make way for Māori and indigenous holism in mental health, we 
will first need to address the dominant Western framework: the structure that Gillett 
(2009) describes as the act of separation and objectification.  It is this framing of 
Being, or what is discussed in the next chapter as the metaphysics of presence, that 
I suggest is an insidious constructive influence that has captured Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being – reforming ideas of complex holism to fit the 
dominant Western metaphysical frame.   
127 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE  
We cannot re-present Māori and indigenous notions of Being without confronting 
its opposite.  As mentioned, while this thesis is concerned with how Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being can be re-presented, there is also a concern 
with how dominant Western metaphysics has interrupted Māori and indigenous 
worldviews.  The exact form of interruption that I am concerned with runs deeper 
than considering the inclusion or exclusion of Māori and indigenous ideas within 
different onto-epistemic systems.  Instead, I am concerned with how a dominant 
metaphysics shapes the way in which Māori and indigenous ideas (and indeed all 
ideas) are able to be articulated.  In the introduction of this thesis, I referred to the 
notion of suppression to describe what I argue is a type of metaphysical 
conditioning of Māori and indigenous onto-epistemes.  In order to understand the 
nature of this suppression and how it is enacted, it is imperative that the method of 
suppression is exposed and deconstructed.  Within this chapter, this method of 
suppression is discussed as a metaphysical orientation: the metaphysics of presence.  
Having a solid understanding of the metaphysics of presence will lay ground for 
understanding how this metaphysics has, I suggest, constructed the notion of mental 
illness (examined in chapter six).   
 
In the previous chapter, the holistic experience of being-in-the world was discussed 
in the context of Māori and indigenous metaphysics with the aim of exploring the 
first principles and premises of a Māori and indigenous orientation to the world.  In 
this chapter, I will discuss a dominant Western metaphysics that, I will argue, sits 
counter to Māori and indigenous holism, departing from the premises of 
interconnection and relational Being.  A conventional and dominant Western 
metaphysics was introduced in the previous chapter as a pervasive influence that 
disrupts indigenous expressions within the context of what Calderon (2008) 
describes as a metaphysical construction of self.  This metaphysical construction 
was linked to ideas of an intellectual rather than holistic embodied connection to 
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things in the world set in place through the Cartesian position that Gillett (2009) 
characterises as a view of the self as a cognitively defined abstract agent.   
 
The legacy of the Cartesian position has been described as the construction of the 
world as a passive and static object, available and ready for conceptual 
representation (Kincheloe and Tobin, 2009).  Through the faculty of the superior 
human mind, which is sharply distinct from the external world, the Cartesian agent 
would attain an objective view allowing for the codification, description, and 
measurement, of an impersonal, specifiable, mechanical world in which what is 
observed obeys universal laws.  In this chapter, I will be extending the analysis of 
the dominant Western metaphysics that has led to the construction of the Cartesian 
position in which the self and the world are separated as subject (the self) and object 
(the self’s objective representation of the world).   
 
While a specific metaphysical orientation (of presence) will be discussed at length 
later in the chapter, here I will simply highlight the invasive principle of presence 
that is at play in this dominant metaphysics, reflecting a preference for how things 
in the world will be represented. Already, I have considered certain premises 
stemming from a metaphysics that makes a particular proposition about the nature 
of the world and reality, framing the world in terms of observability and 
measurement.   It is this sense of solid representation, reflected in the attitude of 
presence, that is the making of the world as an object available (to the human 
subject) for conceptual uptake.  Presence (when viewed through the analytical lens 
of, for example, Jacques Derrida, 1982) constructs the world in terms of a 
conceptual clarity - of clear and present qualities that provide a means for 
measurement and identification or what we might call having (a proxy type of) 
knowledge of things.   
 
In terms of a Māori and indigenous experience of dealing with the metaphysics of 
presence, we might recognise the effects of this insistence on conceptual solidity as 
the experience of conceptual containment that has shown up, for example, in highly 
structured indigenous identities.  These markers of identity were discussed in the 
introduction chapter as ‘expectations’, acting as a type of disciplining of the 
indigenous self through determining normal indigenous traits. The dominant 
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Western epistemic structure insists on essentialisms that fix indigenous expressions 
of identity, appealing to bodies of knowledge that prefer solid representations of 
authentic indigenous ontologies.  Often these authentic markers of indigenous 
identities are based on clear and formal ontological categories that raise questions 
about what it means to be indigenous.  Hokowhitu (2016), for example, asks what 
holds Māori identities together? “Is it whakapapa (genealogy), blood, ontological 
markers such as the ability to speak te reo (the Māori language), the performance 
of culture, or is it hair colour? (p. 83).  Similarly, Weaver (2001) questions the 
solidification of indigenous identity through different forms of measurement, 
asking how we can be sure that the variables of identity that we select will serve to 
achieve inclusion rather than excluding indigenous individuals who do not fit the 
constructed mould.    
 
More recently, King, Hodgetts, Rua and Morgan (2017) note that indigenous 
identities are being quantified through inventories that enable self-categorisation in 
which individuals can select (and rate) particular (pre-determined) identity traits 
including variables such as spirituality and ‘socio-political consciousness’ (see 
Houkamau and Sibley, 2010).  Further, King et al. describe these types of 
representations as ones that tend to force indigenous identities into reductionist 
frameworks turning complex phenomena into manageable entities.   
 
In pushing back against imposed, reductionist identities, indigenous peoples have 
challenged notions of universality and essentialism, strongly resisting the 
representation of indigenous peoples as an essentialised ‘Other’ through “rewriting 
and re-righting our position in history” (Smith, 1999, p. 29).  It is this sense of 
resistance that calls for a re-presentation of Māori and indigenous understandings 
of Being and also supports the drive to deconstruct the dominant Western 
metaphysics that has created universal, restrictive and exclusionary indigenous 
identities.  However, while the casting of indigenous identities in terms of pre-
determined formal traits is problematic, it is not the only consequence of conceptual 
containment that impacts on indigenous ontologies.  Within Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics, the freedom of complex expression is also a concern for more-than-
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human entities whose identities are intimately affected by our perception and 
(conceptual) representation of the world (Blaser, 2014).   
 
Within this chapter, the deconstruction of dominant Western metaphysics 
represents an attempt to re-turn to holism and the complex expression of the self 
and world as phenomena that reflect more than our rational and conceptually 
limited representations.  The philosophical history of clear divisibility and 
objectivity will be explored in this context to illustrate what has led to what I 
identify as a dominant and conventional onto-epistemic attitude.  This attitude is 
one that I will argue has re-shaped our relationship with the world, disrupting 
holism and metaphysically re-structuring the self as the central, rational subject that 
must represent the world in objective terms through projecting pre-determined, 
rigid and limited qualities onto things (and each other). It is also, I will argue, what 
has led to the construction of those who are labelled as experiencing mental illness 
as clinical disorders, limiting the excessive meaning of experience that, from a 
Māori and indigenous perspective, disrupts the ability to speak of one’s experience 
in holistic terms.     
 
Moving beyond the ontological turn 
At first glance, some might read what is being discussed here as something akin to 
the ontological turn in anthropology which challenges the imposition of 
predetermined ideas about reality reflected in the interpretations of cultural 
expressions and practices observed by researchers entering other people’s 
communities.  Blaser (2014) describes the ontological turn as a rejection of the 
notion of ‘culture’ within anthropological contexts where culture is often discussed 
as different versions of universal concepts.  As Blaser explains, the ontological turn 
signals a dissatisfaction with the term culture, seeking to displace its interpretive 
influence through recognising that “‘cultural difference’ is a function of the 
modernist ontological assumption that there is one reality or world out there and 
multiple perspectives or cultural representations of it” (p. 52).  However, while 
Blaser supports the principle of disrupting a certain Eurocentric definition of culture 
(one that merely provides us with multiple representations of a universal reality), 
he asks that we do more, stressing the importance of embracing an understanding 
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of multiple ontologies (a position that is supportive of the ontological turn), which 
requires more than simply changing how different cultural expressions and 
ontologies are conceptualised.  For Blaser, it is the act of conceptualisation and the 
tendency to create categories to house the multiple ontological expressions we 
encounter that is the problem.   
 
Blaser (2014) discusses the task of taking multiple ontologies seriously by first 
challenging the idea that ontologies are inventories of types of Being.  This view, 
according to Blaser, is set up within the power structures that construct knowledge 
systems and tends to favour the dominant view that things in the world exist only 
insofar as those things can fit the available categories created within (Eurocentric) 
systems of thought.  As Blaser states, within dominant structures of categorisation, 
“we surrender any effort to hear about ‘things’ that our categories cannot grasp”.  
(p.52).    Within this framework of ontological inventory, the ontological types of 
Being of the ‘subaltern’ would, rather than being excluded from ontological record, 
be included but as a version of whatever pre-existing category for understanding 
‘things’ exists in the dominant taxonomy.  For example, mātauranga Māori, 
described by Mika (2012) in the previous chapter as “impulse” (p. 241), and the 
embodied unfolding of thought, would be included in the category of knowledge 
which, in the dominant Western tradition, connects thought to the rational and 
cognitive.   
 
Blaser (2014) calls for a radical alterity that would shift our reliance on 
categorisation.  Within the current chapter, the radical alterity that Blaser seeks is 
discussed as the move to take seriously things that do not fit into existing dominant 
taxonomies or do not even comply with the idea of taxonomies.  These are the things 
that do not provide the necessary material and conceptual framework that enables 
things to be cast as discernible, discrete objects and ideas.  Here, I challenge not 
only the dominant constructed categories that are available as representations of 
reality but the notion of category and (conceptual) representation as statements 
about how things are expected to appear or be ‘taken up’.   
 
The challenge of re-presenting things that do not fit into tidy categories of 
explanation was discussed in the previous chapter in reference to the question of 
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how a mental health service would respond to the presentation of a person who 
describes their experience as one in which their mauri was affected, “jarred and 
shaken” (Milne, 2005, p. 13), requiring a response that is altogether different from 
what clinical categories of behaviour allow for.   In terms of Blaser’s (2014) concern 
regarding the surrender of effort “to hear about things that our categories cannot 
grasp”, it is the notion of categories, not simply in terms of their content, but as 
tools for participating in a particular way of treating the world – via acts of 
conceptual grasping – that, I argue, would restrict a full, holistic consideration of 
mauri.   
 
Mauri, by its very nature, would resist full conceptualisation predicated on the 
ability to identify the essential and universal elements of any one thing in the world, 
seeking to lay bare its apparent mystery in favour of representing it as a thinkable 
concept. As noted earlier, like other terms within the Māori language, mauri carries 
with it a sense of the indivisible, described as an energetic element of creation or 
life force.  Treating mauri as a concept, I suggest, would form a type of ontological 
imposition, enforced through the initial act of abstraction.  I would call this a more 
fundamental composition of self and world (as a metaphysical rather than 
conceptual concern) that goes beyond ‘discursive’ social or cultural construction to 
form a thoroughly embodied, spiritual, ontological re-assembly.  
 
Mika (2015c) laments this re-composition of self and world when describing the 
violence that is done through the rational assumption that reduces our connections 
to things to what can be taken up by an individual’s mind.  Using the example of a 
mountain, Mika explains that, from a Māori perspective, we have a thorough 
connection to the mountain as whanaunga (rather than as object).  This means that 
the mountain materially constitutes us and, in conjunction with the world as a 
whole, allows us to then perceive it.  In contrast, a dominant metaphysics would 
restrict the mountain’s identity, ensuring that it is represented within the limits of 
the term ‘mountain’ that acts as a ready-made category with assigned properties, 
posited as the mountain’s essential (present and visible) and true composition.  As 
Mika explains, this mental and conceptual uptake disrupts the former relational 
connection; it now proceeds on the individual’s (exclusive) ability to project 
thought (as the subject) onto things external to the self.  These external things are 
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then rendered simply as static objects, rather than being intelligent entities that exist 
in a holistic, thorough co-constitution of the self and the world.  Mika states that, 
 
with the metaphysics of presence, the mountain only is 
a mountain insofar as it has been equated with the term 
by the speaker or onlooker. I have made the mountain 
what it is by virtue of my intervention on it through 
terminology. I have correctly identified it as a mountain 
because I have managed to connect it to a proper idea 
of it. The mountain is hence matched with its proper 
category. In this act, the mountain is capable of being 
permanently unanchored from its constitution by all 
other things in the world. Most important, I have 
domain over my representation of the mountain: it (and 
all other things) has not in any way brought my attention 
to it in its materiality, but instead, it is a cognitive 
tendency of mine to attend to it (pp. 89 – 90).  
 
Holbraad and Petersen (2017) suggest that a more thorough and effective 
ontological turn would take account of the world’s composition in such a way that 
we would surrender our tendency to engage with the world as a domain of cognitive 
representation.  In a move to go beyond simply striving to re-conceptualise by using 
strategies that get us closer to grasping a different point of view, they describe “a 
basic reversal from striving to grasp ‘the native’s point of view’, to finding ways to 
overcome what one already grasps in order to better be grasped by it” (p.7).  This 
view of engagement suggests that a full grasp of a thing by a central human thinking 
agent may not be an essential, primary ontological (or epistemological) possibility.  
Instead, in taking account of the worlds ability to grasp the self, we might re-turn 
to a holism that accounts for the constructive nature of the self in relationship with 
the world as indivisible Beings, engaging in co-construction in ways that are not 





Shifting metaphysics and onto-epistemic foundations 
The problematic notions of inventory, category, and conceptualisation expose the 
onto-epistemic ground that is often left intact despite the strong challenges aimed 
at the imposition of assumed universal onto-epistemic statements.   Calderon 
(2008), in her doctoral research which focussed on the impacts of Western 
knowledge organisation on indigenous education, has expressed similar concerns 
about what she calls the “foundational categories of systems of thought” (p.72),  
often left untouched, resting beneath notions of ideology and worldviews.  
According to Calderon, these foundational systems maintain a dominant position, 
shaping knowledge production and dictating how knowledge production will be 
approached.  As Calderon puts it when referring to multicultural education research, 
often we are involved in work that “fails to address the foundations of ideology, 
and in turn inadvertently smuggles western metaphysical ideas into our ideas” (p. 
72).   
 
For Calderon, metaphysics is the foundational issue that must be addressed in order 
to disrupt dominant Western onto-epistemes.  Similarly, Trifonas and Jagger (2018) 
call for work that would, “displace the historical traces of the territorial imperative 
of imperialism as a conscious process of colonizing body and mind and refocusing 
a sense of world” (p.214).  While the colonisation of body can be understood 
through, for example, representations on gender and sexualised Being (e.g., Cook, 
2013), and through the imposition of ideologies (e.g., Freire, 1972), it is the 
metaphysical colonisation of mind and body within what Calderon (2008) refers to 
as “deeper cultural fissures” (p.75), that are highlighted here.  These deeper cultural 
fissures are ones which, I argue, are located in a dominant Western metaphysics 
that encourages us to encounter things in a refocused sense of world, expecting 
things to be represented as discernible, thinkable objects.  
 
The problem of making things into thinkable objects is linked to the idea of the 
metaphysical construction of the self as a rational, separated Being.  This 
metaphysical separation, I would argue, continues to enforce the expectation of 
objective representation, disrupting our sense of self and world as holistic Beings.  
In terms of objective knowledge, any dissatisfaction about objectivity as knowledge 
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that imposes a one worldview onto all people, while a valid and critical problem to 
raise in a decolonisation context, must also address the structure of knowledge 
production that underpins objectivity.  Borrowing again from Calderon’s (2008) 
description, I posit that it is the structure that supports objective knowledge 
production (rather than simply the content of objective representations), that 
enables the smuggling of a dominant Western metaphysics into Māori and 
indigenous discourses.   It is this structural influence of a dominant Western 
metaphysics that, I suggest, continues to influence how we express our worldviews, 
maintaining the expectation that things in the world will be described through 
human representation as objects that hold certain qualities as ‘this’ or ‘that’ (Mika 
and Stewart, 2016, p. 302).  It is this “sense of world” (Trifonas and Jagger, 2018, 
p. 214), (a sense of the world as object), that I posit is central to the onto-epistemic 
expectation of objective representation that constructs the self and the world.   
 
As I will argue in this chapter, the construction of the self and the world as fixed, 
objective, conceptual entities is part of a metaphysical inheritance and legacy that 
has influenced central tenets of ontology and knowledge production since early 
Greek philosophy.  Once the premises of this metaphysical inheritance have been 
explored, I will then go on to show how the inheritance has been deconstructed in 
attempts to give way to what Derrida would call ‘play’ or trace that can be directly 
related to Māori and indigenous metaphysics and the sense of world as an ecstatic 
mix of intentional and fluid entities.   
 
My focus on the foundations of a philosophy that sets up the world as an object of 
(conceptual) representation is driven by the desire to provide a clear picture of what 
I believe haunts Māori and indigenous expressions.  While we may strive to 
articulate something other than a dominant explanation of a thing, or to resist an 
imposed, arbitrarily assigned description of Māori and indigenous Being, I believe 
there is something pervasive about the metaphysics of presence that demands we 
engage in the thorough deconstruction of its metaphysical premises.  When we offer 
a Māori and indigenous perspective of things in the world, can we be sure that the 
onto-epistemic structure we use to share those insights is of our own making?  Or 
are we forced to use a structure of articulation that is wholly caught up in the very 
system of thought that we are wary of or that we are attempting to escape? Through 
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providing an in-depth presentation of the metaphysics of presence in this chapter, I 
aim to expose the premises that I believe are suppressing Māori and indigenous 
onto-epistemes – pulling us back into line with a metaphysical tradition that has 
been in play from the time of early Greek philosophy.   
 
The metaphysical re-construction of the self  
Descartes’ subject 
As discussed previously, Descartes’ ideas on the nature of being-in-the-world (the 
Cartesian subject), form broad ontological statements that set up the conditions for 
constructing the self as a separate, self-contained individual, governed by thought 
(Gillett, 2009).  While Descartes is not the first to posit ideas that signify a 
separation between the self and the external world (or separating the categories of 
‘human’ and ‘nature’), his particular configuring of rational ontology makes a 
strong contribution to the broader philosophy of ontological separation 
conceptualised as the separation of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ (Smith, 1999).   
 
Descartes’ notion of the subject, in which the human subject is split from the world, 
cast as the object of an individual’s subjective uptake, is one that separates through 
setting up the subject's mind as the exclusive and fundamental centre of Being.  
Dreamson (2016) explains this separation in the context of what has been called the 
subject-object split in which the world becomes a “cognitive by-product” (p.42), 
existing primarily in terms of our mental representations.  In line with this, Hong 
(2010) calls the subject-object split an ontological detachment where the individual 
is detached from the world in order to objectively represent it.  
 
It is this abstract notion of world as an object that has been discussed earlier in 
reference to Gillett’s (2009) dissatisfaction with dominant Western theories of 
knowledge.  Gillett explains, for example, how this preference for abstraction sets 
up the conditions for being-in-the-world as a detached observer whose cognitive 
faculties are sharply distinct from a world that is viewed as “a set of interwoven 
mechanical processes impersonally specifiable and obeying universal mathematical 
laws” (p.5).  Locating Gillett’s dissatisfaction within Descartes’ philosophy of 
detachment, we might think of the subject as the “thinking thing” while the object 
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is the thing “which does not think” (Cucen, n.d., para. 1).  This view creates an 
ontological hierarchy that, while antithetic to Māori and indigenous thought, has, 
according to Justice (2016), re-shaped indigenous relationships with things in the 
world, casting them as objectively represented phenomena that we are able to 
master.  As Justice explains, treating the world as objects of study is an “extractive” 
(p.23), rather than relational, exercise and it is one that has a certain (historical) 
violence and epistemic privilege at its core.  The relational self (and world) is 
wholly impacted on through these structured conditions of separation and the 
casting of the world as other than (and through epistemic privilege less than), the 
self.   
 
While Descartes is not the first Western philosopher to separate body and mind, 
Grosfoguel (2013) explains that it is Descartes positing of ‘cogito’ as the centre of 
Being that constructs the self as a cognitive actor, emphasising the idea of a human 
mind capable of achieving a “God-eye view” (p.75).  As Grosfoguel explains, 
Descartes’ dualistic structure elevates the mind as the pure element of Being that is 
separate from and unaffected by the body, “floating in heaven”, and “undetermined 
by any particularity” (p.76).  For Grosfoguel, Descartes has re-constructed the self 
as a Being (now the cognitive instrument of universal knowledge) that mirrors 
Christianity’s God.  This separated and unconditioned self, having done away with 
bodily influences, is the uncontaminated mind that is free to engage in a detached, 
universal survey of the world.  Further, as Grosfoguel explains, the legacy of 
Descartes’ dualism is seen in modes of knowledge production that form the 
structure of dominant Western knowledge systems within higher learning 
institutions today: 
 
The “subject-object” split, “objectivity” understood as 
“neutrality,” the myth of an EGO that produces 
“unbiased” knowledge unconditioned by its body or 
space location, the idea of knowledge as produced 
through an internal monologue without links with other 
human beings and universality understood as beyond 
any particularity are still the criteria for valid 
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knowledge and science used in the disciplines of the 
Westernized university (p. 76). 
 
It is also this notion of self, as an individual res cogitans Being, that for Grosfoguel 
sets the stage for possibilities in the types of relationships we have with the world 
and other things in general.  While Descartes’ role in mechanising the world as 
object is emphasised in Gillett’s (2009) earlier critique of Cartesian dualism, it is 
the relational constructionism that drives Grosfoguel’s concern.   As Grosfoguel 
explains, Descartes disqualifies things in the world from having agency which, for 
him, is the purely human (European male) preserve that therefore would cast all 
other things as the objects available at hand for cognitive study.   
 
However, while Descartes may be (justifiably) critiqued for his metaphysical 
construction of the self as a cognitive subject (placing the intellectual uptake of a 
thing at the centre of Being) there is something that sits prior to Descartes’ move to 
make the (exclusively) human endeavour an intellectual pursuit.  At work here are 
more insidious constructions of self and world found in earlier philosophies that 
show how Descartes’ cognitive subject is connected to the deeper recesses of a 
pervasive dominant Western metaphysics.  The cognitive subject has, therefore, 
already been constructed by a prior philosophical inheritance that centres on the 
idea of things in the world as separate entities that, through the notion of discernible, 
identifiable properties and essence, will present as detached, isolated forms.  This 
prior metaphysical construction of essential separation is what makes Descartes’ 
view of the world possible, but it is also, I would argue, what lies beneath all 
expressions of objectivity - the deeper principles of separation that rest comfortably 
(intact) despite our multiple challenges to dominant Western constructs.  
 
Plato, Forms and the essential separation of the self and world 
Here I turn to the metaphysics of Plato to illustrate the setting of a prior template or 
framework for considering the self as the central subject and an orientation to the 
world in which the question of the basic “what is” or “whatness” of a thing can be 
discovered.  It is this turn to things in the world as objects with discernible qualities 
that is posited as being a crucial first step in setting up a certain (non-) relational 
139 
 
orientation to the world.  This initial separation of self and world would set in place 
a philosophical path, leading to a dominant and pervasive Western metaphysics or 
what Derrida and Heidegger would call the metaphysics of presence.   It is in this 
metaphysical construction that we would see the expectation that things in the world 
will be encountered as things separate from the self, taking up a separate 
(conceptual) space.  Further, it is this metaphysics that would seek to lay bare the 
mysteries of existence (Justice, 2016), allowing for “the correct explanation, 
prediction and thus control of natural phenomena” (Cook, 2013, p. 1).   
 
The metaphysics of presence, as a lens through which the world can be re-organised 
as a non-mysterious entity to be fully discovered, has been largely attributed to 
ancient Greek philosophers and the quest to know the world with certainty (e.g., 
Fuchs, 1976).  It is, in other words, the basis of the philosophical inheritance that 
Derrida (1998) warns us about in his critique of logocentrism,12otherwise known as 
an ‘attitude’ towards Being and one that sets in place the premises of essential and 
universal, rational knowledge  or the idea of a world fixed in place for study.   
 
Plato’s fixing of the world: Escaping fluidity and flux 
The development of Plato’s metaphysical orientation has been described as a 
response (at least in part) to an earlier philosophical standpoint in which the world 
was described as being in a constant state of flux (Cook, 2013; Guthrie, 1967).  This 
view was put forward by Heraclitus of Ephesus who described the world in terms 
of its continuous movement characterised by a constant state of becoming, such that 
even those things that may be thought of as opposites with contradictory qualities 
(like sleep and waking), are connected in a process of transitional change from one 
state to another.  For Heraclitus, things in the world are united through the logos: a 
divine generative principle that animates things in the world, making all things one 
(though not in the sense of sameness and fixed material Being) (Graham, 2015) 
through a divine and hidden order.  Heraclitus’ metaphysics is famously represented 
through the analogy of a river, discussed in the following quote from Plato, 
“Heraclitus, I believe, says that all things pass and nothing stays, and comparing 
existing things to the flow of a river, he says you could not step twice into the same 
 
      12 See introduction chapter for an initial discussion of logocentrism. 
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river. (Plato Cratylus 402a = A6, cited in Graham, 2015, para. 19).  For Heraclitus, 
any idea that there is permanency of form is simply an illusion of the senses.   
 
Aristotle would claim that Plato had been interested in Heraclitus’ ideas of flux 
from his early years and this interest held until Plato, in constructing his own ideas 
of the world, would combine the fluidity that characterised Heraclitus’ metaphysics 
with the Socratic search for definitions.  These two influences would lead Plato to 
search for ideas that would fix things in the world, thereby grounding our 
knowledge of things and what things are (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987 a-b, cited in 
O’Grady, 2005). For Plato, the idea that all things pass in a constant state of flux 
presents a problem that is particularly relevant to his concern for the possibility of 
acquiring true, enduring and certain knowledge of things in the world.  As Barnes 
(1982) explains, the problem that Heraclitus presented in positing a world of fluid, 
changing conditions in which things are always in a state of becoming is that it 
would violate the principles of logic that makes (certain and stable) knowledge of 
things possible.  For Heraclitus, it was the comprehension of logos as the underlying 
unification of things rather than knowledge of logos as a thing’s essential form that 
is the important element in understanding reality (Graham, 2015).   
 
Heraclitus sees the world in terms of principles of change that would deny the 
Socratic definition and suggests that even apparently stable parts of the world are 
constantly in motion, even though, like the river, we see them as fixed things.  
However, rather than accepting the idea that things are only apparently fixed, Plato 
would attempt to explain the change, and subsequent uncertainty, of material 
physical things in such a way as to retain the possibility of knowing those things 
(their ‘what is’ or ‘whatness’) despite the appearance of flux.  Plato would counter 
Heraclitus’ principles of fluidity by positing that there is an illusion of the senses 
but one that fools us into believing that earthly material forms are true 
representations of reality when they are in fact simply imitations of the real ‘Forms’, 
existing only as transient changeable matter (Brickhouse and Smith, 1994).  
Retaining the idea of fluidity, Plato utilises the idea of flux to cast things in the 
world as corrupt versions of a higher order of Being that he expresses through a 
central doctrine called the theory of Forms. For Plato, reality is dualistic, made of 
both the material and immaterial.  In his philosophy, the material forms are the 
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corrupt, imperfect versions of immaterial Forms (or souls) that exist outside of 
space and time (Rogers, 1935).  These immaterial Forms, through their place in an 
eternal realm as perfect, enduring, fixed Forms, are the true and constant reality that 
is merely imitated by imperfect, earthly objects (Silverman, 2014).   
 
Plato’s belief in the illusion of earthly forms and the search for knowledge of true 
Forms that represent reality would manifest in his Allegory of the Cave (Petersen, 
2017).  In Plato’s depiction, we are like people chained to a wall of a cave, believing 
shadows on the wall to be real objects when they are in fact mere shadows cast off 
from the real objects that we cannot yet perceive.  Those of us who stay within the 
cave are doomed to live a life in which we are constantly deceived by our senses, 
continuing to perceive these murky shadows as true reality.  To escape the cave is 
to engage our higher intellect - to glimpse the sunlight of the eternal Forms (the 
metaphysical moment) as the real objects that form these fleeting shadows 
(Partenie, 2018; Petersen, 2017).    
 
Plato’s cave is an attempt to explain the human condition in terms of what appears 
to be real against what is “really real” (Huard, 2007, p. 4) or what can be determined 
as an enduring and constant reality.  The nature of the essential and true Forms 
within Plato’s metaphysics is determined by their essence or ‘ousia’, which also 
determines the essence of the material objects of imitation that exist in the physical 
world.  Cook (2013) discusses the importance of ousia in Plato’s metaphysics in 
the context of (the concept of) knowledge.  In describing Plato’s world of 
discoverable essence, Cook points out that, 
 
the essence of each immortal Form is not only the first 
principle or cause of that soul/Form and its imperfect 
manifestations, but also fixedly delimits and defines 
them. It is therefore the essence or ousia of physical 
things that, in creating their stable, enduring, universal 
definition, presents Plato with the possibility of fixed 




As Cook (2013) explains, Plato believed that individuals could know the nature and 
essence of Forms and therefore the nature and essence of earthly material forms, 
because each individual, having encountered these Forms as immortal souls, has 
prior knowledge of these perfect entities.  The true essence of worldly physical 
objects and their Forms could be known through an arduous process of recollection 
that culminates in what Fuchs (1976) describes as the metaphysical moment – the 
point of revelation that stems from an individual’s internal (rational) meditations.   
 
Silverman (2014) describes this process of recollection in the context of the 
immortal soul, locating it in Plato’s middle period: 
 
Here for the first time we find remarks about the 
immortality of the soul, about special entities called 
‘Forms’ that exist outside of space and time and that are 
both the objects of knowledge and somehow the cause 
of whatever transpires in the physical world, and the 
doctrine of recollection, the thesis that the immortal 
soul, in a disembodied state prior to its incarceration in 
a body, viewed these Forms, knowledge of which is 
then recalled by incarcerated souls through a laborious 
process (para. 7).    
 
As described in the quote above, it is here that we also find the idea of the mind-
body dualism that constructs the body as an imperfect, corrupt, physical form and 
the mind as the superior, eternal soul.  The mind or soul is, therefore, cast as the 
immortal connection to the eternal perfect Forms as objects of true, persisting, 
universal knowledge.  Plato would avoid what he saw as a major complication in a 
philosophical orientation that did not allow for enduring knowledge, producing a 
metaphysics that would allow things to be represented as a determinant essence. As 
he states, “Since each of these things never appears the same, which thing can one 
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steadfastly maintain is this determinate thing and not something else, without 
embarrassing oneself?” (Plato, Timaeus 49c7-e7, quoted in Graham 2010, p. 89).   
 
Plato’s idea of a reality, based on a dualistic structure in which the mind is separated 
from the body, produces (among other types of separation), the ‘separation of 
mind’, which is characterised as separation from world or the separation of,  “what 
knows from what is known” (Silverman, 2009, p.29).   Within Plato’s deterministic 
metaphysics, this essential separation would lead to the necessary quest to find the 
essence of a thing, the ‘logos’.  To Plato, logos (rather than being a generative 
principle that animates an interconnected holistic and not fully knowable world as 
it is in Heraclitus’ metaphysics) would identify a thing’s ‘whatness’ or, as 
Silverman terms it, “what is X?... the definition or account that specifies the 
essence… of something” (p. 35).  In terms of the deeper principles of separation 
referred to earlier as those structural premises that remain intact despite our multiple 
challenges to dominant Western constructs, Plato’s foregrounding of the essential 
nature of a thing as a rational concern is significant.  It is this fundamental element 
(the question of “what is”) produced through Plato’s theory of Forms that constructs 
the basic conditions necessary to set the self apart from other things in the world. 
This separation would create a fundamental expectation that things in the world, as 
objects, will occupy separate space from the self in order for the thing to be grasped 
by the self as ‘what is known’ by ‘what knows’ (Arola, 2007).   
 
I return here to Descartes to illustrate how this fundamental separation is developed 
further as an orientation to the world that casts things as objects of representation.   
Following the fundamental separation of self and world set up by Plato’s 
expectation of discoverable essences and a thing’s autonomous space, Arola (2007) 
describes Descartes’ contribution as the casting of the mind as the ‘I’ (I think 
therefore I am) which represents the special subject.  Drawing again on 
Grosfoguel’s (2013) critique of Descartes’ use of detachment from body as a 
statement about the ontological status of the mind and the God-eye view he attains, 
we see that, “The entrance into modernity is characterized by taking the world as a 
domain of objects, the coherency of which is anchored by the human subject” 
(Arola, 2007, p.2).  Arola (2007) describes this subjectivity in the context of 
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concepts that underpin the relational activity between self and world as acts of 
apprehension: 
 
Taking the world as something that stands over and 
against me means to understand that world as something 
fundamentally other than me, and insofar as I am 
subject, this means that this world is an object; it is the 
Gegenstand that literally “stands against” me. Thus, I 
must encounter that which stands against me, the 
objectivity of things, and bring it under concepts— 
literally grasp it so as to be able to represent it to 
myself—so that it becomes thinkable for me. Why must 
I engage in this process of bringing this world under 
conceptual determination? Why must I represent 
things? The reason is that insofar as the world is not like 
me, or I do not belong to the world, or the materiality of 
the world of sensuous experience is not like my 
thoughts, I have to make the world accommodate itself 
to me (p. 3). 
 
We might easily recognise in Arola’s description what is at stake in the context of 
our relational Being and in particular the construction of the self as being in 
opposition to the natural world. It could be argued, for example, that this 
oppositional construction has led to destructive ways of living in the world, 
including the treatment of the environment as an object rather than from within a 
Māori worldview, as whanaunga.    However, the philosophical conditions that set 
up the world as object (the more insidious conditioning of self and world) are also 
fundamentally involved in acts of conceptualisation that Arola (2007) describes as 
making the world ‘thinkable’.  It is on this point Ahenakew et al. (2014) warn that, 
while we may recognise the concept of universal essentialist knowledge is 
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problematic, we are often forced to resist these problematic concepts and contents 
by producing our own forms of universal representations.    
 
The types of representations that Arola (2007) is referring to equate to Silverman’s 
(2009) description of the “what is X?” (p. 35), move in knowledge production based 
on the central aspect of Plato’s, and other subsequent philosophers’, orientation to 
the world.   As Arola states, “Throughout the history of philosophy, and all the way 
up through Husserl’s early works at the very least, if you want to know what an 
entity is, you fasten on to its concept, the universal under which it belongs” (p. 3).  
This ‘what is X’ approach to knowledge is what makes the construction of the self 
as separate from the world a necessary condition. Things in the world, through acts 
of conceptual determination, must ‘stand against’ the self, cast as the object at hand 
for study.  Once this essential space as separation has been set (as it has been in 
Plato’s metaphysics), we are then free to follow Plato’s search for essence and 
identify the discernible qualities of things to answer that central question - the “what 
is” of the thing.  From that point, the thing can be cast - not as a deeply and 
profoundly connected and not fully knowable relation but as object.   
  
It is this orientation to the world and the idea of the solid foundational ground of a 
thing represented through the identification of its ‘whatness’ in Plato’s philosophy 
(and the philosophy of those who would follow and develop different versions of a 
world with discernible identifiable essences) that has come to be known as the 
metaphysics of presence (e.g. Heidegger, 1953; Derrida, 1982).  It is in this 
metaphysics that we see the separation of self and world as a means of grasping a 
thing’s essence (i.e. building concepts) that directly opposes Māori and indigenous 
understandings of being interrelated with things in the world.  This conceptual and 
essential representation of things in the world is put forward as a silent ontological 
declaration that things will be set apart from the self – held at a distance in order to 
be studied. But it is also in this metaphysics that we see the expectation (through 
the idea of discoverable, identifiable essence), that things in the world, and their 
discernible qualities, will be physically, cognitively, and temporally ‘present’ in the 
here and now and made highly evident through objective language in order for them 
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to be identified, measured, defined, catalogued, limited and, ultimately, known 
(Fuchs, 1976).   
 
This idea of a thing’s presence disrupts and opposes what has been described by 
Mika (2017b) in discussing Māori metaphysics as ‘mystery’ or the space of absence 
that, not being immediately present in temporal, physical form or cognitive thought, 
resists the notion of revealing things in their entirety.  In the method chapter, for 
example, I discussed Māori and indigenous understandings of what might be 
translated as a type of ‘more than intellectual thought’, reflected in the description 
of Māori women’s knowledge as immaculate (Murphy, 2011), suggesting that there 
are other entities at play.  In contrast, within the current chapter, it is the idea within 
early Greek philosophy of a latent but absolute knowledge of what a thing ‘is’ that, 
I posit, is a problematic attempt to contain thought within the intellectual realm.  As 
Mika explains, a metaphysics that insists on the representation of things in the world 
as objects of certainty must discount the play of other entities in order to achieve 
clarity.  Again, this orientation translates to the belief in the discernible properties 
of a thing as an object set apart from the self that supports a problematic 
metaphysics, constructing the self as a separate subject that ‘takes up’ the object in 
a separate (conceptual and seemingly therefore physical) space.  This notion of 
presence, and its associated expectations of separation, present challenges for the 
Māori and indigenous self and indeed for the very idea of holism when holism is 
viewed as complete interconnection.  From here, the disruption of holism, 
predicated on an essential separation, would allow for the conditions of a certain 
type of relationship between the self and world, cementing the stance of objectivity 
in a world where things are now fully available to the rational self.  
 
Presence 
Having set out the conditions of the first step in the construction of the self as a 
separated Being existing in a distanced, autonomous space apart from things in the 
world, I will now address the subsequent intellectual uptake of those things.  
Through the metaphysics imposed by early Greek philosophy, things in the world 
are now available as solid and limited objects with discoverable essences and 
qualities from which we may develop certain knowledge.  This notion of certainty 
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is tied to the fundamental metaphysics identified earlier as the metaphysics of 
presence.   
 
The metaphysics of presence denotes a primordial presence, carrying such solidity 
of Being that it is immune to the fluid departure of Being which is a condition of 
the temporal.  As Söderbäck (2013) explains, the question of Being has always been 
intimately connected to the question of time and it is this intimate connection that 
has driven the desire to make Being into something exempt from the fluidity 
associated with time’s passing.  The passing of time as the passing of Being is the 
very nature of time – the present’s incessant passing away that would seem to defy 
the kind of solidity that could be perfectly captured by a discrete concept.  Central 
questions concerning time would ask, for example, the following: how could things 
in the world be conceptually grasped within time if things remain vulnerable to a 
temporal succession that seems to reflect a world of constant change?  How can we 
be sure of a thing’s essential nature if we are not sure that it carries some quality 
that endures despite the movement of time and the apparent ‘flux’ suggested by 
times temporal dance?  What do we make of a present constantly shifting to become 
the past and what are the enduring and present qualities that can be wrestled from 
the temporal movement threatening in each new moment to wash away what is 
present before us?  Each new moment haunts with the possibility of new 
potentialities, resisting the idea of enduring ‘sameness’ - of Plato’s logos.  
 
It is within this context that Söderbäck (2013) describes the task of classical 
ontology as that which would,  
 
"save" presence from this condition of always already 
becoming absent.  Being, to put it simply, has been 
conceptualized as exempt from and immune to time: if 
the sensible realm is subject to change, the intelligible 
is posited as a realm beyond becoming and change. This 
is what is commonly described as a metaphysics of 




Here, Plato’s metaphysics (a view that things in the world are able to be identified 
in terms of their essential and enduring qualities), is given a temporal framework as 
the desire to transcend time’s movement and change. I recall here a statement from 
Plato discussed earlier in this chapter, illustrating his concern for ensuring that 
things can be identified as “determinate things” (Plato, Timaeus 49c7-e7 quoted in 
Graham 2010, p. 89), despite the apparent condition of change they appear to be 
subject to.  The question of how there can be surety of (unchanging) meaning drives 
the construction of a framework for understanding the world based on the 
identification of essential qualities.   
 
The importance of explanation and predication to ancient Greek philosophers is 
demonstrated in the frameworks for essential qualities that emerged from the 
metaphysical ground that formed the basis of their theories of reality.  Plato’s Forms 
(representing the unchanging, universal, and objective character of things) provided 
the framework for identifying the universal categories in which we can place things 
in the world to understand the qualities and properties that they possess.  Aristotle 
would build on the idea of essential forms by developing a framework of essential 
properties (e.g., size, colour, shape), along with a framework for identifying a 
thing’s essential form (e.g., man).  For example, round objects, such as a ball and a 
wheel, will share the universal quality of roundness.   If they are the same colour 
(perhaps red), they would share the universal quality of ‘redness’. These qualities 
and properties ensure that things in the world exist as something – specific and 
measured – so that we might know these ‘things’ as objects with certain qualities.  
Things are taken up as being fully accessible and able to be known because they 
have been given a template on which their Being (their “whatness”) can be 
understood.   
 
In this way, through the assignment of qualities and properties, things are brought 
into the light and are ordered by qualities that are, thereafter, taken up - not as true, 
primordial aspects of nature, but as ‘projections’ of objective representation 
(Glazebrook, 2000).  Heidegger, with a regard for this problem, would discuss what 
he called the mathematical projection of nature in which things are homogenised 
by the mathematical qualities that are assigned to them.  For example, he would 
point out that while we might see in nature an array of beautiful colours (such as 
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when we look at a tree), science would reduce this experience to a measurement of 
light waves (Glazebrook, 2000).  Once that original mathematical projection is in 
place, we can now understand the colour of the tree in advance as a unit of 
measurement that would bring certainty to what we can say about the tree’s colour, 
thereby weeding out any variation in subjective representation of the tree’s colour.  
This way of knowing a certain quality of the tree and its colour in advance, through 
the projected mathematical and scientific template of light wave, is what Heidegger 
would describe as an entity’s pre-determination or, 
 
that which man knows in advance in observing entities 
and dealing with things: the corporeality of bodies, the 
vegetable character of plants, the animality of animals, 
the humanness of man (Heidegger, 1950, pp. 71-72, 
cited in Rouse, 2014, p. 134).    
 
It would also bring a homogeneity of Being to things in the world that could be the 
same things regardless of their contextual difference.  The temporal flux that 
threatens the possibility of having knowledge of things, seemingly presenting 
endless new possibilities of form, appearance, and subjective experience, could be 
overcome by an enduring, fixed quality that, “drags the being clearly into the light” 
(GA 27, 180, cited in Glazebrook, 2012, p. 73).  This stasis is akin to the 
metaphysical moment represented in Plato’s allegory of the cave that Fuchs (1976) 
points to as the view of Being as that which has become immediately present to the 
self. Further, it is the presence of things that is consistently observed and is common 
to all things (rather than unique to things), that grounds a thing’s Being and answers 
the question – what is a thing?   In short, presence is what makes things real and it 
answers, through the assignment of certain qualities that form the template of a 
things essential Being, the questions that drove the search for the truth of Being – 
the what ‘is’ (it) that these beings ‘are’ (Glazebrook, 2012).   
 
The metaphysics of presence is therefore predicated on an ontological and epistemic 
structure that prefers the solid and unchanging definition of things in the world in 
such a way as to defy the threatening movement of temporal change.    In contrast, 
from a Māori and indigenous perspective, temporality and change carry a 
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potentiality that highlights the importance of relational Being.  As discussed in 
chapter four, indigenous temporality is concerned with the shifting contexts in 
which we live, honouring the complexity of lived experience that orientates the 
indigenous self within the world.  The dominant Western view, on the other hand, 
demonstrates a reliance on fixed meaning that can endure despite temporal change 
which carries a certain onto-epistemic claim suggesting that meaning is fully 
present.  The idea of presence also suggests that things in the world are available 
for representation which is, in a sense, a statement about the type of relationship 
that we may have with things in the world.  We cast a type of conceptual spell over 
things, denying a thing its complex expression and movement in favour of logical 
representation that forces things to stay fixed in place.  This orientation to the world 
is what necessitates the self’s separation from things – the dislodging of the self 
from within the world in order to take up the rational position.   
 
Being, temporality and “the present”  
Within the dominant Western metaphysics, the importance of the temporal and its 
relationship to presence rests within the notion of the thing’s essential nature, which 
must be stable and unchanging in order to allow for a true and lasting account of 
‘what is’, or what has been described as the apprehension of things in fixed place 
and focus.  As Garrison (1999) states, “Traditional metaphysics places ultimate 
ontology somewhere beyond time, contingency, and change” (p.346).  Fuchs (1976) 
demonstrates this in his critique of phenomenology as a discipline that is concerned 
with the meaning’s things have in our experience and from within a “subjective 
first-person worldview” (Smith, 2018, para, 5).  In examining the phenomenology 
of Edmund Husserl, Fuchs explains how objects, through their bodily presences that 
are then taken up by immediate empirical intuition, form the basis of what can be 
understood as (given) facts:  
 
Regarding the "presence of facts," presence means that 
the object itself is given in immediate intuition and 
given as it is. It is given in profiles because that is the 
mode of givenness appropriate to the being of the 
object. The individual object is given in empirical 
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intuition, and it is given as a bodily presence. It is not a 
representation, nor a sign, but an immediate bodily 
presence. As revealed in immediate intuition, these 
objects manifest being. Facts are given as an 
unimpeachable source of knowledge of what is. This is 
in keeping with the doctrine of the metaphysics of 
presence (p. 35). 
 
While Fuchs’ description of Husserl’s phenomenology speaks to Being in the mode 
of presence as the absolute physical presence of the thing, it also explains the 
temporal nature that is at play in the metaphysics of presence as it is the ‘bodily’ 
presence that would limit things to being real only in the here and now.  Things in 
the past, for example, are those things that were discussed earlier as “having been” 
(Fuchs, 1976, p.7).  Therefore, the objects that are revealed in immediate intuition 
must be those that are present in the present.  White (1996), in discussing the 
metaphysics of presence, explains how the present is conceived in the term “to be” 
which has, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, been taken to mean “to endure 
through time” (p. 147).  
 
To illustrate how this notion of time has captured conventional temporal 
orientations to the world, and in an attempt to break what she calls the “grip of 
presence” (p.148), White refers to the work of Jorge Luis Borges who challenges 
conventional views on time and present, enduring Being, through presenting an 
unconventional type of categorisation.  This categorisation appears in a Chinese 
Encyclopedia entitled ‘Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge’ that divides 
animals into what, from a dominant Western perspective, might be seen as 
impossible categories, denying solid, logical representation.  Borrowing from the 
Celestial taxonomy, the categories are presented as, 
 
(a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed 
ones,(c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) 
mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those 
that are included in this classification, (i) those that 
tremble as if they are mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) 
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those drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush, (l) 
others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) 
those that resemble flies from a distance (p.148).   
 
Within this representation an animal could change or fall into more than one of the 
categories in a fully contextualised, shifting, relational mode of Being.  This view 
of Being is described by White (1996) as one that challenges the notion that, 
“Things stay put in their nature … are defined by it in our sense, no matter at what 
present moment we examine them. A dog has been, is, and will be one” (p.148).  I 
recall here the radical alterity that was discussed earlier in relation to Blaser’s 
(2014) concern with moving beyond simple gestures of difference to embrace, and 
take seriously, not only that which does not fit existing dominant taxonomies but 
also that which will not fit the idea of taxonomy (or certainty) that would cast things 
as discernible, discreet, objects and ideas. Similarly, Foucault (1970) has 
commented on the ontological and epistemological ordering of conventional 
Western taxonomy and how it shapes and limits what it is possible to think.  Kohn 
(2015) also raises this issue when he talks of things that are “not necessarily socially 
constructed in ways that allow us to do conceptual work with them” (p. 315).  And 
so, it is within non-conventional, non-Western notions of time that things are not 
contained or forced to stay in place as they appear in the present.   
 
White (1996) goes on to discuss conceptions of time in so-called mythological 
(Western) cultures by appealing to earlier historical periods in the Western 
sociological order.  According to White, these mythological Western cultures did 
not adhere to the idea of linear temporal structures or see the world as made up of 
a series of identical “nows” (p.149).  Drawing on Heidegger, White explains that it 
is within these cultures that we see the idea of “sacred time” marked by an 
invocation of bringing the (mythological) past into the present.  As she states, the 
“present loops back to re-join the reality of the past rather than…marching steadily 
into an unknown future” (p.149).  In keeping with Heidegger’s thinking, White 
emphasises how circular, sacred or linear notions of time impact on our relationship 
with things in the world.  According to White, we are either guided to live by the 
cycles and wisdom of what came before (sacred time) or forced to look at things as 
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tools at hand to help us as instruments in our (progressive) everyday life in the 
present (linear time).   
 
In reflecting on the idea of sacred time, I imagine the sense of continuity that is 
expressed by Yates (2016) who, in discussing the term Mauri-ora, places Mauri in 
an “anterior time space” as that which has always been, and also as that which 
resides “before us”. Yates uses the terms “re-forwarding” and “re-turn” to capture 
a sense of something that always comes into presence but as recitation, 
remembering, and “re-counting” (p.266), rather than denoting a fully revealed 
bodily and absolute presence.  It is in this sense of time that Yates is able to write 
of things as always present in the context of ‘immanence’ that resides within and 
“before us” and in such a way that hierarchical ideas of human centred Being, and 
knowledge and agency, are disrupted, giving way to an ethical time space relation.  
As she explains, 
 
One can sense that in order to discuss mauri-ora as 
ethics, the question of time and relational order must be 
schematised. In this indigenous-Māori context, 
whakapapa is an immanental genealogy where the 
human (as centredness or master position) is deferred—
consequent to the primal and agential capacity of the 
earth and sky, then the winds, clouds, the seas, the trees, 
and so on, after which comes the human, who are teina 
(youth) in this immanental ordering. Mauri exists as a 
fielding of the life forces of this genealogy—mauri 
comes first, as before human, before the mammoth, 
before the plesiosaurus and ichthyosaurus, before 
single-celled organisms, attendant to a primal land and 
skyscape electric with agential capacity. This time-
space modality conjures up a vast and complex 
assemblage of life, so deferring human life to non- 





The ‘vast and complex assemblage of life’ that resists the hierarchical privileging 
of human-centredness denies the rational re-positioning of human existence and the 
casting of things in the world as objects whose meaning relies on their appearance 
in the present.  Through this, Yates (2016) offers a pathway to disrupt not only 
essentialism but essentialism’s grasp on the self and the world, denying the 
representational structure that describes the dynamic movement of life in calcified 
terms.  Caputo (2013) would call the disruption of essentialism “The haunting 
spectre of “perhaps” [that] provokes a more radical opening in the present 
[preventing]... the present from closing down upon itself; from being identical with 
itself” (p. 15–16).  Within this view, the potential of ‘perhaps’, of a moving 
experience that is a reflection of the self immersed in the world, gives way to what 
Caputo calls, “the future to come” (p.16), or what might also be called ‘creativity’.   
 
Presence/ absence and the world at play   
The notion that things carry meaning only in terms of their presence sets up the 
conditions for constructing ‘absent things’.  Fuchs (1976) identifies the duality of 
presence and absence as a fundamental principle in the metaphysics of presence.  
This particular duality provides a starting point for considering the general notion 
of duality as part of the structure of traditional dominant Western philosophy and 
onto-epistemes.  Within the general notion of duality, presence (vs absence) would 
signal what Derrida (1978) refers to as ‘the center’; a primary signifier of a 
universal, true and morally good reality.  Fuchs would describe the philosophical 
structure of a central, singular signifier as follows,  
 
The notion of Being as absolute presence means that 
Being in itself, the eternal, immutable idea of Being, is 
the notion of absolute presence, and therefore the 
exclusion of the notions of the temporal, the incomplete, 
and the negative. The notion of Being, in its primordial 
manifestation is the exclusion of absence (p. 7).   
 
We see in Fuchs’ description of presence what Derrida (1998) would call a 
logocentric structure in the form of an oppositional binary system of logic.  
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According to Derrida, within this structure, and following the acts of 
conceptualisation or the grasping of a thing that was discussed earlier, concepts (as 
signifiers of a central meaning and the presence of essential absolute Being) are 
hierarchically fixed in oppositional dualistic terms such as mind/body, male/female 
and presence/absence.  Caputo (2013) would also note that these binaries extend to 
include epistemic and theological beliefs including, “knowledge and ignorance, 
belief and unbelief, certainty and uncertainty, actuality and potentiality, substance 
and accident, theism and atheism” (p. 14-15). This structure of duality would 
position the first term as the primary and valued signifier thereby rendering the 
second term as a negative and lesser derivative of the essential principle concept.   
 
For indigenous peoples, this derivative structure would be seen in the discursive 
(metaphysical) construction of indigenous identities and ways of Being as 
civilised/savage, modern/primitive, and real/mythical.  Further, As Cook (2013) 
explains, the onto-epistemic dominance of the primary term would position the 
lesser absent term - which has real world consequences in terms of subordination 
and exclusion - such that, “While both terms are therefore necessarily identified and 
defined in terms of (difference from) the other, the (privilege) … granted by 
patriarchal metaphysics to all primary terms has depended upon the absence of the 
secondary terms from that and other dominant discourses (e.g. science, religion)” 
(p.84). 
 
Derrida’s (1970) dissatisfaction with duality in classical metaphysics is a 
dissatisfaction with the West’s insistence on the discovery and fixing of the centre.  
The centre, in the context of the hierarchical privileging of certain primary concepts, 
is also hard to dislodge.  In this sense, the centre is the philosophically constructed 
structure of the preference for present and highly evident meaning.  As Derrida 
states, 
 
From the basis of what we therefore call the centre (and 
which, because it can be either inside or outside, is as 
readily called the origin as the end, as readily arché as 
telos), the repetitions, the substitutions, the 
transformations, and the permutations are always taken 
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from a history of meaning [sens]—that is, a history, 
period—whose origin may always be revealed or whose 
end may always be anticipated in the form of presence  
(p.1). 
 
This dissatisfaction with classical philosophy would lead Derrida to engage in what 
is commonly referred to as deconstruction.  Some have described deconstruction as 
a type of method used to critically analyse and disrupt the centre, engaging in the 
act of pulling text apart to reveal that everything that is described is subject to a 
constraint that prevents us from ever finding the essential meaning of a thing (Rolfe, 
2004).   
 
While deconstruction has been described as a method of dismantling the structured 
dominance of primary signifiers and concepts (such as the primary male against the 
lesser derivative female), Derrida himself would point out that to think of 
deconstruction as a method would be to impose structure where none is intended or 
even possible.  As Derrida (1991) states, “deconstruction loses nothing from 
admitting that it is impossible”  (p. 272), and, “deconstruction is neither an analysis 
nor a critique … Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into 
one…It must also be made clear that deconstruction is not even an act or an 
operation” (p. 273).   
 
To illustrate the impossibility of defining deconstruction as an act or method, Rolfe 
(2004) explains that deconstruction is something that is constantly occurring in text, 
both in writing and reading, existing in the tension between what is meant and the 
constrained meaning that language imposes through its pre-determination.  Rolfe 
(2004) points out that, “There is no method to deconstruction because texts literally 
deconstruct themselves in their impossible attempt to employ language as a 
‘transcendental signifier’” (p.274).  For Derrida, the idea of a signifier that 
transcends change and remains fixed in place is always at the mercy of 
deconstruction and the other possibilities at ‘play’.  Derrida, therefore, would speak 
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of a constant deferral of meaning and that which cannot be contained (or accurately 
and fixedly described) by the linguistic structure.   
 
For Derrida, the world ‘at play’ is the impossibility of the singular or as Collins 
(2000) states, “Derrida's interest in the limits of language is precisely a recognition 
of the 'other' that can never be thought.  Always escaping linguistic form that from 
a conventional onto-epistemic orientation presents an alterity that is an “impossible 
thought” (p.314), or what Mika (2017b) would describe as mystery or absence.  To 
Derrida, trace is a rupture within the metaphysics of presence, dislodging the 
oppositional placement of the present/absent binary (Reynolds, n.d) exposing 
(though not as an alternative signifier) the ‘other’ that is present in its absence.  Any 
attempts to arrest the world at play will be subject to difference and trace, meaning 
that the self - which, within conventional metaphysics is seen as being present 
through the ‘mental representation’ of true reality - is never fully present to the self. 
In this event, the self again retains a sense of absence or mystery (Bellou, 2013).   
 
Keeping things in ‘play’: (W)holism, mystery, and complex realms of meaning 
The trace is an opening of space that returns in each moment of attempted 
signification – an escape from linguistic form that is always at once the absent 
present other (Derrida, 1978).  Within the idea of trace, there is the notion of 
something that is at once present and absent, an idea discussed in the previous 
chapter through an exploration of Māori and indigenous metaphysics.  However, 
the question remains whether there can be a full escape from the expectation of 
signification in the sense that Derrida has described it, or what Derrida (1982) also 
warns are hidden “chains of predicates” that do not easily permit themselves to be 
displaced despite “multiple rupturing events”, retaining therefore the language, 
words and, more generally, the signifier (p.72).   
 
Mika (2016) remarks that there is an absence of the term ‘is’ within Māori language 
(which acts as a partner to signification), which would signal that signification of a 
singular determinate and wholly visible thing (at least in terms of its absolute and 
certain presentation as what a thing ‘is’) was not traditionally used to represent 
things in the world or set a thing apart from the context in which it is embedded.   
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In contrast, Heidegger’s (1953) “splitting asunder” (p. 170) would refer to precise 
signification, the reliance on what can be made present, in which things in the world 
through their conceptual representation are displaced from the whole.  But 
Heidegger would also be concerned with that same question that Silverman (2014) 
identifies as a fundamental starting point for a dominant Western orientation to the 
world – the question of “what is X” (p. 29), or, in Heidegger’s (1967) terms, “What 
is a thing?” (p.1).   
 
For Heidegger (1967), this question, concerning those things that we take as 
material (animate and inanimate) everyday objects that are present-at-hand, seeks 
to determine the unconditioned ‘thingness’ of a thing, represented in the description 
of its essential and present material qualities. However, Heidegger warns that 
“everyday things still show another face” (p.12).  Using the example of the jar, 
Heidegger (1971) explains how the jar can be defined through a scientific 
explanation that would latch onto its clear and present qualities, thus qualifying the 
jar in terms of its shape and function.  As Heidegger states, “We represented the 
effective feature of the vessel, that which does its holding, the void, as a hollow 
filled with air” (p.71).  The jar has therefore been reduced to its appearance and its 
technical use; however, Heidegger, in countering this reductive view, invokes what 
he calls the ‘fourfold’ in which, “The thing is a mirror-play of earth, sky, gods, and 
mortals” (Harman, 2009, p.292).   
 
Within this fourfold of Being, Heidegger (1971) describes the gift of the jar, not as 
what the jar appears to be or how the jar appears to function, but as its mirror of the 
fourfold in which we dwell.  The outpouring of the jar, rather than simply being the 
pouring of its contents as a gift that quenches thirst, takes on that wider meaning as 
libation – the gift, that is the jar’s mirror-play of what Heidegger calls the 
“outpouring”: 
 
In the gift of the outpouring that is drink, mortals stay 
in their own way. In the gift of the outpouring that is a 
libation, the divinities stay in their own way, they who 
receive back the gift of giving as the gift of the donation. 
In the gift of the outpouring, mortals and divinities each 
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dwell in their different ways. Earth and sky dwell in the 
gift of the outpouring. In the gift of the outpouring earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals dwell together all at 
once. These four, at one because of what they 
themselves are, belong together. Preceding everything 
that is present, they are enfolded into a single fourfold 
(p.72). 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully engage with Heidegger’s fourfold, 
what is offered here reflects Mika’s (2016) observance of a measured signification 
of a thing within traditional Māori utterances that resists (and understands the 
metaphysical limitations of) the full representation of a thing.  Absence, 
conventionally understood in classical philosophy and metaphysics as a lesser 
derivative non-presence, is now seen in an altogether different metaphysical context 
reflected in, for example, Yate’s (2016) discussion of Mauri-ora as that which 
comes before us and dwells inside us.  Within this view of things that are not fully 
present, the absent nature of things in the world as mystery rather than a lesser 
derivative non-presence points to a dynamic world at play such that any one thing, 
and the essence of any one thing, within a Māori and indigenous metaphysics, can 
only be presented in a speculative response to a thing.  Indeed, recalling a statement 
made earlier in this chapter, Heidegger (1967) would contend that in seeking to 
answer and find knowledge of a thing’s essence as a full and present ‘whatness’, 
we “pass over whole realms” (p.8), of meaning.  
 
Concluding thoughts: Considering the impact of presence on the 
self and the notion of mental illness  
The dominance of presence as a philosophical frame of representation has been 
discussed here in relation to its metaphysical structure.  The structure of presence 
as things that endure despite the threat of temporal flux, resisting unique 
presentations through the identification of common traits, and separating the self in 
order to achieve an objective, rational stance, has remained a central concern of 
dominant Western philosophy since the time of Plato and Aristotle (White, 1996).  
The mind/soul, as the superior faculty, constructs the self as a rational agent whose 
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internal meditations give way to discovery of essential intrinsic properties (Austin, 
2017; Cook, 2013).  This moment of revelation solidifies the self’s search for truth, 
answering the essential question of what a thing ‘is’ (Glazebrook, 2012; Silverman, 
2009), and setting up the conditions for the objectification of the world.   Through 
Plato’s philosophy of Forms, the self is set apart from the world in an intellectual 
liberation that in a Māori and indigenous metaphysics represents an act of 
dislodgement - displacing the self from within the world to reside instead in a 
separate ontological space.   
 
Within this world of objective rationality, the ability to identify the essential 
qualities of a thing is supported by acts of pre-determination that limit our 
subjective expressions of experience through the application of certain objective 
(scientific and mathematical) projections (Glazebrook, 2000).  The complex 
meaning carried by the world as entity is sacrificed in favour of a certainty reflected 
in a (metaphysical) attitude that prefers temporal, physical, and discernible presence 
(Heidegger, 1967).  Within this context, the mysterious fullness of a holistic self 
and world, is denigrated as an absent, lesser non-thing, denying the significance of 
mystery (Mika, 2017), that speaks to the profound and excessive meaning the 
permeates existence.   
 
Given the focus of this thesis, it is important to point out the potential implications 
that presence has for the notion of mental illness.  While these implications will be 
discussed at length in the next chapter, here I simply aim to consider the idea that 
the notion of mental illness is a metaphysical disciple of a dominant Western 
metaphysics.  In considering, for example, Heidegger’s (1971) view of the jar and 
its rendering (in line with the metaphysics of presence), as a vessel that can be 
known in terms of its available and determinate qualities, we might draw a 
comparison with the jar’s representation and the general representation of 
individuals who are labelled as experiencing mental illness.   
 
One way of viewing Heidegger’s (1971) critique of contained meaning within the 
context of mental illness is to consider the idea of reductionism which has been put 
forward as a critique of clinical diagnoses.  Carr and Taggart (2017) for example, 
refer to clinical diagnoses and clinical language as “discursive fig leaves” (para. 5), 
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that mask deeper issues such as childhood trauma and other experiences external to 
the person (rather than being a product of personal conduct). As discussed in the 
introduction, anti-reductionist critiques also highlight the role that value 
judgements have in the development of diagnoses that, rather than representing 
natural kinds of behaviours, are viewed as sociological and cultural constructions.  
In line with this, biological reductionism has also been critiqued in terms of 
psychiatry’s growing reliance on, and preference for, physicalist explanations of 
mental illness, reducing complex life experiences (classed as mental disorders) to 
‘brain disorders’ (Gold, 2009), or what Rouf and Taggart call “biological 
pathology” (para. 4).   
 
In merging Heidegger’s (1967, 1971) concern for the more expansive meaning held 
by things in the world with the protests put forward by the (generally) anti-
reductionist school of thinking, it is possible to draw attention to how things like 
clinical diagnosis and biological pathogenesis construct limits of meaning.  Like 
the qualities assigned to the jar (its effective features of volume, shape and usage), 
I posit that diagnostic and biological explanations of behaviour assign certain (pre-
determined) qualities that limit the deeper and more expansive complexity of a 
person’s experience.  This complexity of experience may not be easily accessible 
through tidy rational constructs or be available for scientific measurement, but it is 
an opening of understanding that allows for what does not fit into the clinical frame.  
Guthrie (1962) captures this sense of excessive meaning when describing personal 
experiences as “not only external and physical phenomena like rain and tempest, 
thunder and sunshine, illness and death, but also those overmastering psychological 
impulses through which a man feels no less that he is in the power of something 
beyond his own control” (p. 26).  This view of experience as something more than 
what can be controlled (or explained) by the person problematises the idea of 
containing experience (labelled as mental illness or mental disorder) through a 
focus on internal functions or through the application of standardised clinical 
framing.  From a Māori and indigenous perspective, however, it also raises the 
possibility of things as entities that do not fit into the idea of the frame – the complex 
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nature of things that resist the possibility of fiercely illuminating a thing (e.g., 
Glazebrook, 2012).   
 
While I posit that these resistant and excessive meanings can be seen as a type of 
(k)new onto-epistemic ground from which we can draw a different understanding 
of people’s experiences, the question of how this onto-epistemic re-turn can be 
made possible within the institution of mental health remains.  A metaphysics that 
sets up the self and world as separate entities lays the ground for a relational 
severing and a subsequent impact on well-being (Mika, 2015).  But it is also this 
metaphysics that sets up the expectation of clear, precise and essential 
representation and re-shapes the articulation of Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being.   
 
Representing things in clear, essential and present terms often involves using 
clinical concepts and the application of ‘qualities’ to explain experience and 
behaviour.  These qualities are reflected in clinical language and form a 
conventional onto-epistemic frame (Canino and Algeria, 2008).   As I will argue in 
the next chapter, Māori and indigenous expressions are often expected to fit in with 
this frame by providing equally clear (and essential) explanations of experience and 
behaviour or through providing translations of clinical terms, making Māori and 
indigenous worldview accessible to the system.   Further, it would appear that 
clinical explanations of behaviour are becoming more reliant on the ability to 
pinpoint behaviour (and dysfunction) in terms of an identifiable, unchanging and 
present form.  The apparent, ever-increasing solidification of the metaphysics of 
presence within mental health has implications for Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being that must find a type of cultural onto-epistemic space for 
expression despite the (metaphysical) expectations that seek to discipline what 
cannot be easily stated.  This includes the profound ‘overplus’ of meaning that is 
embedded in Māori and indigenous cosmologies, that resist (in a spiritual sense), 
the simple translation of the spiritually excessive into limited and pre-determined 
concepts.    
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CHAPTER SIX: METAPHYSICS OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS   
This thesis concerns itself in part with the notion of mental illness and, although I 
alluded briefly to that theme in the previous chapter, the reader may be wondering 
when it will be addressed more centrally.  As I noted in the introduction chapter, 
my suspension of that topic was deliberate, allowing me to first address the ground 
of thought that, I would argue, constructs the notion of mental illness.   This ground 
of thought, the metaphysics of presence, is one that I suggest is so pervasive in 
influencing how things in the world are described and understood that it has needed 
primary attention before any other topic is addressed.  Without a fundamental 
understanding of how the metaphysics of presence constructs and frames the ways 
in which we relate to the world, my concern is that this subtly undermining 
influence would be disregarded in favour of critiquing the concepts that are used to 
describe mental illness.   
 
My concern goes beyond a focus on the types of concepts that inform mental illness 
as a notion.  It does not rest with a concern over whether or not Māori and 
indigenous peoples can offer our own concepts to describe mental illness; it is 
instead a dissatisfaction with the structure of concepts and how the idea of concepts 
relates to the metaphysics of presence - to the idea of human centred, rational 
knowledge, and the fixing experience within a frame of complete conceptual 
explanation. But it is, above all, a concern with what this metaphysics must then 
mean about the type of relationship we have with things in the world and how this 
then impacts on the indigenous self and well-being. 
 
The overall aim of this chapter will be to show how the notion of mental illness is 
a disciple of the metaphysics of presence and to describe the relevance of this 
discipleship in terms of Māori and indigenous efforts to escape the metaphysics of 
presence within mental health.  What I suggest is that the metaphysics of presence 
not only creates and perpetuates the notion of mental illness but it also (as I have 
identified earlier), creates and perpetuates the expectation of how things will be 
represented in the world.  Escaping this expectation means understanding the form 
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that the expectation takes: the expectation that things will be presented (and 
therefore understood), in line with the structure of presence. In this chapter, I will 
be exploring the idea of metaphysical construction further by applying the analysis 
of metaphysical orientation to the tightly bound ordering of mental illness.  I will 
also consider how Māori and indigenous understandings of Being offer positively 
divergent possibilities for reconsidering people’s experiences and behaviour as 
something more than an internally focussed mental disease.  This expanded view 
of experience and behaviour is intended as a way of re-turning to a view of the self 
as being fully immersed in and with the world as opposed to being conceptualised 
as a separate, rational and overwhelmingly cognitive agent.   
   
In the previous chapter, the purpose of engaging in a deeper exploration of the 
premises of the metaphysics of presence has been to expose the ground on which I 
believe the notion of mental illness emerges from.  The analytical approach will 
now shift from examining a foundational philosophy to examining a specific 
manifestation of this foundational philosophy.   This chapter tells a story of what I 
posit is an ever-increasing move towards making things present and highly evident 
in the representation of mental illness.  In order to demonstrate how I believe 
presence is being increasingly sought as a representative style and structure, I will 
be traversing the history of the metaphysics of presence in relation to the notion of 
mental illness.  I aim to show how the structure of presence has shaped how we talk 
about mental illness today.  Given the role of early Greek philosophy in the 
construction of the metaphysics of presence, it is no surprise that Plato and Aristotle 
will feature as central figures within this historical and philosophical trajectory.  As 
I will show, Plato and Aristotle have contributed to a certain view of the self as a 
rational Being and have therefore contributed to modern representations of the 
notion of the mind.   
 
I will also be exploring the notion of mental illness by focussing on how the 
metaphysics of presence has manifested in the construction of a type of ‘madness’ 
that is marked by excessive meaning.  The intention here is to demonstrate that there 
is a wider context of historical notions of disorder that concern more than an 
individual’s mental state.  This wider context affects the understandings of Being 
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that are rendered as nonsensical, non-scientific, absent and perhaps primitive.13 
Within this view of disorder as excessive meaning, all things that do not fit the 
frame of present, essential meaning have the potential to represent a type of chaotic 
excess. In terms of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being, the expectation 
of ordered representation, of evident meanings that fix things within the frame of 
presence, may have particular consequences when considering the inclusion of 
Māori and indigenous knowledges within the field of mental health.  Some 
examples of projects emerging from within the field of mental health (both 
indigenous and non-indigenous) will also be presented at the end of this chapter.  It 
is intended that these examples will support a consideration of how different and 
divergent views are seeking to resist the expectation of highly evident and ordered 
representation.  
 
As part of the task of addressing what lies beneath the expectation of ordered 
representation, this chapter includes a focus on a debate between the philosophers 
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.  The deeper problem of the metaphysics of 
presence as it relates to the idea of ‘madness’ comes to the fore in the works of, and 
the contestations between, Foucault (1965) and Derrida (1978).  They are useful 
here – especially in a particular disagreement of one with the other – for opening 
the discussion of madness (and the notion of mental illness generally) away from 
simply an interrogation of the phenomenon of mental illness towards a much more 
expansive consideration of the validity of ‘mental illness’ in the first instance. 
Further, as I will argue through Derrida’s challenge of Foucault, the drive to 
determine things is manifesting in a quest to define mental illness in ways that leave 
no room for anything other than what can be seen, measured and fully represented. 
The idea of ‘excess’ will hence be an important term and concept for this chapter: 
ideas of ‘suspect’ worldviews that are sometimes deemed to be ‘mystical’ likewise 
become vital in this discussion.  
 
 
    13 See the previous chapter for an explanation of how things that do not fit within the frame of 
presence are marked as lesser derivatives of primary ‘present’ terms that are valued as ‘real things’.  
This hierarchy of meaning has also been referred to in terms of binaries such as civilised/savage, 
modern/primitive, and real/mythical 
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It is therefore important to note that in this chapter the notion of mental illness will 
not be taken up as a true objective state of Being.  As discussed in the introduction, 
there is a vast range of views that apply to the notion of mental illness.  Some of 
these views illustrate a tension that exists between those that challenge explanations 
of what mental illness actually is and those that reject any belief that mental illness 
can be taken for granted as being a true, objective, ahistorical object (irrespective 
of its changing definitions).  The question of how mental illness is understood from 
within two very different metaphysical orientations will be approached using the 
same scepticism about the notion of mental illness (being a real object) to resist 
making any assumptions about its factual existence.  In this sense, the use of the 
term ‘notion’ in association with the term mental illness is deliberate. As I will 
argue, mental illness as a notion implicates certain metaphysical premises that have 
constructed an assumption about objective and abstract aspects of ‘human nature’.  
 
The view of the notion mental illness as a construct is not original to my analysis. 
However, the importance of clearly marking my analytic stance as one that reaches 
into metaphysical ground - and rejects the view of mental illness as an objective 
factual state of Being - relates to concerns raised in the introduction chapter.  These 
concerns focus on whether there is sufficient onto-epistemic space for Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being within the context of what might be called 
mental and emotional states.  What was posited in the introduction is that there are 
certain expectations of how things in the world will be represented that restrict and 
suppress other ways of thinking (and Being) including those that follow from Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics.  The nature of this expectation, which I have described 
as a dominant Western metaphysics, concerns not just constructed meaning that is 
framed as universal knowledge but also the many layers of construction and the 
structure of constructed meaning itself.  It is, in other words, the expectation that 
things will be represented as objects with essential qualities that demonstrate a 
thing’s enduring and essential form.  Within this structure, all things are vulnerable 
as objects to be (essentially) determined, including things that emerge from within 
Māori and indigenous worldviews.  I will begin here by exploring the structure of 
construction as a way of exposing what I believe is a haunting influence that 




Metaphysical predicates and the notion of mental illness 
I want to repeat here two crucial points that were made in the previous chapter using 
a warning that was given by Derrida (1982) in his book, Margins of Philosophy. 
The following quote from Derrida includes two points that are critical to the 
analysis of the notion of mental illness that, as I have posited, represents a type of 
metaphysical discipleship, constructed upon the premises of the metaphysics of 
presence.  These points are important within the wider context of considering what 
restricts Māori and indigenous articulations about Being.  Further, these points 
provide an important steer when examining the influence of the metaphysics of 
presence and its embeddedness in the world as the underlying structure that insists 
on certain, restricted representations of meaning.  Derrida warns that,   
 
the chains of predicates which, even if not permanent, 
are still quite ample, not easily permitting themselves to 
be displaced or interrupted by multiple rupturing events, 
however fascinating and spectacular these events might 
be for the first unaccommodating glance... Unless one 
considers the order of language, words, and the signifier 
in general to be an accessory system... such an attitude 
also would derive from a philosophy, the most classical 
philosophy of the relations between sense and sign (p. 
72).    
 
The first point that I take from Derrida’s quote is that there are those things (referred 
to as predicates) that extend from the metaphysics of presence that, despite multiple 
challenges, stay in place.  These predicates remain beneath the alternate meanings 
that we attempt to install in order to displace or disrupt the constructed, imposed 
meanings we are dissatisfied with.  In the next sentence of the quote Derrida points 
to the primary predicates of the structure that sit beneath the constructed meanings 
we might repeatedly critique.  These predicates, according to Derrida, include 




Here, Derrida (1982), warns us that if we do not consider these predicates as the 
underlying structure of the constructs we are critiquing, we are in danger of also 
using them to develop our own alternate terms or descriptions.   This might, for 
example, show up in a dissatisfaction with a universal meaning applied to a 
particular explanation of behaviour or emotion, but if we are to offer an equally 
rigid replacement, taken up as a universal and essential (alternative) explanation, 
then we remain within the framework of essential signification.  We maintain, in 
other words, the structure of meaning that determines or over-determines what 
something essentially is.   
 
To reiterate a point made earlier in the thesis: the expectation that things in the 
world will be represented as intelligible, discernible objects with conceptual limits 
is an expectation that structures and shapes all (academic) modes of knowledge 
production.  This point has been explained at length in the previous chapter, but it 
bears repeating here because of its central role in the analytic approach that supports 
this chapter.  It is in Derrida’s warning about signification, and the idea of signifying 
a universal exactness through language and words, that I see the focus and 
orientation of my own analysis.  I am looking for ways in which the constructed 
meaning shifts but the structure of discernible essence or a singular universal 
representation remains in place, including when this manifests in how Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being are expected to be represented within certain 
institutions. 
 
The structure and its grasp on meaning 
In seeking to address the issue of the (dominant) structure that influences how 
things are represented, I turn to the work of Maria Lugones (2010) who offers a 
particularly powerful insight that helps to shape an understanding of what I mean 
when referring to the solidity of the structure that lies beneath (the issue of) 
constructed meaning.  In discussing the coloniality of gender, Lugones warns 
against searching for non-colonised constructions of gender because, “There is no 
such thing; ‘‘gender’’ does not travel away from colonial modernity” (p.746).  In 
Lugones’ warning, the solid unwavering structure that is colonial modernity would 
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continue its influence from within the new alternate term or explanation that has 
been introduced, remaining intact as the architect of meaning.14   
 
The idea of concrete histories and equally concrete universal meanings has been 
resisted by indigenous and minority peoples throughout the world; however, 
Lugones is wary of resistance that seeks to subvert imposed meaning by offering 
non-colonial versions of colonial concepts.  In this sense, Lugones exposes the 
hardiness of the structure that rests comfortably beneath what Dube (2002) calls 
‘divergent articulations’ (p. 197).  I would suggest that the notion of mental illness 
can be conceptualised as one of these colonial concepts.  It is, in this sense, a 
concept that exists within this hardy structure that, despite “multiple rupturing 
events” (Derrida, 1982, p. 72), remains and is solidified within the expectation of 
how the world will be represented through complete articulations of a thing’s 
essential ‘whatness’.  
  
When applied to the notion of mental illness, Lugones’ warning about constructions 
that do not travel away from colonial modernity puts a spotlight on efforts that have 
been made to advance indigenous versions of mental illness. Within this 
understanding of a regnant structure of representation, I question whether 
indigenous versions of mental illness and mental health concepts could also be 
 
14 I discuss Lugones’ critique of the notion of gender to highlight how colonialism problematises the 
creation of indigenous versions of categories emerging from dominant Western cultural frames.  
However, I recognise the importance of considering how a dominant Western metaphysics has 
created the notion of women (and more widely gender), and has then proceeded to oppress based on 
this created, gendered identity.  For example, women, as a category largely created from ideas of 
biological determinism, has rendered the female body as a lesser, corrupt vessel (e.g., Plato’s view 
of women as lacking an essential soul and rational mind), justifying the creation of diagnostic labels 
like ‘hysteria’, described as a type of sex based madness where women could be determined as being 
mentally ill based on biologically driven emotional disruptions linked to the uterus (e.g., see 
Goldman, 2009). My concern in this thesis, however; goes beyond posing challenges to these 
imposed gender based, oppressive behavioural descriptions.  I am instead concerned with the 
metaphysical structuring of things and how this represents the possibility of oppression based on the 
enforcing of strict categorisation.  For this reason, while I recognise how gendered oppression has 
resulted from the category of gender (including gendered madness), Like Lugones, I am less 
occupied with addressing the content of the category of gender than with breaking the category apart, 
questioning the existence of gender or talking from outside the category – from the exterior.  This 
critical positioning, exterior to the concept of gender, opens up the possibility for seeing indigenous 
resistance to gendered oppression and gendered racism on our own terms, and perhaps, these terms 
include a type of genderlessness? The task of breaking apart the category of gender requires a lot of 
attention and is outside the scope of this thesis.  However, I encourage the reader to reflect on ideas 
of gender (and genderlessness) in relation to Māori terms and entities (for example, gender and 
Papatūānuku).   
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considered to be potentially problematic articulations. The idea is that indigenous 
versions of mental illness (or what, for example, Kingi, 2018, calls Māori 
understandings of ‘abnormal states of mind’), seek entry into an onto-epistemic 
frame that demands a re-iteration of a particular way of talking about the world, 
regardless of which alternative term or description is placed within the frame.    This 
expected re-iteration of structure would affect both the content and meaning of 
indigenous expressions but, more fundamentally, the way in which indigenous 
understandings are presented.  This problem is not original to the notion of mental 
illness but concerns the retention of structure that resists displacement by divergent 
articulations.  In other words, it is not that the meanings themselves remain static 
across time and place but that the idea of the ‘object’ (the whatness of a thing) 
resists being disrupted. 
 
Drawing again on Lugones’ (2010) insight into resistance against colonial 
constructions, I highlight a point she makes about how the perils of attempting to 
offer non-colonial versions of colonial constructs are tied into the issue of historical 
complexity.  Here, Lugones is emphasising that same sense of caution that Derrida 
(1982) expresses in his focus on the ‘chains’ of meaning (i.e., predicates), that flow 
out from a concrete inner structure of signification acting as an enduring 
metaphysical nexus.  I suggest that this metaphysical nexus captures expressions of 
resistance and forces these into becoming inadvertent conformities.  The historical 
complexity that Lugones points to can be applied to both the notion of mental illness 
and the ways in which efforts to challenge this notion through articulating 
indigenous understandings of Being are impacted on by an enduring insistence on 
making things ‘present’.   Again, the metaphysics of presence is in play here and it 
highlights an interesting intersection between metaphysics as presence and its 
necessary structure of representation on the one hand, and the concept of mind that 
is historically and metaphysically central to the notion of mental illness or abnormal 
states of mind on the other.   
 
The idea of the rational subject has a central role in the enactment of the 
metaphysics of presence and it is this legacy of the mind’s role that I think is 
significant in terms of the context of historical complexities that re-emerge in 
different iterations across generations.  I posit that, as with the colonial concept of 
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gender that Lugones (2010) critically highlighted, the concept of mind, as a central 
agent in the metaphysics of presence, does not travel away from its primary 
metaphysical ground.  This entanglement then has certain implications for Māori 
and indigenous responses to the notion of mental illness, including when Māori and 
indigenous versions of mental illness (and the concept of mind) are put forward as 
a form of resistance to dominant Western discourse.  
 
Moewaka Barnes (2008) has discussed the impact that epistemic expectations of 
how things will be represented have had in terms of the ability to articulate Māori 
metaphysics.  Moewaka Barnes notes that expressing spirituality in science and 
research is a professionally and culturally perilous undertaking for Māori which 
impacts on the depth of the work that Māori academics are able to produce without 
facing professional scrutiny:  
 
I am aware that there is much we, as indigenous 
academics, do not express in writing. There are ways of 
seeing that we leave out of proposals and research 
reports, but nevertheless acknowledge and talk about 
among ourselves…I became increasingly aware of the 
difficulties of expressing spirituality as a part of 
indigenous worldviews, including its place in science 
and research…These things are a part of our knowing, 
but they are not a part of the mainstream, legitimated 
ways of knowing…in western eyes, I would be seen as 
less of a scientist if I suggested that the place of 
spirituality may be broader and largely indefinable; as a 
result, these less tangible aspects are dealt with only 
lightly (pp. 7–8). 
 
In discussing Māori metaphysics as this manifest in the possibilities of research and 
wairua, Moewaka Barnes et al. (2017) describe how they approached research that 
focussed on wairua, affect and emotion.  Within this research, affect was 
conceptualised as an “embodied involvement in social life” with the aim of 
expanding the research beyond the “limited palette of ‘basic emotions’” (p. 316).   
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An important aspect of this research included recognising how epistemic structures 
impact on how Māori experiences can be presented when the complex meaning of 
those experiences are not easily articulated.  These complexities highlight the 
difficulty of fitting Māori metaphysics and the ‘undefinable’ into a structure that 
expects the clear representation of things.  As Moewaka Barnes et al. (2017) 
explain, 
 
Attention to wairua…explores how Māori (including 
Māori researchers) make meaning beyond the usual 
routes recognised in settler societies; the intimations 
and resonances, sometimes subtle and fleeting, 
sometimes repressed, and sometimes strong and vivid 
(p. 316). 
 
Notably absent from the discussion of wairua, affect and emotions are any solid and 
direct references to Western psychological concepts that might be used to orientate 
wairua and its relationship to affect and emotion back to a dominant framework.  In 
their attempts to explain emotion, the authors do not appeal to notions of mind that 
are easily equated with clinical conceptualisations, instead looking to the work of 
Aluli-Meyer (2006) who raises the possibility of an alternative view of self – a 
holistic indigenous metaphysics of (something more than) the mind.  Aluli-Meyer’s 
metaphysical representation presents the holistic inseparability of what might in 
Western taxonomies be listed as components of Being that include mind, body and 
spirit.  This triangulation of Being is described by Aluli-Meyer as a new 
consciousness in which the idea of mind moves away from its association with 
objective representation.  Instead, a triangulation of Being would embrace a 
subjectivity that reflects the complex experience of events and the multiple 
descriptions that come from what the body sees rather than from generalisable 
rational interpretations.15   
 
These examples demonstrate how Māori and indigenous metaphysics present 
possibilities for how notions of mind, mental health and mental illness may be 
 
    15While Aluli-Meyer’s description follows a type of explanatory structure that solidifies the idea of 
wairua and holistic Being through naming aspects of the person, there is also an attempt to depart 
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considered in ways that allow for a positive divergence.  This type of divergence is 
one that, I suggest, attempts to avoid what Moewaka Barnes et al. (2017) describe 
as “neatly packaging within borders” the excesses of Māori spiritual expressions 
(p. 319).  However, Moewaka Barnes (2008) observation of how these positively 
divergent expressions are taken up in the academy and how they are seen through 
the scientific gaze emphasises the “sense of mayhem” (to recall Smith et al., 2016), 
at play that was discussed in the method chapter of this thesis.  This sense of 
mayhem speaks to the tensions created by a dominant expectation that pulls at 
Māori and indigenous onto-epistemic freedoms, haunting with the ever-present 
anticipation of objective representation.  
 
Both of these points - of positive divergence and dominant Western onto-epistemic 
expectation - can be applied to Lugones’ discussion of indigenous versions of 
Western notions grounded in non-indigenous philosophies. They can also be 
applied to the view that we cannot easily escape dominant Western onto-epistemes 
simply through offering new definitions.  Indigenous versions of non-indigenous 
concepts could, within this analytical frame, be seen as an example of the “rupturing 
events” that Derrida (1982) warns may be “fascinating” and “spectacular” (p.72), 
on the surface, but are not able to displace or disrupt the ground from which the 
concepts emerge.  In terms of the notion of mental illness (and mental health), I 
speculate there are historical complexities that manifest as an enduring 
metaphysical influence in the construction of these notions. This metaphysical 
influence is what makes indigenous versions of mental illness and mental health 
important markers for considering not only where we are going in our work for 
recognition of Māori and indigenous metaphysics but to also consider what our 
modern expressions of Māori and indigenous versions of mental illness and mental 
health are metaphysically connected to.  It is this connection to a metaphysical 
structure that I argue has significantly impacted on Māori and indigenous 
expressions.  This structure is what sits solidly in place, constructing objects with 
essential qualities - reflecting a style of representation that does not move despite 
the different names we might provide in an attempt to carve out different conceptual 
 
from the idea of mind as a separate agent of the cognitively driven self.  In other words, listing the 
components of mind, body and spirit appears to be an attempt to show the things that are indivisibly 
connected rather than emphasise a component like separation. 
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pathways.   We might desire to ‘travel away’ from the colonial concepts that act as 
obvious signifiers of imposed meaning, but the structure of imposition, of 
objectivity, solid conceptual representation and rational agency, do not easily give 
way.   
 
Discarding excess and its impetus for the notion of mental illness 
The metaphysical basis of the notion of mind   
As mentioned, within the historical construction of the notion of mental illness, 
there is a sense of disorder that goes beyond the individual to capture all things that 
are considered to carry an excessive meaning.   Things that spill out of the frame of 
present and essential meaning are rendered as problematic anomalies, resisting the 
expectation of order that finds its genesis in ancient Greek philosophy.  This notion 
of excess can also be related to historical theories about the individual rational agent 
which is central to understanding how the notion of mental illness has emerged in 
its modern form.   The idea of an individual’s rational ordering and the ordering of 
all things in the world, can therefore be understood as intersecting philosophies.   
 
In order to explore the metaphysical bases of the notion of mental illness and to 
understand the metaphysics of the notion of mind, the history of the notion of 
mental illness (or mental disease) must be explored to expose the origins of the 
notion of the mind from within a dominant Western metaphysics.   I contend that 
the notion of mind is both a symbol of the metaphysics of presence and a direct 
instrument in the construction of things in the world as discernible, solid objects 
with essential qualities.  It is, in this sense, a double-edged sword that upholds the 
notion (and structure) of objective representation while also providing the template 
for the (symbolic) construction of the self as a rational agent.   
 
In order to identify how early philosophies may have contributed to a modern 
metaphor of mind (one that I suggest still influences how we understand the mind 
as a metaphysical and material concept today), there are certain historical 
philosophies that must be explored.  The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle will 
play a main role in this exploration to determine how the notion of mind was 
discussed in early Greek philosophy. Importantly, examining these early 
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philosophies will also help in considering the relationship between Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s view of the world and how the concept of mind is discussed in a modern 
context.   
 
More broadly, the notion of mental illness and its historical bases must be explored 
to also consider how mental illness has emerged from a certain metaphysical 
orientation.  As I will argue, it is the metaphysics of presence, and its reliance on 
the discernible and present thing, that makes the notion of mental illness into a solid 
and measurable phenomenon.  As such, I contend that the notion of mental illness 
persists regardless of the shifting historically fluid signifiers that have emerged in, 
for example, the different names we give for specific disorders.  Further, it is the 
metaphysics of the rational subject, and the construction of the notion of mind 
related to the rational subject that, I suggest, enforces the idea of the individual 
having an internal mechanism that governs the person, producing balanced 
objective thought. Together, these two elements of the metaphysics of presence set 
up the conditions for the construction of the self as an individual rational subject 
but also for the structure: a style of representation that insists on an ordered 
objectivity, denying the existence and validation of things that do not fit within 
certain (rational) onto-epistemic boundaries.   
 
It is difficult to discuss the origins of the notion of mental illness without also 
engaging in an analysis of the origins of the concept of mind.  The concept of mind 
has (partly) been explored so far through exploring the metaphysics of presence as 
the dominant Western doctrine of being-in-the-world (e.g., Derrida, 1982; 
Heidegger, 1953).  The mind as a concept is not easily separated from this wider 
metaphysics that posits that Being is centred on the idea of the autonomous, 
individual, rational agent (Gillett, 2009).  This idea of the rational agent can be seen 
in Plato’s philosophy of true ethereal Forms that an individual is able to discern 
through internal and intellectual meditations (Partenie, 2018). The mind and its 
transcendent nature are also reflected in Descartes’ insistence that the mind is a non-
physical substance that is other than the body or, more broadly, that the mind is a 
distinct and non-physical faculty (Tanney, 2009).  Further, the mind’s role in 
determining the essence of things in the world has been discussed in terms of a 
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hierarchy in which reason (as a central aspect of the soul/mind) is the superior 
faculty (Grosfoguel, 2013).   
 
In Plato’s philosophy, the soul or mind is made up of three distinct parts and it is 
this multiplicity that explains the complex and contradictory behaviours and 
thoughts that Plato believed was part of human nature and behaviour.  The three 
aspects of the soul that Plato determined include the appetite (governing hunger, 
thirst and lust), the spirit (governing anger), and reason (governing critical thought).   
While Plato imagined that these parts of the soul each contained a cognitive aspect 
(such as with the spirit holding beliefs that caused anger), to Plato the superiority 
of reason was based on the belief that reason is that which is able to look over and 
consider the welfare of all three aspects of the soul.  Plato’s understanding of the 
soul and of the role that its parts play in achieving balance and harmony is centred 
on the idea of self-mastery that is reliant on reason as the necessary, central and 
controlling aspect (Seeskin, 2008).   
 
Aristotle would further solidify the idea of reason as the central aspect of the soul 
(or mind) and would speak of it in terms of its necessary function.  For Aristotle, 
this function reflects the very nature of nature itself which is to eliminate excess 
and deficiency (Kraut, 2018).  It is within this frame of understanding of the soul 
(and the superior rational aspect of the soul) that the idea of mental health and its 
association with morality within Greek philosophy can be understood.  Immorality 
was the condition of imbalance where the soul is divided against itself and Aristotle 
would describe this imbalance as a disease - a pathological condition in which the 
person (or a person’s soul), is torn in different directions (Seeskin, 2008). 
   
While there are ways in which this view of mental disease may be directly applied 
to a discussion about the modern notion of mental illness, it is the idea of a condition 
of psychic harmony and the mind as a function of psychic harmony contained 
within the individual that is of interest in this thesis.  It is also the idea of the mind-
body binary and the mind’s capacity for reason as a function and faculty, superior 
to the body, that forms a framework for considering the continued influence that 
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the concept of mind has on current theories of mental disorder and, more generally, 
understandings of (more than) human nature.   
  
Seeskin (2008) suggests that the idea of an individual’s internal psychic harmony 
that stems from the early Greek philosophers’ view of the mind’s internal function, 
including ridding the individual of excess and deficiency, is a metaphor that we 
struggle to completely discard.   As Seeskin points out, “history is instructive” (p. 
492), giving us a map for understanding some of the common beliefs about mental 
health and mental disorder that exist and are continuing to develop today.  In terms 
of the metaphysical bases of the notion of mental illness, I would agree with 
Seeskin’s contention about the continued focus on the mind as a metaphor for the 
self’s internal functioning, psychic harmony, balance and ability to rid the self of 
excess and deficiency.  The mind, as the rational ‘centre’ of the self is, I would 
argue, still a pervasive symbol of a metaphysics that abhors excess and deficiency 
and seeks, through its various mechanisms, to rid the self of ‘disorder’.   
 
Returning again to Lugones’ (2010) concern with the historical complexities that 
complicate attempts to create indigenous versions of colonial concepts, the issue is 
whether (like gender) the concept of the mind, as a fundamental component of a 
person’s internalised state of Being, is one that also cannot travel away from 
coloniality.  In other words, are the historical origins of Greek philosophy and the 
view of the person as a rational Being that must strive to achieve balance, and 
eliminate excessive disorder, able to be disconnected from the concept of mind even 
when that concept is presented through a different cultural lens?  Or do these 
metaphysical bases remain steadfast beneath all references to the notion of mind 
regardless of the different versions that we might offer?  Māori and indigenous 
versions of mental health concepts (and the concept of mind) can be considered 
within this context. 
 
Māori and indigenous critiques of the notion of mental illness (and Being in 
general) have included a critical focus on the idea of the mind being a separate, 
wholly rational faculty (e.g., Jeffery, 2005) that in a physicalist view, is largely 
associated with the brain (Graham, 2010; Greenfeld, 2013; Gold, 2009).  These 
critiques are wholly important to a consideration of how the concept of the mind is 
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evolving within mental health and to how the concept of the mind is applied to the 
notion of mental illness.  The conceptualisation of mind has, for example, 
significant implications for how Māori and indigenous terms are taken up within 
mental health as translations of the terms mind and mental.   The notion of mind 
and its evolution within mental health is also significant when considering how a 
preference for solid conceptualisations is manifesting in the way that the mind is 
being represented in (largely) scientific terms (Graham, 2010; Greenfeld, 2013; 
Gold, 2009).   
 
Both of these implications will be discussed at length later in the chapter.  However, 
here I aim to highlight what I think is a more fundamental and pervasive influence 
reflected in Plato and Aristotle’s descriptions of ‘mind’.  I would argue that this 
more pervasive influence is the notion of excess and the reliance on and preference 
for the ordered, disciplined, balanced and non-excessive self and world.  It is this 
imposed ordering of things that, within the frame of the metaphysics of presence, I 
suggest limits Māori and indigenous expressions within mental health and other 
institutions.  Within this context, it is important to consider the notion of excess as 
it relates to the structure of a dominant Western metaphysics and the construction 
of a view of disorder that includes but also expands beyond the notion of mental 
illness.  Within this expanded sense of disorder, the complex expressions that stem 
from a Māori and indigenous metaphysics (along with all expressions that resist full 
and ordered conceptualisation) are, I suggest, subject to the expectation of showing 
a limited, non-excessive presentation. 
 
Nature abhors excess – Foucault and Derrida: Some signposts for 
Māori and indigenous thinking 
The idea of balance and excess has so far been discussed in relation to Plato and 
Aristotle’s view of the function of the mind as an internal mechanism with a specific 
role in ensuring a harmonistic state of Being. Within this section I will be exploring 
the idea of excess using two critical and radical analyses that have brought the idea 
of the mind, rationality and mental illness into sharp focus.  I use these particular 
analyses for a number of reasons.  The material comes from two philosophers who 
have influenced my thinking about both metaphysics and the notion of mental 
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illness. The philosophers in question are Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida and 
both have produced work that has captured my imagination in thinking about the 
limitations and possibilities presented by metaphysics and by the historical 
construction of mental illness as a concept. The two philosophers have also engaged 
in a type of debate about mental illness, provoking each other’s thinking and 
producing, from my perspective, a radical view that addresses what sits beneath the 
notion of mental illness and the idea of excessive meaning.   
 
The first analytic work that I will be focussing on is Foucault’s (1965) famous 
publication Madness and Civilization which presents a complex view of the social 
and cultural forces that led to the construction of the view of an affliction called 
‘madness’ (now commonly referred to as mental illness or mental disease).  The 
second analytic work is Jacques Derrida’s (1978) Cogito and the History of 
Madness which is a critical response to Foucault’s work.  Derrida’s reading of 
Foucault’s project provokes a response from Derrida that pushes him to look 
beneath the surface of Foucault’s analysis of the historical construction of madness.  
Derrida is not satisfied with the view of madness emerging as (the idea of) an 
individual affliction and the historical focus on rationality.  It is instead, according 
to Derrida, a view of madness that is about the disorder represented in ideas that 
carry excessive meaning: things that do not fit the rational frame that the West seeks 
to discipline and bring into a certain (rational) order.  Therefore, these two works 
in their relationship to each other have assisted me in developing an understanding 
of how culture and history have impacted on how mental illness is conceptualised 
but also on how metaphysics has impacted on our view of the ‘irrational’, including 
the unexplainable things that do not fit within the rational order. 
 
Derrida’s dissatisfaction with Foucault’s treatment of the notion of madness is not 
centred on the view that Foucault has made an error in highlighting the historical 
events that created a view of certain people as irrational Beings (de Ville, 2010).  
Rather, Derrida is discontented with Foucault’s analysis because he believes that it 
does not go far enough in exposing the attitude of rationality and order.  To Derrida, 
the idea of madness as a loss of an individual’s rational faculties is only one of the 
judgements that has been produced by the dominant structure.  According to 
Derrida, we must go further into investigating what has created the notion of 
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madness because it is, at a deeper level, a metaphysical viewpoint that would 
continue to lay judgement on all things in the world to determine their value and 
legitimacy.  I have chosen to utilise Derrida’s more fundamental critique of 
rationality and order for this reason because it allows me to address the ways in 
which a dominant metaphysical viewpoint has impacted on Māori and indigenous 
worldviews.  To Derrida, it is the things carrying of excessive meaning, retaining a 
sense of mystery and resisting full representation, that is seen as a specific type of 
madness, making things subject to the ordering of rationality.  As I will go on to 
argue, Māori and indigenous understandings of Being have been impacted on by 
the metaphysical preference for rational, ordered and present meaning.  This impact 
is one that I suggest shows itself in a modern attitude of the rational order 
experienced by Māori and indigenous peoples as an imposed imperative: the 
overbearing instruction that states, “you can’t think that”.   
 
While I will be presenting these analytic works as two connected pieces of work in 
order to extract the analysis that is helpful to the focus of this thesis, it is useful to 
first outline Foucault’s general narrative concerning the historical construction of 
madness.  This general summary of Foucault’s work will provide the ground in 
which Derrida’s philosophical viewpoint (as a response to Foucault) can be located.   
 
Michel Foucault: Madness and Civilization 
Michel Foucault’s (1965) analysis of the notion of madness is perhaps the most 
famous example of an historical and social deconstructionist critique of mental 
illness as a concept.  While Foucault’s focus on the history of madness necessarily 
examined the behaviour of those that were deemed sane and reasonable - the 
cultural constructors of the exile and imprisonment of society’s undesirables - what 
is more useful in terms of this thesis is Foucault’s focus on the importance that early 
European societies placed on preserving reason.  For Foucault, madness finds its 
identity in the historical, social, and provincial particularities of the Renaissance 
and the Classical era.  Though each era makes its own contributions to the 
construction of madness, common throughout these histories are the anxieties of a 
society that fears the state of a fallen ‘human nature’ characterised by folly and the 
abyss of “unreason” (p.13). The spectres of fools and folly, embodied by the insane, 
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project an imaginary that haunts society in the fifteenth century.  As Foucault 
explains, a new imaginary emerges out of the mediaeval period leading into the 
Renaissance. While there is some genuine fascination associated with the 
‘freedoms’ of unreason and madness, ultimately, unreason signifies the death of the 
body through the symbolic imaginations of the death of the mind.  This fear of death 
and oblivion is also reflected in a fretful apprehension that Foucault links to spiritual 
anxieties.  As he explains, 
 
Apocalyptic dreams are not new…in the fifteenth 
century; they are, however, very different in nature from 
what they had been earlier. The delicately fantastic 
iconography of the fourteenth century, where castles are 
toppled like dice, where the Beast is always the 
traditional dragon held at bay by the Virgin, where the 
order of God and its imminent victory are always 
apparent, gives way to a vision of the world where all 
wisdom is annihilated. This is the great witches' 
Sabbath of nature: mountains melt and become plains, 
the earth vomits up the dead and bones tumble out of 
tombs; the stars fall, the earth catches fire, all life 
withers and comes to death (p.23).   
 
To Foucault, the heightened anxiety associated with the foolishness of madness he 
describes is not merely a reflection of a growing cultural valuing of reason and 
intellect; it is moreover an anxiety, grounded in the fear of a nihilism that is 
represented in the images of madness.     
 
The reference to the annihilation of wisdom, and its relationship to a nature that 
threatens to destroy, is a theme explored by others who highlight the anxieties that 
colour the social and cultural landscape of Europe in earlier centuries.  Bordo 
(1986), for example, discusses the rationalist project of the seventeenth century as 
an escape from the anxiety of uncertainty and the turn to intellectual salvation as a 
response to those anxieties.  Using Descartes’ dreams of disorder as a focal point, 
Bordo explains how certainty and reason (which in a Foucauldian analysis 
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represents the antithesis of madness and unreason) stave off the chaos of nature that 
characterises both the natural world and the internal world of ‘man’.  As Bordo 
explains, 
 
The culture in question, in the wake of the dissolution 
of the medieval intellectual and imaginative system, had 
lost a world in which the human being could feel 
nourished by the sense of oneness, of continuity 
between all things. The new, infinite universe was an 
indifferent home, an alien will, and the sense of 
separateness from her was acute. Not only was she 
"other" but she seemed a perverse and uncontrollable 
other: during the years 1550-1650, a century that had 
brought the worst food crisis in history, violent wars, 
plague, and devastating poverty, the Baconian imagery 
of nature as an unruly and malevolent virago is no 
paranoid fantasy. More important, the cruelty of the 
world could no longer be made palatable by the old 
medieval sense of organic justice-that is, justice on the 
level of the workings of a whole with which one's 
identity merged and that, while perhaps not fully 
comprehensible, was nonetheless to be trusted. Now 
there seemed no organic unity, but only "I" and "she" an 
unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary "she" whose 
actions could not be understood in any of the old, 
sympathetic (p. 454). 
 
In Foucault’s (1965) analysis, the anxiety of society, as with the anxiety of 
Descartes, is the fear of disorder.  Madness as a symbol of disorder is married with 
fears of base desires.  Characterised as animality, madness threatens through 
disclosing the “underlying realm of unreason” (p.83).  It is the spectre of 
unrestrained animality that marks the disorder of madness and calls for the calming 
restraint of reason, symbolised in the order and constraint of those afflicted with 
madness.   As Foucault states, “All this world of disorder, in perfect order, 
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pronounces, each in his turn, the Praise of Reason” (p.36).   Further, Foucault would 
refer to the ordering of madness as the act of making silent an otherwise excessive 
and profound experience – a tempest of emotion and Being that is silenced by the 
restraining pull of the rational order.   
 
Derrida’s Cogito and excessive meaning: A response to Foucault  
I turn now to Derrida’s (1978) critical response to Foucault’s (1965) analysis of the 
historical construction of the notion of madness to highlight an aspect of Foucault’s 
work that is important to the idea of historical complexity, complicating the 
development of Māori and indigenous versions of Western concepts.  This is 
particularly important as it applies to Plato and Aristotle’s premise of the function 
of reason in finding balance and eliminating excess.  The summary of Foucault’s 
project presented so far already provides a sense of reason as an ordered balancing 
of a state of Being that calms the excesses of madness.  It is within this 
understanding of excess and order that Derrida would respond most strongly to 
Foucault as a way of exposing the predicates preceding and also continuing to frame 
representations of madness (and all things) through what Derrida discusses as the 
continuous return to the logos.  
  
To Derrida (1978), the task of presenting an historical account of madness and 
marking the conception of madness in the classical age silences a more fundamental 
predicate that comes prior to the notion of madness as a social and cultural 
construct.  This fundamental predicate is one that Derrida would describe as the 
“making possible [of] all straitjackets” (p. 57).  What Derrida is pointing to is the 
straightening of all things by the structure of order that would include the structure 
of language available to Foucault when writing about madness or “the language of 
objectification” (de Ville, 2010, p. 4).   
 
Derrida’s (1978) observations about this language and its superstructure of 
logocentrism could be likened to the function of balance and the elimination of 
excess that Plato posited as a function of reason and Aristotle had talked of as the 
nature of nature itself (Seeskin, 2008).  It is, therefore, those things that do not fit 
within a certain order that are the ‘mad’ excesses subject to restraint, rather than 
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any one cognitive or behavioural impairment that can be isolated and labelled as 
madness (that would inadvertently support the idea of a special madness such as 
that treated by psychiatrists).  Further, Derrida would describe the restraint enforced 
by a return to logos as the act of “forced entry... putting into the world that which 
is not there” (p.57).  Derrida describes this act of forced entry as type of violent 
oppression enforced through what he describes as a “narration” (p. 56): a project of 
attempting to think a totality that cannot be thought.  
 
What Derrida (1978) is therefore concerned with, in marking that which oppresses 
the totality, is the suppression and silence of excess or meaning that spills out of 
and exceeds logocentrism.  In this sense, madness as a division between reason and 
unreason, that Foucault locates in the classical age, “has neither absolute privilege 
nor archetypal exemplarity” (Derrida 1978, p. 42).   To Derrida, madness is already 
marked as “the exclusion of a certain madness [that] is the condition of possibility 
of meaning and of language” (de Ville, 2010, p. 5).  This containment of meaning 
would, in Derrida’s view, guard against the possibilities of excess and the 
expressions of meaning that do not fit within the essentialist logocentric structure 
of essence and essential, ordered representation. After all, Plato, for example, 
believed that the language we use to name things – the words for things – originated 
from some kind of immutable essence or the nature of the thing itself (Barbosa, 
2015).  Therefore, the names we give to things were not approximations of a thing’s 
essential Being; they were instead believed to be exact terms for things.  These 
exact terms were what contained a thing’s meaning.  It was not possible for them 
to be anything else or for things to be so complex that their meaning could spill out 
of the conceptual containers (the names) that represented them.   
 
It is in this sense that Derrida (1978) argues that language can be applied to the 
concept of madness and its construction in order to intern it, thereby protecting the 
structure of logocentrism against a perceived total madness.  Madness can be 
contained within certain terms that mean certain things, but it cannot be a complete 
excess of meaning (the perceived total madness) because that would threaten the 
rational order.  Foucault (1965) would call this perceived total madness “the 
absence of reason” (p. 76), that Derrida would further radicalise as madness that is 
in fact the absence of the rational, objective and definitive order.  Within Derrida’s 
185 
 
analysis, disorder is not simply an individual rational affliction; instead, it is the 
absence of a deeper order that disciplines all things in the world, fixing them in 
place by the limits of definition. It is, in other words, the determinate ordering of 
what things are.   
 
Quite apart from the de-structuring effect of Derrida’s (1978) response to Foucault 
(1965) in which the possibilities of liberating madness are unrestricted by a 
historical universal point of division between reason and unreason, Derrida’s 
insight presents the possibility of focussing instead on the idea of excess.  It also 
highlights the anxious response within early Greek (and subsequent) philosophies 
to the idea of unrestrained excessive meaning.   
 
Māori and indigenous expressions: Implications of the Derridean view of 
excessive meaning  
Derrida’s (1978) position is instructive for a Māori and indigenous articulation of 
the more metaphysical designation of madness.  In this sense, Māori and indigenous 
versions of the notion of mental illness must first be considered in terms of the 
historical construction of not only ideas of madness but of the metaphysics that 
constructs the idea of madness.  This is a metaphysics that, I suggest, abhors excess 
and is apparent in Derrida’s observation that (within the rational tradition), things 
that are uncontained, mystical and unsayable are rendered as a deeper and more 
fundamental type of madness.    
 
In terms of Māori and indigenous onto-epistemes, I argue that there is a breaching 
of the limits of rational thinking and (more widely), of a metaphysics that would 
prefer an objective representation of a thing as a present and discernible entity.  This 
breaching of the rational limit may put Māori and indigenous articulations of Being 
at risk within the rational order.  The dominant metaphysical fixture, after all, is one 
that stays in place, expecting diverse articulations to mirror its essential features 
back to itself, albeit in different ways.  There are two things at play here.  Firstly, 
there is the idea of balance and excess that is important to the historical notion of 
mental dis-ease and the contemporary uptake of this idea.  Secondly there is the 
wider rubric of objectification and ordered representation that is the ground from 
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which the logocentric structures of order emerge.  Both of these present problematic 
restrictions when Māori and indigenous articulations are considered within the 
wider context of historical and modern complexities. Further, there is a 
corresponding restrictive impact that exists between historical ideas of ‘madness’ 
and the overarching structure of objective representation.  This overarching 
structure is what, I argue, gives a particular shape to indigenous explanations of 
Being even when these explanations aim to depart from the idea of disorder and its 
primary association with mental states.   
 
This sense of ordering and the elimination of excess presents a problematic 
expectation that shapes the idea of mental dis-ease in advance which in turn shapes 
the ways in which the idea of mental disease can be responded to.  In other words, 
it shapes and rigidly frames the way that we are able to talk about it.  Again, through 
considering the question of whether indigenous versions of colonial concepts can 
travel away from colonial modernity, we might consider, in a Derridean sense, 
whether Māori and indigenous versions of mental disease can travel away from the 
idea of the rational subject and the metaphysics of presence.   
 
The formidable machinery of those first principles, as Derrida would suggest, poses 
immense challenges for the Māori and indigenous thinker when seeking to 
influence and disrupt the dominant onto-epistemes within the mental health system.  
Within this context, a re-presentation of Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being within the mental health system will require looking at a deeper level of 
influence - one that rests beneath the surface of definitions and explanations of 
mental illness.  I would argue that it requires we look at the metaphysical and onto-
epistemic structure that forces Māori and indigenous understandings of Being into 
a re-presentation of the dominant order.  Further, I suggest that it is the reclaiming 
of metaphysical ground (a celebration of excessive and complex meaning) that 
offers a pathway to a more fundamental liberation and our own re-presentations.   
 
Māori and indigenous Being and the notion of mental illness 
Reclaiming metaphysical ground in which Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being can be liberated from strict expectations of ordered representation requires 
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that we first look at the ways in which Māori and indigenous knowledges are being 
applied and taken up within mental health.  It also provides an opportunity to 
consider the meaning of Māori terms commonly associated with the notion of 
mental illness and mental health within Aotearoa.  Examining these terms (and the 
wider context of Māori and indigenous knowledges) within mental health allows us 
to consider whether there is sufficient ground on which to base efforts to produce 
Māori and indigenous versions of the notion of mental illness. Conversely, it 
enables a reflection on whether Māori and indigenous metaphysics (as reflected in 
the terms included in this section) re-presents meaning that is difficult to fully grasp 
or contain within the common translations that are apparent in mental health policy 
and practice (i.e., where Māori terms are translated into dominant Western terms).  
The points made about Derrida’s concern with excessive meaning and the dominant 
Western attitude towards excess - as an individual as well as onto-epistemic 
restriction - are important to these considerations.  A vital question to ask is whether 
we can comfortably accept that Māori and indigenous understandings of Being 
share a sufficient metaphysical synergy with the dominant Western (onto-
epistemic) attitude to support a relationship of alignment?  Or, is it that the excesses 
of meaning apparent in Māori and indigenous metaphysics are re-structured to 
ensure that a certain order is not disrupted?   
 
A recent publication by Kingi et al. (2018), Maea te toi ora: Māori health 
transformations, provides an example of how Māori understandings of the notion 
of mental illness have been discussed and presented historically and in modern 
times.  In the introduction of Maea te toi ora, Te Kani Kingi outlines some of the 
important principles of what he calls ‘Māori mental health’.  As Kingi explains, 
there is a view supporting the idea that ‘abnormal states’ were recognised by Māori 
and that these abnormal states were explained using Māori cultural constructs.  
Kingi states that, “cultural frames were often used by Māori to explain issues that 
(in their mind at least) were clearly evidence of mental illness” (p. 4).  Kingi also 
states that, 
 
there are at least two broad conclusions that can be 
made about Māori mental health.  The first is that 
mental illness (as defined according to Western criteria) 
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is likely to have existed in Māori communities before 
European contact.  This conclusion is simply based on 
the notion that mental disorders have been known to 
occur within all cultures and … it is most unlikely that 
Māori alone could have developed the means, 
biological or otherwise, by which such conditions (now 
termed mental disorders) could have been avoided.  
Linguistic and literary evidence also suggests the 
existence of problems specifically related to the mind.  
Terms such as pōrangi, wairangi, poorewarewa, 
haurangi, and pooteetee are often used by Māori to 
describe individuals considered to be mad or out of their 
mind (pp. 2-3). 
 
I take Kingi’s description to mean there are cultural variations that must be 
considered when the experience or condition of mental disorder is viewed from 
within diverse worldviews.  Indeed, the idea of making conceptual space for Māori 
understandings of (states of) Being in order to expand our view beyond the common 
and dominant definitions of mental disorders is important.  However, utilising 
cultural constructs to suggest that these are evidence that Māori have always had an 
understanding of mental illness returns us to focus on the question of whether the 
metaphysics of the notion of mental illness and the concept of mind are compatible 
with Māori and indigenous explanations of these states of Being.  Looking at the 
terms that Kingi (2018) lists as descriptions used by Māori to describe, “individuals 
considered to be mad or out of their mind” (p.3), we find some clues about the 
metaphysics of these terms that might disrupt attempts to make any clear or simple 
connection between these terms and the notion of mental illness.  Using two of these 
terms, wairangi and pōrangi, as a focal point for analysis, I will first present some 
descriptions of each term that have been offered from within te ao Māori.  I will 
then discuss the implications of these descriptions in the context of making 
apparently straightforward associations between these terms and the notion of 




Wairangi has been described as a spiritual condition that is associated with wairua 
which is indicated by the term ‘wai’ (meaning water) that can be taken to mean the 
essence of life (Rau Kapa, personal communication, cited in Taitimu, 2007).  
Wairangi is also described by Naida Glavish (2018) as being connected with water 
which indicates a state of floating or “trying to reach the heavens” (or reaching for 
rangi or atua).  Glavish also describes the nature of wairangi and its association with 
the term wai as a potential source of healing.  Taitimu (2007) presents an 
understanding of wairangi within her doctoral research, linking wairangi with 
wairua.  As she reports, one participant stated that, “When wairua goes wandering 
that is wairangi” (p. 176).  Wairangi has also been explained semantically by 
Ngamaru Raerino as ‘wai’, meaning motion and ‘rangi’, meaning rhythm (personal 
communication cited in NcNeill, 2005).   
 
In relation to the term porangi, Glavish (2018) describes an intense darkness and a 
state of trying to reach for help.  McNeill (2005) recounts descriptions of porangi 
provided by Hohepa Kereopa and Ngamaru Raerino (2003), stating that, “Although 
Kereopa has a personal dislike for the term porangi he agreed with Raerino that in 
traditional conceptualisations porangi was associated with the darkness which 
Raerino translated to be the occult”, or the unknown (p. 153).  McNeill also 
highlights a description of porangi offered by a kaumatua who is quoted as saying, 
“Kaore e mohio ki nga rereketanga o te pō me te awatea (the inability to distinguish 
between night and day)” (p. 142).  Further, McNeill explains that Hohepa Kereopa 
would go on to speak about his admiration for this account of pōrangi because “in 
eclectic Māori style, it is charged with meaning” (p. 142).   
 
These descriptions of pōrangi and wairangi provide some important points of 
orientation from which to consider the potential for aligning Māori terms to the 
dominant Western concepts of mental illness or mental disease.  In summarising 
descriptions of wairangi and pōrangi, McNeill (2005) states that, “the connotations 
are similar in that they imply a spiritual aspect that causes imbalance” (p. 153).  The 
idea of a person experiencing a type of imbalance that affects behaviour is, 
therefore, implicated within Māori terminology.  Further, this general aspect of 
wairangi and pōrangi would seem to have some relationship with the idea of balance 
that is apparent in Plato and Aristotle’s philosophy of the mind where one of the 
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mind’s central functions is to achieve balance and eliminate what may have been 
seen as a chaotic excess (such as that linked to the notion of animality that Foucault, 
1965, points out as being a concern for those in the classical age who feared the 
excesses of unreason).  However, the excesses of unreason, within a dominant 
Western metaphysics, are located within the individual and are ones that can be 
contained and ordered by a mind that follows proper functioning.   
 
The imbalance that is implied by Māori terms such as wairangi and pōrangi is not 
centralised within an individual rational (or irrational) experience but is rather more 
expansive.  As Mika (2015c) points out, Māori metaphysics is not synonymous with 
ideas of individual perception and representation. Instead, here in the example 
provided through an exploration of the terms pōrangi and wairangi, we see that 
Māori metaphysics implicates elements such as darkness and water and 
communication with the unseen, particularly where these indicate a desire to reach 
for or connect with ātua.    
 
Again, the idea of historical complexities and how these complicate indigenous 
versions of colonial concepts come into play here.  Returning again to Derrida’s 
concern with the suppression of excessive meaning – the ordering of things in line 
with a logocentric preference for present and clear understanding – we begin to see 
how an excess of meaning (such as that implicated in descriptions of wairangi and 
pōrangi that gesture to the spiritual) may be rendered as problematic expressions.  
As I have already discussed, conceptualisations of mind (and the mind’s association 
with mental illness or mental disease) have specific ties to early Greek philosophy.  
Within this philosophy, ‘human nature’ can be explained in terms of an internal 
rational exercise of achieving balance, eliminating excess and seeing the world 
through objective reasoning.  It can also be applied to an onto-epistemic tradition 
that must make sense of things as discernible objects brought into line with a logical 
structure, eliminating ideas that gesture towards a type of spiritual excess and 
subsequent mysterious uncertainty.  When contrasting this dominant Western 
conceptualisation of mind (and the associated conceptualisation of mental illness) 
with Māori terms such as pōrangi and wairangi, can we be sure that the 
metaphysical premises of each of these allow for a shared space of meaning.  Or 
are Māori terms assigned places within a dominant Western metaphysics that 
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captures all meaning within the colonial rational structure, not permitting a re-turn 
home to the holistic, excessive meaning that is reflected in the various descriptions 
of pōrangi and wairangi that have been presented here? 
 
Importantly, Kingi (2018) goes on to refer to the work of Sachdev (1989) to 
highlight that, rather than viewing certain states of Being as an illness that is located 
in the mental faculties of an individual, Māori are more likely to understanding 
certain types of distress in terms of a “transgression of sanctity” (p.3).  This view 
of distress detracts from an understanding of an individual with a disordered, 
internal, and separated mind, appearing to instead support the idea of holistic 
entanglement that was discussed in chapter four.  What we see here, then, are two 
strikingly different metaphysical statements.  One is a holistic statement about a 
state of Being that implicates the entirety of experience (and the world), as the 
multifaceted site of the experience of dis-ease, while the other implicates the mind 
as something that is bound to the individual and the internal function of balancing 
excess to achieve harmony.     
 
Solidifying presence, eliminating Māori and indigenous excess: The mind as 
‘function’  
Having explored the metaphysical bases that underlie dominant Western 
understandings of the concept of (rational) mind against Māori terms that denote an 
expansive spiritual gesturing to things that reside within not only the person but the 
(holistic) world, I now turn to exploring another premise of dominant Western 
metaphysics. The mind as function is another premise associated with the 
metaphysics of presence I wish to discuss here as an element of a metaphysical 
inheritance that lays the ground for modern perspectives on the idea of mind, mental 
illness or mental disease.  This discussion is connected to a concern raised at the 
beginning of this chapter in relation to what I regard as being an ever-increasing 
move towards making things present and highly evident in the representation of 
mental illness.  This intensifying focus on things as present, measurable objects 
represents what I believe is the evolution of the metaphysics of presence within 
mental health.  This ‘evolution of representation’ has, I suggest, significant 
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implications for how Māori and indigenous understandings of Being are aligned 
with (and within) certain concepts in mental health.   
 
As I have already suggested, the historical and philosophical ideas of excess and 
function and modern views of the mind (Seeskin, 2008) have implications for how 
Māori and indigenous peoples interpret and explain the mind in our own models of 
mental health.  In particular, I posit that the historical, philosophical inheritance of 
the metaphysics of presence has implications for Māori and indigenous versions of 
the concept of mind as these relate to the notion of mental illness or mental disease.  
In line with this, a central question is whether the concept of mind has travelled 
away from the view of the mind as an element of the individual that performs a 
certain function, historically conceptualised as ordering, assessment and 
determination of well-being.  In other worlds - in relation to the most recent 
iterations of the concept of mind - has the concept of function that Plato and 
Aristotle described as the role of rationality and reason remained as a central 
premise and, if so, how does this manifest in how the mind is viewed today?   
 
When thinking about the degree to which dominant onto-epistemic traditions 
inform understandings about the concept of the mind, it is important to look at the 
available evidence and dominant definitions of the mind that indicate the 
parameters within which the mind or mental health can be conceptualised.  To 
reiterate a point made earlier in this thesis: there is no consensus on what mental 
illness actually is (Shorter, 1997).  However, in terms of dominant modern views 
of the mind in the context of its function, evidence suggests that function remains 
as a significant factor in how the mind is discussed.  Seeskin (2008), for example, 
states that while Plato and Aristotle may have viewed the mind in terms of moral 
function and how this connects to living ‘poorly’ or living well, today we retain 
these ideas through judging the function of an individual based on the idea of 
successful or unsuccessful performance.  Further, Seeskin explains that this 
performance is primarily evaluated using the principles and language of scientific 
legitimacy.   
 
Today, we are more likely to see the idea of function demonstrated in medical 
scientific language associated with cognitive functions (e.g., Etkin, Gyurak, and 
193 
 
O'Hara, R, 2013), or in mental ‘disorders’ that are described as a form of 
dysfunction (e.g., Wakefield, 2007).  The DSM-5, for example, defines a Mental 
Disorder as follows: 
 
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by 
clinically significant disturbance in an individual's 
cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects 
a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or 
developmental processes underlying mental 
functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
p. 20). 
 
Evidently, the language of function/dysfunction and order/disorder has been 
retained within the disciplines that practice and perpetuate the dominant epistemic 
viewpoints associated with the idea of mental illness and mental disorder.   
 
In many ways, the idea of dysfunction has been well challenged by those that argue 
that what informs the idea of function (and dysfunction) are often value statements 
rather than factual statements about how someone or something should function 
(e.g., Fulford, Broome, Stanghellini, Thornton, 2005).  In this sense, any arguments 
about whether the notion of function still influences how we talk about the mind or 
about mental processes are already well represented.  What I aim to highlight, 
however, are the different ways that people are approaching the question of how the 
mind functions and what this tells us about modern (metaphysical) 
conceptualisations of mind.  It is these conceptualisations and their metaphysical 
bases that, I argue, are what we should be wary of when considering Māori and 
indigenous versions of the concept of mind and, subsequently, when Māori and 
indigenous versions of the notion of mental illness are put forward into certain 
epistemic systems.    
 
It is important here to point out that there is a difference between what has been 
traditionally called a ‘functional brain disorder’, associated with psychiatry and 
‘structural brain disorders’ associated with neuroscience.  Thibaut (2018) argues 
that the line between the two has become far less distinct; nevertheless, there are 
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ongoing debates between those that would favour the view of the mind as a type of 
consciousness that cannot be reduced to a physical substance (Chalmers, 1996) and 
those that favour a physicalist view of the mind where, “states and processes of the 
mind are identical to states and processes of the brain” (Smart, 2017, para 1).  Smart 
(2017) points out that, “Idiomatically we do use ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She 
has a good brain’” (para, 1); however, it is important to consider what lies beneath 
our idiomatic expressions about the idea of the mind.   
 
The metaphysics of presence gains traction in seemingly the most innocent ways 
and exposing the basis of idiomatic expressions is particularly relevant within the 
context of what was discussed earlier in this thesis in terms of Blaser’s (2014) 
concern about taking indigenous ontologies seriously within different epistemic and 
social systems.   The question of whether Māori and indigenous versions of the 
concept of mind would escape the steadfastness of the ‘mind’s’ metaphysical roots 
is raised.  In other words, it raises the question of whether Māori and indigenous 
versions of the concept of mind and mental disease can be untethered from the non-
indigenous metaphysics that underpin the concept being translated.  
 
It is difficult to get a clear gauge on whether there are possibilities for indigenous 
versions of the concept of mind because there is such a rich discussion between 
(broadly) physicalist and non-physicalist camps. Both of these camps can be tied to 
the metaphysics of presence discussed in chapter five; the physicalist view 
demonstrating a reliance on solid, visible, physical objects (the brain), and the non-
physicalist view demonstrating adherence to the idea of a transcendent mind that is 
superior to the body (i.e., consciousness).  However, it is perhaps the non-
physicalist idea of consciousness as a non-material substance that appears to open 
metaphysical possibilities, aligning with Māori and indigenous spirituality. This 
more expansive, less determined sense of the mind shows promising signs of 
according with Māori and indigenous metaphysics; however, the concept of 
function may haunt these possibilities in very specific ways.   
 
It is perhaps this problem that Greenfeld (2013) had in mind when she stated that, 
today, the concept of mental health is seen through a “nearly exclusive biological 
focus” (para. 3).  Further, Graham (2010) explains that while there are ongoing 
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debates between those that advocate for the retention of the term mental or mind 
(non-physicalist consciousness), and those who think mental facts are essentially 
physical facts (physicalist/brain), it is evident that there is a strong metaphysical 
scepticism about the idea of the mind as consciousness because it is non-measurable 
and non-visible.  This departure from the idea of the mind as consciousness has also 
won considerable ground within the professional and epistemic systems that govern 
ideas about the mind and mental health.  As Graham explains, scepticism about the 
mind as consciousness is centred on the view that, “Minds as such are not real, 
strictly speaking. Brains are real, of course, but minds are not. Insofar as minds are 
not real…there are no mental disorders or illnesses of mind” (p. 75).  To illustrate 
the position that is taken within professional fields, Graham quotes the DSM (IV) 
which states that,  
 
Although this book is titled the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the term mental 
disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between 
‘mental’ and ‘physical’ disorders that is [an] . . . 
anachronism of mind/body dualism” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994: xxi). 
 
While this description of mental and physical disorders may be taken as a positive 
step away from mind/body dualism, it is important to understand the metaphysical 
statement that is being made within the DSM as it relates to the concept of mind.  
We might imagine that a rejection of mind/body dualism could open possibilities 
for a metaphysics in which the mind and body are collapsed and are seen as a 
holistic organism.  However, we may also understand the view that is presented 
within the DSM in line with how Graham (2010) describes physicalist metaphysical 
scepticism.  As Graham explains, the DSM represents an explanatory evolution in 
which “reference to the mentality of a mental disorder should be and hopefully will 
be (if this has not already occurred in certain cases) superseded or displaced by a 
brain-centred or physicalistic and non-mentalistic understanding of mental 
disorder” (p. 71).  According to Graham this metaphysical scepticism has 
implications for how the concept of mind explains the cause of things and it would 
appear that the concept of the mind - at least within the context of scientific 
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explanation - is failing to provide satisfactory and solid causal information.  It 
would seem, therefore, that the idea of function, formerly applied to the mind, has 
been retained but has taken a metaphysical detour to represent ever more visible 
and measurable functions such as those that are evidenced through the neural 
processes of the brain.   
 
If this is indeed the direction in which the notion of mind and the notion of mental 
health and mental illness are travelling, then this could have significant implications 
for Māori and indigenous versions of the concepts of mind, mental health and 
mental illness.  The metaphysical scepticism that Graham (2010) describes, which 
is suspect of the idea of a consciousness that cannot be explained in solid physical 
terms, would surely take exception to a Māori and indigenous metaphysics that 
posits an indefinable, indeterminate, spiritual and holistic state of Being.    
 
The growing focus on scientifically determined (and therefore legitimate) 
characteristics of the mind as the physical brain and its implications for Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being is particularly relevant within the medical field.  
As Pihama (2010) notes, medical discourse is more resistant to deconstruction and 
transformation.  Similarly, Green (2015) discusses the view of medical legitimacy 
(which would include language and discourse) in the context of Western medicine’s 
emergence out of the Western rationalist tradition that lays claims to objectivity 
through the idea of value-free scientific research.  This notion of scientific 
objectivity has been described as the possibility of extracting the true nature of a 
thing, and of providing a unified representation of a thing as object, despite the 
existence of varying perspectives.  Importantly, Reiss and Sprenger (2017) call this 
objectivity ‘absolute conception’ which produces the language of objective 
scientific research or ‘the language of absolute conception’ (para. 14).   
 
The framework of objectivity that supports the notion of absolute conception and 
its resistance to deconstruction and transformation is troubling when Māori and 
indigenous attempts to deconstruct notions of mental illness and mental health are 
considered. These terms become part of the lexicon of medical discourse that is 
seen as objective and, I suggest, are continuing to evolve into ever more present, 
visible, and quantifiable forms.  Further, I posit that the entrenchment of 
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(biological) quantification solidifies the idea of objectivity as the notion of mental 
illness continues to be re-constructed producing different iterations across time.  In 
this sense, the names for mental illness might change but the structure of 
objectification does not.   
 
It must of course be recognised that there are numerous contributions that Māori 
and indigenous thinkers have made in providing explanations of mental illness  that 
do not strictly adhere to clinical explanations (e.g. see Milne, 2005; Taitimu, 2007; 
Waitoki and Levy, 2016) or that avoid simply reproducing Western theory and 
ideology (Lock and Gordon, 1988).  However, I would argue that the epistemic 
structures governing the institutions that take up Māori and indigenous worldviews 
create a metaphysical impasse that is becoming more rigid as certain 
conceptualisations of mind and mental illness develop.  This impasse is 
demonstrated in a preference for the type of representation that would continue the 
work of eliminating excess meaning in ways that recall Derrida’s concerns related 
to the central characteristics of logocentrism.  Extending this to include a 
metaphysical viewpoint, what I am suggesting is that the metaphysics that prefers 
the representation of a thing as an object with discernible, visible qualities 
suppresses and limits how Māori and indigenous peoples can think (and feel) about 
the self, including the mind, mental health and well-being.    
 
Hinengaro 
To illustrate the implications of the apparent rational and logical parameters that 
influence the conceptualisation of mental health and mind (and that represent a 
potential suppression of different cultural understandings), I want to first explore a 
term that has been conceptualised as a Māori explanation of mind.  This term, 
Hinengaro, is often used as a translation of mind within mental health literature 
(e.g., Ministry of Health, 2017).   I will first present various descriptions of 
Hinengaro and will then discuss the implications of modern translations of 
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Hinengaro and how these relate to modern Western views and conceptualisations 
of mind, mental illness and mental health.   
 
Hinengaro is a term that is commonly referred to within health policy in Aotearoa 
as the aspect of Being that relates to mental health.  Discussed within a mental 
health policy framework, there is some indication that Hinengaro is broadly 
conceptualised and equated to the concept of mind or is associated with the idea of 
‘mental’ well-being.  Hinengaro is included within ‘te whare tapa whā’: a 
contemporary model of health that has been described as a Māori philosophy of 
well-being that includes four dimensions; taha wairua (spiritual), taha hinengaro 
(psychic), taha tinana (bodily) and, taha whānau (family) (Durie, 1994).  The 
Ministry of Health (2017) describes te whare tapa whā within the context of modern 
health services, noting that these services often lack recognition of the “spiritual 
dimension” (para. 4).  The Ministry states that, “In a traditional Māori approach, 
the inclusion of the wairua, the role of the whānau (family) and the balance of the 
hinengaro (mind) are as important as the physical manifestations of illness.” (para, 
4).  The Ministry goes on to equate Hinengaro with mental health describing the 
connection between mind and body or thoughts and emotions.16  Elsewhere, 
Hinengaro has been translated, when using the term Oranga Hinengaro, as “Māori 
mental health and addiction” (Ministry of Health, 2008, p. iii).   
 
Outside of health policy and frameworks, Hinengaro has been described as being 
associated with feminine energy or as an energy field that involves thoughts, 
feelings and emotions.  Ngaro has been described as things that are not visible to 
the human eye.  Wairua and Hinengaro are said to be in constant communication 
with each other and are experienced as embodied entities that hold an intelligence 
that, rather than being understood as an intelligence usually associated with the 
rational mind, is linked to ātua (Glavish, 2018).   
 
Raerino (1999) offers some helpful insight into the spiritual nature of intelligence 
in the context of mātauranga that Raerino describes as energy flowing between atua 
 





and tangata.  This expanded understanding of intellectualism as a spiritual 
movement has also been discussed in the method chapter of this thesis as an aspect 
of Hinengaro or ‘te hinengaro o te ngākau’ that T. Smith (2015) associates with 
thinking as an active and dynamic embodied intellectualism that does not occur in 
the brain (roro).  As Smith explains, “Early language references do not say that this 
activity [thinking] occurs in the brain (roro), which suggests that responses centred 
within the brain were perceived as fleeting and impulsive.  Therefore, most 
evidence indicates that…thought was centred within the ngākau and was a holistic 
process” (p.261).  Further, Salmond (1985) describes Hinengaro as the spleen 
“where thought, memory and emotions were originated” (p. 240).  Interestingly, the 
Rev Richard Taylor (Church of England Missionary, Whanganui), rather than 
directly translating Hinengaro as thought, would refer to thought as hihiri (Te Ao 
Hou, 1955) that Marsden (2003) would describe as the elemental energy coalescing 
around mauri.  Rev Taylor would instead represent Hinengaro within cosmology as 
‘consciousness’ that, within the process of creation, gives birth to desire (te 
manako).  
 
Already we see quite a marked difference between the descriptions of Hinengaro 
that are presented in health policy and those that are presented from outside of 
health systems and policy frameworks.  The cosmological and spiritual nature of 
Hinengaro reflected in the descriptions of it as a creative consciousness and the 
understanding of thought as a more than cognitive experience departs significantly 
from the simple translation of Hinengaro and thought as a mental state.  While, in 
the Ministry of Health (2017) description of Hinengaro, there is a reference to the 
indivisibility of the mind and body (and reference to the interconnected between 
body and soul), the allusion to mental states remains a prominent feature of the 
description.  An expanded view of the activity of thinking that moves thought 
beyond the individual’s cognitive biology to account for wider interconnections 
(including cosmological interconnections), while hinted at in the Ministry’s 
description, is, I argue, overshadowed by the prominence of the term mental and its 
association with the rational.  In other words, a reference to the inseparable 
connection between mind and body does not go far enough in ensuring that the 
description of Hinengaro within health policy would travel away from the 
metaphysical bases of the notion of mind.  Further, as discussed in relation to the 
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view of the mind in terms of its function, the connection between body and mind is 
also a prominent feature of modern dominant Western clinical perspective that 
solidifies the place of the physical body in explaining the experience of mental 
illness. 
 
The implications of the differences between institutional descriptions of Hinengaro 
and those that emerge from within te ao Māori are reflected in the concerns raised 
earlier in this chapter by Moewaka Barnes et al. (2017) and Aluli-Meyer (2006) 
who are wary of knowledge systems that must take up indigenous spirituality in a 
reductionist style.  This concern includes a consideration of mental health research, 
where states of Being are represented using limited explanations of emotions.  
Further, this tendency to reduce Māori and indigenous expressions in ways that 
bring order and that makes things ‘knowable’ has, in Moewaka Barnes’s (2008) 
experience, restricted what can be said, raising onto-epistemic expectations that 
things will be signified as intelligible entities.  
 
It could be argued that dominant Western notions of mind, and the translation of 
Māori terms such as Hinengaro that equate this term with the notion of mind, would 
not necessarily restrict the ways in which Māori can express Māori ontologies 
within mental health.  However, as Green (2015) points out, health policy (and the 
medical discourse that dominates health policy), is constructive.  A significant 
aspect of this construction is supported by what Green describes as the, 
“foregrounding (of) Western scientific research and back-grounding of Māori 
community research” (p.213).   In a metaphysical sense, the backgrounding of 
Māori community research may represent more than an epistemic imbalance but 
also implicates the spiritual bases of Māori onto-epistemes that extend beyond 
issues of gaining entry into knowledge systems.  As discussed in chapter four, there 
are “deeper cultural fissures” (Calderon, 2008, p.75) exposed that position 
metaphysics as the primary constructive element impacting on the indigenous self, 
reshaping relational Being to align with expectations of representing the world in 
ways that reflect the dominant logical and rational order (Grosfoguel, 2013).   
 
Objectification of the self within mental health has also been raised as an issue and 
has been directly linked to Western scientific research (and discourse) where Sadler 
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(2004) observes that many patients begin to think of themselves as “DSM jargon” 
(p.359), developing “self-identity in a diagnostic concept” (p. 358).  While this is a 
significant issue that highlights how those labelled as having a mental illness are 
discursively constructed, there is perhaps a more significant constructive element 
of the metaphysics that forms the basis of what we recognise as medical discourse, 
Western scientific research, and “the language of absolute conception” (Reiss and 
Sprenger, 2017, para. 14).  Turning again to Derrida’s (1978) radical de-
construction of the concept of madness that foregrounds logocentrism as 
constriction, I argue that it is the suppression and silence of excess, as meaning that 
spills out of and exceeds the logos, that is a fundamental metaphysical restriction 
placed on Māori understandings of Being (including Māori holistic and spiritual 
understandings of mind) that continues to re-construct Māori metaphysics as 
versions of dominant Western clinical, medical concepts.  Within this, I would 
argue that Hinengaro is stripped of profound cosmological beauty, instead co-opted 
and interned to a prior category or aspect of Being that dominant Western 
metaphysics conceptualises as the (physical, functional) mind.  Further, I would 
argue that the metaphysics of presence (manifest in modern versions of early 
Western philosophies of mind and retaining ideas of internal, individual 
functioning) is continuing to put in place ever more present, visible and measurable 
iterations of the concept of mind that travel further away from Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being.   
 
Considering Māori and indigenous understandings of Being in 
mental health: Expressing an excessive meaning  
The idea of excessive meaning - of things that cannot be contained within a 
scientific conceptual structure - is at the centre of my concern for how Māori and 
indigenous onto-epistemes can be taken seriously within mental health.  During the 
course of this research, two significant examples of Māori and indigenous models 
of mental health have caught my attention in considering Māori and indigenous 
onto-epistemes.  These examples provide insight into how Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being are contributing to approaches within mental health that 
are steeped in Māori and indigenous thinking.  They also support an analysis of how 
a scientific conceptual structure might suppress the excessive (spiritual) expression 
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of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being within mental health.  In addition, 
there is one interesting example of a new approach to working in the field of 
psychotherapy that I think demonstrates the potential for expanding beyond the 
view of finding meaning only in what we can conceptually grasp or visibly measure.  
Each of these examples will be presented here and will then be discussed to offer 
some concluding thoughts on the expression of excessive meaning within mental 
health. 
 
Manawanui gathering: Imagining the potential of ‘wairua healing’   
On the 9th of March 2018, the Waitematā and Auckland District Health Boards 
hosted key partners from a range of community and government organisations at 
Manawanui Oranga Hinengaro kaupapa Māori Mental Health site (Pt Chevalier, 
Auckland).  The key partners were invited to discuss what was viewed as a growing 
drug addiction crisis within Māori communities.  While it is recognised that Māori 
have for some time experienced disproportionate rates of addiction, the community 
felt that recent trends indicated an increase in the impact of addictions on Māori 
whānau and communities.   
 
It was clear from the discussions that there is a strong desire for Māori models of 
care (driven by tikanga Māori), to be utilised as a basis of addictions support as 
opposed to simply integrating Māori knowledge into clinical settings.  Māori 
understandings of how people are connected, both visibly (in social, cultural, and 
economic terms), and spiritually in terms of intangible aspects of well-being, were 
described throughout the hui as key elements of a Māori centred approach.  Wairua 
was discussed as a cornerstone of a Māori model of care and was described during 
the gathering as a pathway to re-claiming spiritual concepts.  A significant outcome 
of re-claiming spiritual concepts within the context of a Māori model of care would 
be a re-conceptualisation of addiction including moving away from seeing people 
as a (individual) problem.   
 
The idea of re-framing a view of those experiencing addictions centred on seeing 
people as rangatira, inherently connected to atua and whenua.   Rather than provide 
treatment for individuals, the person experiencing addiction and their whānau 
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would primarily be understood as being part of a whakapapa.  To illustrate the 
potential of focussing on whakapapa as a way of understanding healing, key 
partners discussed the idea of historical trauma which included a focus on ‘place’ 
or whenua. As one Māori psychologist attending the hui explained, there are sites 
of disruption caused by historically traumatic events that require healing rituals 
such as the spiritual clearing of whenua (whakawātea).  In this way, the proposed 
model of care would include a focus on recovery that seeks to address both the 
physical elements of addiction and the non-physical, intangible aspects of well-
being or what one community member called ‘wairua healing’. 
 
Māori and indigenous Trauma Informed Care 
Two major Māori led research projects in Aotearoa provide examples of the types 
of Māori knowledge that can be utilised to support the implementation of Māori 
approaches within mental health.   One of these projects (led by Associate Professor 
Leonie Pihama, Te Kotahi Research Institute, The University of Waikato), aims to 
develop Māori Trauma Informed Care approaches.  The other project (Led by Dr 
Cherryl Smith, Te Atawhai o te Ao, Whanganui), also aims to develop trauma 
healing strategies based on Māori and indigenous understandings of trauma, 
conceptualised as collective as opposed to individual experiences. As part of this 
work, Dr Eduardo Duran, a leading indigenous psychologist, visited the Taranaki 
Region in 2014 to educate communities about historical trauma.  Dr Duran 
described sites (whenua) of trauma within the United States of America, including 
places where massacres of indigenous communities have taken place.  Dr Duran 
explained that trauma from these massacres is passed down through generations 
and manifests in what is labelled from a clinical perspective as mental illness and 
addictions.  
 
Demons in the consulting room  
The phrase, demons in the consulting room, comes from the title of a book written 
by Harris, Kalb and Klebanoff (2017).  The book focuses on the potential that 
resides in the hidden and often unsaid stories carried by people who engage with 
therapists and particularly psychotherapists.  The authors use the term ‘demons’ 
204 
 
(and in other publications refer to ‘ghost’), intentionally as a way of locating their 
work in the liminal spaces that cut across the domains of clinical life and cultural 
thought.  In this way, they hope to avoid being pulled back into the strict parameters 
of clinical concepts and language, clearing the way for an opening of sorts: the 
authors are open to what they call the “present-absence and absent-presence” (p.3-
4) that emerges from people’s histories.   
 
Part of the focus of describing a project in which therapists work with demons – 
with ghosts and memories that haunt – includes supporting those that live with 
histories that have come before, in generations that precede the lived experience of 
the individuals who engage in therapy.  The ‘patients’ include the children of those 
who survived the Holocaust, and whose whakapapa bears the marks of slavery and 
other painful traumas.  The authors describe the experience of re-turning to these 
points in time: the re-enactment of what has (through a certain perspective on the 
temporal) been put neatly in the past through the concept of having been “laid to 
rest as ancestors” (Kalb, 2017, p.19).  What the authors imagine through their dance 
with demons and ghosts (as therapists who have felt the shared experience of 
haunting with their clients) is that there are things that  haunt our experience - ghosts 
that are “insistently undead” (Kalb, 2017, p.19), who continue to move around and 
within us.   
 
The experience of being affected by things that are not fully present in a temporal 
or physical sense, or in the sense of being solid thinkable and explainable ideas, is 
one that Harris, Kalb and Klebanoff (2017) feel is significantly important to the role 
of supporting people to reach a place of healing and well-being.  As they explain, 
while it may be difficult to work with ideas that are beyond conventional language 
and conceptualisation - too excessive to fit a conventional frame – striving to “put 
into narrative what is often beyond explaining in words” (p. 7), may serve to 
suppress important and complex expressions of Being and experience.  Recognising 
the movements of things that continue in our lives in their absent-present influence 
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makes room for the expression of an experience even if it cannot fit into the readily 
available concepts and terms constructed through clinical language.     
 
There is a theme that appears to run through each of the three examples that have 
been outlined here.  The theme relates to the idea of how we may be impacted by 
things unseen and how approaches to supporting people in mental health can be 
(un) structured in ways that are cognisant of their absent presence.  The connection 
between atua, tangata and whenua described at the Manawanui gathering speaks to 
an intangible presence and connection: the ‘thorough collapse’ (Mika, 2017) of 
things in the world such that they fully constitute each other.  The implications of 
this co-constitutive Being have been recognised by community members at 
Manawanui as the potential of the intangible and of thorough interconnection in our 
healing approaches.  This view of healing foregrounds the spiritual, not as a separate 
component, but as an indivisible condition of Being.  There is, in this view of the 
person as a completely interconnected part of the whole, the potential for departing 
from the perspective that it is the individual that is predominantly the ‘site’ of 
illness.   Instead, if there is distress (or what in conventional health systems is 
conceptualised as illness), then the genesis of that experience is multiple - holistic.   
 
A holistic view of distress or illness is also implicated in the example of treatment 
and healing through psychotherapy that recognises what haunts the person: the 
demons in the consulting room that are a person’s personal history or what a person 
is connected to.  The perception of people’s histories as real entities reflects an 
appeal to the mysterious influences that are not easily described through traditional 
clinical concepts in psychotherapy.   There is instead an attempt to open the 
possibilities of meaning: to push past epistemic boundaries to find meaning that 
expands beyond the concept.  There is a sense of an unsayable experience reflected 
in the idea of haunting: things that have profound effect even if we cannot name 
them.  In this understanding of the unsayable, I see reflections of Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics: things that cannot be fully explained, arriving and 
swimming in and out of view (e.g., Mika, 2017) of their own accord.   The example 
of Māori and indigenous trauma informed care also appeals to the idea that we are 
connected to things that are not fully present in the temporal sense of ‘here and 
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now’.  In line with this, a Māori and indigenous view of trauma informed care also 
points to an understanding of trauma as an experience that spans generations. 
 
Concluding thoughts: The unseen and its absent presence 
The dominant Western metaphysics that has been explored in this chapter, and the 
conventional understanding of certain experiences as an individual disorder, pose a 
challenge to the metaphysically complex ideas that are raised in Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics.  This challenge, I suggest, is demonstrated in the apparent 
divide between the way in which Māori terms are described from within either the 
Māori world or the clinical world or mental health system.  Within this chapter, the 
terms wairangi and pōrangi have been explored to consider whether their translation 
within a mental health context, as terms that denote a Māori view of mental disorder 
or mental illness, reflects an adequate presentation of the metaphysical complexity 
that each term carries.  Similarly, Hinengaro as atua has been discussed in contrast 
to the translation of Hinengaro as mental health or mind, foregrounding the 
profound, mysterious, cosmological Being of Hinengaro that cannot be 
conceptually contained.   
 
The structure that sits beneath the translation of Māori terms, and more broadly 
beneath all utterances, has been exposed in this chapter to highlight the challenge 
of resisting a dominant Western influence. Simply offering an alternative 
construction that would give different names for what fundamentally remains as a 
view of a person’s experience as mental disorder does little to dismantle the 
framework that supports the preference for a rational structure.  From the view of 
the person as a Being whose wellness depends on rational and ordered balance, to 
the insistence of representing all things in the world in the order of present, 
discernible, highly evident and knowable qualities, the underlying structure of 
rationalism remains.  Laying different terms over this structure, rather than escaping 
the expectation of putting things in a certain order, would, as Derrida argues, simply 
intern those terms to the dominant frame – reducing their meaning in a gesture of 
apprehension.  At risk is a freedom of expression that accounts for the indivisible 
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interconnection of person and world – the complex relational experience of Being 
that cannot be contained or easily explained.    
 
There is an excessive meaning within each of the terms that have been discussed in 
this chapter that speaks to the often unsayable and unthinkable nature of the world 
reflected in Māori and indigenous understandings of Being.  If, as Derrida (1978) 
suggests, the metaphysics of presence creates a type of madness – a view of 
excessive meaning that resists order and conceptual containment as representing a 
type of metaphysical dis-order – then Māori and indigenous expressions are at 
constant risk of being maintained, contained and restricted.  In order to fit the order, 
the excessive, mysterious and complex holism that Māori and indigenous Being is 
grounded in must be suppressed.  The (k)new expressions that are emerging from 
within Māori and indigenous projects in mental health (those that resist restriction 
and the expectation that meaning will be modified to fit a dominant onto-epistemic 
frame) offer possibilities for liberation from this limitation and restraint.  The 
excesses of Māori and indigenous onto-epistemes, of the potentiality that rests 
within spaces of uncertainty (the places where creativity can emerge from 
complexity) are like points of re-turn: the re-turn to holism as a different 




PROLOGUE TO CHAPTERS SEVEN AND EIGHT: 
ENGAGING WITH INTERVIEWS THROUGH 
WHAIWHAKAARO 
Chapters seven and eight present information from the participant interviews.  The 
purpose of chapters seven and eight is to raise the idea of ‘different possibilities’ 
that might dislodge the notion of mental illness from its place of prominence in 
explaining people’s experiences and behaviour.  Participants’ descriptions of Māori 
and indigenous worldviews foreground certain metaphysical premises, disrupting 
the idea of the self as a cognitive agent and the world as a mechanical object.   
Already in the preceding chapters, the philosophical settings that ground this thesis 
have been presented as a way of raising possibilities of the more excessive, more 
complex and sometimes unexplainable effects that things have on the person (and 
the world).   
 
Within the following two chapters, I aim to present ideas that carry excessive and 
complex meaning.  This is demonstrated in chapters seven and eight in two ways; 
firstly, the participants’ insights into the complex nature of the world provide an 
expanded view that re-presents Māori and indigenous understandings of Being.  
While there are some direct references to mental health, for the most part, the 
participants have not presented their views as direct commentaries about Māori and 
indigenous views of mental health or of the notion of mental illness.  Rather, 
participant responses are largely grounded in Māori and indigenous metaphysics 
and focussed on discussing Māori and indigenous views about Being in the world.  
Secondly, the ‘story’ I present in this chapter is shaped by my personal (yet 
holistically worlded) 17 reaction to the participants’ responses rather than being 
presented as findings that identify truths about Māori and indigenous views on 
mental illness.   
 
Chapters seven and eight present information from the interviews conducted as part 
of this research.  In more conventional research, the presentation of interviews 
 
      17 The reader is asked to refer again to chapters two and three for an explanation of worldedness. 
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might be conceptualised as research ‘findings’ or the main points drawn from 
interview data that align with the research question.  However, as discussed in 
chapter three, the way in which I aim to engage with the material emerging from 
the interviews reflects an intentional departure from conventional ideas of analysis 
and method.  This departure from convention was discussed in chapter three as a 
move to resist objectivity and the presentation of interviews in terms of the 
generalisable – the idea that I might land on some essential and universal meaning.  
In this sense, how I engage with the interviews is different from a conventional 
approach where participant responses are codified into patterns of repetition, 
equating what is real with what is prominent.  Instead, I will engage in what has so 
far been described as ‘whaiwhakaaro’: a complex embodied process of reflection 
that allows the researcher to present a deeply personal response to what has been 
shared by the research participants.  Whaiwhakaaro is, therefore, intended as a 
highly subjective holistic research approach that implicates something more than 
the researcher’s self-contained (cognitive) thinking.   
 
Whaiwhakaaro will be used as an approach that allows for the presentation of highly 
personal reactions to ‘utterances’ that have had an impact on me as a researcher.  
Within this chapter, these utterances are presented as terms and sentences within 
the participants’ quotes that have been highlighted in bold to help the reader identify 
what has pushed my thinking.  These highlighted terms and sentences are then 
discussed in text boxes that are presented directly beneath each relevant quote.  
Each term and sentence highlighted within a quote represents a (personal) impact 
that was felt from the play of the words, the intonation of voice or a sense of a 
‘message’ emerging.   
 
It is important to note that not all quotes include highlighted terms or ideas.  
However, where quotes have been included without highlighted terms or sentences, 
they nevertheless provide rich context, adding another layer of meaning to the 
overall story emerging from participant responses.   
 
The idea of ‘co-creation’ within writing and research has been discussed as 
something that implicates the relational self where the researcher, rather than being 
a central creator of description and meaning, is wholly and holistically ‘caught up’ 
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in and with the world.  This experience of being ‘caught up’ has been related to a 
Māori understanding of things in the world as whanaunga rather than objects of 
study.  Co-creation in this sense is ‘whakapapa’ and the understanding that what is 
written, what is thought, attended to and taken up in reflection is not simply an 
individual cognitive processing of external data.  It is, instead, an expression of 
relationship – the impetus to write, think and reflect, fully influenced by an 
indivisible state of Being in dynamic relationship with things in the world.  It is in 
the context of this indivisibility of Being and the influence that the self’s 
relationship with the world has on writing and reflection that I understand my own 
experience of engaging, not just with what participants in this research have shared, 
but with other things that have emerged throughout the research process.  
 
This approach to engaging with the interview responses reflects the metaphysical 
ground that whaiwhakaaro and the idea of co-creation emerges from.  But it is not 
simply an opportunity for me as the researcher to engage with ‘whakapapa’ as a 
pathway to presenting a type of intuitive response.18  As Mika and Southey (2016) 
explain,  
 
Any user of the whakaaro method will…undoubtedly 
acknowledge its limitations for orthodoxy, which are 
simultaneously its benefits: that it is unpredictable; that 
it is non-foundational; that it results in unprovable 
work; and that it itself could provide fuel for another 
researcher’s creative thinking (p.8).  
 
I want the reader to bear this in mind when going through each of the chapters.  The 
material presented in this chapter may provide an impetus for your own thinking, 
reflecting your own experience of being called to attend to things – the invitation 




      18 See chapter two for an example of how whakapapa is discussed as the co-creation of writing and 
other aspects of work. 
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Content of chapters seven and eight 
Each of the chapters is split into two conversation areas that organise participant 
responses into particular principles of Being.  It is intended that each conversation 
area will illustrate the ways in which Māori and indigenous worldviews implicate 
the influence of things in the world, representing a departure from a human-centred 
view of Being.  This departure lays the ground for understanding how the notion of 
mental illness can be re-imagined from Māori and indigenous perspectives.  Each 
of the chapters, therefore, draws out and elaborates on particular metaphysical 
premises that have emerged from participant responses.   
 
Chapter seven focuses on the idea of the more-than-human nature of Being in order 
to highlight how the world and self are fully caught up in a relational 
interconnection.  The idea of the more-than-human nature of Being is reflected in 
the conversation areas of whakapapa and wairua.  In chapter eight, the human self 
is made more explicit: the notion of mental illness as it apparently impacts the 
human is addressed more directly through a focus on Māori and indigenous 
knowledges (the onto-epistemic bases of Māori and indigenous metaphysics) and 
on expanding an understanding of well-being.  An exploration of Māori and 
indigenous knowledges and of Māori and indigenous understandings of well-being 
is reflected in the conversation areas of mātauranga and Hinengaro (see chapters 
for further explanation of content). 
 
While there is a type of thematic structure that has been applied to the participant 
interviews (and my response to the interviews) this structure does not imply that the 
themes or groupings represent the identification of essential variables.  Instead I 
would liken the structure presented in each chapter to the approach used by McNeill 
(2005) who, in presenting findings from her research, conceptualises the 
presentation of interviews as broad conversation areas.  McNeill talks about the 
intention to present an “unobtrusive reporting style” (p.139) emphasising the 
significance of participants’ ideas, emerging not simply from repeated messages 
that are common across interviews but also from single utterances of individual 
participants.  As McNeill states, “What [participants] actually said, was as 
significant to the study as [participant] agreement on specific topics” (p.142). 
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Within this context, the expression of an idea or viewpoint by one single participant 
could be just as significant as a consensus about an idea or viewpoint.   
 
Going forward, the ideas that have emerged from chapters seven and eight have 
been used to inform the development of chapter nine.  Chapter nine takes the place 
of a conventional discussion section, instead offering a creative speculation on the 
possibilities that arise from Māori and indigenous metaphysics in re-imagining the 
notion of mental illness.  This act of re-imagining through creative speculation is 
guided by what participants have shared (including their own acts of re-imagining 
the notion of mental illness and well-being).  It is, however, also strongly guided 
by the influence of things that push thinking, disrupting certainty and pre-
determined meaning in order to encourage creativity.  Together, these three chapters 
(seven, eight, and nine), foreground Māori and indigenous understandings of Being 
as a basis for considering holism as a metaphysical premise that disrupts 




CHAPTER SEVEN: INDIVISIBLE BEING - THE 
THOROUGH INTERCONNECTION OF SELF AND 
WORLD  
The metaphysical premise reflected in chapter seven relates to the idea of a 
thorough, holistic interconnection between all things in the world.  Participants’ 
responses demonstrate a view of Being that implicates the self as a relational Being 
and of connection to ‘place’ in a more than physical sense.  There appears to be a 
normalising of the experience of spiritual connection that implicates an intangible 
influence on the self through an indivisible connection to all things.  In my 
reflections, this intangible influence indicates more than the self’s connection to 
external things, also signalling that there is an integral co-construction of self and 
world at play. As mentioned in the prologue to chapters seven and eight, the current 
chapter is separated into two conversation areas.  Each of these conversation areas 





Whakapapa concerns the lived experience of holistic interconnection.  Participant 
responses related to whakapapa included a focus on being connected to whenua 
(physically and spiritually) and being connected to unseen influences (sometimes 
described as entities). These relational influences not only disrupt the idea of 
individualism but also disrupt other ideas that impact on how the entities that we 
are connected to are conceptualised from a dominant Western perspective.   For 
example, participants discussed the conceptualisation of Hine-nui-te-pō as a type 
of ‘grim reaper’ character, relating this view to the West’s tendency to conceive of 
life and death as a separation – an ending that solidifies the self’s state of 
disconnection or a final departure.  In general, the dominant Western metaphysical 
orientation of separation was contrasted with Māori and indigenous holistic 
interconnection to foreground the understanding of the self (and all things) as 
thoroughly enmeshed.  This view of Being sits in sharp contrast to an understanding 
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of the self as an isolated part of the whole or (at best), a single Being that is only 
loosely connected to other things.  
 
Wairua 
Wairua relates to the idea of the intangible, an ever-present (absent) influence 
reflected in Māori and indigenous metaphysics.  Participants’ responses indicated 
an awareness of something other than the physical forms that are visually, 
physically, materially and immediately available to our perception.  The intangible 
was also discussed as something that moves in and out of view, showing up in 
feelings or bodily sensations: the impulse to think of different things or share 
‘messages’ with people but not for easily discernible reasons.  This sense of an 
intangible influence was something that participants viewed as a normal aspect of 




The holistic connection of all things 
One of the participants described a Māori worldview as the understanding that all 
life has come from the earth which accounts for relational Being and the 
interconnection of all things.  The participant explained that a holistic view of Being 
also shapes thinking about relationships between human beings and other forms of 
life including shaping thoughts about hierarchies of Being and equality of Being:  
 
when I’m talking about an indigenous worldview... the 
idea that first of all we burst from the earth.  This is the 
critical, this is the foundational idea of all indigenous 
worldviews that all life is born from the earth and 
because all life is born from the earth we are therefore 
all kin with one another...it leads to certain ways of 
thinking about how we interact with all life around us.  
Chief amongst them is the idea that we are not superior 
to the natural world, but we are inherent and a part of 
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the natural life...doing something at one part of the 
fabric of life has effects in the other part of the fabric of 
life.   
 
Another participant talked about traditional Māori worldviews in the context of 
modern influences and the impacts that colonisation has had on perceptions of being 
in relationship with the world including relationships held with entities that make 
up the world.  The participant emphasised that Beings, including Ranginui and 
Papatūānuku, are real entities that are a part of whakapapa.  In this context, the 
participant extended the meaning of whakapapa to include more than human 
genealogical relationships.  The participant emphasised the place of entities in our 
everyday lives as part of a lived whakapapa.  This view of entities as a lived 
whakapapa was supported by a comment from another participant who emphasised 
that Māori identity is ‘episodic’ and relates to material experiences:   
 
I think as contemporary Māori we’re looking at 
whakapapa and trying to understand what that means, 
given that it’s been colonised by the notion of 
genealogical connections and that it’s somehow lineal 
back into the past ... I’m attempting to decolonise my 
understanding of whakapapa.  How I see it is that it is 
more kind of the natural existence and that it is 
Ranginui and Papatūānuku are very much real Beings 
and we’re descended from those Beings, that there is 
really no separation for us….Whakapapa is 
experiential in this sense but also, it’s central to our 
understanding of how the world exists. 
 
When talking of Ranginui and Papatūānuku as real entities, the participant 
attempted to approximate the state of Being that an entitized understanding of 
Ranginui and Papatūānuku represents.  The term energy was used to attempt to 
articulate this state of Being; however, the participant pointed out that there are a 




The nearest word I would get would be energy, that 
there are energies that exist.  In English, that’s how I 
would see it.   And I think when we talk mauri, when we 
talk ihi, wehi there’s so many words within which the 
notion of energies and the transmission of the present 
and a moving dynamic nature of those energies exist.  
And they are kind of so vast that they kind of wear out I 
guess - merge with much bigger Beings and with other 
Beings and other energies.   
 
The state of Being that the participant associated with the term energy was also 
related to other living Beings including plant life.  The participant described how a 
Māori worldview would include understanding that all Beings can communicate 
and share knowledge: 
 
I do believe that energies, plants, have their own 
knowledges and when we interact with those plants, if 
we’re lucky we can share in that knowledge, they can 
reveal knowledge to us, we can ask knowledge of them, 
they can share that back with us and so forth. 
 
 
Believe: The term believe can be contrasted with ‘to know’ and raises 
interesting possibilities about Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being.  To ‘know’ something suggests that there is certain knowledge of a 
thing that in this thesis has been directly linked to having knowledge of a 
thing’s essential qualities (that can be determined through types of 
measurement).  In contrast ‘believe’ suggests a type of faith that something 
exists even though there may be no way of measuring the thing.  This is 
important when considering how Māori and indigenous metaphysics raises 
the possibilities of things that we cannot see or the ‘unseen’.  There appears 
to be a type of faith at play (rather than knowledge), when things (such as 
‘energy’), are discussed.  In terms of mental health, I wonder how these two 
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seemingly dissonant views impact on a person who describes their 
experience in the language of ‘belief’ rather than the language of medical 
conceptualisation?   
 
Knowledge: I interpret the description of plants having knowledge as 
something that disrupts the idea that knowledge is human centred rather than 
supporting the concept of knowledge as the cataloguing of essential qualities.    
 
 
The participant spoke about the outcome of the long running legal battle undertaken 
by Whanganui iwi that resulted in a decision to grant the Whanganui river legal 
rights or rights of personhood.  In talking about the personhood of the river, the 
participant described how communicating with the river (and other living Beings), 
forms part of being present in the world.  The participant related this view of being 
present to being grounded in our bodies in contrast to dominant Western 
perspectives that she viewed as dissociative and that encourage disconnection: 
 
we’ve got that example in Whanganui where the river’s 
been recognised now as a tūpuna, as a living ancestor. 
But that’s always been the way. As you walk past the 
river you talk to the river, you mihi to the river. It’s the 
norm for us, really... I know looking at the way my 
grandmother operated, she was always very present. 
Very present in her body, very grounded in her body.  
The state of Being in the West is very much about, I 
think, disassociating ourselves from our bodies... Which 
is constantly pulling at us to, I think, disassociate. And 
so again it comes to my mind a decolonising process to 
remain in our bodies, to remain connected to all of the 
energies that are around us, to remain connected to our 





Living ancestor: The term ‘living ancestor’ (while used here in a positive 
sense to acknowledge the river as an ancestor), pushes me to think of how 
there is a tendency within dominant Western metaphysics to draw a hard line 
between ‘living’ and ‘dead’.  I interpret this as a rigid separation between 
what is here or present (living) and what is not here or is absent (dead).  This 
would appear to have implications for tāngata whaiora who describe 
experiences of having contact with people who have passed away or with 
things that are perceived as being absent (again – the unseen).  It does not 
seem possible, within a framework that relies on the presence of things, for 
these experiences to be ‘real’.   
 
Grounded: The term grounded pushes me to think about how metaphysics 
constructs the self as either a Being that is immersed within the world or an 
individual who is separated from the world, taking on a detached stance as 
an observer.  These different metaphysical orientations have implications for 
Māori and indigenous researchers who are often, I believe, forced to detach 
from things in the world in order to follow the rules of academic research.  
The holistic nature of Being in which all things in the world are connected 
would, of course, prevent any real spiritual detachment from taking place, 
but the treatment of things as objects that stand apart from the self is, 
nevertheless, harmful (Justice, 2016).  Viewing the self as a connected Being 
and representing things speculatively as holistic and therefore not fully 
knowable things, is the experience of Being within the research.  
 
 
Another participant linked Māori understandings of Being to the idea of ethics and 
ensuring that the integrity of tikanga Māori is upheld.  Maintaining integrity was 
discussed in the context of relational Being and connections with the wider 
environment and how understanding connectedness ensured the protection of each 
Being.  This included understanding mauri, wairua and the role of karakia in 
maintaining connections between things in the world: 
 
For me I think about ethics a lot…This is my kind of 
thinking and kōrero around why we need to have a real 
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wānanga about ethics. Because all the things that we do 
and all the things that we kind of take for granted about 
tikanga Māori is about us maintaining the integrity of 
our being human in this environment. Karakia is one of 
the ways that links us all up together, but then because 
of our understanding of mauri and then our 
understanding of wairua, we put in place a lot of things 
that are actually about protecting the Being.  
 
 
We put in place a lot of things that are actually about protecting the Being: 
The term ‘we’, used here to refer to those that put in place things that will 
protect the Being can be understood as people who engage in things, creating 
something that protects that Being.  In a worlded, holistic sense of Being, 
however, the term’ we’ would refer to all things engaging at once to create 
what is referred to here as protection or what could also be referred to as 
energy (see following quote below). 
 
 
One of the participants talked about their connection to ngahere and how this 
connection related to their well-being.  The participant has created a ngahere as part 
of her home which she experiences as being more than a ‘garden’ in a backyard and 
that provides energy and a lived experience of knowledge that she described as 
being located in the world as opposed to being located in the mind (or head): 
 
Sometimes when I’m really down in every way, I go 
there and hold my tree, my kauri. It’s right underneath 
by my studio and I can sit there, stand there and hold 
and just get the energy back. Those sorts of things, it’s 
about a lived experience of living with it because 
knowledge in your head is dead. It’s dead to the world, 
it’s only in your head, unless you apply it in your lived 




Energy: Referring to energy in this way appears to offer an understanding of 
relationship which contrasts with the idea of knowledge.  When the 
participant talks about getting their energy back, there is no intention to 
analyse the environment in order to gain knowledge of it as a way of 
experiencing or extracting something from the environment, and in this case 
- well-being.  How might a more transactional relationship, based on 
extracting knowledge from the environment, impact on the type of well-
being that is experienced?   Knowledge, within a dominant metaphysics, 
requires that we stand apart from things in order for them to be ‘known’, 
demanding that a type of separation occurs.  In the context of Māori and 
indigenous views on ‘attunement’ (see chapter four), what are the 
implications of an essential separation of self and world? In a mental health 
setting, I imagine that there are types of transactional relationships that occur, 
particularly between a professional who must extract information from a 
person in order for a person’s ‘dis-order’ to be known (based on the qualities 
of dis-order that are available to be assigned to the person in the form of pre-
determined behavioural traits).  The person labelled as experiencing mental 
illness may also be expected to identify their experience in ways that fit with 
the language of pre-determined and well-defined behavioural traits, thereby 
separating themselves from the experience in order to place the experience 
into a certain clinical framework.   
 
Lived experience: The idea of lived experience is important in Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics and I have written about this (for example) in 
chapter four when describing the idea of orientation or the experience of 
Being as our (embodied) interpretations of experience, sensations, and the 
networks we are immersed in as part of a process of becoming.  However, a 
strict reliance on the experience of things in order for things to be ‘real’ 
things is a reliance on the absolute presence of things which is not a 
prerequisite of ‘real Being’ within Māori and indigenous metaphysics.  
Deloria (2001) also talks about experiential existence explaining that our 
experience of the world and our sensory engagement is the ground from 
which our reflection and understanding of relational Being emerges.  
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Experiential existence allows for the movement of existence rather than the 
static representation of existence through grasping or conceptualising.  The 
phenomenon of experience mentioned by the participant captures my regard 
within the entirety of the participants’ revelations about whakapapa. 
Whakapapa as experiential existence extends the meaning of connection 
beyond human genealogy to include a complete holistic connection to the 
world as entity or whanaunga (see chapter four).  This is contrasted with the 
Platonic view that marginalises the sensory, lived experience and indeed the 
(false) physical world itself.  Through Platonic philosophy, the corporeal 
world has become a corrupt, lesser, solely material phenomenon to hold at a 
distance (e.g., Arola, 2007).  This links to the separation that participants 
discuss and to the idea of the concept of mind (also connected to Cartesian 
philosophy) as a marker of that separation through the cognitive uptake of 
the world.  The cognitive uptake of the world may also be connected to the 
marginalisation of the sensory, casting the body as a corrupt tool.  This view 
of the body as lesser ‘tool’ sits in contrast to a Māori and indigenous view of 
the body as a part of a wider organism, as being attuned to a wider organism 
(or out of tune e.g., Vanessa de Oliveira, 2018).   
 
 
Knowledge of the other world 
One of the participants discussed the concept of connection and the spiritual ties 
that continue to connect people, not only in the living world but also once people 
have passed away.  In recounting a conversation that they had with their son, the 
participant talked about their desire to teach their son about “knowledge of the other 
world” or a Māori worldview about the continuation of relationships after death.  
The participant spoke about being able to soothe her son’s anxieties about death 
and dying and referred to Māori traditions, such as pūrākau, that can be used as 
tools for teaching loved ones about Māori views of death and relationship:  
 
you know kids when they’re at that developmental age 
and you don’t want their parents to die... that’s when 
they kind of fixate and get anxious about it and lose 
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sleep over it and start dreaming about it.  One of the 
things I used to talk to him about was... myths, our old 
traditions, our pūrākau because I wanted him to grow 
up with this knowledge of the other world, a Māori 
world view is not like one god.  Because that’s so 
destructive.  The space Hine-nui-te-po has created... I 
wanted him to know that when we die, it’s just as 
heaven, the heaven equivalent, that there’s a space on 
the other side and we’ll be there.  I don’t know, he might 
have been about three or four, and he said when you die 
and then when I die, how will I know where to find you.  
And I said I’ll build a house right next to the door, so 
when you come through, I’ll be right there…I said when 
you come, you just got to call out and I’ll know it’s you.  
That’s a Māori world view for me that he can take and 
know, and it’s going to mediate his fears and his 
worries.  One of life’s biggest kind of fears is death, 
and loss and losing your loved one.  I want him to live 
knowing that it’s going to happen but when it does 
there’s actually a space and a place for us.   
 
 
Our old traditions: Rather than this being a reference to something past that 
is being revisited in teachings, I interpret the participant’s response as a type 
of re-turn to things that are always with us like voices that are always guiding 
us through the world.  Within a dominant Western metaphysics, the things 
that the participant is teaching her son may be seen as ‘old’ in a negative 
sense (things that are in the distant past), but from within a Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics they are ‘here now’.  There is a sense of times 
collapse in this view of traditions that are never distant and that endure in the 
sense of never being absent.  In fact, a mother that is teaching her son about 
these ‘traditions’ is, I think, a demonstration that these things are always 
here, manifesting in a mother’s words to her son.   
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The heaven equivalent: The idea of ‘the heaven equivalent’ potentially 
raises issues about the separation of different spaces (i.e., the world is 
separate from heaven) within Christian thought.  For example, Arola (2007) 
explains how Christianity’s idea of heaven is associated with Plato’s theory 
of Forms in which the real world (or real objects), resides in another space, 
away from the physical world that we inhabit.   The idea of separation seems 
to echo across the different aspects of dominant Western metaphysics and 
seems at odds with Māori and indigenous holism in which all things are here 
in a kind of collapsed space or what was referred to in chapter four as the 
‘cosmoscape’ (Roberts, 2013).  
 
One of life’s biggest kind of fears is death, and loss and losing your loved 
one: I would agree, but there may be a different kind of fear set up by 
dominant Western metaphysics that is fundamentally about escaping the 
clutches of time.  This fear of something bigger than the self is perhaps 
reflected in the metaphysics of presence and particularly where it has been 
described as the quest to resist the flux of temporal change (Garrison, 1999).   
Death’s relationship with temporal change would seem to automatically 
repel those who live in a world that is invested (by way of a certain 
metaphysical inheritance), in keeping things intact – the soothing solidity of 
the perpetual thing (or essential thing) that does not fade away or threaten us 
with a nature  that is not fully knowable.   
 
 
Another participant addressed the sense of anxiety that the participant above has 
associated with views of death by describing how Māori views of death, dying and 
transition contrast with a fearful view of death that they felt stemmed from the 
Wests fear of the unknown: 
 
The West tends to fear pain, the unknown, the 
darkness etc and tries to seek youth and longevity. The 
birthing and the dying is hidden away and 
medicalised. When it is in the home, which is what I 
remember as a child, you learn about the process of 
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birthing and dying as natural life transitions. Death and 
birth are realities that change your experience and 
perception of the world.  
 
The obsession with “I" is enhanced through the removal 
of life transitions, because when we acknowledge 
transitions, we have to reflect on the ways that we are 
part of a collective moving through life and towards 
death. Those transitions include rites of passage from 
one phase of life to another which indigenous peoples 
have rituals for, to honour and acknowledge the spirit 
of change, shedding a skin.   Externalising our 
movement towards death means that the spirit of death 
is not an enemy. 
 
 
The West tends to fear pain, the unknown, the darkness etc and tries to 
seek youth and longevity. The birthing and the dying is hidden away and 
medicalised: The medicalisation of mental illness (or clinical classification), 
would seem like a kind of death – a death of movement, of complexity, of 
faith (when faith is interpreted as a belief in things that remain unseen or 
cannot be measured/proven).  Paradoxically the participant is pointing to a 
type of ‘flight’ from death and transition that would mirror the desire to 
depart from the apparent influence of temporality and change reflected in the 
metaphysics of presence (e.g., see Söderbäck, 2013, and classical ontology’s 
task of making things immune to time).    
 
 
Another participant discussed the misinterpretation of Māori entities (or deities) 
that, through misinterpretation (or reinterpretation), have come to be associated 
with non-Māori views of death:  
 
There are the well-known historical barriers where 
they’ve created their interpretations of our histories 
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and our literature and have come out with spurious 
interpretations of things. My favourite one is the 
misinterpretation or the misalignment of Hine-nui-te-pō 
as some kind of grim reaper.  You see that occasionally 
in various interpretations and sadly some Māori have 
taken that on as well, that Hine-nui-te-pō could almost 
be some grim character.  
 
 
Hine-nui-te-pō could almost be some grim character: The characterisation 
of Hine-nui-te-pō as a type of ‘grim reaper’ appears to mirror a Western 
interpretation of death as a negative finality.  This association re-shapes not 
only our thinking about Hine-nui-te-pō but also suppresses the excessive and 
profound in order to bring Hine-nui-te-pō into line with the notion of death.  
The notion of limited meaning reflected through a certain view of death is 
symbolic of a metaphysics that seeks to escape (the temporal movement of) 
change and uncertainty.  I speculate that this may have repercussions within 
a mental health context when we think of how experience is limited by 
clinical concepts.  These concepts represent a particular manifestation of the 
finality that dominant Western metaphysics has preferred since the time of 
Plato and Aristotle – the same finality that renders Hine-nui-te-pō as a limited 
entity and a representative of death.  In contrast, from a Māori perspective, 
Hine-nui-te-pō has been described as a protector, nurturer (e.g., T. Smith, 
2015) and a guardian that embraces the spirit moving towards its “next 
spiritual quest” (Nikora, Te Awekotuku and Tamanui, 2015, p. 230).  I would 
suggest that we are often rendered in line with the same limited framework 
of Being that mirrors a dominant Western preference for limitation (fitting 
things into limited categories of Being), but that within mental health, this 
rendering is a strict suppression of excess and of the possibilities of engaging 
in a creative response to one’s (holistic) circumstance.    In a Foucauldian 
sense, death and ‘madness’ have a special relationship, embedded in the 
Renaissance period, and the fear of death that manifests in the imaginary of 
“death of the mind” (Barchilon, 1998, p.vi).  Madness, as the free flow of 
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things and the abyss of the unintelligible, must be contained, which is, I 
suggest, still reflected in the concept of clinical diagnosis that we see as a 
predominant feature of mental health treatment today.   
 
 
Reconnecting and healing  
One of the participants talked about individualism as an unhealthy perspective on a 
state of Being.  They described how relationships between people create Being, 
calling each other into existence.  The act of calling others into Being was related 
to wider Māori understandings of the process of creation that the participant said 
gives meaning to her lived experience, describing how “it textures my daily life and 
engagement with people around me” 
 
I cannot be without other people.  Other people make 
my Being and they call me into existence.  So, to try and 
understand me as an individual not only ignores but it 
actually invalidates my existence, and my being in 
relationship, and being called into relationship and 
therefore into an existence.  So, you get the whole thing 
from Te Kore, Te Pō all the way through to Te Ao-
mārama, which really is a process of being called into 
existence, and into the world of be-ing.  So, again, it 
comes back to the whole process of let’s chop it up to 
better understand it, and I found that to be quite a 
fruitless exercise.  It’s easier to actually try and 
understand and give meaning to people, and their Being 
by understanding their life world. 
 
 
Other people: I like the appeal to interconnection that is reflected in the 
participant’s words, that “other people make my Being and call me into 
existence”.  The extension of this thinking would implicate the ‘more than 
human’ calling that makes our Being through a more thorough holism, 
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disrupting the idea of human centred Being.  McIntosh (2012) describes the 
disruption of human centred Being by also using the idea of ‘calling’, 
referring to “a radical re-grounding of humanity (that) must therefore call 
back Being, the soul, if it is to find harmony with ecology in its full cosmic 
depth – with the rta”(Sanskrit word for cosmic order, p. 61). 
 
In a mental health context, this more thorough holism raises questions about 
what is impacting on the person, or what is ‘calling’ to the person.  This view 
of a holistic (and intangible) impact on the person, by things that call for 
attention has, for example, been raised as a possibility by Harris et al. (2017) 
who describe the call as ‘echoes’ (p.9).   
 
Understand: the term understand would appear to signal that something is 
beneath or is positioned under a thing (perhaps an epistemic ground of 
understanding, for example); however, the etymology of the term understand 
shows that its original meaning is ‘between’ or ‘among’ - literally, to ‘stand 
among things’.  When we say that we understand something (when this is 
seen from the perspective of the term’s traditional meaning), we would 
traditionally be signalling that we are ‘within’ the phenomenon rather than 
standing apart from it in order to observe, measure and know it.  The isolated 
subject, in the context of the rational thinking self, is one that stands away 
from an object to determine its essential structure and therefore produce 
knowledge of the object.  This more traditional translation repositions the 
(indigenous) self (and all things), from a Being who is positioned as an 
isolated subject to one who is immersed.    
 
Called into existence: if time is collapsed, then it could be useful to think of 
the possibility that nothing is called into existence but always-already is. I 
like the way that the participant describes the experience of being called into 
existence, but I conceptualise the experience as (perhaps) being called to 
‘see’ or called to re-turn in certain directions, orientating ourselves to things 





Individualism and interrelationship 
Individualism was described as a type of cultural suppression that one participant 
discussed (in relation to Māori and others who find meaning in relational Being), 
as a philosophy that tends to, “diminish the nature of their Being”.  In the context 
of the notion of mental illness, and particularly when considering approaches used 
to support those labelled as experiencing mental illness, the participant stated that 
a central concern would be to determine how views on Being shape support 
systems: 
 
what would be an appropriate system of support and 
care into a space that conceives of the world in a 
particular way?  I think it’s about coming to better 
understand people, and ways of engagement with things 
that are strange, odd, unusual. 
 
In terms of healing approaches and pathways to well-being, one participant talked 
about the idea of interrelationship and the lived experience of a holistic relational 
approach to Being or “interacting” as a pathway to well-being and an expression 
of wairua as embedded in our ways of living in the world: 
 
Mental health is about unravelling - unravelling what 
we’re told and just choosing to live another life.  I don’t 
like to talk about wairua separately because to my 
mind it’s interlinked into everything. Everything is 
living, everything is interacting, but I think a positive 
relationship with the way we operate with the other 
Beings, it’s setting down what that is for us and what 
that process looks like.   
 
grounding myself…and allowing yourself to receive the 
wisdom that comes from these other places…what our 
tūpuna instructions were but findings ways to do that in 
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energy ways and to ground ourselves and be able to 
help others with that. 
 
 
I don’t like to talk about wairua separately because to my mind it’s 
interlinked into everything: What are the consequences of separating wairua 
and treating wairua like it is a separate element of Being?  For example, 
Māori and indigenous peoples are often engaged in rituals (such as pōhiri), 
that lay ground for our ‘gathering together’ as indigenous peoples.  However, 
are those rituals seen as the expression of wairua more so than other mundane 
activities that we are engaged in throughout our everyday lives?  If so, what 
does that say about how wairua is positioned?  How would wairua be viewed 
if it was conceived of as being thoroughly caught up in everything that we 
do?   
 
Positive relationship: I view the participant’s use of the term positive as 
meaning ‘good’; however, the term does make me think of the idea of the 
negative from a Māori worldview that can relate to Te Kore and potentiality.  
I have earlier pointed to the idea of the negative being a powerful energetic 
space for creativity, particularly as this is applied to Nepia’s (2012) 
description of absence, void, nothingness, loss and annihilation, as a pathway 
to enhancing creativity through uncertainty.  What are the implications of 
this view for mental health?  Is there potential for healing (as a type of 
creativity – the creation of healing strategies) in the negative, the uncertain, 
the void?  Rather than seeing this type negativity as ‘bad’, can it be seen as 
an opportunity for discovery of the self? 
 
 
In discussing non-indigenous peoples’ detachment in the context of colonisation 
and living in indigenous lands, the participant spoke about connecting with 
whakapapa, which for some non-indigenous people was mediated by engaging 
either emotional or intellectual connections to histories and origins.  Emotional 
connections were related to Ngaro (also see the conversation area, Hinenagaro, in 
chapter eight for one participant’s explanation of Hinengaro in a cosmological 
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context), and the participant described how connecting with whakapapa through 
Ngaro or emotions provided a type of knowing that could foster reconnection: 
 
I find that some of them, especially very politicised 
women, weep with it. They weep with knowing what 
they’ve missed because of that whole process for them, 
being raised on whenua that’s not theirs and never 
really having a huge relationship with it in their 
histories. Or when you ask them about their 
whakapapa, they can’t even go back. They don’t want 
to go back there... But there are those that just get it, 
because they allow their feel to feel it, not their head to 
know it or not their intellect because there’s the two out 
of the twins.  Hine is the intellect, ngaro is the emotions. 
So, depending which way they come from, the head 
knowledge, the intellect… but those that come from 
their feel know it. They can transpose it and explain 
they’re feeling, what they’re feeling, so when they come 
from that feeling space, they get it. 
 
 
Being raised on whenua that’s not theirs and never really having a huge 
relationship with it in their histories: This description of non-indigenous 
peoples’ dislocation (from their own indigenous lands) makes me think of a 
description of medieval society given by Barfield (1965).  Barfield describes 
the turn in history in which the self was re-presented as being separate from 
the world:  
 
This was not the background picture before the scientific 
revolution. The background picture then was of man as a 
microcosm within the macrocosm. It is clear that he did not 
feel himself isolated by his skin from the world outside to 
quite the same extent that we do. He was integrated or 
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mortised into it, each different part of him being united to a 
different part of it by some invisible thread (p. 78). 
 
While I understand that the participant here is talking about the disconnect 
felt by non-indigenous peoples as a result of being in another physical place 
(a land different from their indigenous home), bearing in mind Barfield’s 
description, I think the disconnect is far more fundamental.  I imagine that 
non-indigenous people can never be fully separated from their histories or 
lands (in a spiritual sense) but have perhaps constructed cognitive barriers to 
being cognisant of those connections which has then impacted on the 
spiritual experience of connection.   
 
 
Whakapapa and identity 
One of the participants talked about Māori identity in the context of constructed 
identities and identity concepts, such as the concept of ethnicity that the participant 
felt was a product of binaries such as Māori/non-Māori. The participant challenged 
what they saw as a tendency towards positivism in articulating Māori identities 
where visible markers of Māori identity are presented.  In contrast, they saw 
whakapapa as an expression of identity that did not rely on positive identity markers 
contained in labels.  For the participant, whakapapa as identity is expressed from a 
place that is independent from the identity marker ‘Māori’: 
 
It’s this kind of positivism that’s crept into a lot of this 
identity politics now where people want to say, I’m 
Māori because (XYZ)... and of course, you can’t do 
that. If you want to use a positive identity, then you do 
have to derive back to your tūpuna in my case, this is 
where I come from… a specificity that’s not contained 
within the kupu ‘Māori’. Māori, as an identity, as an 
ethnicity label, has in some way to be united by the 
confrontation of the other, which is the European. 
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I’m Māori because: King, Hodgetts, Rua and Morgan (2017) point out that 
there is a complexity of Being that makes the singular identifier ‘Māori’ 
problematic and that there are multiple identities that are carried that include, 
for example, tribal and national identities that shift as contexts, locations and 
situations change, sometimes on a daily basis.  However, if each of the 
identities within the complexity of Being is expected to be represented by a 
set of essential markers that define what each of the multiple identities are, 
then even the complex and multiple are subject to the same structural 
representation.  This representation is what has been discussed as ‘the 
whatness’ (Silverman, 2009) of each feature of identity that is reflected in 
the overarching category of Māori.    
 
Derive back to your tūpuna: The idea that we derive back to tūpuna implies 
a type of distance between the ‘here and now’ and the things that are 
perceived to be in the past – things that we might reach back to.   Within the 
indigenous view of time as a collapsed ‘cosmo-scape’ (Roberts, 2013), this 
temporally constructed distance does not exist.  Our tūpuna are, within this 
view of collapsed time, immediately present even if we cannot perceive this 
presence in a physical sense.  Different temporal perspectives may have 
implications for how the indigenous self perceives the self’s connection to 
things in the world (including tūpuna).  The perception of a distanced 
connection to something that can support well-being (or a distanced 
potential), may have a different impact than the perception of being always 
immediately ‘with’ things.   
 
 
Another participant referred to the European gaze as the origin of the concept of 
identity as Māori (in a pan tribal unified sense), and as the ongoing monitor of Māori 
identity.  However, the participant saw the potential to disrupt created or 
constructed identities through denying and claiming other identities outside of those 
that are prescribed: 
 
The European gaze…has not only been creating that 
idea of Māori identity but also assessing when and to 
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what extent it was… they were making their judgements 
about whether or not we still existed, and still are. That 
is what the Don Brash, Elizabeth Rata kōrero is all 
about because to the extent that Māori claim to be other, 
we disrupt the knowledge, the episteme. 
 
 
Judgements about whether or not we still existed, and still are: This point 
was raised in chapter five concerning how the need to find the essential 
nature of things imposes the expectation that Māori and indigenous peoples 
will ‘present’ with certain ‘normal’ traits.  We might also conform to this 
expectation through our own representations of Māori and indigenous 
identity or Māori and indigenous knowledge.  Within mental health, the push 
for cultural competency has led to the development of cultural frameworks 
that are often informed by well defined, fixed, and essentialised 
conceptualisations of culture (Carey, 2015).  In line with this, I wonder how 
the expectation that Māori and indigenous Being will be expressed in certain 
fixed ways would impact on those seeking support that is conceptualised 
(within a service provision framework) as Kaupapa Māori or indigenous.  
Would the models of care that are developed to define what counts as Māori 
or indigenous allow for expressions that do not obviously fit the cultural 
framework created to define what counts as a cultural expression?  The idea 
of the highly personal expression of holistic Being is discussed at length later 
in chapter nine; however, what I am raising here is the possibility that any 
expressions that fall outside of a defined cultural structure (or cultural traits) 
,may not be recognised as a cultural response.  I think this has implications 
for the Māori and indigenous self and the idea of ‘abnormality’.  While the 
notion of mental illness and associated diagnoses have the potential to render 
people as ‘abnormal’, I suggest the rigid conceptualisation of cultural traits 




The participant also discussed how Māori identity has been conceptualised to fit 
various non-Māori theoretical frameworks including biological genetic frameworks 
that frame identity in terms of “mixed blood”:  
 
My mother, as I said, had a Māori ancestress but the 
knowledge of that was suppressed. When her mother 
was being courted by a Pākehā man and when they had 
to ask the father for their hand in marriage, and the 
reply was there’s mental illness in the women of the 
family caused by the mixed blood.  That was a very 
interesting, racist, patriarchal science myth, because of 
the mixed blood, the idea that somehow there was this 
essence of Māoriness that was transmitted through the 
blood so it’s a protogenetic mythology.  
 
The participant reflected on the distinction between a Māori worldview constructed 
in response to Pākehā and a Māori worldview that stems from the ground of thought 
that is associated with relational Being.  Using the term ‘tangata whenua 
worldview’, the participant explained that, rather than carrying what he described 
as an illusory constructed perception of the world, ‘tangata whenuatanga’ is the 
lived experience of connecting (and re-connecting) to sites of significance (whenua) 
that are linked to whakapapa and experiencing emotional and spiritual connections 
to sites of significance.   The participant also stated that Māori are reconnecting 
with tangatawhenuatanga to move beyond constructing identities in the context of 
treaty settlements and other actions of response:  
 
The place where I think the tangata 
whenuatanga…comes forth in my life is when I do 
return to the places where my loved ones are buried and 
my tūpuna are buried, and where my family still does 
own some land and where I do actively connect, not just 
intellectually but spiritually and emotionally and 
physically connect with places that are expressed or 




we are in a state of reconstruction about what tangata 
whenuatanga actually is... so much of our actions today 
and our thinking and psychology is just about grappling 
with the government and trying to settle claims, just 
about survival really.  All of the inspirations that arise 
from our tangata whenua past are being applied in a 
sense of being able to secure our treaty rights or 
something like that but we’re really struggling for these 
ideas to be central to our life ways. 
 
 
Tangata whenuatanga: While the participant is talking more directly about 
a focus on reaction and dissent as a barrier to reconnecting with a tangata 
whenua identity, another idea that emerges from this discussion is the 
relationship between dissent, binaries and the nature or structure of ‘concept’ 
as a tool in reacting to an external pressure.  This is the idea that we are, 
through our reactionary stances, using ‘concepts’ because they are a part of 
the language of the structure.  We can be recognised and stand in an identity 
that is set apart through articulating something other than what has been 
imposed.  If, however, we utilise the same onto-epistemic structure that is the 
basis of objective language then these alternate articulations of identity are 
simply different impositions that lock identities into rigid representations, 
creating equally rigid expectations of what we must be in order to gain 
inclusion and membership.  The rigidity of objective, categorical identity, in 
which what counts as Māori becomes a demand for convergence, is not one 
that stems naturally from a Māori metaphysics that is at home with 
complexity and the colourful haziness of the world that defies full 
representation. Objective rigidity is the inheritance of the very structure that 
provokes the reconceptualization of Māori identities that are aiming to resist 




All of the inspirations that arise from our tangata whenua past are being 
applied in a sense of being able to secure our treaty rights or something 
like that but we’re really struggling for these ideas to be central to our life 
ways: The metaphysics of presence is explicit in the objective construction 
of Māori identity as a set of traits and behaviours that can be fully articulated 
and it is the expectation of full articulation that has been critiqued within 
health settings (including mental health) that search for clear explanations of 
cultural appropriateness and relevancy.   As Mika (2017a) points out, the 
harm that is done to Māori and indigenous expressions cannot be undone by 
appealing to the same tools and structure that have inflicted the harm in the 
first place.  It is a curious paradox that Māori are forced to utilise an onto-
epistemic structure, of objective representation, to give voice to things that 
have been made silent by objectivity’s insistence on finding essential, 
universal identities.  In doing so, the hard parameters of objective language 
and definition make other silences from things that do not fit within these 
constructed frames – the things that are excluded.  Hokowhitu (2016) 
explains these silences in terms of the marginalisation of subjugated groups 
within Māori and indigenous populations who do not readily fit the assigned 
markers of identity that are selected, asking “who is authorised to speak” 
(p.84) to construct ideas of authenticity.   However, these silences can also 
be applied to the imposition of objective language and labels that speak on 
behalf of the more-than-human who traditionally would have been afforded 
agency through less insistent expressions that allowed for an explanatory 
contingency reflected in Māori metaphysics and the idea of mystery (e.g., 
Mika, 2016). 
 
The world that is at play behind the structure of essential identity hints at an 
aspect of ‘tangatawhenuatanga’ that was discussed by the participant, 
highlighting a response to binary and imposed identities based on 
reconnection rather than dissent as resistance. I understand this description 
of a ‘tangatawhenuatanga’ response as a different way of resisting imposition 
but one that re-turns our attention to those things that within a Māori 




While recognising the impact of external influences and the pressures that lead to 
constructed identities, abstract representations of the world, and conceptual 
apprehension of Māori knowledges, the participant believed that the greatest 
barriers to reconnecting with tangatawhenuatanga or a tangata whenua identity 
comes from within te ao Māori and the adherence to binary identities: 
 
we Māori ourselves today have constructed 
interpretations ourselves about our own culture in the 
face of pressures from the outside world, the difficulties 
in the outside world and…my number one view 
regarding advancing the tangata whenua world view 
and the development of Māori people is I believe that 
the great barriers are actually in us now, not in external 
things. Yes, there are things out in the world that 
conspire against us, there’s poverty and all of those 
realities… I feel that the real issues facing us today are 
actually our own internal demons and barriers.  I’m not 
enamoured anymore of heroic stories of how great 
Māori are and how bad Pākehā are…but I think the 
major barriers to our own emancipation…We’ve 
papered over the cracks… We’ve got to have a more 
kind of honest appraisal of ourselves. 
 
  
We’ve papered over the cracks… We’ve got to have a more kind of honest 
appraisal of ourselves: Within the context of Western mental health, how 
might we consider the issue of having an honest appraisal of the self?  The 
participant’s reference to there being a need for honest appraisal raises 
questions about how honesty is encouraged in a system that has led to, for 
example, people constructing their identities as clinical concepts (e.g. see 
Sadler, 2004).  The concepts, taken up as real identities, are what, I argue, 





When talking about ideas related to identifying and describing the characteristics 
of a Māori world view, one participant used the term ‘inscribe’ in reference to others 
imposing a Māori world view onto her.  The participant described her experience 
as a type of paradox where having a Māori identity or worldview was both 
discouraged and inescapable in the context of Māori identity being defined for her: 
 
You weren’t allowed to be (Māori), you had to be 
Pākehā, but to have a worldview of others – from others 
– forced onto me in a sense…so while I wasn’t allowed 
to be Māori others thought of me as Māori.  They would 
sort of inscribe a Māori worldview onto me that I 
wasn’t allowed to have. 
 
 
Inscribe a Māori worldview: The idea of ‘inscribing’ is interesting; like an 
etching in the skin raising the imagery of moko.  But this inscription is of 
Māori identity, not carved by the participant or those connected to them but 
placed – etched and inscribed by others. There is a paradox at play here too 
– the idea that it was not okay to have a Māori worldview or identity, but it 
was also a projected expectation placed by others, enforced by others onto 
the participant.  She could not be anything else, but it was also the only 
acceptable identity (made acceptable through the inscribed meaning of what 
it is to be Māori).   What are the implications of ‘inscribed’ identities within 
a mental health context?  Are the diagnostic categories that capture people’s 




Whakapapa and holistic influence 
One participant described the concept of human nature from a Māori worldview as 
one that would be more aligned to the term Being which, “takes that dichotomy of 




nature in that sense is often seen as the uncontrollable 
parts of human-ness. You know, human nature is the 
innate things that are almost by definition wild. And 
uneducable. They’re the things that you have to tame. 
That notion of human nature, I don’t think we Māori 
had that view of human-ness.  
 
 
Human nature: The participant’s description highlights the implications of 
the idea of human nature as both an imaginary that has been associated with 
uncontrollable or wild aspects of Being and as a concept that would not have 
been a part of traditional Māori world views.  The term human-nature and its 
construction of the idea of the ‘wild’ excesses of humanity (that must be 
controlled) mirrors the critique of the notion of ‘madness’ that was presented 
by Foucault (1965) and the subsequent (more fundamental) critique of 
logocentrism put forward by Derrida (1978). 
 
 
One participant used the term “weave of life” to describe a view of Being that 
differs from what he described as a more common modern view of Being in the 
world.  The participant saw the potential for people who had experienced 
disruptions in their connections with whānau to benefit from developing an 
understanding of the interconnected nature of their Being or their relational Being:   
 
nonetheless, connecting with one’s heritage, and of 
course in the Māori world tangata whenua world view, 
connecting with one’s immediate forebears, ultimately 
means connecting with the natural world…the lesson 
there is for those whose immediate experience of their 
own family background is difficult is somehow to get 
over that and show that in fact they’re part of a much 





In fact they’re part of a much greater weave of life and interconnections 
of life: What is being described here invites the imagery of a fractal (see 
chapter four) and the idea that, given that all parts of the whole are connected, 
any movement in one part will affect and create movement in another.  This 
is also helpful in explaining an idea that came through during the 
development of this thesis in response to a question about how Māori 
knowledge can be conceptualised if dominant Western concepts are not 
adequate to support a presentation of Māori understandings of Being.  Using 
the example of a fractal, I explained that my view of re-presenting Māori 
understandings of Being is that Māori knowledges present a fundamental 
shift (when viewed from a metaphysical foundational level) that, once taken 
seriously, potentially shifts the onto-epistemic ground in which we talk about 
the world.   Within this view, fitting with dominant conceptualisations is no 
longer a strict criterion and neither is reaching points of certainty in order to 
orientate ourselves to things in the world. Our experience of the world 
becomes something different all together: we are orientated within the world 
rather than by our objective descriptions of things (e.g., Rifkin’s, 2017, 
indigenous temporal sovereignty as orientation: see chapter four). 
 
 
One of the participants talked about colonisation as an entity, both in the sense of a 
legal entity and an energetic entity that has impacted on the awareness that Māori 
have of wairua and connected Being.  The participant described the relationship 
between colonisation and Being as a creative experience where focussing on 
colonisation perpetuates and re-creates the experience of colonisation: 
 
There are two things that’s running here. A government 
is an entity, right? Which means that colonisation has 
become one, and that’s only because everyone’s 
brought into it. So, where we disconnect ourselves from 
that energetically is where we can destroy and uncreate 
all the connections …that we had to those particular 
entities so that we no longer have that control. It’s not 
up to us how that actually shows up, but each and every 
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person has their own perspective on that... Like for me, 
I do my best to scoot across the ngaru or across the 
waves of it rather than be at the effect of it. You know, 
that sort of stuff. And out-create it. Because it’s almost 
like the more we buy into the story, the more it 
perpetuates and the more it’s created… so the more we 
give it energy, the more it creates that, so I actually 
prefer to do something else.   
 
 
I do my best to scoot across the ngaru or across the waves of it rather than 
be at the effect of it:  The idea of moving “across the ngaru” makes me think 
of the difference between speculating on something (or finding an 
approximate meaning for something), and trying to fully conceptualise a 
thing.  Like the view of ‘ground’ as a non-foundational entity within Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics (Mika, 2016), the ngaru re-presents an 
understanding of the partial knowledge that emerges from the disruption of 
(a preference for) certainty.  Instead it raises the possibility that things cannot 
be fully apprehended.   
 
 
In terms of a relationship with the natural world (and all things within the world, 
including people), the participant described what they viewed as a suppression of 
awareness that prevents people from connecting with other realities including, for 
example, the human cost of producing goods.  The participant used the term 
“amnesia” to describe this suppression of awareness, speculating that it is an 
enabling factor in continuing to live each day without a focus on global realities:  
 
We suppress what we actually know to do with the 
quality. Sure, I’ve got a mobile phone and yet I’ve seen 
the pictures of children going down holes in the ground 
to get the rare earth metals. The majority of the human 
population survive... on a bowl of rice a day, if they’re 
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lucky. All of those things. The only way we can live the 
way we do in the West is through amnesia. It must be. 
 
 
Amnesia: The participant’s use of the term amnesia raises the issue of being 
disconnected and of being driven by ‘presentism’, defined as an ontological 
doctrine that posits that only things that are present, in the present, truly exist 
(e.g., see Ingram and Tallant, 2018).  Amnesia, in the participant’s response, 
represents a deeper form of presentism – a complete (and I imagine spiritual) 
disconnection with past and future conceptualised as absent things. Other 
people are also cast as absent things because we cannot see or feel how our 
lived experience is connected to their reality.   
 
 
In line with earlier discussions about tangatawhenuatanga and holistic relational 
Being, the participant described the impact of external societal realities on internal 
states of Being.  The participant also connected this sense of Being with modern 
realities that include living largely within built environments and predominantly 
within the interior of built structures:  
 
It seems to me that you’ve got the whole lesson of 
indigeneity is the way in which the external natural 
world is symbolic of your internal realities.  We all feel 
this.  We all feel this kind of sense that we go into the 
world and we see the dis-equilibrium in the world of the 
dis-equilibrium we find inside ourselves… Being 
indigenous is not just about connection to the natural 
world but it’s the degrees to which we allow the natural 
world to be teachers of our own internal realities 
ultimately to come to the truth of ourselves.  Each day 
is an interior day…I live…in this interior, inside built 
environments.  So that constructs inside of me a certain 
kind of consciousness and a way of being-in-the-world.   
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In discussing other theorists who had influenced their thinking, another participant 
referred to the analysis of metaphysical relationships to the conception of self and 
the understanding of the self’s relationship to the external world.  The participant 
described work that had been done by Christopher Lasch and Sigmund Freud that 
focussed on traits such as narcissism and ideas about individuality: 
 
the shifts from the modern liberal individual, I’m saying 
well here’s a construction of mental illness.  Because 
it’s not about societies or cultures or groups or 
subjectivities in plural.  It’s about individuals, and 
much of that is kind of like tied up with kind of legal 
apparatus that grants the individual rights and takes 
away rights and incarcerates them and controls them in 
various ways…Freud very early contemplates the 
possibility of the sickness of a society or a culture as a 
first question.   
 
 
A construction of mental illness: The way that the participant talks about 
mental illness as a construct is interesting because it raises the possibility of 
thinking of illness as a worlded phenomenon.  This makes me think of the 
fractals that were discussed in chapter four that offer a mathematical 
demonstration of Māori imagery where the world is represented as a fully 
interconnected phenomenon.  The notion of mental illness as an individual 
affliction is turned on its head when illness is considered as a societal 
influence.  It also gives the idea of a constructed illness and new meaning that 
extends beyond the view of discursive construction (for example), to 
implicate a type of holistic construction. Within this view, if there is illness, 
it is in society as a whole but it influences the individual who expresses the 





One of the participants described extreme individuality (such as that linked to 
narcissism) as a “form of psychosis”, driven by a metaphysics of separation that 
manifests in abject materialism and non-relational being: 
 
my observation is that when you drive around 
California for instance and you see five or six cars in 
the driveway, and you go into a house and everybody’s 
got their own TV, the possibility of actually sharing 
stuff has diminished, and they view their own 
programmes, they live their own lives.  
 
 
Actually sharing stuff has diminished: This may be seen as a type of social 
constructionism, but what is coming through in my thinking relates to the 
idea of a social psychosis discussed by Jack Forbes (1979) as the Wetiko 
disease which he describes as a psychosis of greed, taking, and apprehension 
forming the metaphysics that gave birth to colonisation (see chapter nine for 
a full explanation of how this may impact on lived realities).    
 
The physical interior: Living in a constructed environment through the 
construction of buildings (and lifestyles lived within these constructed 
interiors), connects to and presents a metaphor for the interior construction 
that occurs through rational thinking as a representation and relationship 
within and with the world.  This construction of self and world connects to 
the psychosis that is illustrated by Jack Forbes’ (1979) description of 
capitalism and cannibalism, contrasting indigenous histories of cannibalism 
that held great ritualistic significance against capitalism’s consumption of 
people for no significant (or positive) spiritual purpose. If material excess 
and ways of living marked by separation (as in the participant’s description 
of living described in the quote above), signifies the expression of a certain 
metaphysics embedded in our self-expressions, then our contrasting 
expressions (verbal, written, or actions that we take), about connected living 
may follow the same pattern that Gordon (2008) describes as mere cognitive 
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familiarities (that do not translate to actions or fully adopting a different way 
of Being. In this sense, though we might talk about connected relational 
Being as a philosophy, we may also live a disconnected material life.  In line 
with the participant’s comment about individualist material excess being a 
form of psychosis, there is an appeal to the idea that mental illness is part of 
the whole rather than an individual experience only (connect to the concept 





Voices and visits 
One of the participants spoke about people’s experiences of being ‘visited’ and how 
these can manifest as hearing or seeing the presence of an entity or entities.  She 
explained that while some people are very comfortable with these experiences, 
others can be terrified.  The participant felt that Māori conceptualisations of the 
experience of hearing or seeing entities contribute to people feeling comfortable in 
these situations but that other conceptualisations have constructed negative views 
and prevent people from engaging with Māori understandings which can lead to 
unwellness:  
 
We have these people around us, not everybody, and 
some people are terrified by these events.  Stuff moves 
in the house, wasn’t there yesterday or the night before 
and it’s moving, doors shut, people could hear footsteps 
across the path, or see faces, and that can be terrifying 
for them; it can be terrifying for me too.   
 
But others are very comfortable in that space, very 
comfortable with being visited… so Māori 
conceptualisations of these phenomenon are 
comfortable conceptualisations for those who do.  But, 
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if we’ve been given this narrative that well that stuff is 
just crazy, and you are crazy and that could never 
possibly happen, then we can react to those things and 
become unwell, shut them down and then kind of break 
away from our understandings of that. 
 
 
Shut them down and then kind of break away from our understandings of 
that: The dominant Western metaphysics and the narrative that this creates 
could represent a pathway to unwellness.  I suggest that it sets up a 
metaphysical dilemma that is internalised (i.e., self-construction as 
disconnected, self-construction as unwell if having what are seen as strange 
experiences).  The participant has used the term “comfortable” to describe 
those who conceptualise these experiences in a certain way – as normal 
experiences that are accepted rather than conceptualised as irrational or part 
of disorder.  Can the reverse be true? Can certain conceptualisations bring 
discomfort that comes through an experience of the world as separated 
phenomenon?   
 
 
Receiving and sharing messages – normalising experiences  
One participant talked about the experiences that one of her friends has had, 
describing them as a way of receiving and sharing information in the form of 
messages or stories.  These messages or stories were given to her friend from an 
external source that she described as “floating around in the ether”, rather than 
being from a visible physical source. Her friend felt that she was being guided to 
share the story or message with a person or people that the information was intended 
for.  The participant explained that as part of these experiences, her friend was 
linked with the intended recipients of the messages in ways that are not fully 
explainable but that involved communication between wairua.  While the details of 
receiving and sharing the stories are important, the participant’s focus in sharing 
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this account was to discuss the legitimacy of this experience as a potential subject 
of academic writing to highlight the normalcy and regularity of these experiences:  
 
She just knew some story had been floating around in 
the ether, until she met this person and then she knew 
exactly where that story was coming from. She was able 
to recall that story or parts of that story…what we’ve 
figured out is that what happens is she will get her own 
messages, and she will literally be given a story that she 
has to tell somebody else, whether I’m there or not.  But 
when we’re in quite a big space with a whole lot of 
people, this is when it normally happens…it’s kind of 
like their wairua and her wairua are kind of like trying 
to get their stories to hook up.  They don’t know each 
other, but there’s a central link, and so their wairua 
says to this wairua no, go and you two meet or you two 
meet.  It has actually happened often enough that we 
have decided we’re going to write about it, we need to 
do that.  We’ve got a couple of friends who are the 
conduits, the landing posts. 
 
 
It’s kind of like their wairua and her wairua are kind of like trying to get 
their stories to hook up: This view of connection raises the possibility of 
exploring the idea of narratives that are entitized presentations and that other 
stories sit behind the stories that we tell.  This view of stories as entitized 
presentations reflects the symbolic and metaphorical nature of indigenous 
storytelling as opposed to providing static representations and completed 
truth narratives.  The explanation of the story and message sharing 
experience that the participant recounted, and its inclusion of the linking or 






Extending her thinking about normalising experiences, such as those described in 
relation to receiving messages to share with others (wairua to wairua), the 
participant reflected on some of the barriers that might be faced in bringing these 
experiences into an academic setting through, for example, developing writing and 
other information.  The participant talked about the need to meet expectations in 
terms of the content of writing, including needing to quantify experiences in order 
to validate the subject. However, the participant was optimistic that there is a shift 
occurring within different disciplines that had traditionally conceptualised these 
experiences as ‘madness’: 
 
the structure gets debated, and I think that’s about kind 
of like quantifying your experiences or trying to or 
having to validate the actual experience.  As opposed to 
“the” experience, as opposed to the phenomenon itself.  
I think that just in terms of wairua, because that’s a 
harder one…how can it be so shut down as a legitimate 
area of study when so many people talk about it.  I think 
psychology and psychiatry has done a really good job 
of shutting it down and making it about madness.  But 
that’s shifting, it’s shifting a lot. 
 
The participant discussed the importance of understanding the notion of tohu or 
signs as an example of communicating with the world and as a part of recognising 
the agency of other entities that hold knowledge as opposed to humans holding 
ultimate knowledge about entities or phenomena: 
 
We can interact and help, and that’s why tohu is such 
an important thing as well.   Being able to read the 
signs, because we know those kinds of Beings have 
knowledge, and we have this humility to be able to say 
alright, you’re telling us this, we’ll try to read things 
better.  That’s our dedication to you, our honouring of 
you is we will try to read what you are saying better.  
And we will thank you for what you do for us.  Gratitude 
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is so much in our way of operating.  I think that’s one 
thing I’d love to see us do more of, which is to bring 
back in more of that as a daily practice.  That’s what 
karakia were actually all about in the past, I think.  It 
doesn’t have to be flash, but I’m just thinking that way 
of connecting to other Beings in a more real way of 
getting the truth, that interaction.   
 
 
Tohu: Tohu seems like such a normal phenomenon to me.  I take for granted 
that we are presented with information in a ‘spiritual’ sense and that we 
receive types of communication in this way.  It is a common saying among 
people I know to refer to tohu – to say ‘he tohu tera’ in response to something 
that has happened in a person’s life or something that someone has noticed 
during a personal experience.  I think about how this contrasts with the 
Western conceptualisation of what Derrida (1982) calls signification: the use 
of words to signify what something ‘is’.  Signification is a ‘sign’ of a 
different (metaphysical) kind.   
 
 
Extending the idea of the personality or nature of Being associated with the notion 
of existence as thinking and mental functioning or the brain, another participant 
discussed the Western world in the context of science and discovery.  The gathering 
or collecting of things in the world was discussed in relation to acts of analysis and 
appropriation (as a product of how knowledge is conceptualised) and a “selfish” 
aspect of personality that is unaware of its impact on others:  
 
I actually think because they’re unable to see their own 
selfishness... in my view, what’s happened is the 
Western world has constructed a whole way of Being 
which is about greed, it’s underpinned by scientific 
theory, ways that science operates, Western science 
operates in ways that knowledge is seen, that it’s very 
much about gathering – gathering of other peoples I 
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would say most of the people who engage in it are 
completely oblivious that they’re constantly gathering 
others; other things,... and they’re also analysing and 
appropriating, so I guess their notion, the way they see 
a self and an individual is also tied up with that... when 
that sort of gathering, collecting type mentality is there 
it’s focused on what it’s gathering, it’s not focused on 
what it’s doing to others 
 
 
That it’s very much about gathering – gathering of other peoples: In terms 
of mental health, this act of gathering described by the participant could be 
related to acts of discovery that apprehend people, manifesting in the 
application of diagnosis that contains the experience.  The person’s 
experience cannot easily escape this conceptual containment and anything 
intangible (for example), is rendered absent or is noted as another sign that 
the person is unwell (i.e., not thinking rationally).  This has significant 
implications when raising the question of whether Māori and indigenous 
ontologies are being taken seriously within different knowledge institutions 
(such as mental health). 
 
 
Another participant spoke about the “unseen” as something that is both invisible 
and highly significant in all things, stating that “Everything is unseen and 
everything is intangible when you’re talking about things beyond the human body”. 
The unseen was described as something that is energetically connected to things in 
the world but not in any way that could be easily explained or fully conceptualised.  
The participant explained this in the context of research and the interview process 
where much of what is happening in the exchange is unseen and therefore not 
entirely explainable or able to be conceptually presented.  The participant also 
explained that attempts to describe and identify what has been conceptualised as 
spirituality will lead to a reductionist explanation and that the very nature of what 
they called the unseen means that arriving at a complete explanation is not possible.  
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Instead, the participant described a holistic approach to understanding things in the 
world that focuses on things that exist in between the things we are able to observe: 
 
once you start to chop it up it disappears…So, if you 
chop it up it’ll disappear.  What’s the other approach? 
Well, you take a more expansive approach to 
understanding the world.  Systems like this are based on 
reductionism, right?  You reduce everything to its parts 
and therefore you’ll be able to deal with it in a much 
more sort of effective way.  But we also know that the 
similar parts don’t necessarily equal the whole.  What 
does that mean?  Do you carry on looking at the parts 
in order to understand the whole?  No, what it means is 
that you start to actually try to understand the whole in 
order to better understand the parts, and the bits in 
between.  Because the bits in between are the things that 
disappear very quickly, and that’s what we actually 
need to apprehend and to better understand.   
 
 
Once you start to chop it up it disappears…So, if you chop it up it’ll 
disappear:  The participant’s discussion of the unseen mirrors a description 
that is offered by Mika (2017b) when talking about how things in the world 
show themselves within the context of mystery.  As Mika explains, once we 
appear to have landed on a solid ground of thought, it would seem to 
disappear, only to be replaced by another idea.  Both descriptions highlight 
the idea of the intangible and of things that cannot be fully known despite 
how we might attempt to represent things through our use of language and 
concepts.  There is something more at play that can be acknowledged through 
the Māori and indigenous metaphysical premise of mystery. 
 
The participant addressed the issue of conceptualising spirituality and a Māori 
world view within the context of the unseen.   From the participant’s perspective, 
there is a tendency to equate Māori world views with a simplistic and stereotypical 
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notion of spirituality that is linked to an expectation of the spiritual manifesting in 
spectres such as seeing spirits.  In contrast, the participant pointed to a wider 
understanding of spirituality in connection with the unseen that includes a multitude 
of experiences: 
 
Now, I could’ve gone down the line of saying oh yes, 
there’s a whole spiritual world that we kind of like 
understand and I sort of get feelings about…I wake up 
in the middle of the night and seeing someone at the end 
of the bed blah blah blah.  I could’ve gone down that 
pathway in terms of explaining the unseen…But I think 
that that is too simplistic, stereotypical, and ignores all 
the other unseen things that occur in our life.  
 
 
But I think that that is too simplistic, stereotypical, and ignores all the other 
unseen things that occur in our life: This suggests an expanded view of 
absent and unseen things that is inclusive of the entirety of experience rather 
than the idea of a separated ‘spirituality’ or a stereotypical view of spirituality 
that is perhaps reflected in a New age type of uptake.  This view of the unseen 
brings forward the idea of the trace or ‘play’ that Derrida (1978,1998) 
discusses.  Also implicated are the haunting sociological presences that 
Gordon (2008) describes as the sites of meaning: the seething presences that, 
through a new consciousness of complexity, create new spaces of 
understanding.    
 
 
In discussing wairua, one participant described a spirituality that is embedded in all 
things in the world.   The participant also explained that the world is an entitized 
realm and that entities, rather than being limited to popular notions that include 
‘spirits’ or ‘ghosts’, includes all things, such as people and all other non-human 




We talk about wairua but it’s actually the width and 
breadth and depth of the entire entity’s spiritual world. 
An entity is defined as everything actually. A book, 
song, you and I, those that have passed on, our so-called 
missing legends – they’re not, they’re like pono, truth. 
Different reality, different dimensions but totally there.  
 
The participant views the world as a realm that is made up of different dimensions, 
including dimensions that cannot be seen. They discussed the ability (and inability), 
to connect with a sense of these different dimensions as another impact that 
colonisation has had on Māori as worldviews have changed and suppressed the 
experience of connection.  However, the participant believes that connecting with 
other dimensions and accessing the world as a spiritual entity (and communication 
between the human and non-human world), is possible through re-learning 
traditional Māori knowledges: 
 
Different dimension totally…Still there. Just that we 
haven’t activated that space anymore, or again, to be 
able to actually have them as a contribution in our 
lives.  They’re totally still there. And the work that is 
being done around the colonised viewpoint of what 
we’ve bought into has actually squashed all of that and 
called it a fairy tale, a myth or a legend, and they aren’t; 
they are totally still there. The Chinese talk about the 
awakening of the dragons. They have dragons, we have 
Taniwha. Same thing but it’s a consciousness 
awakening. Which means that as an entity, we’re able 
to access, go to and acknowledge all time, space and 
reality and dimensions at any given time that we want 





We haven’t activated that space anymore, or again, to be able to actually 
have them as a contribution in our lives: There is a tension between the idea 
of the holistic world (all things as entities), impacting on our lives through 
our conscious awareness of those things and the understanding that we are 
influenced by things in the world regardless of whether we consciously 
attend to those things or not.  I think there is a pathway to well-being, but 
this pathway is always there regardless of our attention to it. 
 
 
The participant described experiences that she has had that are related to physical 
sensations and that indicate the presence of entities.  These sensations have shown 
up as both physical ailments and as emotions: 
 
some of my background is that my body indicates to me 
when wairua entities or spirits are around, and that 
would show up as when they’re around eczema, 
allergies, headaches, heaviness across the shoulders, 
puku aches, through to depression, anxiety, paranoia, 
stuff like that, when all it was… I had a potent 
awareness that entities were around me. The entities 
themselves, or the wairua, had no idea how they were 
showing up to me. 
 
 
Puku: The reference to puku as a site of sensation reminds me of 
conversations that I have had with people where they have remarked that 
they have been guided by their ‘puku’.  It is also something that I have heard 
people remark on as a way of giving a type of guidance such as making a 
decision based on what you can ‘feel in your puku”.  Interestingly, references 
to puku as a site of knowledge or guidance align with L. Smith’s (1999) 
description of thinking residing in the gut which has also been discussed by 
Mika (2016) when describing the convergence of feeling and thought within 




Another participant addressed both the conceptualisation and translation of the term 
wairua as spirituality.  The term spirituality from the participant’s perspective 
denotes a separation and distinction - of something that is experienced as separate 
from the person while wairua is an embedded state of Being.  The participant spoke 
about the need to decolonise te reo Māori and connected the colonisation of Māori 
language, particularly in relation to the translation of wairua as spirituality, to the 
Christian faith and the church.  The participant also referred to the “ahuatanga of 
the words” that te reo Māori are translated into.  The participant believes that we 
need to be aware of the power of words as something that can be internalised or 
something that we “take on” as opposed to simply being terms that are spoken or 
written with no subsequent implications: 
 
For me, wairua isn’t spirituality. There’s no such 
word as spirituality in Māori thinking. It is actually 
embedded in everything, it’s embedded, and it’s not 
talked of, it just is. It’s not talked of; you don’t talk of 
that. In fact, wairua, twin rivers, twin waters, duality, 
the dual nature of atua me tangata, the dual nature of 
the wāhine me tāne. It’s the church people, and in fact 
it’s Bishop Panapa, who in research that took the fem 
out of tangata and they think it’s just the male because 
of patriarchy, because of their church…If we decolonise 
the language then we wouldn’t speak of wairua as 
spiritual, but some will do that because that’s how they 
believe it to be. For me, is a duality. It’s the closest thing 
to atuatanga, me tangatatanga between humankind and 
the atua.  
 
 
For me, wairua isn’t spirituality. There’s no such word as spirituality in 
Māori thinking: The term spiritual carries with it the sense of a separate 
‘thing’, something that exists apart from the physical.  From within a Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics, however, spirituality cannot be separated from 
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Participants’ responses illustrate a metaphysics of holism that disrupts the 
principles of separation, explaining how this principle has impacted on how people 
and things in the world are conceptualised.  Rather than conform to the idea of the 
essential separation of things in the world, participants highlighted how, from 
within Māori and indigenous metaphysics, things can be experienced as whole 
(rather than parts of the whole).  The implications that this view of holism has for 
people who are labelled as experiencing mental illness were reflected on in terms 
of how people can understand what has influence (on for example behaviour and 
emotions).  For example, one participant’s reference to being “called into existence” 
by others presents possibilities that break down the limited conceptualisation of 
people’s experiences as an individual reaction to things.  Instead, when considering 
the metaphysical premise of holism, it is possible to imagine people’s experiences 
as a thoroughly complex holistic reaction – a re-orientation that sets up (k)new 




CHAPTER EIGHT: THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING 
AND THE MORE THAN HUMAN WORLD 
Chapter eight concerns the idea of the world is an entitised reality, acknowledging 
that Being is not restricted to or ultimately governed by a human-centred existence.  
Other things in the world are acknowledged as having agency. Through this, the 
idea of human centred knowledge and the ability to fix the world (and its meaning) 
into self-originating concepts is challenged.  What might be seen, for example, as a 
cognitive event in terms of thought or the ‘mind’, can be extended within Māori 
cosmology to implicate the more-than-human world that influences what we 
experience as ‘thinking’ and ‘sensing’.  There is, in this chapter, an appeal to the 
more profound and mysterious understandings of Being as they manifest and, 
therefore, of people’s experiences, including the experience of what is commonly 





Mātauranga concerns the different ways that participants discussed Māori and 
indigenous onto-epistemes.  Participants talked about the experience of ‘knowing’ 
but not in a way that referenced knowledge as a result of rational deliberation.  
Instead, knowing was talked about as a type of intuitive presence. 
 
Hinengaro 
The participants’ responses culminate in the articulation of Hinengaro. Hinengaro 
is initially represented directly through one participant’s description of Hinengaro 
within a Māori cosmological frame. Hinengaro is also represented indirectly where 
participants talk about the aspects of Being that are particularly relevant to the 
notion of mental illness or, more expansively, to mental health and well-being.   
 
The description of Hinengaro within a Māori cosmological frame sets the scene for 
understanding a more profound relationship with Hinengaro than what is allowed 
for in mental health policy where Hinengaro is often used as a term that signifies 
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the separated aspect of mental Being (e.g., Ministry of Health, 2017).  In this sense, 
Hinengaro resists the limited frame assigned through common translations within 




Science, philosophy and duality 
One participant discussed what they called the fact-value dichotomy.  The 
participant related the fact-value dichotomy to scientific knowledge that the 
participant viewed as a flawed epistemic approach (i.e., a mythical rather than 
factual set of truths).  The participant talked about their experience of studying 
science as part of their tertiary education and developing a realisation that science 
is based on a (cultural) philosophy rather than being based purely on fact 
calculation.  The philosophy of knowledge that the participant began to consider as 
part of her studies related to a fact-value dichotomy that they saw as the “Achilles 
heel” or “weakness at the heart of the scientific enterprise”.  They also described 
the philosophy of scientific knowledge as an embedded philosophy that is invisible 
when considering questions of how knowledge is produced:  
 
I did a master’s in science and it was when I was 
working at the medical school some years later that 
someone first mentioned the phrase philosophy of 
science in conversation with me. I remember being 
blown away by that because I’d never had any idea that 
science had a philosophy. You go to university and 
learn science, or I suppose it starts at secondary school, 
and scientists do not ever give any thought to the 
philosophy of the knowledge that they are working with 
because it’s under your feet. It’s embedded, it’s the 
ground that you walk on. That makes the world of 





It’s under your feet: I reflect on this as a question of the self’s orientation to 
things in the world.  It is the difference between the perspective of being 
within the ground as opposed to seeing the self as standing on the ground.  I 
interpret this as either a Māori and indigenous worldview (Being within the 
ground or Being within the world) or a dominant Western view (standing ‘on 
top of’ or standing apart from things).  To me this is an important 
metaphysical consideration that impacts on how people and the world are 
positioned that has implications for the lived experience of holism and being 
immersed within the world or rationalism and standing apart from the world 
to observe (and control) it.   
 
 
The misfit - framing Māori knowledge 
One participant talked about the practice of fitting Māori knowledge into foreign 
frameworks and theories that reflect cultural beliefs about how the world works.  In 
order to fit Māori knowledge into these theoretical frameworks, the participant 
described how Māori knowledges need to be removed from the original cosmogenic 
narratives that Māori understandings of the world are based in:  
 
Western science has a framework of basic theories 
about how the world works and that Western scientific 
edifice has looked at Māori knowledge, but they have 
cut Māori observational knowledge of the natural 
world away from its theoretical framework which were 
those cosmogenic narratives. Like we were saying 
before, growing up, here’s the Māori version of the 
book, Rangi and Papa, whatever, whatever, and here’s 
my real-world Māori. We have to go back in time to 
where those stories are the philosophical framework 





They have cut Māori observational knowledge of the natural world away 
from its theoretical framework which were those cosmogenic narratives: In 
many ways this is the point that this thesis seeks to highlight before the notion 
of mental illness is addressed.  Mental illness is just one area of concern that 
can be deconstructed to expose the non-indigenous premises that lie beneath 
what are often conceptualised as scientific truths (or generalisable 
explanations) of behaviour.   
 
 
As an example of how Māori knowledges are removed from cosmogenic narratives, 
the participant referred to the labelling of Māori narratives as myths and legends, 
 
If you read any kind of Elsdon Best or any of those 
Western anthropological accounts of Māori knowledge, 
by cutting out those narratives and referring to them as 
fireside tales, which is what they write, or they’re 
always called myths and legends. I will not use that term 
and I correct my Pākehā colleagues. I refer to them as 
nature narratives because I think it’s a much more kind 
of neutral, respectful… We’re not calling them theories 
but they’re narratives that provide a philosophical 




They’re narratives that provide a philosophical framework for 
understanding the natural and human world: The possibilities that are 
arising from viewing Māori ‘cosmogenic narratives’ as pathways to healing 
are demonstrated in the use of Māori creation narratives in mental health. 
Mahi a Atua is a form of narrative therapy that utilises Māori cosmology to 
engage with whānau and tāngata whaiora.  The major focus is on recovery 
from trauma and colonisation (Rangihuna, Kopua, Tipene-Leach, 2018), 
which links to other projects that include a focus on Māori and indigenous 
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models of trauma (and the development of Māori and indigenous trauma 
informed care).    
 
 
One of the participants felt that the dominant structure of knowledge was upheld by 
other structures that perpetuate particular worldviews including worldviews based 
on science and medicine.  These structures include research funding criteria, criteria 
for having publications accepted, and being able to codify work in ways that 
contributes to databases that support university rankings: 
 
It’s not like you have to hide some of the practice that 
you do because it’s going to be seen as not operating 
from that scientist practitioner world view. See, there’s 
that word – world view, scientist practitioner world 
view which underpins a lot of psychology and 
psychiatry in medicine.  I think it’s about a level playing 
field and a lot of what we are taught is so heavily 
constructed and bound with somebody getting research 
funding, somebody getting a publication or a publishing 
house getting the money for publications, and university 
getting good rankings because they’ve got the 
publications, and actually they don’t really work for us.   
 
 
You have to hide: The idea of having to hide a Māori practice because it is 
not seen as operating from a scientific worldview implies that there is a form 
of automatic concealment that is always already in place.  These epistemic 
structures are ones that demand conformity, re-shaping Māori language and 
worldviews to fit the expected representation of things that includes 
presenting Māori ideas about the world in positive language rather than the 
less tangible presentations that are offered through metaphor (for example), 
which merely seeks to approximate a things character (rather than fully 
define it).  The act of approximation (rather than definition or objective, 
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positive representation), may be linked to a Māori metaphysics that views 
the world as an entitized phenomenon, demonstrating a type of active 
engagement (described by participants in this research as, for example, 
energetic communication), that we might imagine as a type of agency in 
which an entity can resist any notion that it can be fully known with certainty.  
The entitized world, and Māori metaphysics as a whole, while including an 
understanding of concealment, is subject to a different type of concealment 
when Māori knowledge is pulled into non-Māori academic and ultimately, 
metaphysical, frameworks.  Rather than speaking to a metaphysical 
concealment that provides some clues about the sense of mystery that 
pervades Māori worldviews, epistemic concealment is a thorough blanketing 
of the mystery that characterises a Māori metaphysics.  The language that 
must be used to demonstrate what will be identified in research, and the 
metaphysical intent that is built into research methods of discovery and 
positive description, discipline Māori worldviews. These worldviews, while 
sometimes represented in the translation of Māori terms into non-Māori 
concepts, have an excess of meaning that is cropped to fit the dominant 
Western frame.  The excesses are those things that are subject to the 







One participant discussed the idea that there could be different cultural versions of 
concepts.  Using the example of logic, the participant stated that logic has one form 
and could not be transformed into an ‘alternative’ cultural model of logic.  The 
participant located the basis of logic in the premises that are set up on which to base 
decisions and behaviour.  They also stated that understanding the premises that 
underpin decisions and behaviour would provide an understanding of why things 
were done even if from a different worldview. The participant stated that within this 
context certain practices appeared to be illogical:  
 
If there’s one thing I’m sure of, it’s that logic is logic. I 
don’t subscribe to the idea that there’s other forms of 
logic. I looked into this quite carefully during my 
doctoral work. I had Pākehā supervisors and I think 
they were quite keen to see me come up with this idea of 
an alternative logic but let’s not get this confused. Logic 
is logic, and Māori are just as logical.  Logic is a 
human thing, it’s not a cultural thing. It’s about the 
premises on which we base logic. Logic is fine in the 
strict sense but when we say this isn’t logical, it’s 
because we don’t understand the premises that are 
behind it.  
 
 
Logic is logic, and Māori are just as logical: Initially, the idea of logic being 
applied to Māori worldviews felt at odds with the discussion of Māori 
metaphysics as something that resists rigid epistemic structure.  The term 
logic and its association with validity, observable phenomena, and universal 
conclusions (of what can, rationally, be accepted as true) would seem to 
present the same restrictive risks to Māori worldviews that has been 
described by other participants in this thesis.  However, it is interesting that 
the participant has referenced the Māori ritual or practice of biting the latrine 
beam (see quote below).  Mention of this ritual leads directly to an article by 
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Anne Salmond (1978) who writes about the ritual, explaining its logic in the 
context of Māori cosmology. The ritual of biting the latrine beam is of 
interest because, as Salmond explains, the seemingly bizarre practice 
exposes how cosmological premises can be linked to the logic that forms the 
practices and principles that support the ritual.  But it is Salmond’s 
description of cosmological orientation that is most helpful (in this thesis) to 
understanding how logic can be connected to phenomena that have no 
objective or physical grounding.   
 
 
The participant gave an example, describing a Māori ritual of biting a latrine beam 
or stick to ward off danger before going on a journey.  While the ritual might appear 
to be illogical, those that understood the premises that this ritual was based on 
would understand that the beam symbolised balance, ensuring both cosmic and 
psychological protection:  
 
There was this pre-European Māori ritual or practice 
of biting the latrine beam, which is basically a stick of 
wood and you sat on it and shat over the cliff kind of 
thing. If you were going into a journey or a place of 
danger, one of the ways to ward off potential danger 
involved this ritual of biting the latrine beam, which of 
course seems totally illogical, but if you understand that 
that pae tūtae was acting as a symbol of the cosmic 
poles. Because the Māori cosmos is made up of these 
polarities, tapu, noa, ora, mate, opo, and they’re not 
only cosmic but they’re also psychological. So, there is 
a logic in that, although it appears on the surface to 





Pre-European Māori ritual or practice of biting the latrine beam: In 
Salmond’s (1978) description of cosmological orientation, the points on a 
compass that are usually associated with directions of travel or physical 
locations are referred to as Māori spatial mappings associated with physical 
and spiritual elements within a complex system of meaning.  Within this 
cosmological map, for example, north (runga), is associated with Ranginui 
(sky father), te ao mārama (world of life/light), and ora (life, health).  South 
(raro) is associated with Papatūānuku (Earth Mother), mate (death), and 
pō/reinga (underworld).  Runga and raro are also directly connected to each 
other along with other points in the spatial web.  While providing a full 
description of Salmond’s Māori cosmological spatial mappings is outside the 
scope of my reflections on Māori logic and its premises, what I take from 
Salmond’s analysis is the idea that the premises on which Māori logic are 
constructed are not dependent on the verification of facts as part of a rational 
process of deliberation.  Logic, in Salmond’s example, can be supported by 
the intangible.  In this case the premises that a ritual is based on produce 
logical actions (and in this case biting a beam of wood that is used in a 
whareiti), but ones that are connected to a holistic and not fully knowable 
cosmological orientation. From my perspective, the premises of logic in this 
context are considered more for how they explain how things fit into an 
overall cosmological whole, rather than explaining how observed parts of an 
experience or phenomenon lead to a logical (universal) conclusion.   
 
Because the Māori cosmos is made up of these polarities, tapu, noa, ora, 
mate, opo, and they’re not only cosmic but they’re also psychological. So, 
there is a logic in that, although it appears on the surface to be pretty weird: 
What are the possibilities presented by understanding people’s experiences 
based on the premises of Māori cosmology? Again, this comes back to the 
idea of how we are orientated within the world and how all things create 
‘place’ and personality (Deloria, 2001). 
 
 
In line with the previous participant’s discussion of Māori logic and the premises 
that underlie Māori logic, another participant talked about knowing as something 
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more than a rational process of thinking, deliberation and conclusion.  The 
participant instead described knowledge as a state of Being.  The participant felt 
that Māori had traditionally understood knowledge and knowing as a holistic 
process but ideas about knowledge being associated with functions of the mind or 
brain have changed perspectives on knowledge.  The participant associated what 
they called ‘knowing’ with parts of the body (including the heart and ‘puku’ or 
stomach), and related knowing to a type of energetic exchange or communication 
with ‘all things’: 
 
We’ve kind of forgotten how to activate and 
acknowledge our knowing. The more practice we have 
at it, the better we are in terms of catching those 
knowings and working with the energy of it rather than 
we might receive a message in the knowing and then our 
head gets in the way and starts analysing it about what 
it is, and we’ve actually forgotten what the instant thing 
was and it’s now changed about four different times and 
then you’re in doubt about what it is, when you actually 
had it…There’s no thoughts or emotions in that, there’s 
nothing. It’s all about your connection and communion 
with all things. Everything. 
 
Our knowing: In reflecting on the participant’s description of knowledge as 
an energetic exchange with all things, I am tempted to summarise the point 
made by the participant as knowledge that comes from communication with 
things external to the person.  However, as discussed in chapter four, this 
view may be informed by a tendency within dominant Western metaphysics 
to conceptualise things as individual phenomena that are connected to other 
individual phenomena.  In considering the participant’s response from within 
a Māori and indigenous perspective, however, communication (and 
knowing) would be the internal and external ‘at once’ - each a continuous 





One of the participants reflected on their own questions about knowledge and where 
knowledge originates from, which led them to consider what their mother had 
taught them about knowledge from a Māori perspective:  
 
I wonder….it stimulated me to think about my mother 
and how she was never ever going to answer, ever. She 
still was of the, oh, really? I’ve been thinking about that 
too. She talked in riddles and that. Then, if we 
complicated things, she would say to us, you know 
what? Whakaaro Māori, it actually makes it easier, and 
we go, so what’s the hell’s that? Immediately she says 
that – and I’m talking about me and my sisters and 
cousins who have all these wonderful wānanga in our 
lives – and immediately she said, what are you talking 
about? Aren’t we whakaaro Māori because we’re 
Māori? She said, your guys’ trouble is you know too 
much.  
 
In line with the participant’s comment about complicating knowledge, another 
participant described how definitions of te ao Māori can complicate discussions 
about Māori world views and lead to overly prescribed representations:  
 
Someone who has got a sophisticated understanding of 
the Māori world will actually complicate the response 
or complicate the assertion in terms of “this is the 
Māori way” 
 
The participant also spoke about the relationship between the origins of knowledge 
or how knowledge is conceptualised and approaches to supporting people who are 
experiencing states of dis-ease.  One of the approaches she described involved 
drawing pictures and creating narratives as opposed to talking directly about 
symptoms or other aspects of behaviour that could be related to (for example), 
different types of diagnosis.   The example provided of creating narratives involved 
both the individual and their whānau who all participated in recounting experiences 
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which in turn would lead to the changing of a narrative.  Rather than seeing this 
approach as an activity that involved the whānau that are physically present only, 
the participant believes that, it’s very much about atua” who are also contributing 
to the narrative: 
 
two of her team are artists so then when somebody 
comes in to talk about what’s going on for them, they’re 
drawing pictures.   And then the person who’s needing 
to be supported and all their whānau to be able to 
understand what’s going on, they all see it being drawn 
and they go, bro, nah, nah, that’s not where the… and 
they participate in the narrative. And then that’s their 
job, changing the narrative, coming to terms with it, 
expanding on it. It’s not about, oh well that’s actually 
distorted thinking; that’s your narrative, so where are 
we going to go with this type of thing. 
 
 
They participate in the narrative: similar to the reflection on narrative 
included earlier in this chapter (i.e., Mahi a Atua), the participant’s 
description of narratives as a way of including people raises the idea of the 
self as a Being that is in relationship with things in a wider context.  This 
wider context expands beyond what is reflected in clinical diagnoses that 
conceptualise a person’s experience as being located within the individual.  
Instead, the narrative is a reflection of a complex holistic connection and it 
brings the person and whānau back to reside ‘within’ things rather than 
seeing the person as being connected to other individual things (e.g. Mika, 
2016).  Through narrative, all that are a part of the story diverge and connect 
with the person, the whānau and atua showing up in the significance of the 
story that is told. 
 
 
The participant discussed her aspirations for engaging in research that explores the 
nature of ‘knowing’ from a Māori perspective which related to her life experiences 
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- the things that she had wondered about and the way that her mother spoke about 
whakaaro Māori.  In considering what knowing is from a Māori perspective, the 
participant has reflected on certain experiences, including physical sensations 
which appear to act as signals that something is about to happen and that put the 
person in a state of readiness.  The participant described how these physical signals 
and sensations are linked to an interconnected state of Being and that they are more 
a type of primordial rather than cognitive process.  These physical sensations can 
be experienced in the puku and the ngākau (for example), and provide a type of 
certainty that is different from how certainty might be conceptualised in a rational 
or definitional sense:  
 
I want to research our knowing.  Here – a lot of us 
know the Māori stuff around here, about all that kind 
of kōrero, but actually I said, I want you to think about 
the knowing. Is it whakaaro? Is it whatever? So, 
what’s the knowing? Where does that come from? 
Because when things are not right – I don’t know if 
you’ve experienced this, when things are not right and 
you have the – all those things that are associated – 
your physical symptoms of dread which includes the 
fear flight thing…but I’m talking about the thing that 
goes – it seems like all your blood leaves you and you’re 
that cold, sweaty… and you don’t know why but your 
knowing knows why and that’s about preparing you. So, 
you get into the state, not of readiness, but of super 
observance. That’s the other thing that when we’re 
talking about how do we know about our Being, we 
come from a culture that’s absolutely extremely 
observant of our natural phenomenon, of our natural 
environment, because we come from a culture that 
knows we’re not alone in the universe. When you talk 
about the knowing thing, you know when you’ve rocked 
it, man, you know because your puku tells you, your 
body tells you and then somewhere along the line your 
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ngākau tells you and then your head catches up 
afterwards with oh, that was pretty cool. 
 
I want to research our knowing. Here – a lot of us know the Māori stuff 
around here, about all that kind of kōrero, but actually I said, I want you 
to think about the knowing. Is it whakaaro? Is it whatever? So, what’s the 
knowing? Where does that come from? The participant’s desire to explore 
‘knowing’ from within a Māori worldview is informed by their intimate 
experience of embodied knowledge that has come through their attention to 
what their body tells them.  It is not a question of ‘how do we know with 
certainty’ but rather, I interpret their question as one that asks, ‘how do we 
get guided to move in different directions’?  I recall from this the description 
of orientation that was discussed in chapter four in relation to Rifkin’s model 
of indigenous temporal sovereignty.  Through movements over time, our 
bodies acquire the very shape of the different directions that we move in.  I 
interpret this movement, in relation to the participant’s description of 
embodied knowledge, as the shifting of the self in relationship with others or 
what Marsden (2003) calls wisdom.  I wonder how mental health ‘treatment’ 
might be re-orientated to reflect this relational understanding of knowledge. 




The participant also described the experience of sensing and feeling a connection 
to others and knowing that they will, through that connection, be affecting the other 
person in some way.   
 
Mātauranga Māori in Mental Health 
One of the participants stated that there is a tendency to equate Māori knowledges 
with terms that apply to clinical practice or non-Māori, non-indigenous therapeutic 
frameworks.  The participant described how translating Māori knowledges as 
components or forms of a non-Māori clinical practice or framework effectively 
changed the nature of Māori terms and knowledges that are related to “standing in 
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the presence of atuatanga”.  As an example of how translating Māori knowledge 
into non-Māori, non-indigenous frameworks impacts on lived experiences, the 
participant described the contrast between standing in the presence of beauty and 
power within the ngahere as opposed to modern practices that lead to visiting 
ngahere to extract and utilise the healing properties of plants:  
 
they try and give a name to it, well hello, we already 
have it, but they just ignore that. That’s the same thing 
around mental health and all of the way we work with 
tāngata whaiora. It’s not about taking it down like that; 
it’s standing in the presence of atuatanga…When you 
go out and stand in that forest out there…you’ll know. 
You just feel the beauty. It is just so powerful. The 
healing… you don’t have to pick their leaves and wreck 
it and drink it and whatever, infuse it…and put it as 
ointment; just stand in there and feel the grace of the 
atua. It’s beautiful. 
 
 
They try and give a name to it, well hello, we already have it, but they just 
ignore that:  Two are things at play here: firstly, there are translations that 
take Māori terms and re-structure them, ensuring that they equate to a pre-
determined concept.  Secondly, there is the idea of re-structuring ngahere, 
changing and limiting its nature from a place where we would experience 
“standing in the presence of atuatanga”, to a place where we can access a 
natural resource as a commodity which is a material consequence of its 
conceptual restructuring.   
 
 
The participant also gave examples of how she believed the premise of separation 
has impacted on how people have engaged with Māori knowledges, describing the 
separation of Māori knowledges into parts.  The participant imagined what it would 
be like for people to engage holistically with traditional Māori knowledges (the 
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lived experience), through describing direct communication with the world as an 
entity:  
 
While we’ve got Kohanga reo trying to give back the 
reo, Puna reo, all of those… while we’ve got all of those 
trying to desperately happen, we still need those that 
will walk not just in the reo but in the tikanga and the 
kawa and the pūrākau and the instilling of whakapapa, 
those things, back into the whole thing. Still again we’ve 
just taken te reo separate from the pūrākau, separate 
from the tikanga kawa, separate from the roles on 
marae, separate from the wāhinetanga, separate from 
the whare tangata …wouldn’t it be lovely if we all went 
around talking and not use this Pākehā reo and said 
“tena koe taku whare tangata” to what we think is 
mother.  Acknowledging the sacredness of the most 
ancient of all sites. Wouldn’t it be beautiful if we talked 
to what we call father…It would change this whole 
world…you carry the sacred seed and to start thinking 
about that sacredness. 
 
Another participant discussed the psychological impacts of Māori experiences of 
non-Māori knowledge structures that were used as mechanisms for re-shaping 
Māori language and culture: 
 
you saw that kind of control that was being exerted on 
Māori in schools where they weren’t allowed to speak 
their own language and they were punished if they did.  
When I was doing some research in the Tai Tokerau, I 
would see generations of Māori kids who are fluent in 
te reo who were forced to sit a written exam for an oral 
language where they failed.  So, although they were 
living on marae and speaking fluent te reo Māori, they 
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failed at their own culture.  That led to some pretty 
disastrous psychological consequences.  
 
Despite recognising the effect of translation on lived experiences, the participant 
provided a view on translation (including conceptual translation), to support an 
understanding of what might sit behind the motivation to equate Māori terms with 
non-Māori worldviews, terms, concepts and frameworks.  The participant related 
the drive to reach understanding through translation to a wider sense of detachment 
and loss that non-indigenous people feel, contrasting this sense of detachment with 
Māori attachment to whenua Papatūānuku: 
 
They have a different reo, they have a different 
language, so they try to put it in a language for them. I 
can work with that, when they’re trying to understand it 
from their perspective. It’s hard to understand 
something that’s not part of their lived experience from 
a child. They’ve never grown up – I mean, they’re 
colonisers so they’re all far away from where their 
whenua is. They’ve never been attached to a whenua 
like we are. We have a relationship with this whenua, 
Papatūānuku, so that’s where it starts from.  
 
Feeling and narrative 
One of the participants discussed how worldviews are formed and talked in a 
contemplative rather than definitive way about the forming of narratives from 
things that people feel.  The repetition of experience was also offered as a potential 
pathway to forming worldviews along with the explanations that are used to 
describe experiences:  
 
you kind of feel those things and then you start talking 
about it, and then that becomes our narrative.  Or is it 
that that’s the way that we explain something, and it just 
becomes our narrative… I think that we have those 
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experiences often enough that we don’t forget them, and 
we can keep talking about them. 
 
 
Narrative: Narratives are not necessarily definitions of experiences or 
phenomena in the world but are described as sense-making mechanisms that 
some view as cognitive maps and others view (for example), as structural 
features of a story or analytic approach (Richardson, 2000).  The etymology 
of the term narrative, in the context of the participant’s contemplation of 
worldviews and the wider focus of this thesis, is associated with the word 
‘gnārus’.  Gnārus is translated as ‘knowing’ and more broadly with the 
concept ‘to make acquaintance with’.  The idea of making acquaintance with 
something brings to mind the translation of whaka aro offered by T. Smith 
(2000) as ‘to cast attention to’ that differs from the common modern 
translation of ‘to think’.  The terms attention and acquaintance appear to 
signal a more relational understanding of the concept of worldview than the 
term knowing allows for, particularly where knowing is taken to mean a type 
of certainty that, in turn, is associated with conceptual understanding or to 
bring things under concepts (Etymology Online Dictionary).  The 
participant’s reference to feelings being a precursor to forming a worldview 
also motivates a reflection on the idea of embodiment as a type of holistic 
thinking rather than a purely cognitive exercise.   
 
 
Another participant spoke about their ideas for bringing people together to discuss 
ethics and to imagine pathways back to living in line with tikanga Māori.  While 
discussing her ideas, she made a comment about being focussed on a timeframe of 
nine days or a nine-day wananga:  
   
I’ve actually already said to people we need a nine-day 
wananga. I don’t know why that number; I just thought, 
oh it sounds nice on my tongue or something, but it 




Nine-day wananga: The participant’s focus on the timeframe of nine days is 
interesting not because of the length of time that she mentions but for the 
way in which she understands her reason (or unreason), of choosing the 
timeframe.  She can give no clear rationale for why the wananga she is 
imagining would be planned for nine days but she has a sense of conviction 
that this is the right length of time for these discussions.  In considering this, 
the participant suggests that the length of time, as an idea, has arrived, stating, 
“it came from somewhere”, which links to Royal’s (2017) discussion of 
Māori Marsden’s experience of “new knowledge arriving” from an external 
source.  I think it is significant that the participant travelled with Māori 
Marsden in earlier years as part of her work in wairua healing as this marks 
a connection between the participant, what they have discussed and how 
Marsden’s experiences of wananga form part of my reflections on the 
participant’s responses.  The participant’s mention of the timeframe of nine 
days sounding “nice on my tongue” also would appear to connect to the 






Extending the description of knowledge that expands beyond intellectual 
conceptualisations of what may reside in the mind or head, the participant who 
discussed Hinengaro talked about the connection between embodied knowledge 
and the atua Hinengaro.  Atua Hinengaro, described from a traditional Māori 
perspective, also raised issues related to gendered representations of Being.  As 
discussed in chapter six, the description of Hinengaro from within Māori 
cosmology disrupts the simple translation of Hinengaro as, for example, mental 
health.   
 
you can know from all over your body, really…but it’s 
still the Hinengaro because hinekorikoriko is the atua 
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wāhine then she partners with tama i ngaro.  They have 
twins.  The girl twin is Hine, the boy twin is named 
Ngaro after his father.  So, when you look at the intellect 
and the emotions that come out of the Hinengaro it’s 
Ngaro.  That is the emotional. In fact, our men are the 
emotional. They harbour their emotions for a long time, 
and it bursts out of them in a different way. Wāhine will 
scream and rant and rave straight away. They don’t 
f**king care, they just tell you. 
 
but the amazing thing is – I’m not talking about the male 
and female, the male’s over there and I’m over here – 
I’m talking about the male/female kei roto i a koe. In 
our reo we have ia. We don’t have him/her. So, what it’s 
addressing is the male/female inside of me. So, when 
you look at it, we look at the taha mauī the left brain is 
wāhine, the taha matau the right brain is male. I go out 
to the prison every day. I don’t live in my feminine. I 
work in my male. When I’m working with wāhine, I’m 
working in my feminine. When I’m working with my 
children, kei roto in the middle is the is the child.  
 
 
Hinengaro: The translation of Hinengaro in mental health policy is a 
significant example of how Māori terms can be co-opted to support the 
dominant Western onto-epistemic framework.  The idea of atua Hinengaro 
being given conceptual boundaries is particularly problematic when 
considering the description of Hinengaro that is offered by the participant.  
How do we effectively reduce the excessively profound and spiritual 
cosmology that is reflected in the participants narrative to equate to the 
concept of mental health?  We do it by putting Hinengaro into a pre-
determined framework, ignoring what cannot fit into the frame or what was 
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discussed earlier in terms of Heidegger’s (1971) cautioning passing over 
complex meaning.  
 
The participant also discussed the term ngaro: 
 
Speaking of ngaro: You have a look at it, it is two things, 
nga – and that’s the plural of oro.  That’s way back in 
the oro in the cosmogenic series when Papa was being 
pulled out of the water sighing - all a part of that 
language, the knowing…the feeling, this new space, the 
new place. She’s been pulled out of moana to open her 
waters so that her father can look upon Papatūānuku 
because he needed to have children, a male, and then 
that’s when the world was… all of that – oro te whiu- 
and its full. 
 
 
Ngaro: Ngaro, rather than being characterised by an emptiness that may be 
implied by the translation of ngaro as to be hidden, out of sight, covered, 
disappeared, absent, is characterised by a fullness that the participant 
explained as being a part of the creation process and the  “cosmogenic series”  
that is encapsulated in the term oro. 
 
 
The contrast between the participant’s explanation of terms such as Hinengaro and 
Ngaro and the common translations that are associated with these terms today were 
provided as examples of the types of knowledge that can be accessed through a 
different study or perspective of Māori language.  As the participant states, “We get 
to understand the secrets lay within the reo”.    
 
In line with the participant’s focus on meaning within te reo Māori, the participant 
spoke about the term ‘aroha’ which is commonly translated as meaning ‘love’. The 
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participant described the term aroha by breaking the term down to ‘Aro’ and ‘Ha’ 
that the participant translated as meaning ‘sacred breath’ or ‘the sacred thought’:  
 
Aroha… Aro – the thought, the sacred thought. Ha – 
the sacred breath. So, where did everything else come 
out of that? Let’s have a look. It’s right there in front of 
us, our tūpuna put it there.  
 
 
Aroha:  Cleve Barlow (1991) describes Aroha as the sacred creative power 
that emanates from the Gods as one of the three essential elements of all 
things, the other two elements being the pu (the positive force) and the ke 
(the negative force).  Barlow states that, according to elders, 
 
love is not skin deep like the tattooed face of a chieftain but swells up 
continually from the depths of one’s heart.  
 
The whakatauki that Barlow presents, referring to ta moko as skin deep, is 
also interesting in that it connects to a comment made earlier by another 
participant referring to things that are inscribed onto Māori (the inscription 
of identity), signalling that there are other things that sit beneath the obvious 
or the things that are etched on the surface.   
 
 
The participant’s description of Aroha as ‘the sacred thought’ is significant to this 
thesis as it relates to the possibilities of expanding an understanding of thought to 
include things that are outside the boundaries of cognitive thinking.  With this more 
expansive understanding of Hinengaro and aroha (as sacred thought) set as a guide 
for re-turning to the term from a Māori metaphysics, we can depart from the 
translation of Hinengaro as ‘mind’ or as a blanket term that can be used to support 




Metaphysics and essentialism 
Participants expressed concerns about the idea of essentialism and how essentialist 
philosophy has led to rigid conceptualisations of individuals and groups including 
in terms of identities and how experiences (behavioural and cultural), have been 
conceptualised.  Essentialism was discussed as a problematic and damaging 
approach to conceptualising human nature and one that has directly impacted on 
(and shaped) how the notions of mental illness and mental health are understood, 
including the separation of mind and body:  
 
if you hold some essentialist view of human nature, then 
that’s the basis on which you can base some kind of 
morality. But I don’t hold that there is.  There are plenty 
of theories in Western philosophy about human nature 
that are essentialist, and one of the main ones is the 
Cartesian world view, which is mind body.  Which I 
think has done a lot of damage to Western philosophy 
historically but also to conception of the mental health. 
 
 
Western philosophy about human nature that are essentialist: These 
hardened layers of essentialism described by the participant are problematic 
in many ways.  The essentialist and “universalist claims” that are described 
here as being more human than scientific (more created than universally 
true), stem from a metaphysical ground that is hard to disrupt.  The 
essentialist project and its metaphysical foundation represent a monolithic 
structure of re-presentation, but it is a structure that has allowed Māori and 
indigenous expressions about Being some entry.  Gaining entry into this 
structure may seem on the surface to present positive opportunities that might 
be thought of as shared epistemic space; however, if essentialism is the 
foundation – the structure – then those things that enter essentialism’s 





One participant discussed the movement towards reductionist conceptualisations 
within mental health that, in searching for things within the body that may be 
contributing to a person’s experience, had created a focus on the brain as the 
physical source of a person’s behaviour, including behaviours that were considered 
to be dysfunctional  The reductionist approach to explaining what is labelled mental 
illness was described within the context of cultural and historical constructionism 
and ongoing debates about ‘human nature’, and metaphysics,  
 
so even now after years of development of psychiatry in 
the West they’re still disputing the very basic 
terminology about the DSM-5 revised.  What is a 
disorder?  A mental disorder.  And they’re still 
questioning the basic metaphysics of a philosophical 
system that led to that kind of radical 
separation…I…avoid actually embracing some kind of 
essentialist doctrine about what it is to be a human 
being…I kind of have a problem with productionist 
views.  Especially those that have accepted the move to 
the body(and) still want to boil it down to something 
that occurs in what we call the brain.  As a brain 
dysfunction, another word which is probably quite 
difficult.   
 
There are masses of philosophical problems in there 
that we are nowhere near solving.  Everything is 
contestable – the terms, the history, the concept of 
human nature that’s at stake…what those conceptions 
are, and what falls out of that, which is really a series 
of inordinate claims about human beings.  Universalist 






The concept of human nature that’s at stake: The philosophies that 
contributed to the construction of the mind-body separation that the 
participant described as a “radical separation” can be linked to essentialist 
discourses.  These essentialist philosophical systems drive what the 
participant felt had severed the self from the world, encouraging a separation 
of things – to recount Heidegger (1953), the “splitting asunder” (p. 170), of 
things from the whole.  Things, now taken up as separate components, can 
be examined within the framework of fixed traits and human nature.  
However, as the participant explained, any attempts to fix traits or apply 
essentialist discourses leads to an impossible explanatory task that is 
reflected in a lack of consensus within mental health professions. In terms of 
Māori and indigenous contributions to mental health ‘knowledge’, what 
‘fixed traits’ must we be wary of constructing?  How do we avoid the ‘fixing’ 




In line with the points made about philosophy and essentialism, one participant 
talked about how essentialist metaphysics has contributed to essentialist views of 
groups within society.  In the participant’s view, the essentialist metaphysics that 
underlies descriptions of groups and populations remains intact and has not been 
adequately deconstructed or, “revisited”.  Taking a social constructionist 
viewpoint, the participant pointed to the Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism as a 
frame for understanding Māori mental health (and illness) as a product of identity 
construction: 
 
I think the relationship between criminality and being 
mentally unwell so to speak, those distinctions all go 
back to some kind of underlying essentialist 
metaphysics that we haven’t really revisited.  It’s quite 
a big problem…after reading Edward Said’s 
Orientalism you can see the way in which Western 
psychiatry constructed Māori mental health in various 
periods through history…which was more about 
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control than reform…if you accept Edward Said’s 
Orientalism when it comes to questions about mental 
health (the) popular descriptions of craziness and 
madness and so on, then I think you’re buying into an 
argument that says each age kind of constructs a 
conception of mental health or various different groups.   
 
 
Control: The idea of Māori and indigenous identities as constructions of 
essentialism helps to extend a consideration of Māori and indigenous entry 
into shared epistemic spaces.  The expressions (the terms, philosophies, 
narratives and metaphors) of Māori and indigenous peoples when considered 
within the context of construction, are not left to be as they may be intended 
by those that offer gifts of indigenous wisdom.  Or, in seeking to gain entry 
and to be heard within an epistemic system, a type of re-construction may 
already occur that ensures that Māori and indigenous expressions are 
recognised by the structure and that the expressions meet the expectation of 
structure and essentialist presentation as “this or that”.   
 
Māori and indigenous identities are also subject to the expectation that we 
will be “this or that”, and the essentialising gaze is ever watchful (Mika and 
Stewart, 2016), determined to keep us in step.  Essentialism’s catalogues 
(including the DSM), place and re-place Māori and indigenous identities and 
insert indigenous ontologies into lists that can ‘tick-box’ troublesome 
identities (constructed through history and re-emerging in ever changing 
iterations).  However, in a spiritual sense, Māori and indigenous Being (and 
indeed all Being), spills out of essentialist representation despite being 
subject to conceptual containment and the essentialist limiting of spiritual 
excess.    
 
 
Continuing the discussion of the construction of identities of mental illness or 
madness that are applied to groups and that have been applied to Māori and 
indigenous peoples, the participant explained that Michel Foucault’s analysis of the 
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construction of (the notion of) madness can be linked to the West’s history of 
favouring reason over (apparent) unreason:  
 
In Hegel, you can just read it…his philosophy of history 
where he sees the West as the pinnacle of development, 
and all others as kind of let’s say subservient 
intellectually.  Not only subservient but questioning 
their capacity to even be able to think properly.  Which 
is why Foucault is so important when he talks about 
reason and unreason, where the realm of unreason is 
that kind of madness and craziness.   
 
As the participant explains, unreason was linked to madness, but also to ‘other’ 
populations that were seen as inferior based on frameworks of intellectualism. 
 
Containing human experience 
One of the consequences of essentialism that was discussed by participants was the 
tendency to reduce complexity in understanding human experience (and therefore 
the complexity of understanding Being). One participant talked about how 
essentialism and reductionism set up the conditions for containment (both physical 
and conceptual) that, while helpful in situations where containment is protective, is 
applied in ways that negatively impact, including in cases of incarceration and 
institutionalisation: 
 
What Western thinking does is to get a bit freaked out 
about difference.  And a person who’s really really 
anxious has to be kind of contained.  Somebody’s mad, 
they have to be contained.  And sometimes people do 
need to be contained for their sake and for somebody 
else’s.  But we contain them in such a way that we 
potentially destroy them.  Criminals we destroy; unruly 
kids we destroy; boys who just are boys and think with 
their mouths and explore with their tongues and their 
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hands get crushed into boxes.  Then of course what 
happens to girls and the way they are structured, are 
socialised to be an ideal.  I reckon a lot of it is about 
construction; our constructions of an ideal is what 
limits our potential to be.   
 
 
Contained: The relationship between the act of conceptualisation and the act 
of apprehension is particularly poignant when thinking of containment as it 
relates to the history of containment that is associated with mental illness.  
Historical forms of containment have been replaced by policies of 
deinstitutionalisation (e.g., Granerud, and Severinsson, 2006). The idea of 
containing people physically is largely unacceptable and is no longer part of 
a preferred approach to working with people labelled as having mental illness 
(Brunton, 2011).  However, conceptual containment can continue to 
apprehend the person to construct them (and their experiences).  The 
participant’s description of conceptualisation and diagnosis forms a link 
between the idea of containment and the trajectory that may follow, setting 
up a certain pathway of treatment (and diagnostic labelling), that then 
reinforces the containment.   
 
The excesses of meaning that are missed through the construction of clinical 
concepts (or containers), can include wider social experiences (e.g., sexual 
abuse), but they may also include unsayable influences that are at play that 
are part of a person’s (spiritual) whakapapa.  The term ‘at play’ is important 
here for two reasons: firstly, the term play has been discussed in this thesis 
in relation to Derrida’s (1978/1998) insistence that the world is at play behind 
the concepts that are put in place as markers of transcendental truths.  This 
sense of play resonates with Gordon’s (2008) concept of sociological 
haunting, mentioned earlier in the thesis, that makes ‘real fictions’ out of 
conceptual containers that claim to alight on the central or true meaning of 
an object or experience.  Secondly, the world at play also highlights that, 
within a Māori and indigenous metaphysics, an excess of meaning that 
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cannot be contained with concepts is an entitized excess – the spirit at play 
that animates the world.  There is, therefore, a discursive construction that 
occurs and constrains the person in a container of conceptual meaning but at 
a deeper level, there is a metaphysical construction that contains and 
constrains all things. 
 
The idea of construction and conceptual containment (such as when people are 
contained within an ideal that structures identity), appeared to be related to both the 
limiting of Being as well as the limiting of potential: 
 
those ways of conceptualising what might be going on 
for somebody are really dated.  Those are the world 
views, like somebody might actually look like they’ve 
got bipolar disorder and psychosis if they’ve had 
sexual abuse all their lives and have been abandoned 
and haven’t been able to form good attachments.  But 
if they are painted up as it’s a biological problem, then 
the treatment is different, the way people view them is 
different and the diagnosis is more likely to stick.  And 
that then tracks onto a pathway on how we treat people, 
and how they are treated. 
 
 
Somebody might actually look like they’ve got bipolar disorder and 
psychosis if they’ve had sexual abuse all their lives and have been 
abandoned and haven’t been able to form good attachments:  The contexts 
of trauma that impact on people who are labelled as having mental illness 
have become an important consideration as models of care expand to account 
for trauma histories.  The tendency for ‘symptoms’ of trauma to be 
interpreted as a biological problem or to be interpreted as clinical diagnosis 
has been widely critiqued (e.g. see Fallot and Harris, 2001a, 2001b, 2002).  
However, it is the apprehension of complex experiences through framing 
experience as concepts that I find more insidious.  The conceptual uptake of 
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things must deny and discard things that cannot be fully explained by the 
terms that we have at hand to describe things.  This is particularly concerning 
for Māori and indigenous expressions, given the metaphysical premises of 
mystery (e.g., see Mika, 2017), or excessive meaning.  Through an adherence 
to the idea of conceptual framing, we are forced to discard what cannot be 
grasped by the concept. 
 
 
Quantifying human nature 
When asked about the notion of mental illness and the implications that this notion 
has for how Being or human nature is understood, one participant pointed to the 
concept of quantification.  They felt that the notion of mental illness reduced the 
complexity of experience in order to fit into norms that include personality types, 
and, in the context of the clinical term, ‘presentation’, would reduce personality to 
a set of observable characteristics and behaviours:  
  
I think it implies that human nature is quantifiable.  
That it’s controllable and that it has to fit into a norm.  
I think that it doesn’t allow for the breadth of 
experiences that people can have. It doesn’t sanction 
the breadth of experiences people can have. And I think 
that we really only have a small range really of 
presentation.  I’ve thought about this before, in which 
we’re not really evolving a great deal in terms of our 
types of personalities…our personalities are changing 
but we’re still pretty limited in how much we can 
be…We’re kind of forced into these spaces, and I think 
we evolve but we just aren’t as capable of Being as we 
could be.   
 
 
Quantifiable: The participant’s experiences of working in treatment settings 
that classify and quantify behaviour and personality can be thought of as a 
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type of suppression.  The participant’s concern with approaches that do not 
allow for the breadth of experiences that people may have is directly tied to 
a scientific view of human nature that the participant describes as spaces that 
people are forced into.  These spaces, while conceptual (i.e., conceptualising 
normative standards of behaviour), are discussed as having real impacts on 
the person, suppressing and restricting growth and Being.   
 
I think about the different ways that suppression and restriction can be 
imposed, and the pathway set by clinical diagnosis and quantification of 
behaviour.  It reminds me of a story I encountered years before that was told 
by Robert Whittaker (2010), a medical writer who is focussed on determining 
why rates of mental illness are increasing in America. Whittaker tells a story 
of two children whose development takes two very different paths: one child 
forced into clinical spaces and medicated for behaviour deemed to be 
dysfunctional, and one who, in accordance with the parents’ decision, is not 
medicated.  These two paths had vastly different results: one child who sat 
quietly, subdued by medication that was doing the job intended; and the 
other, who has a different experience, permitted to be spirited and loud and 
eventually developing past the ‘behavioural issues’ they were said to exhibit 
at the age of four. What struck me in these stories is that both children were 
described by psychiatrists as having a ‘chemical imbalance’.  Their troubling 
behaviour was reduced to a physical, quantifiable, disorder classification.  
 
 
One participant discussed the concept of Māori mental health and mental health in 
general.  The premises that the concept of mental health (and mental illness), are 
based on were described as aspects of a system that separates people into 
(measurable) parts that are broken (e.g., broken heart, broken spirit), as opposed to 
being based on the premise of holism:  
 
That’s where I’m at. In terms of Māori mental health, 
there was never such a thing, eh? It was all part of life. 
But, you know, what Pākehā do, which bothers me a lot 
because we’re dragged into that system of everything 
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is separated. You’ve got a broken heart, you’ve got a 
broken spirit, you’ve got a broken whatever… you’re 
chucked over here, you’re chucked over here for that 
part, this part over here, you’re chucked over here, yet 
we were all kept in one place to deal with the whole 
thing. I just hate that we buy into such systems of 
separation, because we shouldn’t be separated.  
 
 
We’re dragged into that system of everything is separated. You’ve got a 
broken heart; you’ve got a broken spirit: I interpret the participant’s 
description of the onto-epistemic bases of the dominant Western health 
system as a critique of separation but also as a warning about onto-epistemic 
expectation.  Māori and indigenous terms, when “dragged into” the dominant 
system, must conform to a style of representation that demands clarity and 
the presence of meaning.  This is problematic when things within a Māori 
and indigenous metaphysics, while “charged with meaning” (Kereopa, cited 
in McNeill, 2005, p. 142), are unsayable.  Through acts of epistemic 
integration, however, these unsayable things are subject to framing, 
rendering what spills out of the frame silent and absent.   
 
 
Another participant described how dominant Western notions of Being, which 
focus on the brain as the centre of Being, have directly impacted on lived 
experiences resulting in artificial notions of separation:  
 
I think again that notion of my body that’s completely 
artificial, a way from which those artificial separations 
and labelling have caused us to reconfigure life and our 
actions within life... the West goes okay, this is your 
mind, this is your brain, everything exists in your 
brain, that’s the controller of everything and the 
controller of your Being. We know that that’s not true 
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because your body gets sick and all sorts of things 
happen with regards to your body. 
 
 
This is your mind, this is your brain, everything exists in your brain: As 
discussed in chapter five, the metaphysics of presence is, I think, solidifying 
within mental health and moving towards ever more visible representations 
of human nature.  The onto-epistemic tendency and preference for knowable, 
measurable, essential qualities appears to be manifesting in mental health in 
the growing reliance on and investment in physicalist explanations of 
behaviour (and therefore Being).  For Māori and indigenous peoples, this 
move towards more solid (physical) explanations is problematic when terms 
such as ‘mind’ or ‘mental’ are considered from within Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics.  There can be no assumptions that Māori and indigenous 
meaning will find common onto-epistemic ground on which to share 
perspectives of Being or (more pointedly in terms of physicalist notions of 
mental illness) what is meant by the term ‘mind’.  The dominant 
conceptualisation of ‘mind’ within mental health as a physical substance 
(i.e., see Graham, 2010) leaves little room for metaphysical movement.  
From my perspective, this means that when Hinengaro is translated as mental 
health, there is potential for the profound cosmological meaning associated 
with Hinengaro to be aligned with the dominant conceptualisation of the term 
‘mental’ that is upheld within the mental health system.   
 
 
The participant also described the personality or nature of Being associated with 
the notion of Being as thinking and mental functioning or the brain.  Mind-centred 
notions of Being were associated with the need to have certainty about things in the 
world, which in turn was linked to a history of collecting and labelling things (i.e., 
imperialism, colonisation), 
 
we are quite happy to live with uncertainty... the West 
tries to capture certainty all the time, which is why 
they’re rabid collectors – you know, they’ll collect 
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things and they’ll label and try and nail down certainty.  
Whereas, I think our understanding of the world is 
definitely around there are always going to be 
uncertainties because we’re not the king of the planet… 
it has its way of Being and it will give us signs around 
particular things. 
 
In contrast, another participant talked about the Māori term ngākau as a source of 
emotional knowledge.  While ngākau is commonly translated as heart, it was 
described here as Māori understandings of emotional knowledge that are grounded 
in or present in the body:  
 
thinking about ngākau and why do we put so much 
emphasis on ngākau?  Well ... it was really about being, 
I think, more grounded and more present in our bodies 
than we are now... the more we talk about it the more 
we tend to be centred in that and so where emotions 
come from in the body is different.   You know, the 
emotion of the heart, like a lot of stuff in the West is all 
about the heart. Yet, there are completely different 
ideas, I think, around how the body develops and 
therefore how you interact with the world.  So, I think 
all of that needs sorting as well.   
 
 
Ngākau: Māori views of Being that contrast with perspectives of Being as 
‘quantifiable parts’ - such as the brain or even ngākau - foreground the notion 
of embodied Being.  Within this thesis, ngākau has been discussed as a place 
from which thinking can emerge but not in the sense of strict cognitive 
‘thought’.  As discussed in the method chapter, ‘te whakaaro o te ngākau’ 
relates to a holistic process of embodied thinking.  This understanding of 
ngākau can be discussed in contrast with what is closest to a Māori 
understanding of the brain or ‘roro’ that, while also engaging in a type of 
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thought process, was understood as holding knowledge that is ‘fleeting’.  The 
divide between the metaphysics that separates mind and body and a Māori 
metaphysics of holistic embodiment brings the concepts and subsequent 
treatment approaches that are practiced within the mental health system into 
sharp focus.   
 
 
Fixed meaning – fixed responses 
 
One participant shared a memory that provided an understanding of how Māori 
worldviews provide different perspectives of behaviour.  The example the 
participant gave related to what, in a clinical and dominant societal view, is 
conceptualised as suicide.  Rather than speak about common conceptualisations of 
suicide, the participant talked instead about her own experience as an adolescent of 
wanting to “cross the awa” and leave her body:  
 
We know we’ve got to go; we’ve got to go cross that 
awa and then we can travel into that other space, except 
I had to learn to leave where my body was. So, crossing 
the river was not about suicide; it was about going to 
my nan, but she wouldn’t let me come. 
 
 
Crossing the river was not about suicide: Again, Māori expressions appear 
to be at the mercy of a pre-determined concept that is enforced from an 
external worldview.  The participant understands her experience in a 
different way which has implications in terms of how onto-epistemic space 
is created within mental health - allowing for positively divergent 
explanations of experience. 
 
The participant also talked about approaches to healing, expressing discontent about 
pharmaceutical approaches and the impact that these approaches have on the 
person.  The pharmaceutical approach was discussed within the wider context of 
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dominant Western approaches to treatment and what the participant believes are 
barriers to a person’s development and growth.  The inability to utilise traditional 
healing processes was also discussed and the participant described the difference 
between those who position themselves as healers and those who position 
themselves as facilitators of healing,  
 
they drug them out of Being. They walk around like 
zombies. They want to use approaches that just doesn’t 
have that person grow…But in saying that too, we have 
our own people who don’t know how to utilise the 
traditions of ours and the healing processes. They’re 
busy walking around labelling themselves as healers. 
I’m not a healer and never will be, never have been. I 
heal me. My job is to open a door and find the healer 
within that person and say, you know the best about 
you, let’s examine what you think you are. Mine is to lay 




My job is to open a door and find the healer within that person: The idea 
of treatment as healing and as the role of facilitator or an act of facilitation 
appears to be different from conceptualising approaches to healing as being 
located in a professional’s knowledge through diagnosis and the 
management of symptoms. I speculate that this means the healing (in 
whatever form or process), comes from a source different from professional 
knowledge that is conceptualised as ‘expert’ knowledge.  I think there is a 
conceptual difference between the terms treatment and facilitation and that 
this manifests in a metaphysical difference between the idea of individuals 
treating other individuals (human centred knowledge and human centred 
recovery from ‘mental illness’) and the person seeing themselves, and 





One participant discussed how limited conceptualisations of Being and ideas about 
sets of behaviours play out in clinical practice and treatment settings or in working 
with people who are experiencing emotions related to trauma and grief.  Rather than 
supporting people to process emotions as natural responses to traumatic 
experiences, the participant believed that experiencing grief and trauma is limited 
by expectations that include the length of time that a person experiences an 
emotional response, the severity of the response and the type of behaviour that is 
exhibited:  
 
the attending clinician has it fixed in his or her mind 
that the client is suffering from bipolar disorder, or 
psychosis, or something.  But someone else might say 
actually no, maybe it’s PTSD; this person has had a lot 
of trauma. And my biggest concern is that our natural 
response to trauma and grief and pain and hurt is 
controlled for us.  We’re allowed to grieve but come on, 
wrap it up.  For god’s sake don’t go crazy about it, and 
don’t go on hard drugs and get into unsafe sexual 
relationships because it’s filling a gap or quitting your 
job and running off and doing something really crazy.   
 
 
Natural response to trauma and grief and pain: The participant’s reference 
to “natural response to trauma and grief and pain” raises questions about 
what natural responses might be.  Our natural responses are hidden beneath 
objective medical and scientific language that suppresses other possibilities 
of how we might think of our experiences.  I have also heard mental health 
consumer advocates and others who critically analyse mental health 
discourse argue that what is labelled mental illness is in fact a natural and 
normal psychological response to trauma.  
  
These alternate views have the potential to challenge diagnostic categories 
to expand views about what different behaviours mean.  However, it also 
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illustrates how hard it is to shift pre-determined frames of thinking about 
behaviour, including shifting from the conceptualisation of behaviour as an 
individual’s observable behaviour to the individual being part of the whole.  
From within a Māori and indigenous metaphysics, I would argue that the 
individual’s place within the whole is important to the discussion of how we 
think of natural responses (and in this case, a natural response to trauma).  
For example, I attended a presentation in 2018 that was given by Professor 
Vanessa de Oliveira Andreotti. In this presentation Professor Andreotti 
described what she calls modern colonial habits of Being that are 
characterised by capitalist materialist desires and rationalist ontologies that 
reduce Being to ‘knowing’.  
 
The model presented by Professor Andreotti ties our Being to modernity’s 
love for conquest and progress that is conceptualised as scientific and 
technological expansion, discovery, extraction and ownership.  There are, 
however, hidden costs that sit beneath narratives of progress.  The 
exploitation of people and of the planet, the false promise of universal 
security, and the anxiety that is created by the expectation of individual 
progress, are all things that trap the human life-force. Through this analysis 
of the ontology of modernity, Professor Andreotti has begun to look at the 
issue of addiction through the lens of entanglement, theorising that addiction 
(drug and alcohol) may be more like an experience of attunement to what she 
calls ‘colonial addictions’ or addiction to modernity.  This view of addiction 
could be likened to the term worldedness that has been discussed in this 
thesis as the mysterious collapse of the world in any one thing or the 
understanding that “all things actively construct and comprise” any one thing 
in the world (Mika, 2017, p.3).  In this sense, natural reactions that are 
currently conceptualised as mental illness could be understood not as an 
individual natural reaction, but as part of a (un) natural entanglement.  This 
does not necessarily mean that things in the world, including people, will 
automatically become unwell as a result of living and Being in the world.  
Rather, this thinking pushes our attention in a certain direction opening up 
conceptual possibilities for understanding ‘natural reactions’ as something 
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that occurs within the ‘whole’ as opposed to occurring within part of the 
whole (or the individual).   
 
 
The participant also discussed the role of clinicians in the context of ethics 
associated with identifying the cause of mental illness or what may be 
conceptualised as problematic behaviours or emotional states:  
 
I think we have a curiosity and I think a lot of clinicians 
have a curiosity, but they also have the training that to 
know is to be able to help.  If we go with just the ethics, 
and a responsible practitioner would want to know to 
be able to help, but if you get caught up in it to the extent 
that you think there’s something there and you 
absolutely have to know, you could go down the wrong 




Mystery: The idea of ethics as an obligation to ensure that a clinician is able 
to help a person and the pursuit of knowledge about why a person is having 
a particular experience is discussed here as a complicated process of 
balancing knowledge (as certainty), and the potential for reaching inaccurate 
conclusions.  The question, I suggest, is whether healing is dependent on 
accuracy and certainty or if there are other pathways (based on divergent 
metaphysical premises), that can be used to engage with a person’s 
experience.  The idea of mystery as a metaphysical premise brings up 
possibilities that sit counter to finding the centre of meaning.  The possibility 
of navigating a person through an experience by using a type of relational 
orientation was raised in chapter six when discussing psychotherapy that 
focuses on things that ‘haunt’: these are the histories and stories affecting the 
person that cannot be brought fully to light (Harris, Kalb and Klebanoff 
(2017).  The person’s connections to others and the complex weave of stories 
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that make up a person’s realities show up and take effect regardless of 
whether they can be explained or not.  Through invoking different strategies 
to access those complex effects and experiences, a whole realm of 
possibilities may be open to the person and to those that are attempting to 
facilitate healing.  I liken this to the process of creative expression described 
by Nepia (2012) who explains how uncertainty can be a positive feature that 
enhances “the potential for discovery” (p.28). 
 
 
In line with the idea of worldedness, one participant spoke about the difference 
between the concept of relationship that she described as being “in sync” with the 
environment (both physical and non-physical), and the idea of experiencing mental 
illness: 
 
One of the really, really important things – and this is 
about karakia, that he talked about, about that karakia 
transmits our understanding, our Māori understanding, 
of our state of Being, and it helps with our relationships 
with the cosmos, with our environment and with each 
other. So, our Being, our Māori Being is actually about 
being in tune or being cognisant or being in place, at 
peace, in the state of normal with our environment 
which includes our cosmos. When we’re not in line with 
that, we’re not in mental illness, we’re actually out of 
sync with our Being in this environment.  
 
 
Out of sync: Rather than understanding certain behaviours or states of Being 
as an illness, the participant understands these behaviours as being in a state 
that is “out of sync” with the wider environment.  The pathway back to being 
‘in sync’, including using karakia, might be seen as a transmission of 
understanding through karakia - an understanding of the cosmological, 
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environmental and interpersonal relationships that are a part of the ‘normal’ 




Another participant talked about the idea of imbalance as being in an emotional 
state “all of the time” and also as the impact of living in a “Pākehā world” that is 
difficult to escape and imposes restrictions on traditional Māori ways of Being.  The 
participant stated that in working with people who are seeking healing, she sees her 
role as supporting the person to experience balance.  The experience of balance that 
was discussed here also connects to this participant’s previous description of Hine 
and Ngaro through their reference to “the seer that sees beyond the seeing and the 
hearer that hears beyond the hearing”:  
  
When we’re working with those that spend their time in 
their emotions and all of the time in their emotions, for 
me my work is to bring balance. We’re so unbalanced, 
in everything. I say walk into the Pākehā world with 
your hand totally in a Māori world all of the time, that 
you know exactly – as much as you know in te ao Māori, 
be living in it, working in it, knowing it, fully 
experiencing the beauty of the legacy our tūpuna left us, 
and when we can conquer that, we can walk in the 
Pākehā world too because that’s where we’re at. That’s 
where it is. We can’t say to these Pākehā, go home and 
leave our awa alone. It’s already too late. We have 
instilled so much. While I can say we can walk in that 
world, now we’re working even in a more technical 
world which is so totally different, another invasion of 
our ability to use the seer that sees beyond the seeing, 




The participant also provided a view on other clinical labels framing behaviour, 
offering an alternative perspective on schizophrenia which, from a Māori 
perspective, normalises the idea that each person expresses multiple selves that they 
conceptualised as different states.  The participant described the impact of 
conceptualising and framing behaviour and how the idea of exploring behaviour as 
different states of Being can be suppressed through equating this idea with a 
dominant clinical concept:  
 
we are schizophrenic…I’ve been teaching that.  I said 
“we learn through our atua – all the different states like 
tānenuiarangi, tānewhakapirpiri, tāne matua, tāne te 
wananga, tāne te atamai.  I’m the mother and the 
daughter, I’m the auntie, I’m the grandma, I’m the 
great-grandma, I’m the artist, I’m the carver, I’m the 
poet, I’m the storyteller, I’m the teacher, I’m the 
student… and each one of those characters has a 
different behaviour. I’m the lover. I would never use 
that lover’s behaviour with my children. I believe that 
that’s where the roles get crossed, because we haven’t 
learned about the behaviours of each one of that 




We are schizophrenic: The understanding of balance and imbalance that is 
connected to the experience of being in the emotional body, that can be 
conceptualised as Ngaro (the emotional tāne/male aspect within a person), 
and the re-framing of schizophrenia as the multiplicity of Being, shifts the 
metaphysical construction of the indigenous self (and other selves).  Within 
a dominant Western metaphysics, the idea of imbalance has been discussed 
in this thesis as a dysfunctional internal conflict (tied to the idea of proper 
moral functioning), that continues to influence the way that behaviour is 
framed today (Seeskin, 2008).  Within this metaphysics, the rational self (that 
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is connected to the image of ‘mind’), governs other inferior aspects of 
interior Being ensuring that balance is achieved.  The implications that this 
view of the person has had for how the self is constructed has also been 
connected to the separation of mind and body – the mind occupying a 
superior position over the lesser corporal physical aspect of Being.  The 
implications that this metaphysical view of the person has for the 
construction of the self, and particularly the indigenous self, include the 
construction of self as a largely self-contained rational Being and one whose 
experience of ‘imbalance’ is centred on an internal chaos and ‘dis-order’ that 
prevents (individual) moral functioning.  Re-framing the idea of imbalance 
to one that implicates spiritual cosmogenic elements that raise the possibility 
of external influences but ones that are at once intimately connected to the 
Being of a person (and all people), shifts the focus away from internal 
dysfunction to bring in an understanding of balance as relationship.  While I 
am not aiming to provide a tidy explanation of how this shift in 
understanding would be applied within a therapeutic setting, the narrative 
that is offered through an understanding of cosmogenic Being may offer 
different possibilities of understanding an experience.  These understandings 
may not result in the assigning of labels and exact descriptions of experiences 
but rather in seeing the self as something other than a dysfunction.  These 
narratives also challenge the ideas of restricting excess (as discussed in 
Aristotle’s metaphysics), that suppress Māori and indigenous expressions 
that are seen as being inconsistent with the ordering of the positive and 
objective language of scientific clinical discourse.   
 
 
Liberating Māori worldviews 
When asked about their understanding of what constitutes a Māori worldview, one 
participant spoke about narratives that are different from what they called a 
Eurocentric view of relationships between the human and natural world along with 
views about relationships between people.  For the participant, Māori worldviews 
provide a pathway for escaping dominant views, described as a “mental escape 
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hatch” that, while not allowing for a complete escape from modern ways of living, 
enabled a different way of thinking about the world: 
 
To me, a Māori world view is a way of understanding, 
particularly the human world but also to some extent 
the natural world, that derives from a heritage of 
different narrative, stories and events from those of the 
mainstream. My own little way of thinking about it for 
me is being Māori I think of it a bit like an escape hatch 
because everything about this world is so dominated by 
that euro-centric way of understanding the human 
being and the relationship with nature and with other 
human beings. An escape hatch in the sense that it’s like 
that’s not really me. I’m actually over here. It’s not 
really something that I can – I can’t go and live over 
there but mentally, it’s like a mental escape hatch. 
 
 
Mental escape hatch: A mental escape hatch could be conceptualised as an 
activity centred in thinking differently about the world in the literal sense of 
intellectual responses and processes.  It could also be conceptualised, in a 
wider sense, as a way of Being in the world and the ability to transition the 
self from a non-relational Being to a relational Being escaping the limitations 
of having a primarily rational relationship with things in the world. 
 
 
Normalising Māori pathways to healing 
One participant spoke about the normalisation of a Māori worldview, noting some 
behaviours and thoughts that may provide pathways to healing despite these 
behaviours being seen as strange or potentially conceptualised as dysfunctional.  
The participant referred to the experience of a young woman who had sought a 
pathway to healing through sleeping on her grandmother’s grave at night and how, 
in a wider sense, Māori may know that visiting a grave to be with loved ones that 
303 
 
have passed on has the potential to heal.  Within the context of wondering how 
Māori may know that certain behaviours are pathways to healing, the participant 
considered the potential for this knowledge to be embodied or for it to be a result 
of socialisation (i.e., an innate understanding that guides responses to trauma or 
something we learn):  
 
If you don’t have those things, but you are open, or 
maybe you even do have those things and then a Māori 
might come on and go no that’s actually been a wider 
experience, so she’s been sleeping on her 
grandmother’s grave, every time she gets distressed we 
know she’s going to end up on her grandmother’s 
grave.  And she might have had an experience 
where…she was that distressed over a period of time 
that she ended up sleeping on her grandmother’s grave 
in the middle of the night, and it was pouring down with 
rain. 
 
Why do we know that going back to the grave is going 
to heal us?   Our connection back to this Māori-ness, 
this Māori world view includes going back to a grave 
and trying to be with the only tangible object of our 
grandmother or grandfather, grandson anything.  
That’s normal for us, not the best to be doing it in the 
dark when it’s raining, you want to kind of mediate that, 
but that self-help, that Māori world view of how do I 
heal myself because maybe I’m not getting help 
anywhere else, or maybe that’s actually where I want to 
be, that’s a normal Māori worldview response. Whether 
we’re socialised into it or whether we feel it innately or 
whether it’s just that kind of like pain that is in our 
bodies, in our DNA, in our grief, that’s where we go.  
That’s a Māori world view there, and I think Western 
science psychology is shifting on that.  
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Why do we know that going back to the grave is going to heal us? The 
question, “Why do we know that going back to the grave is going to heal 
us?” and the participant’s mention of having a tangible connection to loved 
ones as a way of coping with distress, raises interesting questions about the 
tangible and intangible in the context of help-seeking and treatment systems, 
including in the case of self or whānau help-seeking behaviour.  In the 
example given by the participant, the person is seeking a tangible site of 
healing (the grave of a loved one), but what is implicit in this behaviour is 
also the connection to those who are not physically present (intangible 
connections).  We might also speculate that this same intangible connection 
to a loved one who is not physically present is also tangible in the sense that 
the person is connected through DNA but that there are, in turn, intangible 
aspects to this that are reflected in the term whakapapa that expands the idea 
of blood connection to go beyond biological genealogy to include the 
spiritual connection between all things. 
 
 
Another participant also spoke about the type of experiences that may fall outside 
of dominant expectations of normality when viewed from within a dominant 
Western frame of reference.  These experiences include hearing or seeing 
phenomenon that are not otherwise visible or audible (i.e., explained as visual or 
auditory hallucinations in clinical terms).  The participant explained that when these 
experiences are viewed from a different worldview, however, an alternative ground 
of understanding is presented that may provide opportunities for exploring (rather 
than suppressing) the experience:  
 
I think for what constitutes mental illness, I think if our 
people start seeing someone, if they start seeing people 
coming around them we’ll take it seriously. Our first 
line is probably to say, I know my family is saying well 
who was it? Did they want something? And they’ll take 
it seriously.  Whereas we know the methods of 
practitioners … they’ll classify that a particular way. I 
think the realms between the living and those who have 
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passed on, or even other entities, for us is more dynamic 
and accessible by a lot of people. I think we come from 
that basis. A lot of our people, the mental health system 
is actually making them worse because they’re unable 
to work through things. We have a high tolerance of 
letting people work through what they need to work 
through. Whereas if you medicate it... you don’t 
necessarily understand what’s happening there. 
 
One participant related the experience of what is labelled mental illness (and in this 
example depression), with popular views on “light and dark”.  The participant 
explained that, in popular culture, dark is usually associated with negative states 
and is dramatized in ways that equate dark with fear and dangerous situations.  In 
contrast, the participant explained that, from a Māori perspective, the experience of 
darkness and the idea of being in the dark can be associated with healing and, in 
particular, healing from deep sadness.  The participant described the different 
spaces within the wharenui and how these correspond with realms of light and dark 
in the world or Te Pō and Te Ao Mārama.  Te Pō was described as a realm of 
healing:  
 
we talked about depression around that our 
understanding of light and dark.  And I think this is 
really important…The West are being like the dark and 
anything dark is like bad news.  We’ve raised my moko 
to be actually really comfortable in the dark. I used to 
take them for walks at night and we’d look at the moon, 
we look at the stars and we’d tell her to feel what the 
eels are like in the dark.  Because I didn’t want them to 
be afraid of that.  You know, you see it in songs all the 
dark, the dark is a place to be afraid of. 
 
spaces of darkness could be nurturing places and 
healing spaces... You have at the front Te Ao Mārama 
and you have at the back Te Pō.  And people who were 
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in say states of depression or needing healing could go 
to Te Pō to stay in that place for as long as they wanted 
to go, to be there. Now, if they were there for too long 
people would observe them and if they were there for 
too long, they would start to be enticed out.  There’s 
comfort and healing in those spaces but not too long … 
and then they would start to sing to them, they would 
start to do things to entice them out to Te Ao Mārama.  
Things like that where the West has also cut us off from 
our nurturing places, from our healing spaces. To me, 
the dark the moon and the stars, I just think there’s so 
much healing that comes from them, as much as the sea, 
all of these different things but it’s whether or not our 
kids can be connected to those things. 
 
 
Spaces of darkness could be nurturing places and healing spaces... You 
have at the front Te Ao Mārama and you have at the back Te Pō: When 
thinking about the ways that the participant describes states of Being and 
how these are connected to physical and non-physical spaces (such as the 
wharenui and the more than physical space of ‘Te Pō’), I am struck by the 
contrast between what the participant identifies as Western views on 
darkness (that are often associated with negative spaces), and Māori views 
on darkness (Te Pō), as a source of healing.  The view of Te Pō as the 
physical space of healing and the ability to sit in that space and be nurtured 
seems to contrast with what was described by another participant in an earlier 
comment about how Western clinical approaches tend to encourage people 
to hastily discard heavy emotions in favour of re-turning to a functional state.  
Within that previous comment the participant expressed concern that “our 
natural response to trauma and grief and pain is controlled for us”.  I reflect 
on that sense of control in the context of a healing process in which darkness 
is a source of healing and the healing is a process of sitting and Being.  This 
view of healing, within a clinical setting and more widely from within a 
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cultural world view that equates darkness with negativity, appears to 
represent a dual suppression of Māori spiritual responses.  Both the idea of 
darkness and the idea of taking time to experience distress (or remain in an 
emotional state), appear to be viewed through a negative lens.   
 
 
The participant also spoke about the variations in darkness that exist and the beauty 
that is associated with the various shades and hues.  However, while the participant 
used terms such as “velvety blue” as an example of variance that would indicate 
differences in shades of colour, they referred to this difference as “all sorts of 
states” as opposed to referring to ‘all sorts of colours.   
 
Another participant expressed discontent about the tendency to equate what is real 
with what can be seen or what is visible and how these tendencies impact on the 
way that emotions and behaviour are interpreted:  
 
when are we going to wake up and realise that there’s 
a whole other world apart from what they can actually 
see…the way they interpret emotion sometimes, that’s 
fraught, the way they interpret behaviour is fraught, so 
I think that a lot of ways that stuff happens in the system 
that is not great. 
 
In speaking about experiences that have been termed Extra Ordinary Experiences 
(See Taitimu, 2007), including for example seeing someone who has passed away, 
another participant reflected on the question of how the person who has had the 
experience would interpret the experience and framed this as a central issue in 
determining a response to the experience.  The participant stated that external 
interpretations (both clinical and indigenous), tend to suppress the complexity and 
variance that exists in people’s experience of phenomena:  
 
If we’re defining the Māori way as exploration of soul 
wounds, intergenerational trauma, all those sorts of 
things then we’re just saying one way, and that’s the 
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problem I have, it’s not complex, it’s not complicated 
enough.  It doesn’t account for the variance that is in 
there.   
 
 
It doesn’t account for the variance that is in there: What I find interesting 
in reflecting on the two responses shown here is that there is a sense of the 
need to account for things that are both visible and invisible (presence and 
absence). However, there is a sense that, in developing Māori approaches to 
healing, the complexities tied to the invisible and the unsayable, 
unintelligible aspect of Being can be lost in the defining of an experience.  
Defining trauma from an indigenous perspective may not capture the 
variance that is at play in the experience (and the person) and may be as rigid 
as non-indigenous conceptualisations.   The idea of there being an 
expectation of how something will be re-presented as ‘this’ or ‘that’ and the 
language that is at hand to produce and share indigenous models of mental 
health are significant in the context of engaging the “whole person”.   
 
 
When talking about the notion of mental illness, one participant related the notion 
of mental illness to having a strong awareness or experience of wairua.  The 
participant believed that wairua, and connecting with wairua or entities, are 
fundamental aspects of what is commonly conceptualised as mental illness:  
 
I have a very strong point of view that I don’t mind 
sharing, that mental illness is a strongness with 
wairua.  People are very potently aware, and they don’t 
have the tools of how to handle it on a daily basis, and 
we’ve been brought into the spooky and drama and 
trauma of what it is for other people, what the movies 
say. When you get rid of all that stuff, the actual reality 
is it’s just you and I having a conversation, and it’s just 





That mental illness is a strongness with wairua: There is a connection 
between conceptualising mental illness as a wairua experience that has come 
to be associated with ideas projected from ‘scary movies’ and other 
narratives, and previous comments made about how darkness has come to be 
associated with fear and negativity.  The experience of wairua as an energy 
has been discussed earlier in this thesis in relation to Valentine’s (2009) 
description of wairua as a fundamental attribute that enables Māori to engage 
with our reality through a type of intuitive consciousness.  Later in this 
section, another participant will refer to wairua when discussing healing 
through engaging in karakia to address what is “impacting on wairua”.  This 
has an interesting alignment with what the participant is describing in the 
comments above when they describe wairua as an entity (or entities) that we 
may be “having a conversation with” but that this might manifest as 
behaviour that causes concern (e.g.., behaviour that is labelled 
schizophrenic). There is a sense of mystery and the unknowable that is 
connected to the spiritual nature of both wairua and darkness or Te Pō.  
Neither is fully discernible and the mystery that is part of these entities was 
described in chapter four as “a limit on what we know about an object, related 
to its ability to withhold part of itself from our view” (Mika, 2017, p.5), or 
things that call for our attention, presenting themselves to be regarded while 
at the same time withholding the fullness of their spectre.  
 
The ability for wairua to call for our attention and the impact that this has on 
wairua (as a shared element of being between the internal and external 
world), along with the nature of mystery that denies a full apprehension of 
the experience, may sit comfortably within a Māori metaphysics. However, 
this same metaphysics is challenging to a dominant Western orientation 
relying on discernible present objects that provide some certainty.  It is the 
clash of these two metaphysics that I suspect gives rise to a negative framing 
of spiritual experiences (that can then be catalogued and made present and 
measurable as, for example, schizophrenia), and also suppresses spirituality, 
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preventing learning about the types of wairua communication that the 
participant is describing.     
 
 
In terms of conceptualising the connection between colonisation and Being as a 
creative experience, one participant discussed the use of terms as things that create 
dis-ease or well-being.  This participant believed that many of the terms used in 
health (including public health that is usually associated with the prevention of 
disease), reflect states of illness and that using language that focuses on illness has 
a material impact that creates and re-creates disease:  
 
Speaking from a public health perspective with all those 
rules and stuff, it’s still very heavy. As an example, in 
the public health space it’s all disease state, a spectre. 
So, what happens is that if they’re always promoting 
about a disease you will perpetuate that for all eternity. 
If you sort of flip that and talk about ease within your 
family – ease, health, wealth, feeling great – it’s a whole 
different energy, and there’s nothing medical about it.   
 
This view was also expressed by another participant who was concerned with the 
way in which words (as part of the understanding of interconnection and impacts 
on wairua), impact on well-being.  When talking about her own experiences of 
dealing with what mainstream medicine describes as a chronic health problem, the 
participant recounted the experience of being advised by a medical professional to, 
“stop talking about being chronic”; this medical professional instead encouraged 
her to focus on her state of wellness, given that she was already engaging in 
treatment and was experiencing good medical outcomes.  The participant spoke 
about the power of the words that we use and their “reverberation”.   
 
In another example, the participant recalled providing similar advice to a Māori 
organisation who had, in searching for a name for their group, settled on a term that 
held specific implications for them in terms of their behaviour.  The name the group 
settled on loosely translates to ‘calling wellness’ which, as the participant 
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explained, creates certain responsibilities related to the reverberations of words that 
make up the name provided.  The name the group had selected would have 
implications that would be set in motion by using the particular words, which in the 
early stages of developing the organisation were ‘karanga’ (to call) and ‘ora’ 
(wellness).   
 
because that’s just the name they’ve put up, I said 
you’re calling wellness. So, if you’re calling wellness, 
that entity to enter into your life, you’ve got to prepare 
to be accepting of it if oranga comes… you call ora in 
and how prepared are you to accept it? Because it is an 
entity. I also know that we will and can call in kino as 
well, and some of the times we don’t recognise when 
Mauriora is coming in the door or te ao kino is coming 
in the door, because we’re so f**ked up in our heads 
around our colonised way of thinking.  
 
I was talking to them about ora being a real thing, so to 
get ora to happen you need to prepare the place where 
ora is going to land. That’s from your ngākau that’s 
from your wairua, all of that sort of thing so that when 
ora comes and you do the pōhiri, you’re doing the 




Because that’s just the name they’ve put up, I said you’re calling wellness. 
So, if you’re calling wellness, that entity to enter into your life, you’ve got 
to prepare to be accepting of it if oranga comes: An entitized description of 
language, and the sometimes inadvertent act of calling in entities through the 
words that are used, is reflected in how language is described from outside 
of an ‘objective language’ framework.  This view of language presents it as 
something more than descriptive words that grasp and represent an object.  
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We see clues about how the participants describe the living nature of 
language in some of the descriptions of language that were presented in 
chapter four.  Language as a living entity is described as a “sacred expression 
of breath (that) incorporates this orientation in all its foundations.” (Cajete, 
2005, p. 70).  Words and phrases are described as “vitalistic (and) expressive 
of life forces, (of) metaphysics, and cosmic energy”.(Manuka, 2001, p.199), 
and language is also described as a non-linguistic energy or ‘ecology’ that 
resists any strict rules of the structure that is expected through verbal and 
written language.  It is in this sense that the impact of language on states of 
Being may be understood, particularly when considering how a label (such 
as chronic illness), is applied to a person’s experience.  As Mika (2005) 
explains, language has a spiritual movement implicating those things that 
exist behind the terms that are used - things that are then ushered in by 
language.  Within this context, what are the implications of employing the 
terms that are used in mental health to describe the notion of mental illness - 
including the term mental illness itself - in relation to the construction of the 
self?  Considering the participant’s description of language as a living entity, 
I speculate that the clinical terms used in the mental health setting (that find 
their way into popular conceptualisations of mental illness), are both 
spiritually and materially constructive.  This construction includes but also 
goes beyond the discursive and social construction concerns that are often 
voiced about labelling to impact on the spiritual self as a relation to other 
things in the world. This is particularly significant when the self is re-
constructed to deny the existence of relationships with external entities - a 
refusal which is arguably built into the structure and meaning of the language 
that is dominant in mental health treatment settings and in the community.    
 
The participant described ‘kupu’ as entities that can be called in and that there is a 
need to prepare for the entity’s arrival.  Distinguishing between entities that are in 
line with mauriora (associated with a sense and state of wellness) and kino (evil or 
bad) was also important and the participant related the ability (or inability) to make 




In terms of returning to a Māori way of thinking and Being that would support the 
ability to engage in the calling of entities that align with wellness - and, more 
broadly, ways of living that call wellness - the participant spoke about being able 
to receive a type of guidance through different ways of thinking and engaging that 
she characterised as dreaming and imagination:   
 
We need to start dreaming, imagining, whatever you 
like to call it, the world that we want it to be and then 
we do this big kind of – miss out this bit and go back to 
that bit to say, okay you people, there were some things 
that you actually laid down for us – we can’t find them, 
you’re going to have to give us a clue and be absolutely 
okay about the wairua giving us some clues about what 
we need to be thinking about. 
  
Another example of the reverberation of words and a sense of a living entitized 
language was reflected in one participant’s recounting of a memory from childhood.  
The participant described her sibling as an amazing singer who had been chosen for 
classical training.  At this point, another sister of the participant, who was present 
in the house during the interview, joined the conversation, confirming and adding 
details to the story.  The following is a full account of the story as it unfolded in 
conversation.  It is included here in this way to allow for a discussion of how the 
story pushes thinking about the impact of applying structure and rigidity to things 
that would be, in a more natural state - melodious (in the context of song and 
singing/waiata and tune/rangi):  
   
Interviewee: But our sister was taught classically by 
Beatrice Webster, and thereafter right up until she died, 
whenever she wrote a waiata it was something that had 
that trained connotation.  It missed something after 
that...that sadness in it. 
 




Interviewer:       Like it had to follow some rules. 
 
Interviewee:       It did, it did, and Pākehā rules. 
 
Interviewee 2:   It doesn’t belong. It doesn’t belong.  
 
Interviewee:  It wasn’t that natural melody, that 
melodious Māori ability 
 
 
Like it had to follow some rules: This reference to rules pushes my thinking 
towards considering the rules that are apparent in clinical systems and 
clinical language.  The simple representation that is reflected in clinical 
language and diagnostic categories is, through provisions in health policy, at 
times complemented by additional contextual information that include 
cultural beliefs.  However, holism or holistic health, from within a Māori 
metaphysics, is more than the visible social connections that a person 
experiences including, for example, connections to physical landscapes.  
Holism as a metaphysical experience is an understanding of the complex 
nature of Being that resists the idea of conceptual, definitive explanation, and 
the view that something (including behaviour), can be grasped in such a way 
that it is fully presentable.  The multiple connections with both seen and 
unseen entities (whanaunga) make objective, positive descriptions of human 
experience highly problematic within this metaphysical context and serves 
to silence those less discernible, and less visible connections, muting the 
melodious fullness of Being that is at play.   
 
 
Within this example, there is a sense of containment that comes through in how the 
‘rules’ of singing and ‘melody’ are described.  This appears to mirror the idea of 
containment that has been discussed so far in this thesis in relation to human 
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emotion and behaviour and (in a wider context) the world as a whole that must be 
‘disciplined’. 
 
Māori metaphysics in health  
In talking about the role of Māori in mental health systems of treatment, one 
participant recognised the contribution of all Māori who work to contribute to 
developing Māori approaches within mental health while also recognising the 
systemic restrictions that frame much of the work that Māori are attempting to 
undertake.  The participant stated, “they’re doing the best that they can within their 
own intellectual environment”.  However, when reflecting on the focus of this 
thesis and PhD research question, the participant was mindful of how focussing on 
what is not working can detract and distract from creating pathways back to 
relational Being through a focus on Te Ao Māori and interconnectedness that 
supports a process of, “re-centring ourselves back into our universe”: 
 
we’re so busy doing things against what’s not working 
…. I don’t think this deconstructs mental illness, but 
what it does do it actually requires the construction or 
the reconstruction of Te Ao Māori and our relationships 
with our universe and with each other.  
 
Another participant commented on the provision of Māori health services that they 
felt were often based on the same models of care as non-Māori, non-indigenous 
services:  
 
there’s lots of Māori health providers but they’re just 
providing the same health, they’re just brown faces, 
aren’t they? Brown faces for the same health provision 
with the same medical models. 
 
One participant also cautioned that the application of Māori values and concepts 
within the context of mental health would need to account for and retain the 
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premises on which Māori values and concepts are based rather than attempting to 
fit Māori values and concepts into non-Māori models:  
 
Fundamentally. Well, I think what we’re good at doing 
is making it seem commensurable. Like, we can take 
that model and do a Māori version of it and make it 
seem like it fits. But what informs the Māori view is 
often completely different, is premised on a completely 
different notion of being a person, being human, Being.  
 
In reflecting on Māori mental health approaches, one participant described how 
Māori have knowledge of behaviour that may appear to be similar to psychological 
theories (such as the superego), but that Māori have a different metaphysical basis 
that extends beyond the individual.  In comparing and relating the concepts of te 
hihiri that the participant related to the psychological concept of the superego,  the 
participant explained that the Māori term te hihiri, when understood in the context 
of a person or personality, can be likened to a taniwha; an entity that can bring 
balance within a person and the place that is the “seat of immense power”:  
   
When you go into te hihiri…the super ego space, which 
is where memory and taniwha actually co-exist and 
violence. It’s the seat of immense power and knowledge, 
but it’s also where the taniwha are actually created for 
specific reasons– they’ve got their own roles as well. If 
you didn’t use the taniwha, we would be extremely 
violent people because there’s no balance– so you 
create the taniwha and the taniwha is te whakatūpato 
and you don’t want to awaken the taniwha because 
then you lose the control of hihiri where greatness is 
but also where destruction and violence lies, talking 
about our Hinengaro and our wairua and our mauri 
actually keeps that in control.  
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You don’t want to awaken the taniwha because then you lose the control 
of hihiri where greatness is but also where destruction and violence lies, 
and how our lives, talking about our Hinengaro and our wairua and our 
mauri actually keeps that in control: I imagine the possibilities of this 
narrative being used within mental health to guide people through an 
experience or to orientate people to their experience.  Like the narrative 
therapy, ‘Mahi a atua’ (see earlier reflection), the participant positions the 
person within a wider cosmological narrative.   
 
 
The participant described their experiences of teaching others to engage in 
assessments when working with people who were experiencing what might be, in a 
clinical context, conceptualised as psychosis.  In recounting these experiences, the 
participant explained that some people she has worked with were seeing entities 
and hearing voices.  In teaching others to complete assessments with those who 
were having these experiences, the participant encouraged staff to directly address 
what people were hearing and seeing and, further, to engage in conversations that 
encouraged people to actively think about and contemplate what they were seeing 
or what they were hearing:  
 
I have done some independent research around this. 
When I taught people how to do assessments, I actually 
told them to have the conversation about who visits who 
when they see people and all this, because a lot of 
people who have either drug and alcohol addictions or 
some who are traumatised, they’re actually traumatised 
by the people that they’re seeing or hear. So, I 
encourage people when they’re doing the assessments 
to talk about who it is that they see or hear, what do 
they look like; actually, really talk about it as if you’re 
talking about all these other symptoms and then 
somewhere along the line go so, do you reckon your 
grandmother will come and beat you up? Do you reckon 
your grandmother wants to hurt you? Do you reckon 
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your tūpuna, who spends a lot of time setting things up, 
what do you reckon they would be doing?  
 
 
I encourage people when they’re doing the assessments to talk about who 
it is that they see or hear, what do they look like; actually, really talk about 
it as if you’re talking about all these other symptoms: While there is 
evidence that clinical assessments will involve some discussions about what 
a patient is experiencing in the context of seeing or hearing phenomena that 
are visible and audible only to the patient, these experiences are usually 
associated with clinical diagnostic categories that include visual and auditory 
hallucinations.  Taking these experiences seriously and encouraging patients 
to contemplate their meaning in the way that is described here requires a 
reconceptualization of the value of these experiences as material for 
discussing thought processes.  From a Māori perspective, however, and 
particularly in relation to the participant’s view of real entities, it also 
requires a metaphysical leap. I suggest it would require that professionals 
who are completing assessments do not conclude, despite exploring a 
person’s perception of spiritual, non-visible entities, that the person is, 
nonetheless, still experiencing hallucinations of things that are not real. The 
potential impacts of concluding that spiritual experiences simply reflect 
clinical interpretations of an experience again goes back to the idea of taking 
indigenous ontologies seriously and to the ways in which clinical categories 
and language construct the self.   
 
 
One of the participants described some of the work that she is involved in that 
relates to teaching others how to deal with wairua.  This work involves teaching 
rangatahi Māori and whānau about how wairua might manifest in experiences that 
are often conceptualised as symptoms associated with mental illness including 
depression and anxiety.  The participant saw this teaching and learning experience 




we teach them a whole bunch of simple tools for first of 
all the whānau, because sometimes the kids aren’t 
ready to receive until they see that their whānau have 
some of the skills to receive it. And these kids are ones 
that knowingly come through, who are classified by the 
doctor as depressed, have anxiety, all of that stuff that 
the mental health system wants to medicate. 
 
When it’s medicated that brings on a whole other raft 
of impacts to the person in that any time drugs and 
alcohol were used – and prescription, I’ll put in that – 
what that means is that the infinite Being or the Being 
is no longer in control of their body, it is now controlled 
through the drug or the alcohol, which then opens them 
up to the lower harmonic entities to enter their space 
and use the body. 
 
When discussing wairua healing, another participant spoke about what she thought 
was impacting on wairua and the potential reasons for the states of unwellness that 
people experienced.  Trauma was pointed to as having an impact on people and in 
particular past trauma that the participant related to both a person’s own experiences 
and to whakapapa in the context of intergenerational trauma.  Rather than pointing 
to impacts that could be conceptualised as visible signs of trauma, the participant 
described trauma that rests within whakapapa and the soul (as non-visible sites of 
trauma).  The wairua healing process would include addressing the accumulation 
of trauma in this context which would lead to those facilitating the healing searching 
for the points within whakapapa where trauma had occurred:   
 
Past trauma. Most of it is past trauma. You can tell the 
people when they’ve got – they don’t have oranga 
Hinengaro. You feel them, you feel them in a different 
way.  When you’ve worked in mental health and all that 
sort of thing and you know we’re not actually even in 
their domain. That’s because their soul at this point on 
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their whakapapa can’t cope anymore with the traumas 
of previous whakapapa. Now, this person before you 
might have been sexually abused, this person before you 
might have had violence against them; all the sorts of 
things that we attribute mental illness to. But if you do 
wairua healing, you look at this person and you don’t 
say, so why are you reacting to the abuse? The wairua 
healers go, at what point in your whakapapa did the 
first hara happen? And they go there, and they clean 
that up, and they go there and clean that up. They do it 




You feel them, you feel them in a different way: The participant described 
part of the process of searching for points of trauma as getting a feeling for 
the person, which indicates an embodied, intuitive approach to identifying 
what is impacting on a person.  This sits in direct contrast with clinical 
approaches that are largely based on rational, scientific knowledge matching 
a person’s experience with pre-existing categories and checklists of 
symptoms and associated diagnoses.  Intuition has been discussed in chapters 
two and three as a more than cognitive exercise that is connected to the idea 
of the world as an integrated organism.  Ott’s (2017) description of thinking 
as a type of embodied cognition was used to describe an experience of Being 
in which all things in our environment (including people) becomes an 
extension of the self.   
 
While Ott uses examples of physical objects to demonstrate how this 
extension occurs (i.e., a blind man who uses a cane that can be thought of as 
an extension of the blind man’s body), I expanded this view of the extension 
of the self to include things that are non-spatial, non-physical and non-
psychological in the sense that we need not be aware of them.  Within this 
context, the participant’s experience of ‘feeling’ in order to identify what is 
321 
 
impacting on the person implies that there is a type of non-physical 
continuum between the participant and the person seeking healing.  Within a 
Māori metaphysics, this continuum may be explained by an understanding 
of holism (see again the term worldedness), but importantly it also highlights 
the nature of Being as more than Cartesian subjectivity or ‘Being as thinking’ 
(Ahenakew, et al. 2014).  
 
Conceptualising a person’s experience as one that is controlled largely by 
rational processes sets up the conditions for a rational response where 
understanding a person’s experience is informed by what can be thought.  
Māori and indigenous metaphysics would not restrict the conceptualisation 
of Being as thinking, thereby allowing the self to feel and intuit a person 
(rather than simply having a rational understanding of a person).    
 
 
The participant also discussed the possibilities presented by taking different 
approaches to working with people who are labelled as having mental illness and 
are treated within clinical settings.  In general, the type of approach that the 
participant described involved undoing thoughts about mental illness and the 
process of stripping away layers of understanding about unwellness that had been 
given to the person.  The participant used the term ‘re-birth’ in describing the impact 
that undoing types of thinking might have and the ability to bring the person to their 
“own original thought” about their experience: 
 
I really wanted to be one of the people who could take 
people back through all their levels of knowing because 
by the time they come in and they’re mad and out of 
control or whatever because somebody else said they’re 
not functioning. But by the time you kind of take them 
back to all their levels through to their own original 
thought, which actually might manifest itself in the 
person going back to their own foetal place, then your 
job is to kind of rebirth them again… because I think 
half the thing about our people who go into institutions 
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or get institutionalised in their thinking, is because their 
power to reorganise their thoughts have been taken 
away. I always knew that when we were medicating 
people, some people want to be medicated so they can 
live their lives in the way that they want, and you can’t 
take that away; but when we’re medicating people we 
were stopping their process. 
 
 
Their power to reorganise their thoughts have been taken away: I interpret 
the reference to reorganising thoughts as a more than cognitive exercise that 
implicates other things in the world that show themselves in order to be 
regarded.  This view of an entitised influence on a person’s ‘thoughts’ 
therefore re-contextualises the idea of ‘reorganisation’ as a ‘re-connection’ 
to things in the world. 
 
 
Another participant addressed the use of the term mental illness and its connection 
to the view that there is something beyond a physical state of Being.  The participant 
also indirectly challenged the notion that an illness is something linked to the 
internal workings of an individual and that external factors may be at play in the 
person’s experience of illness:  
 
I’m not even sure if Māori would use the word mental 
anyway, but as something that’s beyond the physical. 
There’s no clear obvious physical cause for someone’s 
behaviours to change, so therefore the cause is 
something else. And I think in our traditional world 
view, also the cause could be external to the person – it 
could be over there, it could be those people’s fault or 
it could be that person, it could be a mākutu, it could be 
some breach of tapu. Also, it would have been seen as 




I’m not even sure if Māori would use the word mental anyway: However, 
there is evidence that suggests that Māori do use the term mental as a 
translation for Hinengaro which equates to a type of reductionism, limiting 
the profound cosmological character of Hinengaro in order to provide a 
Māori term that can be used within mental health (see chapter six for 
discussion of Hinengaro and the term mental health). 
 
 
The external world in Māori mental health 
One participant emphasised that relational Being, manifesting in experiences such 
as tohu or signs and holistic Māori worldviews, remain as part of the lived 
experience for whānau.  However, in the context of the notion of mental illness, the 
participant stated that the benefits of (for example), believing tohu to be real are 
outweighed by the attributions that are made about these experiences within clinical 
settings.  The participant stated that these attributions limit a Māori worldview that, 
in contrast, presents a range of possibilities of what may be contributing to a state 
of imbalance or illness: 
 
Well, so far, it’s not a benefit. It’s not even accepted. In 
fact, for some people it would make them look even 
crazier than what they’re suffering. So, I think the 
system as it is, because it doesn’t accept the range of 
possibilities that we think are available, as I say, as a 
diagnosis, then by not accepting it they’re doing us 
harm.  
 
The participant discussed the importance of understanding the notion of tohu as an 
example of communicating with the world and as a part of recognising the agency 
of other entities that hold knowledge as opposed to humans holding ultimate 
knowledge about entities or phenomena:  
 
We can interact and help, and that’s why tohu is such 
an important thing as well.   Being able to read the 
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signs, because we know those kinds of Beings have 
knowledge, and we have this humility to be able to say 
alright, you’re telling us this, we’ll try to read things 
better.  That’s our dedication to you, our honouring of 
you is we will try to read what you are saying better.  
And we will thank you for what you do for us.  Gratitude 
is so much in our way of operating.  I think that’s one 
thing I’d love to see us do more of, which is to bring 
back in more of that as a daily practice.  That’s what 
karakia were actually all about in the past, I think.  It 
doesn’t have to be flash, but I’m just thinking that way 
of connecting to other Beings in a more real way of 
getting the truth, that interaction.   
 
 
Tohu…this humility to be able to say alright, you’re telling us this, we’ll 
try to read things better: In my experience, tohu and the belief that we are 
given signs that guide us, is accepted as a normal part of life.  I’ve never 
thought of this experience as one that requires a certain level of humility.  
However, if tohu are understood as the showing of knowledge from other 
Beings, rather than the development of self-originating knowledge (reliant 
on the internal rational processing of information), then it would seem that a 
certain type of humility and gratitude would form part of the experience.    
 
 
While the participant emphasised a relational holistic understanding of imbalance 
in contrast to the notion of mental illness, she also cautioned against the 
development and use of Māori models of healing and support that are based on 
romanticised notions of Māori principles of Being.  The participant talked about the 
need to ensure that any application of Māori values and concepts in the context of 
mental health would need to be grounded in socio-cultural realities:   
 
It’s complicated. I don’t think we can make pure 
romantic models saying this is all about whānau, 
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because whānau are complex organisms as well and not 
all whānau are romantic multi-generational extensions 
these days. For some whānau functions, if you drove up 
and parked in the carpark, you would lock your car. If 
I put it as simply as that – you would lock your car... 
you can’t take for granted trust. A lot of abuse happens 
in wider whānau context, so the nature of whānau 
changed as well as the nature of what happens for 
individual experiences. But if we go back to say the 
Māori models, Māori values and concepts that can be 
used in mental health, then yeah, they’re there but they 
have to be applied to real context, real life context. 
 
One of the participants described a changing landscape of meaning and 
conceptualisations of the experience of imbalance, indicating that worldviews 
contrasting with the principles that guide Māori understandings of Being have 
influenced perspectives.  However, the participant also stated that Māori views on 
external contributors to states of imbalance remain part of a lived experience for 
her and her whānau and that relational experiences such as receiving signs or tohu 
are considered to be an ongoing part of the relational experience of Being that 
influences how the experience of imbalance or illness is understood:  
 
And at the same time, we’re trying to relate to that in a 
sort of Māori way even though it’s changed – the 
landscape’s changed, the relationships have changed, 
the rules, the order of life has changed.  
 
I think that’s often the first order of diagnosis, that it’s 
external to us. And I think what we accept is that it can 
be deliberately caused by another person wishing us 
harm, or that we have breached something, even 
unintentionally. I think for those, well, for my family, 
those are real, those options are on the table all the 
time. And that also we’ve often been sent signs that 
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something might happen or is going to happen. It could 
be birds, a bird appearing, something unusual 
happening, and it’s a tohu.  
 
One participant also talked about the locus of unwellness, not as an individual’s 
experience of unwellness, but as a societal issue.  The markers of an unhealthy 
society that the participant pointed to that impact on the health of whānau included 
economic disparities, health disparities and social injustice.  The participant 
expanded the view of the notion of mental health being linked to personal or 
individual states of Being to highlight the existence of ill health as a systemic state 
of Being:  
 
You know, we live in an unhealthy society and always 
we’re wanting whānau to be more and more resilient. 
Well, it can’t be resilient if there’s no employment, our 
general health status is not good, our access to things 
is not good. So, mental health is part of this bigger 
system of social injustice, and an unjust society is an 
unwell society. If I put it like that, those are the 
fundamentals. So, with the mental health system, well 
we need a big mental health system. In the same way 
they think of a prison system, we actually need a much 
bigger mental health system, because we live in a 
society that creates, produces mental health problems. 
So, I guess the thing is yeah, there’s all the care stuff 
but how do you create a society that doesn’t produce as 
much mental ill-health, because that’s the systemic 
change that needs to happen. And it’s not just a single 
thing – it’s our economy, our cultural values, our day 





We live in an unhealthy society and always we’re wanting whānau to be 
more and more resilient: I discuss the idea of health being a societal rather 
than individual issue at length in the next chapter, however, I think it is 
important to acknowledge how this participant’s response (and similar 
responses from other participant’s), has shaped this thinking.  The idea of an 
unhealthy society highlights how our complete interconnection with things 
in the world makes the idea of an individual illness a problematic proposal.  
I imagine that there is a metaphysical basis to the tendency to focus on 
changing people as opposed to changing an unhealthy society.  Does 
dominant Western metaphysics have such a strong grasp on our 
conceptualisation of health that it pulls us back into the frame of ‘fixing the 
individual’ despite our knowledge of (the concept of) unhealthy societies and 




The participants’ responses create an opening of things, presenting possibilities for 
how mātauranga and Hinengaro are taken up as something ‘more than’: extending 
beyond the concepts and common translations applied to each term from within a 
dominant Western framework.  Participants’ description of ‘knowing’ from within 
Māori and indigenous metaphysics re-presents mātauranga in ways that disrupt any 
simple and limited understanding of mātauranga as being synonymous with 
dominant Western conceptualisations of (rationally derived) knowledge.  Similarly, 
Hinengaro as atua is more than the concept of mind or mental (discussed earlier as 
common translations that reduce the meaning of Hinengaro), encompassing a 
profound and complex identity that cannot be captured within limited 
conceptualisations. Each of these terms, and their expanded meaning, has potential 
implications for how the notion of mental illness is understood and for how people 
who are seeking support within the mental health system encounter treatment. 
Rather than limiting the self’s expression through the conceptualisation of a 
person’s experience as an individual’s illness (with increasing focus on biological 
Being), there is an opportunity to engage in an opening of meaning – an expansive 
view of the person and world.   Through this, there is potential for a creative self to 
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emerge away from limited clinical concepts and individually focussed worldviews.  
The creative reflective self is therefore re-positioned to reside within the world as 






CHAPTER NINE: SPECULATIVE POTENTIAL AND 
A NON-FOUNDATIONAL CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I gesture to the potential apparent in Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being through suggesting how the ideas that have come through 
in this thesis might manifest as (k)new possibilities in mental health.  While there 
is an element of summarising the main points that have emerged throughout the 
thesis, I aim to go further in my thinking by imagining how these emergent points 
and ideas can influence creative speculation.  Within this chapter, I speculate about 
the potential to re-imagine mental health, presenting what can be considered as an 
expansion of thought - an ongoing process of reaction and reflection. This process 
is demonstrated in the articulation of ‘what might be’ if we shift our view of self 
and world to account for a thorough holism.   
 
This chapter replaces a conventional discussion section in which themes or data are 
analysed and explored.  Again, although there is an element of summarising the 
main points of the thesis, the central focus is on speculating about the potential for 
Māori and indigenous understandings of Being to influence a shift in how mental 
health and the notion of mental illness are perceived.  In many ways, this chapter is 
a continuation of the (non) method of whaiwhakaaro.  Like the free-flowing 
reflection that guided my responses to the participant interviews, the creative 
speculation in this chapter adds another dimension of worlded reflection.    
 
While the ideas that emerged through the participant interviews form part of what 
influences my thinking in this speculative chapter, there is no attempt to order my 
thinking as a direct commentary of the conversation areas described in chapters 
seven and eight.  Further, rather than using the interview responses (and other 
material that has been employed in this research) to construct an exact framework 
that describes how Māori and indigenous understandings of Being can shift a view 
on mental illness, I aim to re-imagine.  
 
It is intended that a speculative approach will further disrupt the view that research 
must identify the essential qualities of a thing or present the essential variables that 
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make up a phenomenon.  Rather than treat participant interviews (or any other part 
of the thesis) as data that provides certainty about a particular topic, I aim to engage 
in a creative exercise, exploring potential ways forward.  I hope to shift the ground 
of thought that the notion of mental illness emerges from, dislodging the notion 
from its solid orientation, including its allegiance to the language of conceptual 
representation and the essentialist framing of people’s experience.   
 
I end this chapter with a non-foundational conclusion that re-visits the metaphysical 
premises of open expression.  Within this conclusion, Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being provide ground for further reflection on the potential future 
directions that may be taken in re-shaping approaches to providing support to those 
who are labelled as experiencing mental illness.  I also present some final thoughts 
on the research process that I have engaged in, reflecting on the experience of 
holistic research and whaiwhakaaro. The limitations of an academic research 
process are highlighted here along with an exploration of the researcher’s journey 
as it relates to the ability of the indigenous self to express a more (spiritually) 
complex research experience.  
 
Revisiting interview responses 
In chapters seven and eight, four conversations areas were presented, providing a 
view of Being based on metaphysical premises that highlight the idea of 
connections that push our thinking of holism beyond a view of being linked to 
things only insofar as they are visible, physical, and thinkable phenomena.  
Whakapapa and wairua were presented as a view on the indivisible nature of Being 
that is permeated by an ever-present (absent) influence reflected in participants’ 
descriptions of spiritual experiences and subjectivities.  Wairua, discussed by some 
participants as a connection to the unseen, raises the idea of being connected to 
intangible presence.  This intangible presence (that is cast as an absent non-presence 
within a dominant Western metaphysics), represents what has been described as an 
embodiment of life (Moewaka Barnes, et al., 2017), that has also been linked to 




Mātauranga and Hinengaro presented a view on the more-than-human world.  
Mātauranga was described by one of the participants in this research as a holistic 
experience, surpassing the concept of rational, cognitively derived self-originating 
knowledge and connected to, “standing in the presence of atuatanga”. The 
presence of atuatanga was given an approximate description as an indefinable and 
powerful feeling of what one participant called “grace” that is experienced by the 
person, not as intellectual insight, but as a thorough connection to (and experience 
of) an intangible (yet present) entity.  Mātauranga was also presented in terms of 
the participants’ re-presentation of knowledge as a more than cognitive process, 
implicating not only the self as a fully integrated (mind, body and soul) organism, 
but the world as a co-constructor of complex spiritual knowledge or what one 
participant referred to as our “knowing”.  Finally, Hinengaro, as atua, was re-
presented through both a direct description of Hinengaro as cosmological Being 
and through an exploration of participants’ views of the potential of Māori and 
indigenous understandings of Being in mental health.  Together, these conversation 
areas, the participants’ experiences, and the participants’ vision for change have 
influenced the development of this chapter and my overall aim of imagining the 
potential of Māori and indigenous understandings of Being in re-considering the 
notion of mental illness.   
 
The reader will note that the terms and sentences that were highlighted in chapters 
seven and eight to present whaiwhakaaro (or my reflections on participant 
responses), are repeated in this chapter.  These highlighted terms and sentences are 
included as footnotes to show how my thinking as creative speculation has been 
pushed further by the reflections that came through in my reaction to what the 
participants said.  Each of the points of reflection presented in chapters seven and 
eight will be linked to relevant aspects of the creative speculation that forms the 
basis of this chapter.  Doing this will support the reader in making connections 






Speculation on the bases of metaphysical premises  
The excessive meaning reflected in Māori and indigenous metaphysics finds 
expression in this chapter through an exploration of the potential for re-framing the 
notion of mental illness and seeing experience through a holistic lens.  There are 
two main premises that underpin this exploration of potential.  Firstly, there is the 
premise of thorough interconnection that enmeshes all things in the world (reflected 
in chapter seven through the conversation areas whakapapa and wairua). This 
premise is explored through a consideration of worlded Being in an attempt to 
depart from the notion of mental illness as a condition of disorder that rests within 
the separated individual. Secondly, there is the premise of excessive meaning that 
cannot be contained within objective representation (reflected in chapter eight 
through the conversation areas mātauranga and Hinengaro).  This premise is 
explored through a consideration of how complete interconnection might show up 
in a (k)new understanding of the indigenous self as a relational Being whose 
expressions are the creative manifestation of indivisibility.   Using these premises 
as a starting point, I will explore how Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being can be re-presented to disrupt conventional conceptualisations of mental 
health and the notion of mental illness.  
 
Resisting frameworks 
What does it mean to account for an excess of meaning that denies full 
representation and resists being fixed within the definitional frames that capture 
(and explain) behaviour and experience?  Derrida’s (1978) warnings about a 
metaphysical inheritance that is hidden beneath divergent articulations illustrates 
the challenge of attempting to account for things in the world that, in his words, are 
always ‘at play’, resisting any notion of fixed meaning.  For Derrida, once we 
assume that we have found the essential meaning of any one thing in the world (that 
we might represent in solid conceptual forms), we are immediately at the mercy of 
other things (Mika, 2017) that, while escaping our conceptual attention, always 
form traces of greater meaning.   
 
Gordon (2008) raises the possibility of the traces of meaning formed with each story 
that is told as if it were a story of a ‘true’ reality - the idea of landing on the essential 
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features of social and cultural lived experiences.  These stories, dressed up as ‘real’ 
representations, are fictions, characterised as such by things that haunt our writing 
and assertions - disrupting our ability to define a thing with certainty.  Within this 
context, the framework of factuality struggles with excessive meaning – the 
complex encroaching other that threatens the certainty entrenched in the 
metaphysics of presence since the time of Plato and Aristotle.  And yet, despite the 
haunting threat of something that is more than what can be contained in limited and 
partial explanations, the expectation of positive and present representation has 
become a pervasive influence on Māori and indigenous expressions.   
 
As I have already discussed in previous chapters, it has been noted that, within 
institutions (including mental health), Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being are often translated in accordance with a prior (and superior) definition or are 
expected to be presented in conceptual frames that ensure meaning is fully ‘present’ 
and available (i.e., the language of absolute conception).  Māori and indigenous 
expressions are re-shaped to ensure a type of easy comprehensibility is achieved 
(e.g., Randal, Geekie, Lambrecht, and Taitimu, 2008), or to suit the political palette 
of the system (Waitoki, 2018).  Māori and indigenous metaphysics in the context 
of constraining excess (of meaning and Being) resists the expectation of absolute 
and ordered conception.  Despite this, the ways in which Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being are translated and taken up within institutions, and in this 
case mental health, have continued to follow a reductive approach that, for example, 
reduces Māori terms, rendering them as simple and direct translations of clinical 
concepts.  The inclusion and translation of Māori terms within Aotearoa/New 
Zealand based mental health literature suggests that there is a tendency to equate 
Māori understandings of holistic Being with dominant Western concepts that 
constrain the excessive meaning reflected in Māori worldviews.  Responses from 
participants in this thesis, however, demonstrate that there is no simple way of 
directly translating Māori terms into Western conceptual frameworks.  My own 
reflections (whaiwhakaaro) also show how I have been called to re-turn to Māori 





Worlded Being: Departing from the notion of mental illness 
The idea of ‘worldedness’ has been discussed as a thoroughly indivisible state of 
Being in which the world and self are wholly and inseparably involved in a dynamic 
process of co-creation of lived experience.  The co-constitution of the self with and 
by all other things in the world brings forward (but necessarily expands) a 
consideration of what has been called (from a more conventional metaphysics), a 
holistic view of well-being.   The notion of mental illness within a worlded context 
raises the possibility of taking seriously an expanded idea of holism.  This more 
expansive view would go beyond the consideration of holism as quantifiable 
variables such as those listed within a determinants of health framework (i.e., social, 
cultural and economic indices, Ministry of Health, 2002), that were discussed in the 
introduction of this thesis.19    
 
Expanding the idea of holism to engage with holistic Being in its excessive, 
unconstrained meaning allows for an alternative view of what is labelled mental 
illness.  This is particularly relevant where mental illness denotes a type of disorder 
that is located within the individual.  In reflecting on the response of one of the 
participants in this research, I speculate that there is much more at play in people's 
experience of ‘mental illness’ than what is reflected in clinical explanations of 
disorder.  The participant in question described the influence of societal structures 
and how these shape behaviours, particularly focussing on materialism and how this 
is reflected in a societal shift to accumulating (personal material) goods.  As the 
participant stated, “the possibility of actually sharing stuff has diminished” within 
a world where personal, individual Being is constructed by a culture of materialism 
and self-indulgence. While this example is one that provides a visible and 
observable representation of society’s influence on the individual, I speculate that 
it could, when considered within the context of ‘worlded Being’, implicate a deeper 
understanding that could be understood as a spiritual and metaphysical construction 
of the self.20   
 
 
19 Quantifying your experiences: The idea of quantifying lived realities.  
20 The physical interior:  The construction of the world mirror the construction of self. 
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In line with Māori and indigenous views on relational Being, a deeper spiritual, 
metaphysical construction of the self, who is indivisibly connected with all things 
in the world, disrupts the idea that our experiences are predominantly mediated 
through our internal (and largely cognitive) faculties.21  Despite the growing 
entrenchment of physicalist brain-based explanations of behaviour, ideas of 
indivisibility, and how this influences and shapes our lived realities, offer a different 
insight into how and why we may be affected in ways that are commonly (and 
reductively) described as experiencing mental illness.   
 
I speculate that worlded Being is reflected in the manifestation of what is labelled 
as mental illness but that it is, from within a Māori and indigenous metaphysics, 
what can be described as a type of holistic distress.  I suggest that dominant Western 
metaphysics plays a significant role in the setting up of the conditions of holistic 
distress by positing a view of the world that has become a structural influence in 
our lived realities.  This structural influence is one that forces the indigenous self 
(and all selves), to discount the sense of play in the world and the understanding 
that our perceptions are a pathway to relationship rather than objective knowledge 
of things.  As Mika (2015c) states, the world affects the Māori perceiver.  Merely 
contemplating a thing has an effect on the self – a simultaneously spiritual and 
material shaping that is part of the indivisible relationship that the self has with all 
things in the world.  Further, this type of spiritual and material indivisibility has the 
potential to impact on our well-being, mirroring our relational orientation to the 
world.  As Mika explains, 
 
If one is permitted to acknowledge the ground of 
perception - and hence the object - as both ultimately 
beyond one’s cognitive capacity and as a living entity 
that contains to it thoroughly unknowable and 
imperceptible characteristics, then one may retain 
wellness. If, on the other hand, the indigenous self is 
forced to view the object as merely a product of 
something originating from the self, and hence an object 
 
21 In fact they’re part of a much greater weave of life and interconnections of life: Being 
orientation within the world. 
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of thought, then a kind of violence is done as a whole 
(p. 1138).  
 
The violence that Mika points to is, as the quote above suggests, a type of severing 
of the self from the world.22 But it is also the setting up of conditions for a type of 
separated society that manifests not only in how our perceptions of things are 
conceptualised - and how we subsequently experience reality - but in how our 
concept of responsibility to each other and other things in the world is shaped.23 24  
If we take seriously the view of the world as a thoroughly connected, co-
constructive experience, then how does a world that is constructed based on the 
values and ideals of a dominant metaphysics engage us and our experience of co-
construction?  How, in other words, does metaphysics manifest in the world and 
self in ways that are both seen and unseen?  
  
Holistic distress, as a manifestation of a metaphysical construction of the self, 
cannot be easily separated from the idea of a metaphysical construction of society 
- an idea reflected in the thoughts shared by the participant who pointed to the 
construction of the separated self through a society that is focussed on materialism.  
The complete interconnection between all things reflected in Māori and indigenous 
worldviews indicates that the “violence that is done as a whole” (Mika, 2015, p. 
1138), (through the metaphysical and conceptual separation of the self from the 
world), can be taken literally as a forced distancing that affects and constructs the 
entire world in which we live.25    
 
Vanessa de Oliveira Andreotti (2018) describes this forced distancing as ‘the house 
that modernity built’ in which a dominant Western metaphysics is represented 
through ideas of separation (relational disconnection of people from each other and 
 
22 They have cut Maori observational knowledge of the natural world away from its theoretical 
framework and cosmogenic narratives: manifesting in the notion of generalisable, internal 
explanations of behaviour.   
23 Amnesia: Other people are also cast as absent things through the construction of a separated 
society. 
24 Actually sharing stuff has diminished: Psychosis of greed.   




from ‘other-than-human’ entities including the natural environment),26 universal 
reasoning (certainty of universal concepts that reduce complexity and allow for 
control of things in the world), and exploitation of people and the planet (the quest 
for progress through consumption of resources including human resources).    
 
As de Oliveira Andreotti (2018) explains, modernity’s structure of separation and 
consumption is constructing a lived reality of social, economic, political and 
ecological crises through exceeding the limits of what people and planet are able to 
sustain as resources for ‘progress’.27   As part of these concerns about modernity’s 
restructuring of self, Andreotti raises the issue of mental health crises (in a global 
sense), mirroring the concerns raised within Aotearoa/New Zealand that have led 
to a review of Mental Health and Addiction Services (see Government Inquiry into 
Mental Health Addiction - Oranga Tāngata, Oranga Whānau).  According to de 
Oliveira Andreotti, the crisis reflected in rates of mental illness, rather than being 
understood as an individual affliction, is firmly rooted in the world.28 29  As the 
world of modernity increases its momentum of progress, utilising natural and 
human resources as impersonal (disconnected) commodities, altering and 
dislodging people and place, the essential and relational construction of our well-
being shifts (literally and spiritually) from beneath our feet.30    
 
This shifting of relational construction is mirrored in what one participant described 
(when talking about those labelled as experiencing mental illness) as philosophies 
that “diminish the nature of their being”, hiding and suppressing the holistic self 
 
26 Knowledge: One participant’s description of the natural environment holding (non-intellectual) 
knowledge. 
    27 It strikes me that the excessive consumption described within de Oliveira Andreotti’s (2018) model 
of modernity demonstrates that excess is a fundamental aspect of the metaphysics of presence but 
that this excess is created by the same reductionist reasoning that suppresses the excesses of Maori 
and indigenous metaphysics.  Through the reasoning of separation (that is integral to a metaphysics 
that must stand apart from the world in order to capture the essential and present qualities of a thing), 
people and planet are cast as resources for progress and are therefore reduced to being a type of 
commodity rather than the more expansive view of all things as, for example, whanaunga.  
Paradoxically, it is this reductionism that turns people and planet into usable commodities (within 
modernity’s quest for progress), that leads to excessive behaviour – the behaviour of excessive 
consumption.   
28 A construction of mental illness: If there is illness, it is in society as a whole -it influences the 
individual manifesting in personal experience.  
29 Natural response to trauma and grief and pain: The individual’s place in the whole and how this 
influences and co-constructs ‘natural’ responses.  
30 It’s under your feet: Grounded completely within the world such that it moves our Being as it 
shifts.   
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within limited frames of Being that split the person from the world - re-constructing 
the self in a context of individualism.  However, I posit that, rather than creating a 
truly autonomous state of Being, the constructed context of individualism 
demonstrates how the world (as a whole) is implicated in people’s experiences of 
distress.  In this sense, the indivisible nature of the world is reflected in the making 
of the self as a Being who is forced to live in a type of spiritual alienation.31  We 
are, in other words, still co-constructed by a worlded reality but it is one that co-
constructs our Being based on the values of modernity.   
 
Forbes (1979) illustrates the idea of a worlded illness in his observation that 
cannibalism (rather than being conceptualised in negative terms as a primitive and 
savage indigenous practice), is a type of societal psychosis that is captured in the 
Cree term ‘Wetiko’.  According to Forbes, the Wetiko disease is characterised by 
the ‘mental illness’ (being stuck in a rational existence marked by separation and 
rigid boundaries between the internal and external world), of excessive greed and 
the symbolic and literal, “consuming of another’s life for one’s own private purpose 
or profit” (p.24).  While Forbes provides examples of this practice in the form of 
historical treatment of populations (including oppression through slavery), in a 
similar way to de Oliveira Andreotti (2018), Forbes points out that the desire for 
progress and advancement is one that has persisted through to modern times, 
characterised by continued economic material and therefore spiritual exploitation.32 
   
Forbes’ (1979) description of Wetiko disease and de Oliveira Andreotti’s (2018) 
explanation of modernity’s impact demonstrate the form of holistic distress that I 
speculate is manifesting in what is labelled as a mental health crisis (globally and 
locally).  Taking account of a worlded understanding of Being in which all things 
are collapsed together in an indivisible co-construction, I suggest that if there is a 
type of ‘illness’ then it is in the world - a world that constructs what we (choose to) 
see at an individual level or as “personal conduct” (Szasz, 1961, p.2).  Interpreting 
the impacts of a structural, systemic (and in the context of Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics, spiritual) construction of the self as an individual illness aligns with a 
 
31 Out of sync: Being in a state that is ‘out of sync’ with the wider environment.   
32 That it’s very much about gathering – gathering of other peoples: Also applies to the conceptual 
containment of people in mental health (i.e. labelling and mental illness).   
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dominant and conventional worldview that rejects more complex views of holism.  
Worlded Being is instead an interpretation of not only self-assembly but of the 
world’s simultaneous assembly as a complex organism in which the idea of 
orientation is not dependent on solid concepts but on embodied interpretations of 
experience.33 As one participant in this research commented, “Other people make 
my Being and they call me into existence” which, when extended to include all 
things in the world, is a view of relational Being that describes our movement with 
others - including the more-than-human (Rifkin, 2017).  These movements account 
for our experiences in what was discussed in chapter four as “rhythms—patterns of 
consistency and transformation that emerge immanently out of the multifaceted and 
shifting sets of relationships that constitute formations and out of the interactions 
among those formations” (Rifkin, 2017, p.33). These embodied experiences shift 
and change, denying the rational impulse for universal explanation.  They also 
expand the frame of Being and experience beyond ideas of internal experience.34   
 
Forbes (1979) stresses that the relatedness of all forms of existence means that what 
is done in (and to) the world ripples out in all directions.  But it is also this 
relatedness (demonstrated in indigenous reverence for and belief in holistic life and 
Being), that provides a pathway back – a re-turn to connection and shared 
responsibility.35  Within this research, this view of holism and re-turn was reflected 
in one participant’s description of indigenous people who are seeking a pathway 
back to whenua and whakapapa.  As the participant stated, the journey of re-turn is 
supported by people understanding that “in fact they’re part of a much greater 
weave of life and interconnections of life”. When a view of interconnection is taken 
as a sense of shared responsibility (as it is in Forbes’ philosophy), the possibility 
exists to not only resist excessive greed but to re-construct our relationship with the 
world as a whole.  Whakapapa, reflected in a lived and embodied understanding of 
interconnection and the orientation of self and world as simultaneous relational 
 
33 They participate in the narrative/They’re narratives that provide a philosophical framework for 
understanding the natural and human world: Considering holism as a type of worlded participation 
- life as a complex narrative. 
34 Lived experience: Whakapapa as experiential existence extends the meaning of connection 
beyond human genealogy to include a complete holistic connection to the world as entity or 
whanaunga.  
35 Aroha: Sacred creative power. 
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movement and change, shifts the focus of ‘dis-order’ from the individual to the 
collective.36 37 
 
It is important to note that there are many social constructionist discourses that 
already call for an increased focus on collective or societal contributors to people's 
experience of mental illness.  However, what I am suggesting, in relation to the 
notion of holistic distress, is that this is a spiritual experience that is manifesting as 
a material condition (when perceived through an observation of people's material 
conditions and lived reality).  This understanding of holistic distress would 
therefore require a deeper metaphysical response and one that resists the rational 
impulse of addressing only what can be measured.38  
 
Highlighting the spiritual here is more than just a cultural preference.  Forbes’ 
(1979) focus on the pathway back from excessive greed is one that implicates the 
need for another type of excess – a spiritual excess - that pushes outside of the limits 
of conceptual, universal, rational representation. Paradoxically, the excess that I am 
referring to is one that, I argue, would achieve a balancing of life through 
highlighting the relational responsibility that emerges from taking a deeper, 
spiritual holism seriously.  Through this, I suggest that we might disrupt the view 
of Being as that which is ordered by human centred intellectualism39 in which the 
world (and other people) become divisible (commodities) within the human 
domain. 40 41 
 
Spiritual holism disrupts certain metaphysical standpoints, and particularly those 
that have grown from a quest for universal, essential meaning.  These standpoints 
 
36 We put in place a lot of things that are actually about protecting the being: All things engaging 
at once to create a form of protection.  
37 Logic is logic, and Maori are just as logical/Pre-European Maori ritual or practice of biting the 
latrine beam: The logic apparent in Maori cosmological orientation still resists the dominant logical 
order. 
38 Quantifiable: Approaches that do not allow for the breadth of experiences that people may have 
is directly tied to a scientific view of ‘human nature’ suppressing and restricting growth and Being.  
39 Control: Essentialisms cataloging of people and the world. 
40 For me, wairua isn’t spirituality. There’s no such word as spirituality in Maori thinking: 
Spirituality cannot be separated from the physical.  It is part of holistic Being or is simply the 
experience of Being-in-the-world. 
41 We’re dragged into that system of everything is separated. You’ve got a broken heart, you’ve 
got a broken spirit: Through acts of epistemic integration, unsayable things are subject to framing, 
rendering what spills out of the frame silent and absent.   
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firmly position the self in a rational existence predicated on a (ancient 
philosophical) construction of relationship where the world stands apart from the 
self in order to be studied.  Within this philosophical construction, spiritualism  
itself appears to be split from whole, becoming a separate aspect of life that can be 
easily recognised in ritual but is not necessarily lived as an indivisible experience.42  
However, as one participant commented when talking about the difference between 
the concept of spirituality and Māori understandings of wairua, “It is actually 
embedded in everything, it’s embedded and it’s not talked of, it just is''. The 
‘coming-together’ of self and world (the recognition of an embedded, indivisible 
spirituality), relies on the re-presentation of a holistic standpoint that effects not 
only our treatment of the world (as more than a resource for progress), but also 
changes our view of how balance is achieved.  It would, I suggest, call for 
approaches to conceptualising and providing support that reach both the individual 
and world in a conscious awareness that the determinants of health are, rather than 
being external influences that impact on the person, at once the world and person 
in synchronistic construction.  Simply fixing the person while tweaking social 
conditions, I argue, will not result in wellness as the wider context – the site of dis-
ease - is left unchanged.43 
 
At one level, a re-view of mental illness as holistic distress requires that our 
rationally mediated, disconnected relationship with the world is altered to bring the 
world back into focus as whanaunga.  At another level, and particularly when 
considering how tāngata whaiora experience mental health services, taking holistic 
distress seriously means allowing for an understanding of experience that exceeds 
the conceptual boundaries afforded by mental health concepts and clinical 
(medical) discourse.44  The excessive meaning of tāngata whaiora lived experiences 
(and the inability for these experiences to be contained within clinical concepts) 
will be discussed in the following section; however, here I wish to highlight how 
 
42 I don’t like to talk about wairua separately because to my mind it’s interlinked into everything: 
Wairua as an indivisible, lived experience including in what we might consider the mundane.  
43 We live in an unhealthy society and always we’re wanting whānau to be more and more 
resilient: Dominant Western metaphysics and the conceptualisation of health that it pulls us back 
into the frame of ‘fixing the individual’ despite our knowledge of (the concept of) unhealthy 
societies and environments?   
44 Western philosophy about human nature that are essentialist: A monolithic structure of 
representation that often captures Maori terms within mental health. 
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holistic distress may be utilised to guide a mental health response.  The way in 
which holistic notions of health are currently conceptualised may be impacted on 
by taking whakapapa seriously as a spiritual and material reality in which certain 
metaphysical constructions of the world are manifesting as, for example, negative 
health statistics.   
 
Waitoki (2018), in responding to the latest iteration of Government mental health 
frameworks in Aotearoa (He Ara Oranga: Report of the Government Inquiry into 
Mental Health and Addiction, 2018), states that holistic perspectives on mental 
illness continue to be largely ignored.  This is, according to Waitoki, particularly 
pronounced at the structural level where racism and other constructors of difference 
and disparity are created and perpetuated.  Waitoki notes that, while there is some 
focus on enhancing and modifying systems that impact on individuals and 
communities (e.g., addressing WINZ sanctions that penalise single mothers that do 
not name the father of their children), and on increasing investment in kaupapa 
Māori services, there is also significant focus being put on enhancing the ability for 
the individual to practice self-contained strategies for well-being (i.e., mindfulness 
and resilience).45 In response to this, Waitoki appeals for an increased focus on 
systemic injustice, including a focus on how systems contribute to and in some 
ways exacerbate the experience of (for example), trauma, which in many cases is 
observed as (individual) criminal behaviour or mental illness.  Waitoki’s analysis 
of the direction that Government are advocating as part of proposed mental health 
reforms highlights what appears to be a significant philosophical (and subsequently 
political), difference in how mental health is conceptualised.   
 
The limited attention paid to the systemic construction of people’s experiences is, I 
would argue, a reflection of the heavy influence of an individualistic metaphysics 
that is centred on the rational.46 This construction of self can be historically linked 
to philosophies that regard the individual’s well-being as something that ultimately 
 
45 I’m not even sure if Maori would use the word mental anyway: The use of the term mental in 
Maori mental health. 
46 Mental escape hatch: A paradoxical expression about resisting rationality. 
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stems from rational balance and clarity (perhaps reflected in the premises of 
mindfulness).47 48 49 50 
 
A focus on systemic influences (as advocated by Waitoki, 2018), opens up 
possibilities for understanding an individual’s experience of what is labelled mental 
illness as a more complex phenomenon.  Within this context and considering what 
de Oliveira Andreotti (2018) and Forbes (1979) have described about holistic 
systemic impacts, I suggest that systemic influences are important to consider 
because they signal the individual’s embodiment of systems.  As one participant in 
this research stated,  
 
we’re dragged into that system of everything is 
separated. You’ve got a broken heart, you’ve got a 
broken spirit, you’ve got a broken whatever… you’re 
chucked over here, you’re chucked over here for that 
part, this part over here, you’re chucked over here, yet 
we [Māori] were [traditionally] all kept in one place to 
deal with the whole thing.  
 
When taking indigenous metaphysics seriously, the embodiment of systems (or 
worldedness) changes the premises on which we form our understanding of what is 
happening to the person or community described by Moewaka Barnes et al. (2017) 
as a process of changing our understanding of ‘affect’.  In a similar vein, we might 
understand the idea of affect in Ferreira da Silva’s (2013) appeal to a sense of 
collective movement that counters the preference for knowing as rigid acts that re-
turn us to certain predetermined points.  Instead Ferreira da Silva opens the space 
necessary for understanding the limitless meaning provided through our (ever-
moving) encounters that re-turn us to the idea of knowing as something residing in 
 
47 Understand: the positioning of things and people based on a view of the rational self that stands 
on a ground of thought as opposed to standing among things.    
48 This is your mind, this is your brain, everything exists in your brain: Equating Being with the 
(physical) brain and its (cognitive and neurological) processes. 
49 Hinengaro: More profound meaning of Hinengaro cannot be reduced to the term mind. 
50 Talking about our Hinengaro and our wairua and our mauri actually keeps that in control: 
Balance of emotions through Maori understandings of (spiritual) Being. 
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the experience of relationality.51 52  Without this change of (metaphysical) premise, 
I argue that our interventions will always gravitate more towards fixing the person 
rather than focussing on the relational and constructive environment that the 
individual resides within.  This is not to say that the individual is completely 
dissolved within a worlded view, but that the principle of individualisation is 
sacrificed in favour of a deeper holism and that individuals are supported to engage 
in interventions that account for dis-ease as a holistic affliction.   
 
Whakapapa and the relational individual  
While individualism might be conceptually disrupted by a positive spiritual excess 
of meaning reflected in a deeper sense of holism, the individual experiencing 
holism, rather than dissolving in a sea of overpowering collective identity is, I 
would argue, paradoxically given more space for expression.53    Within this view 
of the holistic individual, the self’s interconnection and relationship with the world 
foregrounds what is described by Glazebrook (2012) as what is unique in each thing 
rather than what is common across all things.54  An understanding of the individual 
experience as unique, and (at the same time) holistically connected, disrupts the 
idea of the self-contained individual but it also disrupts notions of the collective as, 
for example, the existence of collective universal traits.  This is important in the 
context of Māori and indigenous responses to imposed Eurocentric ideas of 
universal indigenous identities because it resists framing alternative expressions of 
identity (as a form of resistance), by using the same structure of universalism.55 56  
As Hunt (2014) states, “The heterogeneity of Indigenous voices and worldviews 
can easily become lost in efforts to understand Indigeneity in ways that fix 
Indigenous knowledge, suppressing its dynamic nature.” (Hunt, 2014, p. 29). 
 
51 Positive relationship: The paradoxical power of the negative (i.e. the void or te kore in Maori 
cosmology), as an opening of space for creativity.  
52 Ngaro: A fullness that is part of the creation process and the “… cosmogenic series…”  that is 
encapsulated in the term oro. 
53 I’m Maori because: disrupting the overarching category of Maori.    
54 The concept of human nature that’s at stake: The impossible explanatory task of defining human 
nature. 
55 Inscribe a Maori worldview: The implications of ‘inscribed’ identities within a mental health 
context and the (imposed) superficial etchings on the surface of a much deeper experience. 
56 Judgements about whether or not we still existed, and still are: The expectation that Maori and 
Indigenous peoples will ‘present’ with certain ‘normal’ traits. 
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Instead, the individual, as a holistic Being who moves with all things in the world, 
can share their experience of holism as a unique expression of worlded Being.   
 
Some participants in this research described how the dominant Western preference 
for describing things in terms of common traits has impacted on how Māori and 
indigenous worldviews are represented.  These impacts have included the 
quantification of Being57 demonstrated in the framing of people’s experiences as 
behavioural categories that one participant felt restricted our ability to express 
ourselves.  As they stated, I think that it doesn’t allow for the breadth of experiences 
that people can have... And I think that we really only have a small range... of 
presentation... we’re still pretty limited in how much we can be”.  
 
Limited and normalised representation was also discussed in terms of its impact on 
how Māori and indigenous worldviews about death and illness, time and place, and 
the profound cosmological beginnings of life were presented when interned by the 
dominant Western worldview.58 59 60 61 Within this space of internment (of 
interpreting things through a dominant Western lens), all things are caught up in 
limitation62, including the individual indigenous self who must resist the impulse of 
creativity, relying instead on a conformity that aids others in their quest to 
understand, fix in place and (over) determine.  The re-turn to the individual as 
creative expression was reflected in participants’ discussion of embodiment and of 
making space for people to reclaim “their power to reorganise their thoughts”.63  
 
57 Quantifiable: A scientific view of ‘human nature’ that suppresses and restricts growth and Being.  
58 Hine-nui-te-pō could almost be some grim character: Western interpretation of death as a 
negative finality that re-presents Hine-nui-te-pō in the image of the West’s fearful imaginary. 
59 The West tends to fear pain, the unknown, the darkness etc and tries to seek youth and longevity. 
The birthing and the dying is hidden away and medicalised: Containing experience in order to 
control the fearful imaginary which includes medicalising mental illness. 
60 One of life’s biggest kinds of fears is death, and loss and losing your loved one: How we are 
impacted by a Western view of death and its symbols (e.g., the passing of time, being vulnerable in 
a world of uncertainty). 
61 Called Into existence: Collapsed time and the possibility that nothing is called into existence but 
always-already is.  
62 They try and give a name to it, well hello, we already have it: Maori worldviews on Maori terms 
without the limits of dominant re-conceptualisation. 
63 As I discuss in chapter eight, when reflecting in this participants words, I understand the “power 
to reorganise their thoughts” as meaning more than a reorganisation of rational thinking.  Rather, 
using Maori and Indigenous metaphysics as a basis for understanding a person’s ability to re-
organise thoughts, I believe that other things in the world are implicated, showing themselves in 
order to be regarded - an entitised influence that re-contextualises the idea of ‘reorganisation’ as a 
re-connection to things in the world.   
346 
 
Mika (2017c) discusses the individual as a worlded Being when describing how the 
self engages with and responds to language.  As the individual encounters a term, 
reaction and response signal that there is an effect taking place that is deeper than 
what might be considered from the perspective of a rational encounter.64 65 Mika 
refers to this as the term’s “irruption” (p. 1): the influence of language that is “at 
once” (p. 2), what we say about the world but is also the world itself.66  The world 
is, in a holistic sense, signalling the impossibility of using language to transcend the 
more complex fabric that is life’s mystery.  Words are therefore real things rather 
than being mere tools of human expression.  Their irruption (as an influence on the 
self), is a holistic relationship that manifests as an opening of what might in 
dominant Western convention be seen as linguistic containment.67 68 69  
 
So far in this thesis (and particularly when considering what has been discussed in 
chapter three), this relational view of language as things that emerge at will has 
been linked to the researcher being called to attention by things in the world that 
encourage a type of (embodied) thinking or ‘whaiwhakaaro’ (to follow the thought).  
But the relational self and the calling of the self by things in the world need not be 
restricted to language’s influence.  Relational Being in a worlded sense implicates 
all things as it highlights our metaphysical location of full immersion within (as 
opposed to being a separate part of), the whole.70 71 
 
The expression of experience that the self offers within this more holistic context is 
therefore an articulation of the connected individual who is able to voice the 
‘unique’ as opposed to following expectations of ‘common’ expression.72  Rather 
than being restricted by the dominant frameworks that govern meaning of 
 
64 What’s the knowing? Where does that come from? A relational understanding of knowledge. 
65 Ngākau: ‘te whakaaro o te ngākau’.  
66  The name they’ve put up, I said you’re calling wellness: An entitised description of language.  
67 Nine-day wananga: One participant’s reflection on why a nine- day wananga sounded “nice on 
my tongue”. 
68 Our knowing: Communication is internal and external ‘at once’ each is a continuous part of the 
other. 
69 Contained: Containing the person through language - people live their diagnostic labels.  
70  Energy: Relational attunement between self and world.  
71 It’s kind of like their wairua and her wairua are kind of like trying to get their stories to hook 
up: Entitised and interconnected communication. 




experience within mental health (e.g., Randal, Geekie, Lambrecht, and Taitimu,  
2008), the individual is able to engage in a personal yet creative response to the 
holistic influence that characterises being-in-the-world.  When considering 
personal creative response within a mental health context, Taitimu (2007) explains 
that “A major boundary between Pākehā illness and Māori cultural experience 
(negative and/or positive), may lie within the experiencer (in terms of their personal 
understanding), rather than the experience itself” and that “This is also influenced 
by the constructions shared by those around them (whānau, friends, helping 
professions)” (p.255).  I interpret Taitimu’s reference to the ‘experience itself’ as a 
statement about static representations that attempt to concretise individual 
experiences, simplifying the complex and creative into ready-made categories.73 74  
The ‘experiencer’ on the other hand would seem to represent a liberated 
manifestation of whakapapa as connection that in Taitimu’s observation includes 
whānau, friends and helping professions but could be extended to include the entire 
dynamic world in which the individual is immersed.75   
 
This view of Being and meaning echoes the idea of experiencing an orientation to 
the world: an experience that provides meaning but does not rely on meaning as 
certainty or pinpointing an exactness of what things are.76 77 78 Instead, orientation 
is a type of experiential fluidity earlier discussed as “bodies [that] acquire the very 
shape of such [experiential] direction” (Ahmed, 2006, p. xxvii). 79  In this way, 
orientation can be understood as another way of describing holistic interconnection 
 
73 But I think that that is too simplistic, stereotypical, and ignores all the other unseen things that 
occur in our life: Complexity that creates new spaces of understanding.    
74 Shut them down and then kind of break away from our understandings of that: The dominant 
Western metaphysics and the narrative that this creates could represent a pathway to unwellness.  
75 Because the Maori cosmos is made up of these polarities, tapu, noa, ora, mate, opo, and they’re 
not only cosmic but they’re also psychological. So, there is a logic in that, although it appears on 
the surface to be pretty weird: How we are orientated within the world and how all things create 
‘place’ and personality (Deloria, 2001). 
76 Mystery: The idea of mystery as a metaphysical premise brings up possibilities that sit counter to 
finding the centre of meaning.   
77 You have to hide: Epistemic concealment as a thorough blanketing of the mystery.  
78 Western science operates in ways that knowledge is seen, that it’s very much about gathering – 
gathering of other peoples: People being gathered into categories: their experience reduced to a pre-
determined meaning.   
79 All of the inspirations that arise from our tangata whenua past: Tangatawhenua response re-
turning our attention to an intimate, connected state of Being. 
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but one that resists static descriptions as variables that can be measured (i.e. 
determinants of health) to show how well or unwell a person is.80   
 
Drawing again on Rifkin’s (2017) discussion of being-in-the-world (discussed as 
an indigenous temporal framework), our experiences are seen as complex rhythms 
that shift with other things (relations)81 in a circular (rather than linear) pattern of 
self formation.82 83  This formation of the self, however, need not be seen as 
individualistic. It may instead be seen as the individual’s expression of the 
experience of dynamic holism (or what Taitimu, 2007, describes in the quote above 
as personal understanding).   
 
One example of how this view of personal understanding can be understood in a 
mental health context relates to the earlier discussion of Papatūānuku (see chapter 
four).  Mika (2016) remarks that Papatūānuku is often (through conventional 
translation), equated with the term ‘land’, denoting a solid (physical) definition and 
character that is out of step with Māori descriptions.  Māori understandings of 
Papatūānuku reflect a deeper more expansive view that speaks to the idea of being 
fully immersed within Papatūānuku or what Marsden (2003) refers to as “the womb 
of the primeval mother” (p.45).84  This understanding of Papatūānuku is also 
reflected in one participant’s description of Ranginui and Papatūānuku [as] real 
Beings” explaining that “we’re descended from those Beings, that there is really 
no separation for us….Whakapapa is experiential in this sense but also, it’s central 
to our understanding of how the world exists.85  I speculate that this view of 
relational connection to Papatūānuku has much to offer in shaping how we 
 
80 Believe: A type of faith that something exists even though there may be no way of measuring the 
thing. There appears to be a type of faith at play (rather than knowledge) when things (such as 
‘energy’) are discussed.   
81 Once you start to chop it up it disappears…So, if you chop it up it’ll disappear: Non-foundational 
shifting ground of Being and thought. 
82 Derive back to your tūpuna: Relations that are ‘here and now’ rather than being made absent by 
the concept of things in the past. The ability to continuously re-turn to relations.    
83 Our old traditions: Suggesting a sense of temporal distance that does not exist in Maori and 
Indigenous metaphysics. 
    84 See chapter four for the full discussion of Papatūānuku and relationship including the idea of 
attunement that explains the notion of immersion within Papatūānuku.   
85 Being raised on whenua that’s not theirs and never really having a huge relationship with it in 
their histories: Imaging the potential of non-Indigenous re-turn to (spiritual) whakapapa. 
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understand the types of support that are provided to those that are presenting with 
what are commonly conceptualised as symptoms of dis-order.86 87  
 
In the early stages of imagining this research, I encountered an example of what I 
would call the possibilities that a relational view of Papatūānuku (and more widely 
of holistic immersion in the world), provides when attempting to re-present Māori 
and indigenous understandings of Being in ways that disrupt conventional views of 
mental illness.  The example draws on the work of Heid Erdrich (2012) (a native 
American scholar and Poet), with a particular focus on the poem Craving First 
Month, which I interpret as a story about both the human womb and the ‘womb of 
the primeval mother’ or Papatūānuku.   
 
I first encountered the poem at the 2014 Native American and Indigenous Studies 
Association (NAISA) conference after hearing Ryan Rhadigan (University of 
California), present his research on science and indigenous ontologies in Erdrich’s 
poetry.   The poem describes the cravings of a woman in her first trimester of 
pregnancy but in a style that is different from the usual descriptions of cravings for 
food that equates to a type of biological nutrition.   Erdrich (2012) instead describes 
the land as the women’s nourishment: the women hungry for home - feasting with 
her eyes and tasting the colours of the prairie, 
 
My belly rejected everything but a certain sky, the one 
that rocks the high north plains of home. Nothing but 
color and light for my mouth, streaks of cirrus like pale 
lettuce— tear a leaf and taste that clear covering of 
clouds! I craved the prairie (p.144). 
 
Rhadigan (2013) describes Erdrich’s poetic representation of (home) land as a 
poignant inversion of the idea of nourishment as food that rearranges (and I would 
argue re-presents), connections between “land and place as bodily nourishment” (p. 
 
86 Living ancestor: Deferring from the tendency within dominant Western metaphysics to draw a 
hard line between ‘living’ and ‘dead’. Re-contextualising tāngata whaiora experiences of having 
contact with those who have passed on (the unseen).  
87 Who it is that they see or hear: Exploring a person’s perception of non-visible entities. 
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93).88  Through this encounter with home, the child is also nourished in the womb89 
which is reflected in Erdrich’s description of the women’s internal dialogue to her 
unborn son,  
 
Here it is, I said into wind up the bald hill. Here it is, I 
said to the question mark of child. Here’s the land we 
are born from. Here’s what made us. Here’s the world 
that fed us. Here now, you eat too (p. 144).   
 
When I first presented my own interpretation of Erdrich’s poem at a local 
conference in 2017, Dr Naomi Simmonds, a Māori researcher from the University 
of Waikato, gave me some direction on how to link the idea of land (or whenua) as 
nourishment to Māori understandings of Being.  Following my presentation, Dr 
Simmonds leaned over to me and said, “look at ukaipo”.  In line with what has been 
described by participants in this research as the world communicating with us 
through tohu or ‘signs’,  I took for granted (in a positive sense), that Dr Simmonds’ 
remark was a significant marker in terms of what I was meant to explore to bring 
Erdrich’s poetry into relationship with Māori worldviews.90  
 
Simmonds’ own PhD (2014) turned out to be a rich source of information.  
Simmonds presents a discussion of ‘Te Ūkaipō’ explaining that it is a concept that 
ties together maternal bodies, whenua and Papatūānuku.  As Simmonds explains 
(referencing Murphy, 2011), ūkaipō (commonly used to refer to the spiritual and 
physical nourishment provided through ‘breastfeeding’), is a name given to 
Papatūānuku in recognition of her spiritual and physical nourishment of humanity.  
Further, Simmonds relates this understanding of ūkaipō to her research participant’s 
responses, particularly where participants conveyed a sense of being nourished by 
 
88 You feel them, you feel them in a different way: The power of intuition and embodied knowledge. 
89 Puku: A site of knowledge - the convergence of feeling and thought within Maori metaphysics.   
90 Tohu: It is a common experience - to say ‘he tohu tera’ in response to something that has 
happened.   
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the experience of being outside in nature during pregnancy that Simmonds 
interpreted as a type of ‘grounding’.91  
 
Taking Simmonds’ (2014) discussion of ūkaipō into account in the reading of 
Erdrich’s poetry, I imagine the implications of seeing the land (in an expanded 
sense), as Papatūānuku when considering the experience that is presented in 
Erdrich’s work in the context of mental health. The woman in Erdrich’s poem, 
while expressing her love for (home) land and the nourishment that her journey 
home provides, also expresses what might, within a mental health context, be 
considered part of dis-ordered behaviour.92   
 
References to hunger and the belly’s rejection of food as nourishment might at one 
level raise concerns over maternal nutrition in a physiological sense, but the craving 
for land as nourishment (as an overriding desire that surpasses the desire for food), 
when expressed within a clinical environment could, I speculate, raise a different 
type of concern.  I am not advocating that a lack of desire for food in pregnancy be 
completely ignored; however, I wonder how a (for example, perinatal maternal) 
mental health service would respond to a woman’s desire to re-turn to land and 
home as a way of satisfying strong cravings for spiritual nourishment and in 
Erdrich’s example, cravings that appear to eclipse the desire for food.93  While I 
don’t claim to have any definitive answers to offer in considering how this situation 
could be interpreted to ensure the best possible outcome for woman and child, I do 
think that the pathway to providing effective cultural support in this context is 
heavily reliant on the act of interpretation.  As one participant in this research stated, 
how we interpret worldviews has implications for the type of support that is offered 
within mental health - particularly when those worldviews appear to represent what 
has been labelled as bizarre behaviour or beliefs (i.e., see introduction for a 
description of the bizarreness included in the DSM).  As the participant stated, we 
need to consider, 
 
91 See introduction chapter for a discussion of grounding as an explanation of research and being 
immersed within the things that are being explored. 
92 That mental illness is a strongness with wairua: The possibility of understanding behaviour in a 
different context. 
93 Spaces of darkness could be nurturing places and healing spaces: A (k)new perception of things 
commonly perceived as being negative. 
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what would be an appropriate system of support and 
care in a space that conceives of the world in a 
particular way?” I think it’s about coming to better 
understand people, and ways of engagement with things 
that are strange, odd, unusual. 
 
Food as a source of nutrition can be interpreted scientifically through the 
physiological measurement of nutrients in a way that spiritual nutrition cannot.  A 
reliance on things that can be interpreted as solid phenomena and the move in 
mental health towards ever more solid representations of Being as for example, the 
brain, suggest that the premises that support interpretation limit the possibilities of 
providing culturally (and metaphysically) appropriate systems of support.  It also 
limits the possibility of the deeply personal expression of relationship that the 
individual has with the world that manifests in the body’s knowing of where and 
how well-being can be found.94 95  
 
In the case of Erdrich’s poetry and of Simmonds’ discussion of spiritual 
nourishment or ūkaipō, the question of, “what would be an appropriate system of 
support and care in a space that conceives of the world in a particular way?” is 
raised and forces a consideration of alternative metaphysical premises.   A woman 
and child’s nourishment, through both tangible and intangible connection, expands 
what is possible to articulate (Ahenakew et al., 2014), as well as what we can 
imagine are the metaphysical premises of well-being.96   
 
Imagining the possibilities presented by taking indigenous ontologies seriously 
means not only ‘thinking’ differently about the metaphysical premises of well-
being but imagining ways that alternative metaphysical premises can be taken up 
within institutions such as mental health.  Taitimu (2007) calls these premises 
 
94 We haven’t activated that space anymore, or yet again, to be able to actually have them as a 
contribution in our lives: We are influenced by things in the word regardless of whether we 
consciously attend to those things or not - a pathway to well-being, but this pathway is always there 
regardless of our attention to it. 
95 Why do we know that going back to the grave is going to heal us? The bringing together of 
tangible and intangible sites of healing. 
96 We’ve papered over the cracks… We’ve got to have a more kind of honest appraisal of 




“wider dimensions that are essential to Māori wellness” (p.280),97 identified in 
Taitimu’s research as including whakapapa and whenua and pointing to aspects of 
whakapapa and whenua-based well-being that open up our interpretations.  These 
expanded interpretations go beyond simplistic translations of whakapapa and 
whenua (based on the premises of solidity) that (for example), see whakapapa 
translated as genealogy and whenua translated as land.  But they also make room 
for whakapapa, whenua, and all things in the world to be interpreted as embodied 
experiences or the individual’s deeply personal creative expression of relationship 
- one that is pregnant with the potential of moving us towards our understanding of 
what makes us well.98 99   
 
Thesis conclusion 
In this final section, I aim to offer reflections related to the possibilities that may 
stem from Māori and indigenous understandings of Being in relation to mental 
health. Utilising the main ideas discussed in this thesis, I will summarise points 
related to the potential for Māori and indigenous metaphysics to influence future 
directions in mental health. 
 
The metaphysical premises that Māori and indigenous understandings of Being are 
grounded in provide guidance on the type of potential future directions that are 
available as a basis for a (k)new approach to understanding and providing support 
within mental health.  The conceptualisation of behaviour and experience as a 
(largely) self-originating, internal condition negates the possibility of 
understanding lived experience as a complex interplay of an entitized world. A 
Māori and indigenous view of the world resists the tidy categories of behaviour that 
are a central feature of conventional mental health frames.  Instead, they offer a 
pathway back to understanding Māori and indigenous worldviews from within the 
 
97  It doesn’t account for the variance that is in there:  unintelligible aspect of Being can be lost in 
the defining of an experience. 
98 I do my best to scoot across the ngaru or across the waves of it rather than be at the effect of it:  
Non-foundational ground and creativity.  
99 Tangata whenuatanga: We can be recognised and stand in an identity that is set apart through 
articulating something other than what has been imposed. 
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ground of Māori and indigenous metaphysics as opposed to apprehending these 
views to fix them in place, forcing them into the frame of order and taxonomy.  
 
The tendency to represent things in the world as objects with clear boundaries of 
meaning (as separate objects that can be fully determined), has, I suggest, a 
particular impact in terms of the notion of mental illness and the conceptualisation 
of treatment.  The distant and value free science that underlines dominant 
approaches to guiding people through distress, and the arbitrary (ever-present) 
structure that demands uniformity within mental health, re-present things in the 
world and, as I have argued, interns them, making them conform to a dominant 
metaphysical structure.  The more mysterious, profound and complex 
understandings of Being are thereby integrated into dominant Western metaphysics.   
The internment of excessive meaning that is Māori and indigenous metaphysics 
ensures that the potentiality reflected in spiritually dynamic understandings of 
Being is suppressed by the weight of the positivist, objective knowledge structure. 
 
In relation to mental health, the internment of Māori and indigenous terms 
represents more than an epistemic suppression of meaning.  It is, I would suggest, 
the internment of the Māori and indigenous self and with this the internment of all 
other things in the world. If, through stripping terms of their mystery and of their 
inherent reference to interconnection, we set up a relationship between self and 
world that does not permit us to think of world as entity, then we are re-shaped to 
fit the normal expectation.  This expectation, from another’s view of normality, 
creates a barrier to the indigenous holistic identity – a restriction on how the world 
and self can be perceived – cutting us off from a perception that may bring wellness.  
It is a restriction that demands we fit our view of self and world with what the 
dominant West finds conceivable.  Profound entities that are intimately connected 
to the self are rendered as simple objects of thought.   The re-presentation of Māori 
and indigenous understandings of Being is, therefore, an ethical movement – one 
that recognises the more-than-human while also allowing for the self’s re-turn to a 
perception of holistic connection.   
 
Within this thesis, much has been made of the premises that underlie different 
metaphysics: the premises on which we base our worldviews.  A significant driver 
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of exploring these premises has been the aim of exposing the predicates of a 
dominant Western worldview that lie beneath certain concepts.  In order to 
determine whether there is sufficient onto-epistemic space for Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics, the aim has been to identify whether the ground beneath 
our own expressions has been shifted and replaced by the metaphysics of the 
dominant other.  While there is evidence to suggest that Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being have been subject to an expectation of ordered 
representation, there is also evidence of a type of liberatory resistance.  The ideas 
that are emerging through research and service provision discussions within Māori 
and indigenous communities provide examples of work that is seeking to shift the 
foundations on which the possibilities of healing are based.  These include research 
focussing on understandings of trauma as an intergenerational and holistic 
(spiritual) experience, and the development of mental health services that are 
oriented towards wairua healing.   What informs these examples, I posit, is a shift 
towards growing the experience of being immersed in a metaphysical ground: one 
that opposes dominant Western metaphysics, invoking a different type of 
knowledge – a holistic knowledge that relies on relational rather than rational 
orientation.      
 
The sense of holism as worldedness has been discussed as a (k)new orientation.  It 
shifts not only the view of people’s experiences (as isolated and individually 
mediated experiences), but also shifts the very people who are impacted on away 
from simply being examined through an individualistic lens.  A (k)new 
understanding of the individual also emerges where the expression of the self is not 
reliant on conformity, making room for the personal expression of relationship with 
things in the world – for a creativity that has no pre-determined boundaries.  People 
are re-placed into histories, generational legacies, cosmological realities, residing 
with whanaunga, both human and more-than-human.  Rather than relying on the 
use of clinical mental health concepts as tools to orientate people to their 
experiences, Māori and indigenous understandings of Being offer a re-turn to the 
whole.  Through this wider consideration of what makes up the person we might 
also shift our view of dis-ease from individual dysfunctions and deficiencies to 
address the dis-ease that exists in the entire organism.  Healing, rather than 
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sacrificing the needs of the person experiencing distress, would take on a much 
more excessive meaning where personal stories can move beyond conceptual limits.   
 
The idea of re-positioning the person and the potential for different stories to be 
told was reflected in chapters seven and eight where the idea of using narratives to 
locate people and their whānau was discussed by participants in this research. One 
of the examples that was included in this discussion was of ‘Mahi a Atua’ 
(Rangihuna, Kopua, Tipene-Leach, 2018), that uses cosmological narratives to re-
locate people, bringing them back into the metaphysical fold and representing them 
as the mirror image of whanaunga and atua.  I am not suggesting that the use of 
narratives should be seen as a prescriptive, formulated approach to providing 
culturally effective therapies.  Within the context of Māori and indigenous 
metaphysics, the potential for different approaches to emerge from the idea of 
narrative is multiple.  What I am advocating is that the principle of holism and of 
interconnection that is evident in the narrative approach be highlighted.  The 
example of using narratives also provides a point of departure from relying on 
limited and pre-determined clinical labels to give names to experiences (or to 
identities).  The individual is free to express their own experience of holism, to 
break from (all) conventional and rigid expectations of how their story will be told. 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are no defined strategies presented in this thesis to 
provide points on which we might land to determine how to develop and implement 
changes in how Māori and indigenous understandings of Being are used to create 
healing strategies within mental health.  Instead, the research should be seen as 
something that contributes to an ongoing conversation about the deeper levels of 
dominance that haunt our work in the form of an entrenched structure of 
representation. In this sense, the absence of strategies echoes the central message 
within the thesis which is to disrupt the expectation of definition and the 
construction of normal, standardised cultural ideas. It is intended that this research 
will push other work in the direction of disruption rather than lay more ground of 
definition and structure.  
 
To end my contribution to an ongoing conversation about Māori and indigenous 
understandings of Being and deconstructing the notion of mental illness, I want to 
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highlight and reiterate the point that has been made in this thesis about the limits of 
meaning.  In line with Derrida’s (1978) critique of dominant Western onto-
epistemes and the role they play in suppressing excessive meaning (discarding 
complex things that do not fit within conceptual frames), I also posit that we must 
be wary of the invitation to participate in systems that rely on the structure of 
concept.  Māori and indigenous metaphysics re-present a world beyond concept – 
an excess that cannot be contained by conventional and definitive description.  If 
we are to escape what I suggest is the suppression of excessive meaning or a 
spiritual restraint that only allows limited room for expressive complexity, then we 
must address the deeper levels of the dominant onto-epistemic structure.  Doing so 
will push the limits of the expectation that has been enforced upon Māori and 
indigenous expressions of Being, forcing an opening that exceeds the conceptual 
frame.   This necessary threatening of the rational order goes deeper than 
considering how Māori and indigenous views can find purchase within the system.  
It seeks to shake the system, to buckle its foundations of certainty and, through this, 
engage us in a profound gesture towards those things that reside in the excess and 
emerge from the void that is full with potential – the relational reality of holism.   
  
The holistic research approach and its academic limitations: On violence and 
well-being  
The idea of concluding a thesis (to end a piece of writing and offer final thoughts 
that tie together and complete a project), sits counter to holistic temporal principles 
– principles of continuance and cultural perpetuation that exist within Māori and 
indigenous metaphysics.  While I use the term conclusion as a heading for this final 
section (and throughout this thesis to conclude earlier chapters), there is in fact no 
end – no conclusive point of arrival that can be constructed to receive a final word 
on how Māori and indigenous understandings of Being should be re-presented.  Any 
hard and insistent conclusions, offered as definitive strategies developed from what 
has emerged in this research, would negate the deeper message that I hope to 
convey.    
 
The idea of conclusion and completion is mirrored in the dominant Western 
epistemic frameworks that I have worked to disrupt throughout my writing.  
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However, the fact that I am using the term conclusion highlights the very limitations 
of research that have concerned me throughout this project.  While I write of things 
that have no apparent limits (no clear lines of demarcation that can be drawn around 
things in the world to separate them and mark them as individual things), I am also 
forced to use the limited language I have at hand to explore a metaphysics that exists 
on different terms. I have, for example, throughout my writing, utilised the term 
concept to point to Māori and indigenous views (i.e., Māori concept of ‘x’ or ‘y’), 
while at the same time, critiquing the deeper basis that underlies the term concept: 
a central feature of dominant Western epistemes that apprehend things through the 
language of conceptual representation.   
 
The limitation of conclusion also relates to the research approach that I have used 
as a way of engaging in holistic research rather than presenting well defined 
strategies of implementation.  The (non) method used in this thesis – whaiwhakaaro 
– is intended as a possible pathway of moving away from the sense of finality that 
appears to be embedded in a conventional academic research approach.  The 
expectation of delivering a final statement on Māori and indigenous understandings 
of Being and how these understandings might re-orientate our view of mental 
illness has been deferred in favour of gesturing towards something.  This gesture is 
made through the work of clearing the metaphysical ground that has become 
overrun with the dominant tradition of determination and pre-determination – of 
things that are named by their clear and present qualities.  It is a gesture that aims 
to lift the structure that represses more complex utterances.  However, a full escape 
from convention has proved difficult.   
 
The limitations of working within an academic process, within the context of the 
aim of engaging in holistic research, raises questions about structure and whether 
this can be fully disposed of.  While I have engaged with the research material in a 
reflective style that detracts from a more rigid approach of developing themes that 
represent essential ideas to inform definitive strategies, I have also enclosed the 
research material in a type of structure.  For example, in chapters seven and eight, 
I claim to group participant responses into conversation areas instead of themes.  
But the difference between conversation areas and themes may not be as evident as 
I had hoped.  There is, after all, still a sense of order applied to the presentation of 
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participants’ ideas – still a sense of the researchers influence even when referring 
to the more-than-human that I believe has helped shape this work. I have my own 
views about what I think has disrupted Māori and indigenous holism and what I see 
as signposts for a return to spiritual complexity in lived experience.  I cannot claim 
that these views are not constructive - that they have not influenced the presentation 
of ideas.  However, I also cannot discount the play of other influences or make a 
clear mark that signals where any self-contained thoughts might begin and end 
within the context of what, in this research, has been referred to as worldedness - 
that thorough co-constructive collapse of self and world.   
 
While I recognise the challenges that are built into the presentation of academic 
material and how this presentation conflicts with the desire to engage in 
whaiwhakaaro as a holistic reflective approach, I have no clear ideas on how I can 
fully escape this dilemma.  The expectation of at least some level of structured 
presentation is one that I will continue to find hard to escape.  What I can say is that 
I also see no way of escaping holism despite the different representational structures 
that we might employ.100  As mentioned in the method chapter of this thesis, I posit 
that whaiwhakaaro gestures to a subjectivity that re-presents research and the 
researcher as the influenced subject whose thoughts are etched by and with an active 
and entitized world at play.   
 
Any utterance is much more than what we may be able to make of it using 
conventional language or description.  This limitation is one that, in my experience, 
lingers despite our attempts to describe how the experience of research can be 
understood based on more spiritual premises of Being. Understanding the world’s 
influence on the researcher would necessarily, therefore, bring forward a 
consideration of the researcher’s well-being - the impact of the researcher’s ability 
to express a spiritual perception.  The focus of this thesis is not directly centred on 
the question of method as an aspect of well-being, focussing instead on the notion 
of mental illness. However, engaging in research that raises the possibility of an 
entitised world will bring up some significant issues that are relevant to a wider 
context of well-being, implicating the role of metaphysics in all aspects of life.  I 
 
100 Grounded: Viewing the self as a connected Being and representing things speculatively as 
holistic and therefore not fully knowable things, is the experience of being within the research.  
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recognise that I am impacted by the issue of effectively and respectfully 
communicating thoughts that are formed with things in the world.  These thoughts 
are not limited to what can be processed through cognitive awareness: they breach 
the limits of intelligibility. Yet, I have attempted to write them down and give them 
form.   Each term I use - each description I provide for an experience or phenomena 
- is still marked by a form of suppression and limit. While I write of the excess of 
meaning, signalling my awareness of a complexity that exceeds the limits of 
representation, I am constantly pulled back into the limited expression, knowing 
that my perception and experience of holism can never fit within the parameters of 
my written work.   
 
It is in this sense that I am still left wondering how to express a spiritual influence 
in academic research. Despite this, there are some examples in this research that I 
think have been helpful in foregrounding the idea of spiritual influence.  This has 
included describing my encounter with Indranil Chakravarty’s PhD journey (see 
chapter four), in which he expresses a sense of wonderment - of wondering what 
calls people (with no direct connection) to almost simultaneously take up the task 
of telling the same historical story.  This story has long been left hidden beneath the 
tracks of time, but it has called people across the world to remember - to explore 
and re-turn to the life of a man that did great and interesting things. I have also 
attempted to present the experience of spiritual influence through re-calling a 
comment made to me by Dr Naomi Simmonds who re-turned my focus to 
Papatūānuku as Te Ūkaipō.  This seemingly casual reference made at the end of an 
academic presentation grew into an imaginary about the individual’s place in the 
world as a unique expression of holistic interconnection.  These two examples are 
meant as a way of reflecting on the experience of research as a type of spiritual 
collaboration - one that re-presents the researchers work as an expression of the 
world’s affectual resonance.  
 
Within this view, the attributions that we make about where ideas come from shifts 
to take seriously the influence of the entitized world, potentially making all 
utterances ideas that flow from relational Being.  While we may choose (or follow 
an expectation of) how to represent these influenced ideas in ways that then reduce 
their spiritual genesis – calcifying their open meaning – we may still understand 
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their importance to our potential for re-turn; turning again and again to those things 
that reach for us – calling us to attention.  It has been my intention through a holistic 
research approach to listen for this call: to rest comfortably within a reflective 
process that lets go of the notion of certainty and that, through a belief in relational 
subjectivity, gives way to creativity - to the stories that are pending and always with 
the potential to emerge.  
 
In an attempt to counter the limitations of my research as I have experienced them, 
I have engaged in a research approach that takes advantage of limitation, 
foregrounding the idea of the researchers limits as an individual thinker.  What has 
emerged from this process is a different view of the self: a self that is immersed in 
the research, thinking with things in the world rather than studying their nature.  
This approach to research mirrors the understanding of the more-than-human 
influence but it also provides another pathway of re-turning to the act of disrupting 
conceptual conclusion.  My individual research voice offers no definitive 
conclusion - no final concept.  In this context, I view this thesis as a way of 
participating in an ongoing conversation.  As discussed in chapter six, within mental 
health (as with other institutions), Māori and indigenous concepts are often subject 
to the dominant Western request of providing cultural ideas in reductive forms.   
Māori and indigenous expressions may also be re-shaped to ensure a type of easy 
comprehensibility is achieved or to suit the political palette of the system.  Within 
this context, writing to disrupt a structure that captures Māori and indigenous 
expressions – that interns those expressions to the rational and logical order – is a 
task that has no end.   
 
The dominant Western preference for clear and highly evident representation is not 
something that can be easily disposed of and the logical order would not readily 
give way.  Its insistent expectation that Māori and indigenous understandings of 
Being will be presented in tidy conceptual packaging – that we will present 
ourselves and our knowledges in line with the rules of present and evident meaning 
– will continue to haunt our efforts.  The entrenched nature of the dominant Western 
onto-epistemic attitude that underpins and apprehends, demanding that things are 
represented in positivistic terms, requires a certain level of vigilance.  It also 
requires that we continually look for ways to re-present Māori and indigenous 
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understandings of Being in ways that resist predetermination, basing our 
presentations of the world in a metaphysics that not only allows for, but is itself, a 






Ahuatanga way, aspect, likeness, circumstance, characteristic, 
property, feature, function, attribute, trait, 
phenomenon. 
Hara sin, foul, crime, offence, transgression, wrongdoing, 
gaffe, infringement, fault, problem. 
Hinengaro mind, thought, intellect, consciousness, awareness 
Hine-nui-te-pō Hine-tītama was the eldest daughter of the atua Tāne-
nui-a-Rangi and Hine-ahu-one. She had several 
children to her father, but on learning that her husband 
was her father she fled to te pō (the underworld) where 
she receives the souls of the dead and is known as 
Hine-nui-te-pō. 
ia he, she, him, her. 
Ira atua supernatural life, atua genes. 
Ira tangata  human genes, human element, mortals. 
Iwi extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, 
nationality, race - often refers to a large group of 
people descended from a common ancestor and 
associated with a distinct territory. 
Karakia to recite ritual chants, say grace, pray, recite a prayer, 
chant. 
Karanga formal call, ceremonial call, welcome call. 
Kaumātua Adult, elder, elderly man, elderly woman, old man - a 
person of status within the whānau. 
Kaupapa Topic, policy, matter for discussion, plan, purpose, 





Kaupapa Māori  Māori approach, Māori topic, Māori customary 
practice, Māori institution, Māori agenda, Māori 
principles, Māori ideology - a philosophical doctrine, 
incorporating the knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
values of Māori society. 
Kawa Protocol - marae protocol - customs of the marae 
and wharenui, particularly those related to formal 
activities such as pōhiri, speeches and Mihimihi. 
Kino Evil, wickedness, sin, vice, immorality. 
Kōrero To tell, say, speak, read, talk, address. 
Kūmara Sweet potato. 
Mākutu To inflict physical and psychological harm and even 
death through spiritual powers, bewitch, cast spells. 
Mana Prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, 
spiritual power, charisma.  
Marae Courtyard - the open area in front of the wharenui, 
where formal greetings and discussions take place. 
Often also used to include the complex of buildings 
around the marae. 
Matakite Prophecy, prophet, seer, clairvoyant, special 
intuition. 
Mātauranga Knowledge, wisdom, understanding, skill. 
Mauri Life principle, life force, vital essence, special nature, 
a material symbol of a life principle, source of 
emotions - the essential quality and vitality of a being 
or entity. 
Mihi Speech of greeting, acknowledgement, tribute. 
Moko Māori tattooing designs on the face or body done 
under traditional protocols. 
Ngahere Bush, forest. 
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Ngākau Seat of affections, heart, mind, soul. 
Oranga Survivor, food, livelihood, welfare, health, living. 
Pākehā English, foreign, European, exotic - introduced from 
or originating in a foreign country. 
Papatūānuku Earth, Earth mother and wife of Rangi-nui - all living 
things originate from them. 
Pōhiri To welcome, invite, beckon, wave. 
Poutiriao Spiritual guardians - mythical male beings, guardians 
of the Universe appointed by Io-matua, the Supreme 
Being. 
Puku Swelling, tumour, lump, bubble, stomach, abdomen, 
centre, belly, tummy. 
Pūrākau Myth, ancient legend, story. 
Rangi-nui Atua of the sky and husband of Papa-tū-ā-nuku, from 
which union originate all living things. 
Reo Language, dialect, tongue, speech. 
Taha matau On the right hand, right. 
Taha mauī On the left hand, left. 
Tāne Husband, male, man. 
Tāngata whaiora  People with experience of mental illness, who are 
seeking wellness, or recovery of self. Literally 
translated as people seeking wellness. 
https://www.mentalhealth.org.nz/home/glossary/  
Tangata whenua Local people, hosts, indigenous people - people born 
of the whenua, i.e. of the placenta and of the land 
where the people's ancestors have lived and where 
their placenta are buried. 
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Taniwha Water spirit, monster, dangerous water creature, 
powerful creature, chief, powerful leader, something 
or someone awesome - taniwha take many forms 
from logs to reptiles and whales and often live in 
lakes, rivers or the sea. They are often regarded as 
guardians by the people who live in their territory but 
may also have a malign influence on human beings. 
Tapu Be sacred, prohibited, restricted, set apart, forbidden, 
under atua protection - see definition 4 for further 
explanations. 
Te ao kōhatu Stone age, ancient world, old world. 
Te Ao Mārama World of life and light, Earth, physical world. 
Te Kore Realm of potential being, The Void. 
Te Pō place of departed spirits, underworld - the abode of 
the dead/darkness, night. 
Tikanga Correct procedure, custom, habit, lore, method, 
manner, rule, way, code, meaning, plan, practice, 
convention, protocol. 
Tohu sign, mark, symbol, emblem, token, qualification, 
cue, symptom, proof, directions, company, landmark, 
distinguishing feature, signature. 
Tūpuna Ancestors, grandparents. 
Wāhine Female, women, feminine. 
Wairua Spirit, soul - spirit of a person which exists beyond 
death. It is the non-physical spirit, distinct from the 
body and the mauri. 
Wānanga To meet and discuss, deliberate, consider. 
Whakapapa Genealogy, genealogical table, lineage, descent. 
Whakatūpato To warn, alert, caution, forewarn, take care. 
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Whakawhanaungatanga  Process of establishing relationships, relating well to 
others. 
Whānau Extended family, family group, a familiar term of 
address to a number of people. 
Whanaunga Relative, relation, kin, blood relation. 
Whare tangata House of humanity, womb, uterus.  
Whareiti Toilet, lavatory, convenience, latrine, loo, bog. 
Wharenui Meeting house, large house - main building of a 
marae where guests are accommodated. 
Whenua Land - often used in the plural. 
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of understanding extraordinary experiences and schizophrenia 
(Unpublished doctoral thesis). The University of Auckland, Auckland, New 
Zealand. 
  
Tamatea, A. (2008). Ideology is theft: Thoughts on the legitimacy of a Māori 
psychology. In M.  Levy, L. Nikora, B. Masters-Awatere, M. Rua, M. & W. 
Waitoki, (Eds.), Claiming Spaces. Proceedings of the 2007 National Māori 
and Pacific Psychologies Symposium 23rd-24th November 2007 (pp. 123-
126). Hamilton, New Zealand: Māori and Psychology Research Unit, 
University of Waikato. 
 
Tamati, A. (2007). Ko te ira tangata, he ira atua: exploring an indigenous Ao Māori 
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Te Awekotuku, N. (1991). Mana wāhine Māori: Selected writings on Māori 
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APPENDIX 2: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Research title:  Re-presenting Maori and Indigenous notions of ‘being’: 





This research is part of a PhD thesis that I am completing within the 
Department of Philosophy at the University of Waikato.  The research explores 
Maori and Indigenous understandings of human nature and being.  I am 
interested in exploring ways in which these understandings have been 
impacted on by dominant Western concepts that have influenced popular 
ways of thinking about human nature (including behaviour) in the context of 
mental illness.  This includes exploring how some Western views on 
knowledge have shaped ideas about mental illness such as categorizing 
behaviours, formulating and applying diagnoses, and relying on observable 
phenomenon.  This research aims to provide an opportunity to discuss these 
differences and theorize about what these differences might represent that 
point to something other than mental illness as an explanation of what is 
happening.   
 
This research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Waikato.  Any questions 
about ethical conduct may be sent to the Secretary of the Committee; email: 
fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz, postal address: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 
Te Kura Kete Aronui, University of Waikato, Te Whare Wananga o Waikato, 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton, 3240. 
 
What is involved? 
 
Interviews  
I will engage in up to 10 interviews that are guided by a set of questions that 
have been developed to stimulate discussions about Maori and Indigenous 
notions of “being” and how these might differ from dominant Western notions.  
I anticipate that the nature of our discussions may mean that there are a 
number of areas that you may want to describe and discuss and in this case the 
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questions I have will not need to be rigidly followed.  I am happy for there to 
be a free-flowing discussion throughout the interview and will simply ensure 
that the following areas are included: 
 
▪ Maori and Indigenous notions of human nature and being, 
▪ Differences between Maori and Indigenous and Western notions, 
▪ The relationship between knowledge and being (what does our view 
of knowledge or knowing say about how we see the world?), 
▪ Implications that Maori understandings of human nature and being 
have for Western notions of mental illness. 
 
The interview will take between 1–1.5 hours to complete and we can meet 
wherever you feel comfortable.  I can also provide a location and space for the 
interview as well.   
 
If you agree to be interviewed, you will be asked to sign the Consent Form on 
the last page of this document.  You will be given a copy of both the Participant 
Information Sheet and the Consent Form to keep. 
 
Please note that I would like to record the interview. You do not have to agree 
to the interview being recorded.  If you do not want the interview to be 
recorded, please tick the appropriate box at the end of this form. Please note 
that if the interview is not recorded then I will record the interview in written 
notes to the best of my ability, however, this will have an impact on the detail 
that I will be able to record and that can be included in the research report.  
 
What are my rights? 
▪ You don’t have to agree to be interviewed, 
▪ If you do agree to be interviewed, you can decline to answer any 
questions that I might ask, 
▪ You can decline to have the interview audio-recorded or for the 
recorder to be turned off at any time, 
▪ You have the right to review your interview transcript and make 
amendments,  
▪ You can withdraw from the interview process at any time, 
▪ You can withdraw your data up until analysis begins on the transcript.  
Analysis of the transcript will begin once you have reviewed and 
returned your interview transcript or one month from providing you 
with a copy of your transcript (whichever comes first).   
If you choose to be named in the research report, you can request a list of 
quotes that I intend to use in the report and summary paragraphs that 
explain the context in which the quote will be used.  You will have one month 




You can choose for your name to be used in the research report or you can 
choose to remain anonymous.  If you choose to remain anonymous, I will use 
an appropriate pseudonym in place of your name, but please be aware that 
total anonymity cannot be guaranteed.  All your personal information and 
hardcopies of your interview transcripts will be stored in a locked cupboard 
at the University of Waikato.  These documents will be destroyed when the 
PhD is completed.  I will keep electronic copies of your transcripts on my 
student hard drive and on my personal ‘OneDrive’ which is a cloud storage 
facility offered through the Microsoft Corporation.  These will also be 
permanently deleted when the PhD research is completed. 
 
Recordings from interviews will be transcribed by a professional transcriber 
who will sign a confidentiality agreement.   
 
I intend to present my research at conferences and to publish academic papers.  
In the case of public presentations and academic papers, no participant names 
will be used. 
 
What are the potential risks? 
It is important that you carefully consider if you would like your name to be 
used in the final report or if you would like to remain anonymous.  It is possible 
that if you choose to be named that people will read some of your responses 
and disagree with them.  For this reason, it is also important that you take the 
opportunity to review your transcript and make any changes you feel are 
necessary.  You will have an opportunity to make changes whether you choose 
to be named or to remain anonymous.   
 
If you choose to be named in the research report, you will have the option of 
requesting a list of quotes that I intend to use in the report.  This list will also 
include summary paragraphs that explain the context in which the quotes will 
be used.  You will have 1 month from receiving this list to make any 
amendments.   
 
How will my interview responses be used? 
This research does not attempt to define anything in relation to Maori and 
Indigenous understandings of human nature and being.  You will be quoted 
throughout the thesis and then I will engage with what you have said to delve 
into the issues I am exploring. This may mean that, alongside referring to what 
you say, I will respond in a creative way. In this process, I will ensure that I 
always respect the integrity of the knowledge that sits within your responses 
to my questions, by summarizing what you say and then responding in ways 
that always acknowledge the importance of your knowledge.  
 
Please note here that the research will be used for the completion of a PhD 
thesis, which will be published in hard and electronic copies.   
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What will happen to my interview transcript and audio recording after 
the research is completed? 
 
The PhD supervisors will store all data from the research in a secure location 
at the University of Waikato for a period of 5 years following the completion 
of the researchers PhD examination.  This will allow for research scrutiny (in 
necessary). 
 
WHO DO I CONTACT FOR MORE INFORMATION OR IF I HAVE CONCERNS? 
If you have any questions, please contact me directly:  
 
 Kim Southey, PhD candidate 
 Mobile: 027 037 6792 
 Email: Kimarie781@gmail.com 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research or my conduct you 
can contact the Department of Philosophy, University of Waikato: 
 
 Department of Philosophy, University of Waikato 







Carl Mika, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Education, The University of Waikato. 
Email: mika@waikato.ac.nz, phone: 07 577 0620 extn. 8752 (Tauranga 
Campus). 
 
Tracy Bowell, Pro-Vice Chancellor Teaching and Learning, The University of 
Waikato.  





Dan Weijers, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, The University of Waikato. 











Please tick to indicate you consent to the following (Add or delete as 
appropriate) 
 
I have read and I understand the Participant Information Sheet.   Yes  No  
I have been given sufficient time to consider whether or not to 
participate in this research. 
Yes  No  
I am satisfied with the answers I have been given regarding the 
research and I have a copy of this consent form and information 
sheet. 
Yes  No  
I understand that taking part in this research is voluntary (my 
choice) and that I may withdraw from the study at any time. 
Yes  No  
If I decide to withdraw from the study within a certain 
timeframe, I understand that my interview transcript may 
continue to be used. 
Yes  No  
I wish to remain anonymous. Yes  No  
I would like my name to be used in the PhD report in relation to 
my interview responses. 
Yes  No  
I know who to contact if I have any questions about the study in 
general. 
Yes  No  
I understand my responsibilities as a study participant. Yes  No  
I wish to receive a copy of my interview transcript to review and 
amend. 







Declaration by participant: 







Declaration by researcher: 
 
I have given a verbal explanation of the research project to the participant and have 
answered the participant’s questions about it.   
 
I believe that the participant understands the research and has given informed 








APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
- What is your understanding of a Maori/indigenous worldview? 
- How does this worldview present understandings of the human self/non-
human world? 
- Within this worldview, what is the relationship of the human self to the non-
human world?   
- How do you think a dominant Western/non-Maori/non-indigenous 
worldview differs from this? 
- How, if at all, does the orthodox model of mental health/mental illness 
reflect a dominant Western/non-Maori/indigenous worldview?  
- What does the notion of mental illness imply about human nature?  
- What are the potential implications of dominant Western worldviews for 
Maori or Indigenous mental health clients?   
- In what ways does a Maori/Indigenous worldview interact with notions of 
mental illness?  i.e. How do you think it aligns with these notions?  How do 
you think it contrasts with or challenges these notions?   
- How might Maori and indigenous understandings of the human self and 
non-human world impact on people who are currently understood to be 
experiencing mental illness? 
 
 
